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Showing 601 to 700 of 166058 Records
601...1951 (10) TMI 17 - HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
Bharat Bank Ltd. Versus KS. Misra
Court – Jurisdiction of ......
........... irtue of clauses 22 and 23 of the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, read with Article 372 of the Indian Constitution which came into force on 26th January, 1950. By virtue of the aforesaid clauses, the law which was in force in India continues to be so in force unless altered by some Legislature or authority empowered to regulate the matter in question. The law in force in India would include all notifications enabling courts to entertain suits of a particular character. In our opinion, therefore, the District Judge, Nagpur, had the jurisdiction to entertain the present winding up proceedings and was competent to pass the order that he did. We, therefore, proceed to consider the question whether the compromise should be accepted or not, and also to decide the appeal filed by Shri K. S. Chitnavis. In view of the fact that Shri Dabir appeared before us mainly at our instance, we do not think that any order about the costs of hearing this question of jurisdiction should be passed.
602...1951 (10) TMI 18 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Kisanlal Radhakisan Versus The State
........... industry. From this point of view, a dealer who buys small quantities of jari or silk required solely for use on hand-loom cloth produced as a cottage industry will not be debarred from claiming exemption under Rule 25. I consider that the Board should be content with laying down this principle, leaving it to the (1) 1950 1 S.T.C. 153. Sales Tax Commissioner to determine in each case what quantities of materials of embroidery can be regarded as required strictly for the pur- pose indicated. In the light of the principle laid down, it is open to him to review his decision, should the circumstances of a case make it just and proper he should do so. So far as this case is concerned, however, the appellant has no valid claim for exemption. Even if on the question of dealings in jari he should have an arguable case, his dealings in power-loom cloth are sufficient to negative any claim he may have on other grounds. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed..
603...1951 (10) TMI 19 - SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF ORISSA Versus MADAN GOPAL RUNGTA AND ARJUN LADHA
Whether directions in the nature of interim relief only could be granted under article 226, when the Court expressly stated that it refrained from determining the rights of the parties on which a writ of mandamus or directions of a like nature could ......
604...1951 (10) TMI 2 - SUPREME Court
Commissioner Of Income-Tax And Excess Profits Tax, Madras Versus R. SA Sankara Ayyar
Bad Debt ......
........... nstruction placed on them by the Assistant Commissioner and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The facts are that when a division was made between the partners on the 12th September 1942, the books of the partnership were closed, an account of the debtor was opened in the family books and be was debited with the amount of Rs. 8,197, indicating that he became a debtor of the new partnership of the business and the debt became a loan advanced by the assessee s money-lending business to the debtor. When later on there were payments, the debtor received credit for such payments in this account with the respondent and must have got a discharge receipt from him. He was thus recognised as a debtor of the new firm and the amount in question being a loan of the money-lending business of the respondent, it was an admissible deduction under section 10(2)(xi) of the Act. In our opinion, the conclution of the High Court is correct and the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
605...1951 (11) TMI 1 - SUPREME Court
Commissioner Of Income-Tax, West Bengal Versus Isthmian Steamship Lines
Unabsorbed Depreciation ......
........... shown that full effect was not given in the previous year, owing to there being no profits or gains chargeable for the year, or, owing to the profits or gains chargeable being less ,than the allowance. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that in the present case full effect could not be given to the unabsorbed depreciation not for the reasons stated in the section but on account of the failure of the assessee to take the matter in appeal against the assessment for 1940-41. In our opinion, this view is based on a misreading of the section. The words used in the section are -- where full effect cannot be given , and not where full effect has not been given. It is not denied that the profits or gains were less than the depreciation allowance, and that being so the requirements of the section were satisfied. In our opinion, the view taken by the High Court on the limited question referred to it is correct, and we accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
606...1951 (11) TMI 10 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Kandula Radhakrishna Rao and Others Versus The Province of Madras
........... s in Government of Madras v. Veerabhadrappa(3) went too far in holding that in no event and under no circumstances can a commission agent be deemed to be a person carrying on the business of buying or selling goods and I must express my respectful dissent from them. In my opinion, the plaintiffs in these cases would be dealers within the meaning of that expression in the Act and liable to tax under Section 3 but for the exemption given by Section 8. As I have held that the conditions of the licence granted under Section 8 have not been infringed, the plaintiffs will be entitled to the exemption. All the suits will therefore be decreed. In the result, Appeals Nos. 365, 468, 551 and 447 of 1947 will be allowed and Appeal No. 641 of 1947 will be dismissed. There will be decrees as prayed for. The plaintiffs will have their costs here and in the Court below. Suits decreed. (1) (1871) L.R. 5 H.L. (E and 1) 395. (3) 1950 1 S.T.C. 245 I.L.R. 1951 Mad. 257. (2) (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 797.
607...1951 (11) TMI 11 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
NC. Palia and Sons Versus The State of Bombay
........... r- warded to him. 8. As regards (2) the instances in which the applicants have re- covered sales tax on conveyance charges are contained in Exhibit 19 which has been prepared by the parties. The applicants do not dispute this and are prepared to forego that portion of their claim in the revision vide Exhibit 21. In the circumstances the Sales Tax Officer will have to investigate only the instances mentioned in Exhibit 20 and make his report. 9. The Sales Tax Officer will make his report (through the Collector of Sales Tax) within two months of the papers of this case reaching him. November 23, 1951. 10. The Sales Tax Officer has made his report dated 24th Septem- ber, 1951. Both parties have nothing to say against it vide Exhibit 28. In the circumstances, we accept it and pass the following order. ORDER. The order under revision is modified and it is directed that Rs. 184-6-0 out of the sales tax already paid by them should be refunded to the applicants. Ordered accordingty.
608...1951 (11) TMI 12 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Lipton Ltd., Nagpur Versus The State
........... tional only when the customer takes delivery of the receipt, making payment for it. From what has been stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 above, it seems to me that the case is not really one governed by Section 19 of the Sale of Goods Act in the sense suggested, but that it involves a variant of the circumstances described in Section 23. Also, for the reasons given, in none of the instances of supplies made to customers in Central India can the sale be considered as having taken place in the Province. Further, the goods at no point of time having been situated in the Province, the sales are not such as can even be deemed to have taken place in the Province, by virtue of Explanation II to Section 2 (g) of the Sales Tax Act. This contention of the applicants learned counsel is accepted by the learned counsel for the State. The sales in dispute are not taxable. I, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Commissioner and allow this application for revision. Application allowed.
609...1951 (11) TMI 13 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Ramakrishna Pradhan Versus The State of Orissa and Others
........... arty must adopt the form of remedy given by the statute. Liability to sales tax is a statutory liability and the petitioner should have availed him- self of the provisions of the Sales Tax Act itself to obtain redress. (1) (1881) 21 Q.B.D. 313. (2) (1940) A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 105 at 110. Sections 43 and 44 of the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act have been relied upon before us, as though they give an independent right of suit. I confess I have been unable to follow the argument. The Sales Tax Act is a special Act dealing with a parti- cular kind of public demand. We have been shown no authority for thinking that the said provision of the statute which provide the machinery for recovery of public demands in general has the effect of giving the party against whom the demand is made an independent right of suit to deny liability on grounds or in a manner different from what are provided in the substantive law relating to that particular public demand. Petition rejected.
610...1951 (11) TMI 14 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Rajasthan Printing and Litho Works Ltd., In re
........... to these conclusions, we are fortified by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and of the Privy Council in the cases of the The King v. Dominion Press Limited(1), and Dominion Press Limited v. Minister of Customs and Excise(2). The Supreme Court of Canada held that the job printer, whose work consists in executing special orders for customers, but who procures the material upon which such orders are to be executed, is a manufacturer selling a product and his business is not a lease or hire of work and services. The questions put to the printers in this case and their answers suggest a similarity to the contentions raised on behalf of the applicant before us. The decision of the Canadian Supreme Court was upheld by the Privy Council. 6.. For the reasons given above, we are satisfied that the case has been rightly decided by the learned Sales Tax Commissioner and we dismiss this application for revision. Application dismissed. (1) 1927 Dom. L.R. 225. (2) 1928 A.C. 340.
611...1951 (11) TMI 15 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Katta Adinarayana and Brothers Versus The State of Madras
........... leader raised the preliminary objection that the petitioner has other adequate and effective remedy by way of filing a suit in a civil court and therefore this application should be dismissed. In The Province of Madras v. Satyanarayanamurthy(1), Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ., held that the Madras General Sales Tax Act of 1939 with its subsequent amendments has not ousted the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts when a party is alleged to have been aggrieved by the administration of the Act, and that suits alleging that sales tax was illegally levied against the plaintiffs and that excessive amounts were collected from them as sales tax are maintainable. This judgment was delivered on 26th April, 1951. The petitioner could have filed a suit in a civil court for the relief which he now seeks to obtain in this writ. As he has other effective remedy, this application is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Application dismissed. (1) 1951 2 S.T.C. 141.
612...1951 (11) TMI 16 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
The Cosmopolitan Club, Madras Versus The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Another
........... in some respects an unusual petition, the unusual feature attaching to the case being that Government have perfectly bona fide collected this tax on this and similar Clubs for more than 10 years without any demur, protest or challenge as to legality. The finding that this tax is illegal, which I have had under law to give, may raise some hopes in the petitioning Club and also other Clubs of claiming a refund of some of the tax paid in the past from Government. I would like to express the view that no such claim would, in the circum- stances, be really equitable, the collection of this tax having been acquiesced in all these years. Nor can I of course grant any such relief on this petition. The petitioning Club which is given on this petition the relief it seeks, can well rest content with it and the free- dom this decision gives them from any future levy of the tax regarding the past tax they have paid as an ex gratia contribution to the State Treasury. Ordered accordingly.
613...1951 (11) TMI 17 - SUPREME COURT
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, BOMBAY Versus GORDHANDAS BHANJI.
Whether an order should issue under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act against the appellant, who is the Commissioner of Police, Bombay?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The Commissioner of Police be directed to consider the requests made ......
614...1951 (11) TMI 6 - HIGH COURT OF ASSAM
Allambag Tea & Trading Co. Ltd. Versus United Bank of India Ltd.
Compromise and arrangement ......
........... upta invited our attention to para. 7 of the petition of the decreeholder dated 16th January, 1950, in which it is stated that certain payments were made by the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder. Mr. Gupta s argument is that having made the payment, the judgment-debtor has waived the terms of the scheme which had given certain privileges to the judgment-debtor against whom decrees had been passed. This contention is clearly untenable. A judgment-debtor, if he wishes to pay earlier than the date prescribed by the sanctioned scheme, is not prevented from doing so. Such a payment cannot be regarded as a waiver. The result is that the appeal succeeds. In the circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs. The order of the learned subordinate Judge ordering the execution to proceed is set aside. We wish to point out that the scheme which has been sanctioned by this court lays down the terms by which decrees exceeding Rs. 260 are to be enforced. Deka, J. mdash I agree.
615...1951 (11) TMI 7 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Dinanath Mahadeo Dalal of Nagpur Versus The State
........... ed as a broker and his remuneration as brokerage. At any rate, the view urged by counsel on both sides that a person, acting as a broker and recovering only his brokerage, is not a dealer is correct. 3.. The appellant, not being a dealer, according to his own state- ments and pleadings, was not competent to make an application under Rule 25. The dismissal of an application so made is, therefore, in order. I would note, however, that the appellant is not without a remedy, if the facts stated by him and on his behalf are correct. He could ask for cancellation of his registration certificate and upon cancellation he should get the relief he has desired. If, however, the facts stated by him and pleadings made on his behalf are not correct, we revert to the position as determined by the Sales Tax Commissioner. In either case, there is no reason for interference in appeal with the order of the learned Commissioner dismissing the application made under Rule 25. Ordered accordingly.
616...1951 (11) TMI 8 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
DM Ranade and Another Versus The State
........... in view of Section 2(b) of the Act. But sale , as defined in Section 2(g) is very much wider than a transfer of property in goods made in the course of execution of a contract . This is only one type of transfer of property that comes within the definition of sale . There are other types too. In fact, sale means any transfer of property in goods and the Board has already held that when a printer executes his customer s order, himself providing the paper and other materials required for executing the order and delivers the printed goods, there is a transfer of property or sale within the meaning of the main clause of the definition of sale contained in Section 2(g). The execution of the order is undoubt- edly in pursuance of a contract, but the contract is not one answering to the definition contained in Section 2(b), but a contract of sale as ordi- narily understood (vide Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act). In the result, the appeal so called is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
617...1951 (11) TMI 9 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Ganesh Mahadeo Lele Versus The State
........... far as the revising authority is concerned, it may well be argued that one of the parties to the dis- pute will be adversely affected by the order. Even in such a case, a hearing, of course, may not be claimed as of right by the party con- cerned, but at the same time it may be regarded as proper for the revisional tribunal to hear him before passing the order. These con- siderations, however, do not apply to the present case. The refusal to revise has not introduced any element of finality to the proceedings, which are still in progress and which can certainly be brought before the Commissioner once again, should the assessee find it necessary to do so, when the appropriate stage is reached. Even on grounds of propriety, therefore, the order refusing revision cannot seriously be ques- tioned. For the reasons given above, we decline to interfere with the learned Sales Tax Commissioner s order and dismiss the application for revision made to the Board. Application dismissed.
618...1951 (12) TMI 5 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Great Indian Motor Works Ltd. Versus Chandi Das Nundy
Winding up – Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ......
........... dwill. It is shown in the balance-sheet of March 31, 1950, as Rs. 1,04,636 which appears to me to be a very inflated figure for a business of this kind. It has been pointed out by the directors that the depreciation allowance on buses and spare parts and such like should be increased. But even so, the goodwill of this company is shown at a higher figure than the value of the buses which operate the bus services and of the spare parts. In fact it is the main item in the balance-sheet. If the goodwill of this company is not worth anything like the amount stated then quite obviously this company is in a bad way. Banerjee J. was of opinion that it could not pay its debts and I think he is right. In my judgment therefore the petitioner established the grounds upon which the court rightly made a winding-up order and that being so, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Certified for two counsel. The costs of the company will be paid out of the assets. Das, J. mdash I agree.
619...1951 (12) TMI 6 - WEST BENGAL HIGH COURT
Calcutta Tanneries (1944) Ltd. Versus State of West Bengal
........... Tax Officer. So, it is ordered in review that the assessment in respect of the year ending 31st December, 1945, should be done afresh by the Commercial Tax Officer who has jurisdiction over the area in question. 4. The assessment for the year ending 31st December, 1945, being without jurisdiction and, therefore, illegal, there could be no question of the taxable turnover for the next three years being more than 3 lakhs as contended by the opposite party. The opposite party evidently means by this that the taxable turnover as determined by the Assistant Commis- sioner during the years in question did not fall below 3 lakhs. But the assessment itself being without authority, the latter assumption cannot be accepted. And as at present under the law only a Commercial Tax Officer can make assessments under Section 11, all the four petitions are allowed and the cases are sent back so that a fresh assessment may be made in each case by the Commercial Tax Officer. Petitions allowed.
620...1951 (12) TMI 7 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Shri Ganesh Jute Mills Ltd. Versus Commercial Tax Officer and Others
........... ppears in the exemption section and by means of a simple merger of the functions of these departments with the newly designated depart- ment, the petitioner can be deprived of the benefit of the exemption claimed. As I have pointed out before, although the notification in question created this new department and conferred on this new department these functions which were being performed by the Indian Stores Department and the Department of Supply, there was no amend- ment effected in sub-clause (iii) of clause 5(2). I am of the view, therefore, that the petitioner is not liable to pay sales tax in respect of the supplies in question. In the circumstances this Rule must be made absolute, the Noti- fication dated 8th November, 1950, is cancelled and the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are directed to forbear from giving effect to the said Notification. The West Bengal Government will pay one set of costs to be divided between the petitioner and the Union of India. Rule made absolute.
621...1951 (12) TMI 8 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Kumardhubi Engineering Works Ltd. Versus The State of Bihar
........... context indicates otherwise see clause (b) of Section 2. The assessee did not claim exemption on this ground in his return. He did so at a late stage, without getting any finding whether a ropeway, used collectively, comes within the special meaning of the word contract . Question (6)-Though the claim of a deduction under rule 4 was mentioned in the grounds of revision, it is not clear to me if this ground was pressed before the Board. The Resolution of the Board dated the 21st July, 1949, by which the revision petition was dismissed, does not mention this point. The point is mentioned as point (f) in the applica- tion for a reference to this Court the Board then said that it was a question of fact. Though I do not understand what the Board meant by saying that it was a question of fact, I presume that it was open to the Board to refuse to consider in revision a claim which was not made earlier and for which full materials were not available. Reference answered accordingly.
622...1951 (12) TMI 9 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
Rahman Stores Versus. Commissioner of Taxes, Assam
........... v. Province of Bihar, Indian Sales Tax Cases, Volume I, 1938-1950. There again the order in question was an original order, and not an appellate order. We are unable to apply the principle of the decisions of the Madras and the Bihar High Courts to appellate orders. The Assam Sales Tax Act ex- pressly provides for a period of limitation from an appellate order as being 60 days which are to be computed from the date of the order, and not from the date of the service of the order. We can only interfere with the order of the Commissioner holding that the petition before him as time-barred, under the provisions of See- tion 32(6) of the Act, but we are not satisfied that the decision of the Commissioner is erroneous. We think the decision of the Commissioner is right. Accordingly, we reject this petition. The petition is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee assessed at Rs. 51. The Rule is discharged. DEKA, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed. (1) 1951 19 I.T.R. 402 A.I.R. 1951 Mad, 204.
623...1951 (2) TMI 11 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Raja of Vizianagaram Versus Official Liquidator, Vizianagaram Mining Co. Ltd.
Charges – Registration of ......
........... uded from participation in the assets of an unregistered company which is wound up. I think it is in connection with administration and succession actions that the situs of a debt has relevancy. In Cheshire s Private International Law, it is stated at page 595, The fact, however, that a debt possesses a definite situation for some purposes does not necessarily imply that its assignment should be governed by the lex situs. Even apart from that, the provision of law enacted in section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code is an answer to the argument based upon the situation of the debt. In this view of the matter it is not necessary for me to refer to the various decisions cited to us by Mr. Tiruvenkatachari on the question of situs of debt. For the feregoing reasons, the contention urged on behalf of the appellant that the proof of debts of the foreign creditors should be expunged is not acceptable to us. I entirely agree with my learned brother in his conclusions in other respects.
624...1951 (2) TMI 12 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Staynor & Co. Versus Commercial Tax Officer
........... erson being a dealer or not when an application for registration as a dealer is made before him. The petitioners case however stands on a different footing. They are already registered as a dealer. The petitioners purchased the business in May, 1943, and new registration certificate was issued to them on 22nd May, 1943, under Section 17 of the Act. They have not taken any steps to have the registration cancelled. So long as they are registered they are liable to pay the tax. It is submitted by the learned Advocate-General that there is no allegation of demand of justice and its refusal in the petition and this is fatal to the maintainability of the application for mandamus and reliance is placed on the case reported in Surendra Nath Das v. State of West Bengal(1) (Harries, C.J., and Banarjee, J.). This decision is binding on me and I accept the contention. In the result the petition fails and the rule must be discharged with costs. Petition dismissed. (1) 1951 55 C.W.N. 255.
625...1951 (2) TMI 13 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
TNK. Govindarajulu Chetty, In re
........... nd found it is obvious that the assessee bona fide believed that his act of accommodation to his customers in keeping up to the terms of the contract entered into with them would not change the real nature of the transaction. If he was able to convert the ingots entrusted to him into brass sheets he would have got exemption in regard to his manufacturing charges. Indeed, as the evidence discloses, and as the accounts show, he later on sold away the ingots entrusted to him after converting them into sheets paying sales tax. He might have been wrong in the view but I cannot say that he omitted the item deliberately with the idea of evading tax. The fact that immediately it was pointed out to him he was ready to make good the defect, is really indicative of his bona fides. I therefore hold on the evidence adduced in the case that the appellant did not wilfully submit an untrue return. The conviction and sentence are therefore set aside and the appeal is allowed. Appeal allowed.
626...1951 (2) TMI 14 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Major Soap Co., Ltd. Versus Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Calcutta
........... , subject of course to restrictions contained in Rule 71. Under Rule 71 the matter of registration of a dealer, amendment of certificate of registration or cancellation of registration can be delegated to the Commercial Tax Officer, and it has been so done. Section 20 and Rule 74 make provisions for appeals, revision and review. Section 21 of the Act provides for statement of case to the High Court. Thus there is efficacious and adequate remedy under the Act. It is idle to suggest that by virtue of repeal of Section 18 the petitioner is without any remedy. The petitioner described itself through its pleader as transferee and was registered as dealer as a matter of course. No question whether it was a transferee or not or dealer or not at all arose for determination. There has been no refusal to exercise jurisdiction nor any excess of jurisdiction. The application is wholly misconceived. The petition therefore fails and the Rule must be discharged with costs. Rule discharged.
627...1951 (2) TMI 8 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Lothian Jute Mills Co. Ltd., In re.
Meeting and Proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called ......
........... eetings called by the quarrelling groups of directors may be invalid, the shareholders should not be exposed to the uncertainties flowing from the situation and the consequent litigation and it should be held that a position has arisen which makes it impracticable for the meeting being called in accordance with the articles. It is true that the impracticability contemplated in the section is as to the calling of a meeting. It appears to me however that the section also contemplates that the court should exercise its powers where it cannot say with reasonable approach to certainty, or even prima facie, that the meeting called in exercise of the powers contained in the regulations will be valid. I think, therefore, that in the circumstances of this case I have the power to call the meeting and if I have the power I have no hesitation in exercising it in order to resolve the conflict and uncertainty which has arisen as the result of the quarrel between the two sets of directors.
628...1951 (3) TMI 12 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Kirpa Ram Versus Shriyans Prasad
Requirements with respect to memorandum and Compromise and arrangement ......
........... thing which he does not like to do. Should a depositor for a fixed term like to get back his money he will be entitled to get it minus the interest which he must forego or pay as the case may be. (5) If the shareholders of the two banks at meetings properly called want to vary the scheme in any manner they will be entitled to do so, The discharge of the injunction will be subject to these conditions. The opposite party will have their costs of these proceedings in this Court. As to the application for transfer of the case to this Court, both parties agree that this is one of those cases which should be so transferred, with which I agree. I, therefore, order that this case (Suit No. 57 of 1951) pending in the Court of Mr. Y.L. Taneja, Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Delhi, be transferred for trial to this Court. The record is already here and it need not therefore go back. It shall be put up for hearing in due course before such Judge as is appointed by my Lord the Chief Justice.
629...1951 (3) TMI 13 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
A Anantalakshmi Ammal Versus Hindustan Investment & Financial Trust Ltd.
Meeting and Proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called and Restriction on exercise of voting rights of members who have not paid calls, Etc. ......
630...1951 (3) TMI 16 - HIGH COURT OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN
MD Abraham, Liquidator, Malankara Industrial & Mercantile Co. Ltd. Versus A. Philipose
Winding up - Distribution of property of company ......
........... depositing any amount in the Anchal Savings Bank will arise. All parties shall have their costs from out of the assets in the hands of the liquidator. It is now represented on behalf of the official liquidator that there are shareholders who have not been traced and who may come forward later and claim payment of the moneys to them. We take the view that the surplus amounts in the hands of the liquidator need not be deposited in the Anchal Savings Bank as directed by the Court below. We consider that the proper direction to give is that the liquidator shall deposit amounts in his hands which he has not succeeded in disbursing in the court below to the credit of Company Petition No. 6 of 1120 on the file of the Mavelikara District Court. The court below shall remit it to the treasury as Civil Court Deposit. As and when the shareholders or their legal representatives who claim payment of these moneys come forward it will be open to them to apply to the court below for payment.
631...1951 (3) TMI 17 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
GV. Rama Iyer and Others Versus Government of Mysore
........... the tax under consideration relates to a period earlier to the amendment. The amendment in Mysore is introduced to remove possible doubts that may be entertained in construing the provisions of the Act. Even without the amendment, this Court had come to the conclusion that criminal Courts have no jurisdiction to question the validity of the tax. The prosecution has proved the liability of the assessees on facts in the first two cases and on law in the last mentioned case. I am, therefore, of opinion that the convic- tion in all the three cases should be upheld. Regarding the sentence, the amount of fine levied in Criminal Revision Petitions Nos. 164 and 165 is Rs. 25 each, which is by no means heavy but the levy of Rs. 150 in Criminal Revision Petition No. 290 appears to be rather severe, and I, therefore, reduce it to Rs. 50. In the result, with the modification of sentence in Criminal Revision Petition No. 290, all the petitions fail and are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
632...1951 (3) TMI 18 - VINDHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Hemchand and Others Versus State of Vindhya Pradesh and Others
........... in the Sales Tax Ordinance may have a chance of criticising the proposed amendment. On notice, it is open to the assessees to inpress upon the Government the inadvisability of the proposed amendment. The law also intends that at the end of the month, Government should reconsider them in the light of public opinion. The amendments having been made without notice and reconsideration they are invalid being in violation of Sec- tion 6(2). In the result I hold that the sales tax was rightly enforced. No direc- tion is called for against the levy of the sales tax. A direction of the nature of the mandamus is issued on the opposite party calling upon them to give effect to Schedule II as it stood originally and not to give effect to the amendments made by the Sales Tax Com- missioner. The applicants having failed over most of their grounds, they should pay costs to the opposite party of Rs. 50 in each of the 2 cases. Applica- tion No.55 is summarily dismissed. Ordered accordingly.
633...1951 (3) TMI 19 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Doma Sahu Kishun Lal Sao Versus State of Bihar
........... ction with which the High Court is invested under Section 21 of the Act is of an exceptional nature and is limited by the express terms of the section that the High Court is in seisin of only such question of law as has been duly raised in the state- ment of the case. I do not therefore propose to examine the question raised by Mr. P.R. Das on behalf of the assessee. But it is right to state that in the petition made by the assessee for reference before the Board of Revenue no such question was formulated. In the order of the Board of Revenue at page 16 of the paper book it is mentioned that usual notice had been sent in the prescribed form calling for the return and all relevant documents and such notice was duly issued and served upon the assessee. Upon all these grounds I would answer the questions referred to the High Court in the affirmative. The assessee must pay the cost of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 250. SARJOO PROSAD, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
634...1951 (3) TMI 20 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Mohammad Amin Brothers Ltd. Versus The Province of Bihar
........... de to the department of the Government was not liable to be charged with sales tax. After he was informed of the decision of the Government of Bihar he promptly applied for registration to the appropriate authorities. Learned counsel also referred to a letter dated 22nd December, 1944, addressed by the Sales Tax Officer to the assessee, to the effect that meat was exempt from sales tax and the business need not be registered under the Bihar Sales Tax Act (vide Annexure A, printed at page 5 of the paper-book). Upon these facts it is clear that there was no wilful default committed by the assessee within the meaning of Section 10(5) of the Act and the penalty imposed by the Sales Tax Authorities ought not to have been levied. I would therefore answer this question in favour of the assessee. Since the assessee has failed as regards the two questions I hold that he should pay costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 250. SARJOO PROSAD, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
635...1951 (3) TMI 21 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Md. Amin Brothers Versus The State of Bihar
........... hat the Tribunal should have decided the case on merits and the dismissal of the appeal for default could not be said to be a hearing of the appeal and its determination. The provisions of Section 20 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act are in pari materia with Section 31 of the Indian Income-tax Act. In my opinion the word determination in Section 20(2) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act must be construed to mean a decision on the point raised in the case and not merely an order of dismissal for default. It is clear that the Commissioner acted illegally in dismissing the appeal for default and confirming the assessment without giving reasons in support of his order. For these reasons I would answer the question referred to the High Court in the negative. There will be no order for costs. (1) 1950 18 I.T.R. 928. SARJOO PROSAD, J.-I agree. The reference in both the cases should be answered in the manner indicated and for the reasons stated by my learned brother. Reference answered accordingly.
636...1951 (4) TMI 1 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
HAJI SATTAR HAJI PEER MOHAMMED Versus COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
Natural Justice ......
........... ted out that it is not the practice of the Customs Authorities to give any hearing in such matters, although in the affidavit opposition in the Matter No. 97 of 1950 it is pointed out that in some cases personal hearing is given. If public officials holding posts of responsibility have no regard for fair dealing and consistency the administrative machinery of the Customs department is bound to crumble to pieces in no time. 4. I have no hesitation in holding that there has been a total disregard of the principles of Audi Alterem Partem and a clear violation of the principles of natural justice. 5. For the reasonings given in my judgments in Soorajmull s case (87 C.L.J. 201) and in Matter No. 97 of 1950 (judgment delivered today) I am of the view that this petition should succeed. The rule is accordingly made absolute. The decision dated the 24th April, 1950 and the order dated the 13th-27th May, 1950 are quashed. The petitioner is entitled to costs of the present proceedings.
637...1951 (4) TMI 14 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
RGN. Price, Official Liquidator, Andhra Paper Mills Co. Ltd. Versus State of Madras
Winding up - Powers of liquidator ......
........... declares that in the absence of a contract to the contrary, the seller is entitled where the ownership of the property has passed to the buyer, before payment of the whole of the purchase money, to a charge upon the property in the hands of the buyer for the amount of the purchase money or any part thereof remaining unpaid and for interest on such amount or part from the date on which possession has been delivered. We are not now concerned with what defence the Province may have to the claim for interest. But the provision in section 51 to which we have referred certainly shows that the claim put forward by the Official Liquidator cannot be frivolous or vexatious. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of the learned Judge dismissing the appellant s application. We give sanction to the Official Liquidator to institute the proposed suit. There will be no order as to costs but the Official Liquidator will get his costs of the appeal from the funds of the company.
638...1951 (4) TMI 15 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Narasaraopeta Electric Corporation Ltd. Versus State of Madras
Company – Incorporation of ......
........... eem to be any necessity to put an end to the agency agreement in toto. It may be that this provision, as pointed out by the learned Advocate General, was enacted for the benefit of the managing agents, as otherwise they would not have been entitled to any remuneration or commission. But there is no reason to put an end to the agreement altogether. As suggested by my Lord the Chief Justice in the course of the arguments, the difficulty can be got over by reading section 15 as terminating the managing agency agreement between the licensee on the one hand and his managing agent or managing director on the other, restricting it in so far as it relates to the undertaking covered by the licence and no more. In this view there is no necessity to hold that section 15 is also invalid. For these reasons, I am of opinion that subject to the modifications mentioned above, the petitions fail and must be dismissed with costs. Rajamannar, C.J. mdash I agree entirely and have nothing to add.
639...1951 (4) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Bharat Vegetable Products, In re
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Cost and expenses payable out of assets in a winding-up by Court and Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ......
640...1951 (4) TMI 2 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
HAJI SATTAR HAJI PEER MOHAMMED Versus COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
Natural Justice ......
........... r is not entitled to get a copy of the test report because there is no provision in the Sea Customs Act for supplying a copy. 14.The Customs Authorities have come forward with the suggestion which is for the first time made in the affidavit in opposition that the flash point of the oil imported by the petitioner as recorded in the certificate of quality is the result of open Cup Test but if Abel s close test is applied it will be 15 F to 20 less. This was disputed by the petitioner in the Affidavit in reply. No opportunity has been given to the petitioner before the orders complained of were made to disprove the suggestion of the Customs Authorities. 15.The fundamentals of fair play have not been observed. In my view there has been denial of natural justice in this case. 16.In the result the petition succeeds. The rule is made absolute and the decisions dated the 9th May, 1950 and 16th June, 1950 are quashed. The petitioner is entitled to the costs of the present proceedings.
641...1951 (4) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
M Velu Konar and Others, In re
........... nts that are prescribed in Section 8. I do not find anywhere in the judgments or in the evidence that has been read out to me that the petitioners come within the scope of Section 8 of the General Sales Tax Act, notwithstanding the fact that they did not obtain licence from the Government for the purpose of carrying on the agency business. If at least there was evidence to the effect that they were acting as commission agents for a fixed remuneration and were at least main- taining accounts of the transactions, then certainly there would have been some material for the courts below to go upon and decide that the petitioners were not really dealers but were merely commission agents. In the absence of any such evidence, I do not think that there is any case made out against the judgments of the courts below. I therefore hold that what the courts below have decided is correct and there are no merits in these petitions. The petitions are therefore dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
642...1951 (4) TMI 21 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
The Province of Madras Versus Chekka Satyanarayanamurthy
........... any such exclusion expressly or by necessary implication. When Section 18 of the Act provides that no suit shall be instituted against the State unless the same is done within six months from the date of the act complained of, it necessarily implies that there is no prohibition against the filing of a suit. The section is couched in the negative form but if it is paraphrased and expressed in a positive form, the result comes to this, that a suit can be instituted against the State Government for an act done or purporting to be done under the Act if the same is done within six months from the date of the act complained against. In our opinion this section comes within the category explained by Varadachariar, J., in Kamaraja Pandiya Naicker v. Secretary of State for India in Council(2), and the suits are therefore maintainable. The civil miscellaneous appeals are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed. (1) 1890 I.L.R. 17 Cal. 590. (2) 1935 69 M.L.J. 695 A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 269.
643...1951 (4) TMI 22 - HYDERABAD, HIGH COURT
MA Ganapathy Iyer and Another Versus Hyderabad State
........... y as being essential for the life of the community that the State Legislature would be incom- petent to levy tax on such commodity, otherwise not. Therefore the articles in respect of which it is sought to get exemption from the levy of sales tax are not goods which are under the law declared to be essential for the life of the community and hence not exempt from the levy of sales tax. It is well known that exemption under sales tax should be strictly construed and cannot be extended. Analogical principles cannot be invoked for claiming exemption from taxation where such exemption is not specifically provided for. Therefore unless the petitioners can bring the articles for which they claim exemption under any of the items mentioned in the exempted articles under the Sales Tax Act they are not entitled to exemption. In the result the applications for the issue of writs of certiorari fail and are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50 in each case. Applications dismissed.
644...1951 (5) TMI 1 - SUPREME Court
Eastern Investments Limited Versus Commissioner Of Income-Tax, West Bengal
High Court, Whether Allowable Deduction ......
........... etween the company and the Administrator and which has been sanctioned by the Court. If the debentures had been paid for in cash by the same party, no objection could have been taken to allowing the interest amount to be deducted. In principle, there appears to us no different, if instead of paying in cash the payment of the price is in the shape of giving over shares of the company, when the transaction is not challenged on the ground of fraud and is approved by the Court in the re-organisation of the capital of the company. In our opinion, therefore, the ground on which the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and the High Court disallowed the claim of the assessee is not sound. In our opinion, the High Court has failed to appreciate the true position and the question submitted for its opinion should be answered in the affirmative. The appeal is therefore allowed. The respondent will pay the costs of the appeal in this Court and of the reference in the High Court. Appeal allowed.
645...1951 (5) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
KUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA & ANOTHER Versus DEBA PROSANNA MUKHERJEE.
Whether the decrees were passed in "a suit to which this Act applies."?
Whether the respondent as sub-mortgagee is an assignee within the meaning of sub-section (5) of section 36?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The reference to t ......
646...1951 (6) TMI 6 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Associated Pictures Ltd. Versus National Studios Ltd.
Company – Incorporation of ......
........... ed above on behalf of the respondent to the contrary, I do not think that there is any doubt that the view taken in the second of the Rangoon decisions and in the Calcutta decision was correct. The wording of section 3 of the General Clauses Act clearly indicates that the definitions and explanations which form the rest of the section are not universally applicable, and that in spite of these definitions and explanations the meaning of the words has to be construed in the light of the subject of the statute and the context in which the words or used, and to my mind the provisions of Order XXXIII leave no doubt that the word person in this part of the Civil Procedure Code means only an indivual person. I accordingly accept the revision petition with costs and set aside the order of the lower court permitting the respondent company to sue in forma pauperis. The parties have been directed to appear in the lower court on the 16th of July, 1951. I assess the costs at fifty rupees.
647...1951 (6) TMI 7 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Gurmukhdas Salamatrai Versus The State of Bombay
........... amount. It merely says that necessary steps will be taken for the offences committed. As we have already said the letter merely amounts to an offer to drop criminal proceedings in case the amount was paid. We cannot construe it as an order appealable under Section 21 of the Act. If the Collector sanctions the prosecution of the appellant there would be an order under Section 24(2) of the Act and an appeal can lie to this Tribunal against it. The Sales Tax Officer who appears for the respondent is not prepared to accept this view, but reading the pertinent provision of the Act, we think that is the position. If the appellant so wants he can decline the Collector s offer. He (the Collector) will then have to pass an order under Section 24(2) sanctioning the prose- cution and then the appellant can appeal to this Tribunal, if so advised. 3.. For the reasons given above we think that this appeal is pre- mature and must be rejected. ORDER. The appeal is rejected. Appeal rejected.
648...1951 (7) TMI 10 - HIGH COURT OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN
TV. Krishna Iyer Versus Official Liquidator, Cape Comorin General Traffic Ltd.
Winding up - Preferential payments ......
........... them and if they have only discharged their duties as required by the agreement entered into by them with the employers no extra compensation promised to them will come within the meaning of section 25, sub-section (2), of the Indian Contract Act. This is clear from the decided cases which are all collected together in the commentary of Pollock and Mulla on the Indian Contract Act, pages 182 and 183, (7th Edition). In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in allowing this appeal and setting aside the order made by the court below. We are leaving the question open as to whether when the list of creditors is ultimately settled the employees in whose favour a bonus has been sanctioned by the directors may come forward and prove their claims just like ordinary creditors. The main question then will be whether they are not persons to whom gifts have been promised. The appellant will be entitled to costs of this appeal payable out of the assets in the hands of the liquidators.
649...1951 (7) TMI 11 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Mrityunjoy Chakravarti Versus Provat Kumar Pal
Winding up - Powers of liquidator and Prosecution of delinquent officers and members of company ......
........... t which has control over the acts of the liquidator and having a suitable order made by the court in the matter. This appears to be provided for in section 183(5) of the Act. I would point out further that neither in section 179 nor in section 237(1) is there anything to indicate that if the liquidator takes action without a direction of the court, this action would be in any way illegal or invalid. It might mean, however, that any costs incurred in such a proceeding might have to be paid by the liquidator personally. At any rate, neither section in express terms limits the liquidator s power, which he has in common with any other citizen, to file in court a complaint that another person has committed a criminal offence. Whether a court should in its discretion take cognizance in such a case is another matter. A similar view with regard to the effect of sections 237 and 179 was taken in the case of Emperor v. Bishan Sahai Vidyarthi. The result is that this Rule is discharged.
650...1951 (7) TMI 12 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Radha Kishan Bhagwan Din Versus Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh
........... proviso to Section 7 as also under Rule 39 of Chapter VIII. This being the state of affairs there is no force in this case. We, therefore, reject this application with costs. The learned Standing Counsel shall be entitled to a fee of Rs. 200. We may say that a copy of the order of the learned Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, refusing to submit the case to this Court was not filed along with the application presented to this Court by the applicants. We are informed that no rules in regard to the papers to be filed along with applications under the Sales Tax Act have as yet been framed by this Court. Until such time as these rules come to be framed by this Court, the rules which apply in regard to the filling of judgments, orders and other papers in connection with Income-tax References should be deemed to be applicable to references under the Sales Tax Act. A copy of this order shall be sent to all the three Bar Associations and to other Honourable Judges. Application rejected.
651...1951 (7) TMI 13 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Shiva Dayal Jaiswal Versus Sales Tax Commissioner, UP., Lucknow
........... facts as stated in the petition, no such case as would justify us in asking the Revising Authority to refer it to this Court for decision. The next point urged by learned counsel for the applicant is that in calculating the sales tax the licence fee should have been deducted from the turnover. Rule 44 framed under the Act lays down that the tax under Section 3 shall be computed on the net turnover. In deter- mining that net turnover the amounts specified shall be deducted if they are found included in the gross turnover. Looking to the amounts which are to be deducted, we find that the licence fee is not one of them. It cannot come under any one of the sub-rules (a) to (g) of Rule 44. We consequently find that there is no force in this argument either. For the reasons given above, we hold that there is no force in this application. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Learned standing counsel shall be entitled to a fee of Rs. 200 from the applicant. Application dismissed.
652...1951 (7) TMI 14 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Umor Abdul Kadarbhai Versus The State of Bombay
........... observe here that there is a defect in the drafting of the sec- tion and that it ought to be removed as soon as possible by mentioning the Collector of Sales Tax as an authority entitled to condone delay (in suitable cases) in filing revision applications. He mostly deals with revision applications. It will certainly be strange that he should have no such power. 4.Section 22A of the Act would have helped the applicant had Section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act covered cases of revision. We could then have deducted in his favour the time taken in obtaining the copy of the Assistant Commissioner s decision but unfortunately for the applicant Section 12 does not cover applications for revision. 5.For the reasons given above we think we have to uphold the decision of the Collector of Sales Tax, that the application to him was barred by limitation. This revision application fails. ORDER. The application is rejected. There will be no order as regards costs. Application rejected.
653...1951 (7) TMI 15 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Lalchand Gopalji Versus The State of Bombay
........... onable doubt, to put such a construction upon a taxing statute as is most bene- ficial to the subject. In view of these decisions we think the benefit of the ambiguity in the wording of the item ought to go to the appli- cants. This means that cloth of sample No. 4 ought also to be treated as subject to the general tax of half anna in the rupee and not to the special tax. 9.We find from the record that the figure of tax so far as the cloth of sample No. 4 is concerned has been fixed at Rs. 337-7-0 by the Sales Tax Officer under the orders of the Collector of Sales Tax. This figure will have to be reduced to half, i.e., Rs. 166-11-6. 10.We pass the following order. ORDER. The order of the Collector of Sales Tax is modified and it is direct- ed that the tax already assessed be reduced by Rs. 166-11-6. The applicants will have their costs throughout from the opponent. Ordered accordingly. (1) 1935 3 I.T.R. 147 37 Bom. L.R. 112 at p. 117. (2) 1948 16 I.T.R. 192 50 Bom. L.R. 349.
654...1951 (7) TMI 16 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
Vidya Parkash and Others Versus The Punjab State
........... Indian food preparations ordinarily sold by Tandur- walas, Lohwalas and Dhabawalas. We do not think, however, we should go into the merits of the applicants contentions, for by Sec- tions 20, 21 and 22 of the Act provision not only for appeal and for revision but also for statement of a case to the High Court in the manner of Section 66 of the Income-tax Act is made. We think it is for the applicants to take their proper remedies under the Act rather than here seek to invoke an extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Without therefore expressing any opinion on the merits of the contentions raised we think these applications should be dismissed. No order as to costs. Applications dismissed.
655...1951 (7) TMI 17 - PEPSU HIGH COURT
Piyare Lal and Others Versus Assistant Sales Tax Officer and Another
........... 51 Mad. 249. the conduct of the authorities concerned is such as to make it clear that they have not been discharging their duties and are not likely to do so without the guidance of the Court that the Court will be justified in issuing mandamus. In this case, there is nothing to show that the Sales Tax Officer or the Commissioner did not discharge their duties or that they were not likely to discharge their duties without the guidance of the Court and that accordingly this being an exceptional case appro- priate writs should be issued even though the petitioners have not availed of the remedies provided by the Ordinance. In fact, it appears to me that either because of the wrong advice given to them or because of certain other reasons which are not clear from the record, the peti- tioners rushed to this Court without any cause whatsoever. In the result I would dismiss the petitions with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 20 in each case. GURNAM SINGH, J.-I agree. Petitions dismissed.
656...1951 (8) TMI 12 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Mansukhlal Dhanji Vora Versus Jupiter Airways Ltd.
Prospectus – Registration of ......
........... at that was a serious difficulty which may be met by reference to the Commissioner for Taking Accounts. There is only one further point which may be referred to, and which I have already referred to shortly, and which I may refer to again, namely, as regards the change in capital structure. I have already referred to the resolution of July 20, Exhibit F, which was duly filed, but a reference to Exhibit 0 may also be made, and in these circumstances, to my mind, there is no substance in this allegation. The capital structure was changed at the end of July, 1946, and the share scrips issued on December 3, 1946, clearly indicate on the face of them what the capital structure of the company was, and there is no evidence whatever before the court that any single shareholder lodged any protest against that position. The suit stands dismissed with costs. The costs of the suit to include the costs of the notice of motion and the chamber summons. Interim injunction to stand dissolved.
657...1951 (8) TMI 13 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
PP. Sivarama Pillai and Another, In re
........... itioner paid the amount due and therefore he is not guilty of the offence under Section 15(b) of the Sales Tax Act. The conviction and sentence are therefore set aside and the amount if it has been paid shall be refunded to the petitioner. Crl.R.C.No. 788 of 1950 In this case the amount involved is Rs. 440-8-0 and it has been paid by cheque dated 24th September, 1948, which was cashed on 6th October, 1948. For the reasons mentioned in my judgment in CrI.R.C.No. 787 of 1950 the conviction and sentence of the petitioner are set aside and the amount if it has been paid shall be refunded to him. CrI.R.C.No. 1327 of 1950 In this case the amount involved is Rs. 344 and it has been paid by cheque dated 13th October, 1948, which was cashed on 11th November, 1948. For the reasons mentioned in my judgment in CrI.R.C.No. 787 of 1950 the conviction and sentence of the petitioner are set aside and the amount, if it has been paid, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Conviction set aside.
658...1951 (8) TMI 14 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Mariyala Venkateswara Rao, In re
........... -3 to P-5 and even if it is taken to be true, will not amount to an offence in the circumstances of this case where the Assistant Commercial Tax Officer went to the peti- tioner s shop on a holiday and during the lunch interval, which he had no right to do under Section 14(2), and also illegally insisted on the petitioner s showing him some private papers and cash and signing in an unauthorised statement prepared by himself. Of course, actual use of physical force is not necessary for obstruction or prevention under Section 14(2). Words causing an apprehension of violence, or acts pre- venting or obstructing the inspection, like locking the premises to pre- vent inspection, or running away with the goods and registers will do, in a proper case where there is a right of inspection under Sec- tion 14(2). In the end, therefore, the conviction and sentence of the petitioner are set aside, and the petitioner is acquitted. The fine, if paid, will be refunded. Conviction set aside.
659...1951 (8) TMI 15 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
Rawatmal Mulchand Versus Commissioner of Taxes, Assam
........... accordingly heard at Tezpur on 6th May, 1950 an advocate appeared on behalf of the petitioners on that day. On 9th May, 1950, the petitioners also submitted a statement of their sales of jute. The enhancement was made on the materials furnished by the petitioners, and it could not be said that it was done without any basis and without giving the petitioners a reasonable opportunity of being heard. All these are questions of fact, in my opinion, and no reference is competent on these questions. We think the learned Commissioner is right in saying that the proviso to Section 31 of the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, has been complied with. It was conceded by the petitioners advocate that if the proviso to Sec- tion 31 has been complied with by the Commissioner, his decision to enhance the assessment rests on facts and not on any point of law. The result is that the petition is dismissed with costs. The Rule is discharged. RAM LABHAYA, J.-I agree. DEKA, J.-I agree. Rule discharged.
660...1951 (8) TMI 16 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Ballabhdas Gokuldas, In re
........... cases arising out of our Act. (1) 1949 1 S.T.C. 193 53 C.W.N. 278. It has been pleaded on behalf of the applicant firm that they had no option but to show separately the two items referred to earlier in this order, as their principals, namely, the cigarette manufacturers, insist on the actual catalogue price being shown clearly in cash memo- randums or bills. This trade practice-for it is nothing more-cannot help the applicant in getting over the definition of sale price and turnover as contained in the Act. The essence of the scheme it embodies is that the tax is payable by the dealer, calculated at a specified rate on the totality of his receipts from the purchaser, minus certain items particularised in Section 2(j). Among these items is not to be found any element which the dealer may have recovered from the purchaser in lieu of the sales tax due from him (the dealer) to the State. In the result, this application for revision fails and is dismissed. Application dismissed.
661...1951 (8) TMI 8 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Associated Banking Corpn. of India Ltd. Versus Nazaralli Kassambhai
Winding up – Powers of liquidator ......
........... ence caused to litigants, however much it might be regretted, must be looked upon as unavoidable in the larger interest of society which requires that the affairs of banking companies should not be unduly delayed and the winding up should be completed as soon as possible. I am therefore of the opinion that with great respect the learned Judge was in error in the conclusion he came to and this court has jurisdiction under section 45B to decide this matter and the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court has been ousted under section 45A of Act XX of 1950. Therefore, the order of dismissal passed by the learned Judge will be set aside and the appeal will be allowed. The liquidator s costs as between attorney and client will come out of the assets of the banking company. There will be no order as to costs on respondent No. 3. The suit was filed as a summary suit and therefore it will go back to the learned Judge in Chambers for disposal according to law. Bhagwati, J.- mdash I agree.
662...1951 (9) TMI 1 - SUPREME Court
Commissioner Of Excess Profits Tax, Bombay City Versus Shri Lakshmi Silk Mills Limited
Excess Profits Tax, Income From Business, Income From Letting Out, Income From Other Sources ......
........... ng it in its own manufacturing concern or temporarily letting it to others for making profit for that business when for the time being it could not itself run it. The High Court therefore was in error in holding that the dyeing plant had ceased to be a commercial asset of the assessee and the income earned by it and received from the lessee Messrs. Parakh and Co. was not chargeable to excess profits tax. The result therefore is that we hold that the answer returned by the High Court to the question referred to it by the Tribunal was wrong and the correct answer to the question would be in the affirmative and not in the negative. The appeal is allowed but in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. We have not thought it necessary to refer to all the cases cited at the Bar as none of them really is in point on the short question that we were called upon to decide and analogies drawn from them would not be helpful in arriving at our decision. Appeal allowed.
663...1951 (9) TMI 2 - SUPREME Court
Lakshminarain Bhadani Versus Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bihar And Orissa
Income Tax, Part B States ......
........... e put right. In our opinion, it is necessary that the Income-tax Officer should issue the notice of demand against each the members of the family in accordance with the concluding words of section 25A(2) and that should be done. We are unable to accept the second part of the argument of Mr. Umrigar that it is only on the failure or default of payment by one of the members that the Government has the right to recover that portion of the amount from others. The proviso to section 25A(2) makes the position very clear. In contrast with that the proviso to section 26 shows that when the Legislature wanted to give power to the Income-tax authority to recover from others only on failure of payment by a party, it said so expressly. The absence of similar words in the proviso to section 25A(2) must result in the rejection of this part of Mr. Umrigar s argument. As the appeal has failed substantially the appellant is ordered to pay the costs of the appeal. Appeal failed substantially.
664...1951 (9) TMI 23 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Atma Ram Sahni Versus Chitra Production Co.
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ......
........... ed that the decision was not in a former suit, but whether this were so or not makes no difference for it has been recently pointed out by this Board in Hook v. Administrator-General of Bengal that the principle which prevents the same case being twice litigated is of general application and is not limited by the specific words of the Code in this respect. I am therefore of the opinion that the question of the right of Amrit Rai Sood to bring a petition for winding up, which depended on his being a creditor of 500 rupees or morn, not having been contested at a previous stage of the proceedings, it is not open to Atma Ram Sahni or the company now to contest that point and that the principle of res judicata applies to these proceedings. Atma Ram Sahni or the company cannot therefore object to the existence of liability of the company to Amrit Rai Sood. I, therefore, dismiss this appeal and uphold the order of the District Judge. The respondent will have his costs in this Court.
665...1951 (9) TMI 24 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Srivilliputtur Permanent Fund Ltd., In re
Shares capital – Reduction of ......
........... ase of reduction of capital. It is introducing into the company a system of share capital as required under the company law, in effect, regularising what has been irregularly carried on all this time. In this view, the proper course for the company is to alter the memorandum of association giving notice to its members and applying to the court under section 12 of the Indian Companies Act. I therefore consider that this alteration is necessary to carry on the business of the company more efficiently and economically and in accordance with the existing law governing the companies. I am satisfied that the alterations of the memorandum of association are necessary in the interests of the company and its creditors and depositors, since there is now 3 permanent share capital assured to those whose interests may be considered to be safe. The resolutions stated in the petition are therefore confirmed. Prayer (a) is ordered. Petitioner will have its taxed costs from out of the estate.
666...1951 (9) TMI 25 - HIGH COURT OF GWALIOR
SP. Bhargava Versus Kameshwar Shastri
Winding up – Circumstances in which company may be wound up voluntarily and Power to apply to court to have questions determined or powers exercised ......
........... under section 216, and do not qualify the orders of attachment, distress or execution. In my judgment, section 216 itself presupposes that an application under that section would be made after the commencement, of the winding up and the words after the commencement of the winding up obviously refer to the time when any attachment, a distress or execution is put into force against the estate or effects of the company. Again, the power under section 216 of the Companies Act can be exercised only if the court is satisfied that the exercise of the powers would be just and beneficial not only to the petitioners but to all the parties. It would clearly be not a just exercise of powers when there are obvious irregularities in the procedure as regards the winding up. For the above reasons, I reject the petition. In view of the difficult question involved in the petition which both sides were entitled to litigate, I direct that the parties shall bear their own costs of this petition.
667...1951 (9) TMI 26 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Brindaban Agarwala Versus Official Liquidator, Saraswati Soap & Oil Mills Ltd.
Winding up - Powers of liquidator ......
........... ng confirmation of the sale provided the price is adequate for otherwise, as Stodart J., pointed out in Rowthmall v. Nagarmall, Offers for the purchase of the property will be merely tentative. A prospective purchaser will not disclose to the liquidator the final figure to which he is prepared to go if his offer is liable to be outbid by someone else when the sale comes up before the court for approval. It is also in our opinion desirable that, in the case of sales effected by an Official Liquidator, a reserve price should, if possible, be fixed and in that event the purchaser at the sale, provided his price exceeds the reserve and there has been no fraud or irregularity, would be entitled to have the sale confirmed notwithstanding the subsequent receipt of a higher offer Soundararajan v. Mahomed Ismail. In these circumstances we dismiss this appeal, but there will be no order as to costs. The order of stay made by this court on 10th August, 1951, is automatically discharged.
668...1951 (9) TMI 27 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Home Insurance Co. Ltd. Versus Jagatjit Sugar Mills Co. Ltd.
Company – Incorporation of ......
........... at section that we have to find the place of suing. According to the statute, in my opinion, an incorporated company can be sued at its principal place of business or if cause of action arises at some other place and it has got a subordinate place of business, at that place also. In the present case neither of these two conditions are satisfied. Counsel for the plaintiff has stressed the point that the insurers have been writing to them that the case would now be looked into by the New Delhi office, but that does not give them a cause of action. In my opinion the learned Judge was in error in holding that by the change of the Lahore office to New Delhi the courts at Delhi had jurisdiction to try the suit. I, therefore, allow this petition, set aside the order of the trial court and make the rule absolute. The plaint will be returned to the plaintiff for filing his suit in a court of competent jurisdiction. The opposite party will pay the costs of the petitioner in this court.
669...1951 (9) TMI 29 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA BHARAT
State of Madhya Bharat Versus Hiralalji
Loans to managing agent ......
........... I find that the learned Additional City Magistrate s order seems to be correct and the principles do not allow a court to extend the meaning of the word guarantee so as to include within it a joint pro-note executed by the mill and the managing agents for facilitating a loan to the managing agents. The learned Government Advocate has also drawn our attention to an irregularity committed by the learned Additional City Magistrate in this case. As the respondents were exempted from attending the court under an order of His Highness the Maharaja Holkar, the learned Magistrate, instead of examining them under section 342, recorded the statement of the counsel for the respondents. We are sure that this was not warranted by any provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We entirely disapprove of the procedure adopted by the Magistrate but we do not think the case necessitates a retrial inasmuch as the appeal against the order of acquittal cannot succeed. We, therefore, dismiss it.
670...1951 (9) TMI 30 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Motilal Laxmidas and Co. Versus The State of Bombay
........... in this very case, returns submitted in 1947 and April 1948 came up for disposal by the Sales Tax Officers on 28th June, 1950. (1) 1951 51 Bom. L.R. 280. 17.. For the foregoing reasons we consider that the orders under revision must be modified by deleting the penalties and exempting in full the refreshments (solid) served by the applicants to passengers at their kitchen or on the platform or in the train. 18.. We wanted the parties to give us the exact figures of the tax payable in accordance with the above judgment but the applicants representative pleads his inability to give them and wants that the cases should be remanded to the Sales Tax Officer. In the circumstances we shall send the cases back for the purpose. 19.. We pass the following order ORDER The Sales Tax Officer shall fix the figures of assessment in accordance with the above judgment without any amount of penalty. There will be no order as regards the costs of both the applications before us. Case remanded.
671...1951 (9) TMI 31 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Shah Khimji Shamji Versus The State of Bombay
........... e purchases made from registered dealers only. I think this cannot be the intention of Government. The sales tax on pre-registra- tion purchases has already gone into the price and the retention of 25 or more is itself a penalty for late registration. The Sales Tax Officers ought, I think, to allow the remission of 75 on all pre-registration taxable purchases after adding 10 to arrive at the applicant s sales turnover on the line adopted in new Rule 26A(4)(b) of 29th April, 1948, in composi- tion cases of small registered dealers having a gross turnover not exceeding Rs. 60,000. There seems to be nothing in the findings of the Sales Tax Officer in this case to justify an additional penalty under Section 11(5). ORDER. The application is allowed. The papers of the case should be sent to the Collector of Sales Tax with a direction that he should hear the revision application on merits and pass suitable orders. No order as regards costs before this Tribunal. Application allowed.
672...1951 (9) TMI 32 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Govindram Laxman Prasad Versus State of Madhya Pradesh
........... t, it must be said that no proof was demanded. Even if the statement were true it would not affect the validity of any provision of the Act. The position is, in certain respects, not dissimilar to that which their Lordships of the Privy Council discussed in The Governor-General in Council v. The Province of Madras(1) where the imposition of two distinct taxes-an excise duty and a tax on sales-more or less simultaneously, at the time the goods left the factory or workshop for sale, was considered not open to objection in law. Dual taxation of the kind alleged, where it has actually been levied, on a single transaction of sale, may be attacked on grounds of (1) 1945 1 S.T.C. 135. policy, but cannot be called in question legally, under any of the provisions of our Sales Tax Act. 23.. The case, in my view, has been rightly decided by the learned Sales Tax Commissioner and, as my learned colleague shares this view, the application for revision is dismissed. Application dismissed.
673...1951 (9) TMI 33 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Motilal Ramchandra Oswal Versus The State of Bombay
........... J., and acquitted the applicant. We may say that the same curious result follows in the case before us where a small turnover of a man as processor is sought to be combined with his general turnover. Both Mudholkar, J., and the Division Bench negatived such an interpretation and held that the two turnovers cannot be so combined. Following this ruling, we have to reject the interpretation adopted by the Collector of Sales Tax. We will also respectfully invite his attention to the rules of interpretation mentioned in the Nagpur case. We are clearly of opinion that the turnover of goods processed by the dealer must either exceed Rs. 10,000 or his total turnover must exceed Rs. 30,000 before the liability of a dealer to pay sales tax can arise. In the above view the application succeeds. We pass the following order. The application is allowed and the assessment made against the applicant set aside. The applicant is entitled to his costs before the Tribunal. Application allowed.
674...1951 (9) TMI 34 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
Central Potteries Ltd., Nagpur Versus State of Madhya Pradesh
........... vernment provides for appeals against the assessments made by two classes of persons only, viz., a Sales Tax Officer and an Assistant Sales Tax Officer, but not against the assessments of an Additional Sales Tax Officer. Clearly, therefore, the applicant had no right to prefer an appeal to any authority under the Sales Tax Act. That being the position, two courses were open to him-to institute a civil suit or to come to this Court under Article 226. He has come to this Court and we think that it will be more con- venient and be in the interest of justice if we were to exercise our jurisdiction to interfere in a case of this type. We are clear that the assessment was made by the Additional Sales Tax Officer without any jurisdiction. We therefore quash it. Nothing that we have said should be taken to mean that the proper authority cannot proceed with the assessment. 6. For the reasons we allow the application with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 50, if certified. Application allowed.
675...1951 (9) TMI 35 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Hirji Govindji, In re
........... y. Goods are despatched-the Calcutta firm undertaking to find buyers for the goods, at prices approved by the applicant, (sub- ject to narrow marginal fluctuations) and guaranteeing payment of the price received, after it has reimbursed itself its expenses and appro- priated to itself its commission or reward for the services rendered. In this process, we consider that the contract of sale takes place between the Calcutta firm and the person who buys of that firm after the goods have reached Calcutta. There has been no sale in this Province and the amounts involved are exempt from assessment under our Act. 10.. In the result, we direct that the amount of Rs. 1,435-12-0 mentioned in paragraph 3 of this order and the amount of Rs. 1,87,182-11-6 mentioned at the beginning of paragraph 5 should be excluded from the taxable turnover, as determined by the Assessing Officer. To this extent the application is allowed, and in other respects it is rejected. Application partly allowed.
676...1952 (1) TMI 10 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Harmukh Rai Jairam Das Versus The State
........... ice to the assessee. It is necessary to add that the Sales Tax Officer had wrongly thought that the amount of Rs. 1,349 which was not entered in the pucca rokar was suspicious. On this point the Board has commented that the amount of Rs. 1,349 has been explained and books were pro- duced to show that the item has been accounted for. For these reasons I hold that the failure to issue notice under Sec- tion 13(2) of the Act has caused prejudice to the assessee and in con- sequence the assessment made by the Sales Tax Officer is invalid in the circumstances of the case. The case should now recommence from the stage when the Sales Tax Officer should issue notice under Section 13(2)(a) of the Act, on the basis of the returns which have been already furnished. After such notice is issued the assessment proceedings should be completed in the manner prescribed by the Act. There will be no order as to costs of this reference. SARJOO PRASAD, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
677...1952 (1) TMI 11 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Banarsi Lal Versus The Province of Bihar
........... h in this argument which requires qualification only in this sense that the discretion vested in the Board must be exercised not arbitrarily but in a judicial manner. Though the judg- ment of the Board in this case is defective the subsequent resolution dated 19th May, 1949, makes it clear that the Board refused in its discretion to go into questions of fact in view of the failure of the assessee to maintain books and to produce accounts and because of the concurrent findings of the two courts as to the quantum of business. Upon the particular circumstances of this case it cannot be held that the refusal of the Board in its power of revision to go into questions of fact is illegal. The question referred must therefore be answered against the assessee. We do not propose to make any order as to costs of this reference. The assessee is entitled to refund of the amount of Rs. 100 in deposit since the first question has been answered in his favour. Reference answered accordingly.
678...1952 (1) TMI 12 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
M Hassanjee and Sons Versus The State
........... usion, had the present Rule 5(iv) of the rules made under the Act been in existence during the period to which this assessment relates. What apparently has escaped the notice of the learned Commissioner as also of the learned counsel, who represented the applicant before me, is Section 24 of the Sale of Goods Act, the principles of which are more or less embodied in Rule 5(iv). Even in the absence of Rule 5(iv), Section 24 applies to cases of goods supplied on approval . On this ground, therefore, the application succeeds, so far as the point of law urged is concerned. As to the exact amount qualifying for exclusion, I do not propose to give a decision in these proceedings. That decision should be given by the Commissioner, to whom I remand the case, after examining the particulars of each of the transactions involved, in order to see whether it is covered by the provisions of Section 24 of the Sale of Goods Act, read with Rule 5 (iv), referred to above. Ordered accordingly.
679...1952 (1) TMI 13 - VINDHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
State of Vindhya Pradesh Versus Raghunath Mannulal
........... taken under the Ordinance with the provisions given in it can be deemed to take away the jurisdiction of the Court. The case reported in Bai Marium v. Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property, Jetpur(4), is also similar to the Bombay ruling referred to above. The principle is that a special law takes away the general jurisdiction of the civil Court only in regard to acts done under that Act. The same principles also apply to limitation. The special rule of limitation can only apply to the acts done in the special law. If the act has been done outside the special law then the general law of limitation comes in. In regard to limitation and jurisdiction the fact that the taxing authority was not aware of the illegality at the time of the collection, but became aware of it subsequently makes no difference. The result is that the appeals are without substance, and are dismissed. Costs to the plaintiffs-respondents and pleader s fee at 31/2 per cent in each case. Appeals dismissed.
680...1952 (1) TMI 14 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Ramdhan Lal Sharaff Versus The Province of Bihar
........... ally arise and we do not propose to attempt any answer to those questions. It is necessary to add that Mr. R.J. Bahadur pointed out that the assessment in this case is based upon the figures for the quarter ending 31st March, 1945, which is subject matter of M.J.C. 131 of 1948 in which we have called for a further statement of case. It was contended by the learned counsel that if the Sales Tax Authorities revise the figure of assessment for the quarter ending 31st March, 1945, the position with respect to the assessment in this case will be affected. The argument is not really relevant for the disposal of this reference. Should the assessment in M.J.C. No. 131 of 1948 be revised in favour of the assessee it will however be open to him to make a claim before the taxing authorities in regard to the period covered in this case. There will be no order as to costs of this reference but the assessee will not be entitled to a refund of the amount in deposit. Reference not answered.
681...1952 (1) TMI 15 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Haji Dawood Usman of Yeotmal Versus The State
........... for the Akola and Malkapur shops, after giving due consideration to the misclassification made by the assessee in the accounts of other branches. In the circumstances in which he found himself by the inability of the assessee to produce his account books, it is difficult to see how he could have given his reasons at any great length. It is, of course, possible that another officer may have viewed the case from a different angle but that possibility by itself does not vitiate the proceedings of the officer who actually handled the case. Moreover, the contention that a particular figure of percentage enhance- ment was appropriate and that another figure was not cannot be said to raise any substantial question of law, which is the only ground on which revision can be considered. 5.. For the reasons given above, I see no case for interference with the findings and decisions of the departmental officers and I, therefore, reject this application for revision. Application rejected.
682...1952 (1) TMI 16 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
RS. Rekhchand Mohta Versus The State
........... enactments being reduced to a nullity. But, as it actually happened, however, the Legislature provided neither for mention of the officer s predecessor-in-officer, nor naturally of the circumstances in which review of the predecessor s order was permis- sible. The implication of Section 22(6) therefore would be to construe the person referred to therein by office or by designation and not by name. In other words, all that it means in the context of the present case, is that the Commissioner may review any order passed by the Commissioner. If, for example, A has been succeeded in office by B, B is competent to review an order passed by A. B s powers of review are not restricted to reviewing orders passed by B alone. 4.. For the reasons given above, I hold that the Commissioner has taken an incorrect view of the legal position and I, therefore, set aside his order and direct that he should now dispose of, on merits, the application for review made to him. Ordered accordingly.
683...1952 (1) TMI 17 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Messrs. Raghubar Mandal Harihar Mandal Versus The State of Bihar
........... n acting upon it. I further agree with their Lordships view that the sooner it is understood that these are questions of fact the better it is and that the application to state cases must be discouraged in matters which, on ultimate analy- sis, are really only questions of a fair figure of assessment. The Privy Council decision in Malik Damsaz Khan v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab and N.W.F.P.(2) also adds strength to the view which I have taken. If in substance there is no difference between an assessment under Section 23(3) and an assessment under Section 23(4) of the Income-tax Act, on the same principle there is no real difference (1) (1928) 3 I.T.C. 48. (2) 1947 15 I.T.R. 445. between an assessment under Section 10(2)(b) and an assessment under Section 10(4) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act. In the result, the question raised is answered in the affirmative. There will be no order for the costs of this proceeding. REUBEN, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
684...1952 (1) TMI 18 - TRAVANCORE AND COCHIN HIGH COURT
The Bombay Company Ltd., Alleppey and Others Versus The State and Others
........... ll and at his request two more weeks have been granted to him. In the circumstances, we do not propose to wait for hearing the arguments in these two petitions also before pronounc- ing this judgment. Applying the principle which we have recognised, the transactions in the cases which we are now dealing with are exempted from the levy of sales tax and there will, therefore, be orders granting the writs prayed for to the petitioners therein with costs and advocate s fee which we fix at Rs. 250 in each case. We may add that we have not referred in this judgment to the details which were mentioned in the course of argument which are not material in dealing with the question of law which has arisen in these petitions. We have also not mentioned the points that were conceded on behalf of the State by the learned Advocate-General. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is granted under Article 132(1) of the Constitution as prayed by the learned Advocate-General. Ordered accordingly.
685...1952 (1) TMI 7 - HIGH COURT OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN
AM Muhammed Abdulla Tharaganar Versus Official Liquidator, Cape Comorin General Traffic Co. Ltd.
Compromise and arrangement, Oppression and Mismanagement ......
........... int of its being oppressive to some part of the members, the court would not have found it just and equitable to order the winding up of the company. This was not done and the present belated application has only the unjustified opinion of its authors to support it. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the arrangement proposed does not deserve to be considered by a meeting of the members of the company under the circumstances of this case and that the application for ordering a meeting of the members in that behalf should be rejected with costs. We fix the advocate s fee at Rs. 200 each for the respondent and for the liquidator s advocate. The amount shall be paid out of the assets in the hands of the liquidator. After this judgment was pronounced Mr. Ninan on behalf of the petitioner applies for a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution of India for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We are not satisfied that this is a fit case for granting such a certificate.
686...1952 (1) TMI 8 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Jayawant Ramrao Nana Versus The State of Bombay
........... eat them as accessories. They are attached to a motor, but this is done because Section 28 of the Motor Vehicles Act requires this to be done, obviously to facilitate traffic control and identification if not other police purposes. These are purposes extra- neous to the use of motor vehicles. I am of opinion that the number plates cannot be treated as accessories. With due deference to the Department, we must say that the contrary opinion expressed at page 228 of the Bombay Sales Tax Hand Book is not correct. I hold that the number plates in common with traffic signals are liable to sales tax at the general rate (1/2 anna) and not the special tax. P.C. HANSOTIA, MEMBER.-I agree. ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL. The order under revision is modified and it is directed that Rs. 1,951-1-0 out of the tax assessed and penalty imposed against the applicants be refunded to them after deducting therefrom the amount already refunded. There will be no order as regards costs. Ordered accordingly.
687...1952 (1) TMI 9 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Provincial Automobile Company Ltd., Nagpur Versus The State
........... rd Motor Company to the applicant and a second sale by the applicant to the consumers. As the appropriations took place only at Bombay, it should be deemed that on the dates mentioned above, there was a transfer of property from the Ford Motor Company to the applicant and another transfer of property from the applicant to the consumer-both these transfers of property taking place at Bombay. As the transfers of property took place at Bombay, it follows that the sales of the motor vehicles mentioned above also took place at Bombay. I have already said that Explanation II below Section 2 (g) of the Sales Tax Act does not apply to the present case. 9. As the sales were made outside this province, no sales tax can be levied on these sales. The order of the learned Sales Tax Commissioner is, therefore, set aside so far as it pertains to the sales of the four vehicles mentioned above. H.S. KAMATH, PRESIDENT.-I agree with the conclusions of my learned colleague. Ordered accordingly.
688...1952 (10) TMI 17 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
BN. Viswanathan Versus Tiffin's Barytes Asbestos & Paints Ltd.
Meetings and Proceedings – Chairman of Meeting, Restriction on exercise of voting rights of members who have not paid calls, Etc., Proxies , Ascertainment of directors retiring by rotation and filling up vacancies and Alternate director – Appointment ......
689...1952 (10) TMI 18 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Mothey Krishna Rao Versus Grandhi Anjaneyulu
Memorandum and articles of association – Registration of ......
........... eclared intention in Exhibit A-5. It is brought to our notice that on a petition filed by the appellant, a commissioner was appointed by this court on 2nd May, 1951, to prepare a list of all documents and registers and that he was discharged on 2nd August, 1951, by PANCHAPAKESA AIYAR J. In an appeal against that order, GOVINDA MENON J. and RAMASWAMI GOUNDER J. appointed a receiver, who called a general body meeting at which six directors were re-elected. It is sufficient to say that during all this period, the second defendant continue to function as secretary and treasurer. What happened subsequent to the suit is quite immaterial and cannot affect its merits. For reasons given supra, it is quite impossible for us to give the plaintiff any relief in the plaint as framed and on the footing on which he has come to court. We dismiss his appeal, but we consider this to be a fit case in which the parties should be directed to bear their own costs throughout and direct accordingly.
690...1952 (10) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
India Sugar Refineries Ltd. Versus Estate of V. Ramalingam
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc. ......
........... in a fiduciary capacity of his position to make a gain. The law says that such a person shall not keep that gain to himself but shall give it up to the person to whom he owes a fiduciary duty. To such a suit there is no other article applicable and therefore Article 120 must apply. The decision of the Full Bench of this court in Subbiah Thevar v. Samiappa Mudaliar supports us in this view. The suit was filed in 1946 and is well within the time of six years provided by Article 120. We therefore do not agree with the learned Judge that the claim is barred by limitation. To this extent we allow this appeal and pass a decree in favour of the company for Rs. 8,510. From this amount of Rs. 8,510 will be deducted a sum of Rs. 2,406-1-0 which is the amount debited against Ramalingam towards godown rent. The decree will bear interest at six per cent. per annum from the date of suit. In this appeal, the appellant and the contesting respondents will pay and receive proportionate costs.
691...1952 (10) TMI 28 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
The State of Travancore-Cochin and Others Versus The Bombay Company Ltd., Alleppey and Others
Whether sales here in question, which occasioned the export in each case, fall within the scope of the exemption under Article 286(1)(b)?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. We are clearly of opinion that the sales here in question, which occasi ......
692...1952 (10) TMI 30 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
The State of Madras Versus North Madras Firewood Trading Co.
........... commission payable to the commission agent but it must not be overlooked that we are dealing with a set of circumstances out of the ordinary way. There was an emergency and the Government were acting under extraordinary powers conferred on them by emergency legislation in fixing the prices and in controlling the movement and distribution of essential commodities like firewood. That is why we find the Government, in the interest of all parties, fixing the commission payable to the respondents as agents for the owners of the firewood. The Government having proceeded all along on the assumption that all that the respondents were entitled to was commis- sion at a fixed rate, cannot now claim to treat them as independent dealers. We agree with the learned trial Judge s finding that the plaintiffs dealings come within the meaning of Section 8 of the Act and that therefore they are not liable to pay the tax. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
693...1952 (10) TMI 31 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
Jethalal Virajlal Versus State of Madhya Pradesh
........... , Board of Revenue(1). Section 2 (h) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, which defines sale price , has been reproduced in the judgment. That provision appears to be identical with Section 2 (h) of the Central Pro- vinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. The learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court construed this definition in the same way as we have done and have held that the sale price as defined in Section 2 (h) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, includes any amount charged or realised separately as sales tax from the purchaser by the dealer. 10.. We would, therefore, answer the question referred to us in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 247 of 1951 in the affirmative and dismiss Miscellaneous Petition No. 88 of 1952 with costs. Costs of the reference will be borne by the applicant in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 247 of 1951. Counsel s fee Rs. 50 in each case. Reference answered in the affirmative. Application dismissed. (1) 1949 1 S.T.C. 193 53 C.W.N. 278.
694...1952 (10) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court Reports Aswini Kumar Ghosh And Another Versus Arabinda Bose And Another
Whether the petitioner No. 1, who is an Advocate of the Supreme Court' can, in addition to exercising his right of pleading the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court which is not challenged by anybody, claim, by virtue of the provision of section ......
695...1952 (11) TMI 1 - SUPREME Court
Raghuvanshi Mills Limited, Bombay Versus Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay City
Liability To Tax ......
........... s considered by the Privy Council in The King v. B. C. Fir and Cedar Lumber Co. and we do not think their Lordships had in mind a case of this nature when they decided Shaw Wallace and Company s case. The learned Solicitor-General relies strongly on a clause which appears in three of the four policies with which we are concerned. That is a clause which states that the insured must do all he can to minimise the loss in profits and until he makes an endeavour to restart the business the moneys will not be paid. This he argued shows that the money was paid as an indemnity against the loss of profits and was neither income nor profits, nor was it a gain within the meaning of the section. We are unable to see how these receipts cease to be income simply because certain things must be done before the moneys can be claimed. In our opinion, the High Court was right in holding that the Rs. 14,00,000 is assessable to tax. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
696...1952 (11) TMI 8 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Makhan Lal Jain Versus Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd.
Oppression and Mismanagement – Right to apply under section 397 and 398 ......
........... hellip hellip hellip hellip hellip hellip hellip The obtaining of the consent is a condition precedent to the making of the petition. In other words, consent must have been obtained prior to the presentation of the application. The two sets of shareholders, who subsequently gave their consent, have clearly indicated in the document embodying their consent that the petition had already been filed and that they were expressing their approval thereof. Their subsequent consent is not a valid consent under sub-section (3). I am, therefore, of the opinion that the requirements of law regarding the obtaining of consent in writing have not been complied with and consequently this petition is not maintainable. It should fail on the preliminary ground. The opposite parties are entitled to their costs. Opposite parties 1 and 2 shall receive a sum of Rs. 500 each as costs and such of the remaining opposite parties as have engaged separate counsel shall get a sum of Rs. 200 each as costs.
697...1952 (11) TMI 9 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur Versus Mohanlal Ramkisan Nathani, Raipur
........... cles of luxury and therefore the word glass-ware must be understood to apply only to such articles made of glass as are used for luxury. I do not think that all the articles specified in this Schedule can be properly regarded as luxury articles. Even assuming that Schedule I is confined to only articles of luxury, that is to say, the articles used by the well-to-do classes, it seems difficult to hold that glass panes would not fall within the term glass-ware . It is common knowledge that glass panes are not used by the poorer classes of people. For, they are not affixed to windows or doors of their houses. In my opinion, therefore, the term glass-ware whether it is interpreted in a narrow sense or otherwise, would necessarily include glass panes. I answer the second question accordingly. 9.. The answers be sent to the Board of Revenue. Costs of this reference will be borne as incurred. Reference answered accordingly. (1) (1886) 16 Q.B.D. 636, 641. (2) 1914 1 K.B. 641 at 647.
698...1952 (12) TMI 1 - SUPREME Court
Anglo-French Textile Company Limited Versus Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras
Carry Forward, Profits And Gains, Set Off ......
........... forward the question of its determination and computation becomes irrelevant. The High Court proceeds on the ground that when proceedings a taken under Section 34 the assessee is not entitled to reopen the who proceedings as the further proceedings are limited to assessing that portion of the income which has escaped assessment. We need not express any opinion on this. The question we have to answer is confine to the facts and circumstances of this case and those circumstances a (1) that no return was filed at any stage of the case disclosing an income, profits or gains at all, (2) that proceedings were later take under Section 34, and (3) in the course of these proceedings the assess claimed that a certain loss should be determined and recorded. Our answer is that that cannot be done for the reasons we have given an that consequently the question referred was rightly answered in the negative by the High Court. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
699...1952 (12) TMI 2 - SUPREME Court
Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras Versus K. Srinivasan And K. Gopalan
Assessment Year, Income Tax, Previous Year ......
........... ar did not seriously press this matter before us. He, however, drew our attention to the directions contained in the Income-tax Manual in force for a number of years and contended that the department itself placed on sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 25 the same construction as was placed on them by the senior Judge in the High Court and that was the true construction of these two sub-sections. This argument, in our opinion, has no validity. The department changed its view subsequently and amended the manual. The interpretation placed by the department on these sub-sections cannot be considered to be a proper guide in a matter like this when the construction of a statute is involved. The result is that we allow the appeal and hold that the answer given by the senior Judge to the question referred was wrong and that the answer given by Viswanatha Sastri, J., was the correct one. In the circumstances of this case we would make no order as to costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
700...1952 (12) TMI 22 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Sha Mulchand & Co. Versus Jawahar Mills Ltd.
Shares – Power, to issue of at discount and Power of court to rectify register of members ......
........... so forth which would in law bring about the change in legal status, namely the extinguishment of his own title and the transfer of it to another, for estoppel is no more than a rule of evidence which prevents a man from challenging the existence or non-existence of a fact. Once the facts are ascertained, or by a fiction of law are deemed to exist, then it is those facts which bring about the alteration in legal status it is not the estoppel as such nor is it the abandonment or waiver per se. I prefer therefore to adhere to what I conceive is the proper legal nomenclature. As I understand it estoppel was the basis of the decision in Clark and Chapman v. Hart. See Lord Wensleydale s judgment at page 1458 and the Lord Chancellor s at page 1453 so also in Garden Gully United Quartz Mining Company v. Hugh McLister. That there is no sufficient ground for estoppel in this case is shown by the facts set out in the judgment of my learned brothers. I agree that the appeal must succeed.
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