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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 8 of 8 Records
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1950 (6) TMI 18
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... ... ..... dge for amendment of plaint and joinder of parties which was then rejected by the Subordinate Judge. He was a party in the revision petition before this Court which revision petition was allowed ex parts against him and the joinder and the amendment of the plaint allowed. Since then he has not contested that order. The contest is by other persons, namely, defendants 2 to 4 who would not be in any way harassed and vexed by the joint trial of the claim against them with that against defendant l, and as far as they, i.e., defendants 2 to 5, are concerned the trial of the suit will not be at all embarrassed. 25. Therefore, in view of the special and very peculiar facts of this case I am of opinion that the order previously passed allowing the amendment of the plaint and the joinder should not be disturbed and defendants 2 to 5 should not be dismissed from the suit and the suit should be allowed to proceed as it is being done now. 26. The rule is, therefore, discharged with costs.
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1950 (6) TMI 17
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... ... ..... cer who has a statutory duty imposed upon him to proceed if he makes a discovery within the meaning of Section 34 of that Act. He has to determine the facts and the law in order to give him the jurisdiction to proceed and if in the determination of this he goes wrong, the proper remedy for an assessee is to go up in appeal and to have a case stated to High Court under the provisions of the Income Tax Act. The determination of the place of assessment of an assessee on the determination of which Courts in England have issued writs of prohibition is a matter to be determined by the Commissioner of Income Tax and not by the Courts. Looked at from any angle, therefore, the petition was misconceived and must therefore be dismissed. As the matter is one which has come up for the first time before this courts and the principles on which this Court will proceed had not been determined before, I would not award costs against the petitioner. Harnam Singh, J. I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1950 (6) TMI 16
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... ... ..... e Board in the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving, (1905) A. C. 369 (74 L. J. P. C. 77) where it is in effect laid down that, while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matter of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment." There is nothing is Article 227, Constitution Act, which would indicate that there was such an intendment as is sought to be attributed to Article 227. Certainly there are no express words in the Article which would give the Court the right to interfere with a right in existence at the time of the passing of the Constitution Act. 3. In these circumstances we are of opinion that this Rule must be discharged with costs. Certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court is granted. K.C. Chunder J. I agree.
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1950 (6) TMI 15
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... ... ..... or ancillary to the main legislation, they could not be severed from the rest of the enactment. In my opinion, the impugned Act in this case is of the same nature; the whole texture of the Act is inextricably interwoven, and a large number of the provisions relating merely to possession are ancillary and incidental to the main legislation. It would be impossible to sever some of the provisions from the rest. Such a severance would disturb and defeat the whole scheme of the Act. 87. For the reasons given above, the suit must succeed, and the plaintiff will get a declaration that the Bihar State Management of Estates and Tenures Act 1949, is ultra vires and wholly void. The plaintiff is also entitled to an order of injunction in the terms asked for. The plaintiff is further entitled to his costs against the State of Bihar. 88. As to the applications in the miscellaneous cases, I agree with my learned brethren that they be dismissed without costs, for the reasons given by them.
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1950 (6) TMI 14
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... ... ..... term in the contract that the payment would be made to the assessee at the office of the Reserve Bank of India, Bombay. But even if this condition was not there the fact that the cheques were issued by the Controller of Military Accounts on the Reserve Bank of India at Bombay and when sent to the assessee were sent by him (the assessee) for collection to the Imperial Bank of India, Bhopal, the inference is clear that the receipt was in British India at Bombay. The cheques given to the Imperial Bank of India for collection were really given to the Bank as agent of the assessee and its receiving the money in Bombay must be held to be receipt by the assessee in British India. In view of this, I would answer the question in the affirmative and hold that the profit made by the assessee from the contracts executed in the Bhopal State was received or deemed to be received in British India by or on behalf of the assessee under Section 4(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act. Soni, J.-I agree.
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1950 (6) TMI 13
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... ... ..... ng of the Assistant Commissioner on this question, this petition cannot succeed. We have found against the petitioner on this point. We therefore hold, agreeing with the learned Commissioner, that the appeal was summarily dismissed as time-barred and the further finding embodied in the order that tobacco leaf was taxable was unnecessary and could not be made the basis for a demand for reference in the circumstances of the case. The decision of the Assistant Commissioner has been correctly treated as only a decision on the question of limitation and therefore it cannot give rise to any other question of law arising from the dispute as to the liability of the petitioner to assessment. It will be open to the petitioner to question whether tobacco leaf is taxable in any subsequent assessment. For reasons given above, this petition must fail and is dismissed. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. THADANI, C.J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1950 (6) TMI 12
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... the definition given in section 153 (6) widens the definition of the term company . I would, therefore, answer the question in the following way mdash (1)For the purposes of winding up an unregistered company would be covered by the definition of the company given in section 2 (2) of the Indian Companies Act. (2)Section 153 (6) enlarges the definition of the expression company and brings within its ambit all companies which can be wound up under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act which would include foreign companies. See Mercantile Bank of Australia and North Australian Co, v. Goldsborough. (3)A scheme of arrangement between the Indian creditors of the Frontier Bank Limited is allowable under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act. (4)If a proper case is made out, the High Court, having jurisdiction, will sanction a proposed scheme. ORDER OF THE COURT Khosla, Harnam Singh and Kapur, JJ. mdash The question referred to the Full Bench is answered in the affirmative.
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1950 (6) TMI 11
Winding up – Powers of liquidator and Appeals from orders ... ... ... ... ..... eneral Manager and Oldrich Brazina as Chief Accountant as a mere description. That the absence of a necessary party makes the appeal and the petition incompetent is clear from the rule laid down in Rameshwar Das v. The Official Receiver, Delhi. The petition must fail on the ground that the company which was a party to the original proceedings and is a necessary party has not been a party to these proceedings and the order has become final with regard to it. Mr. Ratan Lal Chowla then prayed that he be allowed to amend the petition and to add parties. I am unable to grant this prayer because by the non-inclusion of the name of the company in the list of respondents the appeal has become barred by time and, therefore, the name cannot be added as a respondent see Rameshwar Das v. Official Receiver, Delhi and Chokalingam Chetty v. Seethai Achai. I am, therefore, of the opinion that these petitions fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Khosla, J. mdash I agree
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