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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 22 Records
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1952 (5) TMI 29
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... ... ..... the principles of natural justice was thus an order passed without jurisdiction and was liable to be quashed by Certiorari. It appears however that subsequently upon representation being made by the petitioner a representative of the petitioner was heard on 9th June 1951 at Naini Tal but the respondent confirmed the order that he made on 19th May 1951 at Dehra Dun. The petitioner has however not been made a party to the proceeding and has thus been reprieved of its right of appeal under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act. In the circumstances the petitioner has properly invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 19. In my view this petition should succeed, The Rule is made absolute. The orders dated 19th May 1951 and 9th June 1951 are quashed. The opposite party is directed to forbear from giving effect to these orders. The petitioner is entitled to costs of the present proceedings. Hearing fee is assessed at three gold mohurs.
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1952 (5) TMI 28
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... ... ..... xtend to personal property which is different from personal rights. Further this article does not import any legal obligation but is an assurance only. All that the covenant does is to recognise the title of the Ruler as owner of certain properties. To say that the Ruler is the power of certain properties is not to say that those properties shall in no circumstances be acquired by the State. The fact that his personal properties are sought to be acquired on payment of compensation clearly recognises his title just as the titles of other proprietors are recognised. Finally, the jurisdiction of the Court to decide any dispute arising out of the covenant is barred by article 363. 54. In my judgment, for reasons stated above and those stated in my judgment in the Bihar appeals, these petitioners must be dismissed. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J. 55. I have nothing useful to add and I agree with the orders made by my Lord the Chief justice and my learned brothers. 56. Petition dismissed.
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1952 (5) TMI 27
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... ... ..... he ground that they had purchased the mortgage properties in execution of a fraudulent decree. Both the lower courts have found that the mortgagees defendants had practised fraud in obtaining the decree and purchased the equity of redemption in execution of the fraudulent decree. Upon these findings it is manifest that the defendants must hold the advantage gained by them for the benefit of the mortgagor. In my opinion the plaintiff has been rightly granted a decree for redemption by both the lower courts and that the second appeal to the High Court should be dismissed. For the reasons assigned I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice and hold that upon the facts stated the plaintiff can ignore the sale on the ground that the decree in the money suit was fraudulent and that the plaintiff is entitled to be granted a decree for redemption of the mortgaged land. I regret that I have reached a conclusion different from that Reuben, J., for whose opinion I have always great respect.
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1952 (5) TMI 26
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... ... ..... n these circumstances, there were operations on the soil of the land itself by human, skill and labour which factors have not been found to be present in the case before us. In this case, all that has been found by the Tribunal is that there was expenditure of human skill and labour for regeneration and preservation of the trees without defining what processes were carried on for this purpose. The only reference to the actual process carried on is found in the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax which, if referred to, would show that all that was done was pruning, weeding and protection of the trees. There was no process carried on on the soil itself or directed towards the growth of the trees. Consequently, in this case, it has to be held that the income derived from the forest was not income from land used for agricultural purposes or by agriculture. Therefore, our answer to the first question is in the negative and to the second in the affirmative.
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1952 (5) TMI 25
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... ... ..... lar rate. Only three markets were selected, called the 'notified market' at the last closing rate of which, contracts made previous to the Ordinance must be settled. It is quite clear therefore that the real character of the Ordinance was to regulate the jute trade within the province. This is the pith and substance of the Ordinance. It was necessary to pass the Ordinance to meet the situation brought about by devaluation. The provisions in the Ordinance relating to contracts are only incidental. 69. We are therefore of opinion that the Ordinance is intra vires and declare it to be such. The original contracts must be settled in terms of Cl. 3 (c) (ii). But no claim has been made on this basis either before us or the Court below. 70. The result therefore is that the appeal must be allowed. We set aside the decree of the learned trial Judge with costs here and below. Certified for two counsel. Arthur Trevor Harries, C.J. 71. I agree. Gopendra Nath Das, J. 72. I agree.
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1952 (5) TMI 24
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... ... ..... he provisions in the Act about "arrears of rent" and the "cost of works of benefit" amount to banked confiscation. Where the legislative action is arbitrary in the sense that it has no reasonable relation to the purpose in view, there is a transgression by the legislature of the limits of its power. Under the guise of legislating for acquisition, the legislature cannot enable the State to perpetrate confiscation; and if it does so, the Act to that extent has to be declared unconstitutional and void. If the part that is void is so inextricably interwoven into the texture of the rest, the whole Act has to be struck down. Such, however, is not the case here. 163. It is gratifying to note that the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act of 1950 and the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act of 1950 which are also in question are free from this blemish of reaching at arrears of rent due for any period anterior to the date of vesting.
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1952 (5) TMI 23
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... ... ..... ld not insist on its forfeiture merely for the purpose of spitting or spoiling the Company. It seems to me further on the materials, placed before us, that the affairs of the appellant Company pre-eminently require a public investigation which can best be obtained by means of a compulsory winding-up and I am clearly of the opinion that, in the circumstances of this case, a "winding-up order" is eminently desirable or, to quote the words of Buckley J., at least justifiable "as the means of bringing to an end a vicious career". In the above view of the matter I would hold that it is just and equitable to make a "winding-up order" in the present case and, in allowing the petitioner's application, the learned trial Judge has exercised his statutory discretion in a proper and judicious manner. The conclusions of the learned Judge must, accordingly, be affirmed. 50. I agree, therefore, that this appeal should fail and must be dismissed with costs.
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1952 (5) TMI 22
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... ... ..... re with trade or commerce. There may be some substance in the contention that transport business comes within the expression "Trade and Commerce", but the contention that the taxation will interfere with trade and commerce is absolutely devoid of substance and force. Taxation is sanctioned by the Constitution, and generally speaking a mere taxing Statute cannot be regarded as unconstitutional. There is no restriction put upon the business itself, everyone being free to travel and to transport goods by the vehicles mentioned in the Act, My learned brother has already referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in 'STATE OF BOMBAY v. F.N. BALSARA', AIR 1951 SC 318 and following the reasoning adopted in that case, the Act cannot be deemed to be unconstitutional even if it indirectly affects the business of transportation. I, therefore, hold, in respectful agreement with the views' of my learned brothers, that all these suits must be dismissed with costs.
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1952 (5) TMI 21
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... ... ..... oned. The appeal petition is not entertained under Section 34(2). Inform the appellant." By this order the Assistant Commissioner refused to admit the appeal and finally disposed of it. This power can be exercised only under Section 35 of the Bengal Act. The order was therefore an order under Section 35 of the Bengal Act and an appeal therefore lay to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 36 of the Bengal Act. It is true that the order does not expressly refer to Section 35 of the Bengal Act but as it can only be justified by that section it is an order under that section (See Commissioner of Income-tax v. Khemchand Ramdas 1938 6 I.T.R. 414 ; 65 I.A. 236. The Appellate Tribunal therefore should have held that the appeal to them was competent and should have decided it on the merits. It will be for the Appellate Tribunal to consider whether there is any merit in the appeal. I therefore answer the question referred in the affirmative. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1952 (5) TMI 20
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... ... ..... vision in the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act whereby a receiver appointed in respect of any estate in the possession of the executor may be assessed in respect of the income received by the executor. The estate of the deceased as such is not assessed to income-tax. The Appellate Tribunal was in error in thinking that the estate of the deceased was the assessee. In Income-tax law the estate of the deceased as such is not a separate juristic entity or a corporation sole represented from time to time by managers and receivers. Asit Kumar, as receiver, was therefore not liable to be assessed in respect of the income in question. For the purpose of the statute the income of the accounting year was never found with him so as to make him chargeable to taxation. His intervention in the assessment proceedings does not make the income of the "executors his income. The question must therefore be answered in the negative as stated by my Lord. Reference answered in the negative.
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1952 (5) TMI 19
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... ... ..... Another point which was argued related to the privilege which the Home Secretary claimed on behalf of the State Government under article 22 (6) of the Constitution. Government disclosed certain facts in the grounds furnished to the detenu and claimed privilege regarding the rest of the facts in its possession. In-our opinion, the grounds supplied were sufficiently specific and they could form a proper basis for the "satisfaction" of the Government. As regards the rest, Government has claimed privilege in the affidavit of the Home Secretary on the ground of public interest. This raises further questions which we do not intend to examine as the respondent is not to be re-arrested. The order of release was, in our opinion, wrong, but in view of Government’s undertaking not to re-arrest the respondent, we direct that he be not re-arrested in respect of the matters to which this appeal relates. Order of High Court set aside. Agent for the appellant P.A. Mehta. 683
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1952 (5) TMI 18
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... ... ..... is, however, does not make it any the less a compulsory deposit within the meaning of the Act. Whatever doubt may have existed under the earlier Act of 1897 the decisions cited for the respondent, Miller v. B.B. & C.I. Railway((1903) 5 Bom. L.R. 454.) and Raj Kumar Mukharjee v. W.G. Godfrey(A,I.R. 1922 Cal. 196) are under that Act, the meaning has now been made clear by the definition in section 2 of the present Act; any deposit "remaining to the credit of the subscriber or depositor after the happening of any such contingency" is also a compulsory deposit; and the contingency may be retirement from service. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order of the lower court dated 1st February, 1949, appointing a receiver is set aside as regards the Provident Fund amount of ₹ 1,563 lying to the credit of the judgment-debtor. Under the condition granting special leave, the Government will pay the 1st respondent's costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1952 (5) TMI 16
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... ... ..... xercise or enjoyment of post-constitutional rights and must, therefore, strike down the discriminatory procedure if it is sought to be adopted after the Constitution came into operation. To that situation, the decision of the Privy Council referred to above can have no application. For reasons Stated above, the conviction of the appellants on trial held by the Special Judge after the date of the Constitution according to the special procedure prescribed by the impugned Act and the sentences passed on them cannot be supported and these appeals must, therefore, be allowed and the convictions and sentences must be set aside. The appellants are entitled, after the Constitution, not to be discriminated against in matters of procedure and are entitled to be tried according to law. We, therefore, direct that they be tried for the offences alleged to have been committed by them according to law and in the meantime they be retained in custody as undertrial prisoners. Appeals allowed.
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1952 (5) TMI 15
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... ... ..... dhavi Amma(1) on an analogous,provision of the Code of Civil Procedure contained in Orders XL, Rule 1, and XLIII, Rule 1 (s). Order XLIII, Rule 1 (s) makes any order made under Order XL, Rule 1, appealable, while Order XL, Rule 1, only empowers the court to appoint a receiver. It was held that the order removing a receiver was appealable under Order XLIII, Rule 1, inasmuch as such an order fell within the ambit of Order XL, Rule 1, and the power of appointing a receiver included the power of removing or dismissing him. The present case stands on a higher footing. The power of granting a certain relief includes obviously the power of refusing that relief. In our opinion, therefore, the order made by the Additional Custodian refusing to declare Aboobaker an evacuee and his property evacuee property was an order made under section 7 of the Ordinance and was therefore appealable under section 24. The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1952 (5) TMI 14
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... ... ..... ent" and the "cost of works of benefit" amount to banked confiscation. Where the legislative action is arbitrary in the sense that it has no reasonable relation to the purpose in view, there is a transgression by the legislature of the limits of its power. Under the guise of legislating for acquisition, the legislature cannot enable the State to perpetrate confiscation; and if it does so, the Act to that extent has to be declared unconstitutional and void. If the part that is void is so inextricably interwoven into the texture of the rest, the whole Act has to be struck down. Such, however, is not the case here. 163. It is gratifying to note that the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act of 1950 and the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act of 1950 which are also in question are free from this blemish of reaching at arrears of rent due for any period anterior to the date of vesting. 164. Appeals allowed Petition No. 612 dismissed.
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1952 (5) TMI 13
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... ... ..... oceedings under the Act has been vested in a very high and responsible officer and he is expected to act with caution and impartiality while discharging his duties under the Act. This contention of Mr. Umrigar must, therefore, fail. The last point made by Mr Umrigar does not seem to us to be tenable. It is true that a procedure different from what is laid down under the ordinary law has been provided for a particular class of persons against whom proceedings could be taken under section 27 (1) of the City of Bombay Police Act, but the discrimination if any is based upon a reasonable classification which is within the competency of the legislature to make. Having regard to the objective which the legislation has in view and the policy underlying it, a departure from the ordinary procedure can certainly be justified as the best means of giving effect to the object of the legislature. In our opinion, therefore, there is no substance in the petition and it shall stand dismissed.
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1952 (5) TMI 12
Detention orders - Held that:- The grounds of detention must be regarded as a whole and when that is done the relevance of the first ground becomes plain. Gravamen of the charge against the petitioner is that he aimed at setting up a parallel government in the Uran Peta area and that in order to achieve that end he did various acts such as intimidating the workers in the salt pans with threats of murder, and his own workers with threats of death, unless they carried out his orders; and among the lesser instances given to illustrate the exercise of parallel governmental authority are the ones set out in the first ground, namely the infliction of fines with the sanction of excommunication and boycott to ensure their payment and due obedience to his orders. This point has no force and is decided against the petitioner. It will not be open to him to re-agitate this afresh when his case is reheard on the remaining issues.
All the four cases will now be set down for hearing on the remaining points which arise in them.
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1952 (5) TMI 11
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... ... ..... ferred to us, and that it is open to the State Government hereafter to assess the assessees on such contracts as can properly come within the purview of the Explanation to sub-section (12) of Section 2 of the Act. We have already stated in the earlier part of our judgment that we have not before us material upon which we can come to the conclusion that the contracts of sale involved in this reference can be deemed to be sales within the meaning of the Explanation to sub-section (12) of Section 2 of the Act. Whether if and when the authorities have material before them upon which they can bring the contracts of sale involved in this reference within the purview of the Explanation to sub-section (12) of Section 2 of the Act, they will be entitled to tax the assessees, is a question for the authorities concerned to decide. We express no opinion at this stage. The reference is disposed of by the answers which we have given above. DEKA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1952 (5) TMI 10
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... ... ..... the petitioners the petitioners might reasonably have been suspicious about the genuineness of the signature and might have wanted to verify them. But in the absence of any such circum- stances, I cannot but hold that the petitioners did all that they could reasonably be expected to do to comply with the requirements of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act and also the Sales Tax Rules 27A. I need hardly point out that a seller cannot be held responsible for the movements of a purchaser. The fact that the purchasing dealer is untraceable is wholly irrelevant in a matter of assessment as the Board has held already in another case. There is not evidence before me to con- clude that the declarations are not genuine or that they were manufactured by the petitioners. So the petition for revision is allowed. The claim for deduction of Rs. 24,150 from the gross turnover in order to arrive at a taxable turnover is allowed. The assessment should be revised accordingly. Petition allowed.
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1952 (5) TMI 9
The term "foodstuff" is ambiguous. In one sense it has a narrow meaning and is limited to articles which are eaten as food for purposes of nutrition and nourishment and so would exclude condiments and spices such as yeast, salt, pepper, baking powder and turmeric. In a wider sense it includes everything that goes toto the preparation of food proper (as understood in the narrow sense) to make it more palatable and digestible. Whether the term is used in a particular statute in its wider or narrower sense cannot be answered in the abstract but must be answered with due regard to the background and context.
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