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1959 (2) TMI 41
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... ... ..... these principles in mind if we examine the facts of this case we find that the requirements of Section 201 as laid down by the Supreme Court in Palivinder Kaur v. State of Punjab 1953CriLJ154 have been, made out. The evidence set out above clearly shows that this accused knew or had reason to believe that an offence had been committed and with that requisite knowledge and with intent to screen the offender from legal punishment, has given false information to P.W. 7, who was interested in bringing the offender to public justice and that this information did mislead P, W. 71 and laid a false trail for him and which false information stood out in its true colours only when P.W. 8 investigated the information given by the accused at the instance of P.W. 7. 28. Therefore, altering the conviction of the accused from Section 302 to Section 201 IPC we convict him accordingly and sentence him to rigorous imprisonment for seven years. HC/K.S.B. Conviction altered and sentence reduced.
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1959 (2) TMI 40
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... ... ..... ir and just that the accuracy or otherwise of such information will have to be ascertained and the only way of doing so is to give an opportunity to the assessee who can urge his plea as to whether the Income Tax Officer is misinformed. At any rate, giving this opportunity the Income Tax Officer will always be in a better position to know as to what extent that information is right and whether he should act upon it or not." 22. The Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Gunda Subbayya v. Commissioner of Income Tax, has been relied upon by his Lordship. 23. Taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of this case I find that the question that has been referred to us for decision should be answered in the negative. The petition is allowed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100 (one set of costs). 24. (C.P. 30 of 1956) This order will govern the connected petition No. 31 of 1956 a copy of which should be kept in the file of the connected petition.
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1959 (2) TMI 39
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... ... ..... lthough there is provision for prosecution and daily fines, a leisurely correspondence goes on, and of course nobody has need to be aware until told on solemn affirmation that in a congested living space, numerous mills are going on merrily, contributing their quota to the already unbearable smoke nuisance of the city and its suburbs, without erecting chimneys, and using whatever fuel comes handy. The inevitable conclusion must be that the restrictions imposed by the Act are by no means too wide or unconscionably strict or constitutionally unreasonable. The fact is that they are not wide enough, and not administered with that sense of urgency which is imperative, and without which, this statute will like its predecessor, be very soon relegated to the limbo of oblivion, like so many other statutes relating to public health and sanitation, so bravely promulgated and so utterly wasted. 11. The rule is discharged, interim orders if any, vacated. There will be no order for costs.
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1959 (2) TMI 38
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... ... ..... d only be decided by the appropriate Income Tax authority. It was a matter of discretion with the Income Tax Officer as the proviso only contains an enabling provision giving powers to the Income Tax Officer to reduce or waive the interest payable by the assessee. There is no mandatory direction that he must always do so. In this particular case, no question can arise for interference by this Court in respect of the exercise of the discretion by the Income Tax Officer when it is not even asserted that the Income Tax Officer paid no heed to this provision of law and that he ignored it when he passed the order. In all these circumstances, this ground also has no force. 3. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs, 4. This order will also govern the Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 748 of 1956 in which also the same principles of law are involved and the facts are similar though the figures or relevant years may be slightly different. That petition is also dismissed with costs.
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1959 (2) TMI 37
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... ... ..... ome up on the next date fixed is not proper compliance of Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and if there is, as is apparent, no legal order remanding the accused to police custody, the detention obviously would be questionable. 11. The learned Assistant Advocate-General for the State had no real answer to the contentions raised but suggested that in any event today (at the time of the hearing of the petition) the detenu was in proper legal custody, for the challan for those offences had meanwhile been put in Court. The submission is wholly untenable. In point of time, the question has to be settled whether at the time of arrest of the detenu, the detention was legal or not. 12. For all these reasons and considerations, I have no manner of doubt that the detention of the petitioner on the day he was taken into custody, e.g., 7th January, 1959, was wholly illegal. In this view, this petition must succeed and the petitioner detenu must regain his liberty forthwith.
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1959 (2) TMI 36
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... ... ..... manifest error apparent on the face of the record in taking proceedings in the manner in which he has done. Consequently, we allow this petition to the extent that a writ of mandamus shall issue to the opposite party directing him not to take any proceeding for recovery of the tax in pursuance of the notice dated the 4th November, 1955. We make it clear that this order will not stand in the way of the Income-tax Officer taking any other proceeding for the recovery of the tax against the petitioners, if permitted by law. In this case, though we are allowing the petition, the main grounds which were raised by the petitioners have not succeeded and consequently we direct that parties shall bear their own costs of this petition. Considering that this case raised complicated questions and had to be argued before us for about 5 days, we fix the fee for counsel on each side at ₹ 500 even though it is not necessary to fix it just at present for the purpose of taxation of fees.
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1959 (2) TMI 35
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... ... ..... stration. We do not see anything wrong in the said clauses of the deed warranting the rejection of the application of the assessee for registration, if we are to take into consideration the deed as a whole. These are only conditions prescribing the manner in which the business has to be conducted. Hence following, the aforesaid decision of the Tribunal, we hold that there is no justifiable reason to reject the application of the assessee for registration. We, therefore, direct the Income-tax Officer to grant registration to the assessee." The conclusion reached by the Tribunal appears to be correct and in the light of what we have stated above the question referred has to be answered in the affirmative. We do so, though in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Appellate Tribunal as provided in section 66(5) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
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1959 (2) TMI 34
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... ... ..... een infringed, it is not an error of law at all; and so an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari based on the alleged infringement of the rule must fail. 19. We would like to add that, if we had felt inclined to take a contrary view about the character of the rules, we would have considered the question as to whether it would not be more appropriate to place this matter before the learned judges who decided the case of R. Rama Reddiar, Civil Appeal No. 783 of 1957, D/- 6-2-1958 (supra), to deal with the question as to whether their decision has been properly interpreted in the present proceedings or not. However, on the view we take about the character of the relevant order, no other question really survives. 20. The result is both the appeals fail and must be dismissed with costs, one set in each. Sarkar J. 21. In view of the judgment of this Court in Civil Appeal No. 37 of 1958 (AIR 1959 SC 694), I agree with the judgment of my learned Brother Gajendragadkar J.
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1959 (2) TMI 33
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... ... ..... ether the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has not proceeded in accordance with the essential requirements of law which it was meant to administer." The words "law which it was meant to administer" are very significant. The Transport Authorities in the present case were certainly meant to administer the orders issued under s. 43-A. 37. There is one thing more that I wish to observe in this connection. It may be that an order which it is the bounden duty of the Transport Authority to obey may give it a certain amount of discretion, but that in my view would not make the order any the less a law. If the discretion has been duly exercised, there would be no error of law for the law itself gives the discretion. It would be the bounden duty of the tribunal to observe that law and so if necessary to exercise the discretion given by it. 38. For the reasons earlier mentioned, however, I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. 39. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (2) TMI 32
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... ... ..... hat in case we found for the plaintiffs on the question of infringement of copyright the damages to which the plaintiffs would be entitled should be ₹ 500; accordingly, we hold the plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages ₹ 500 from the defendants. It is not permissible for the plaintiffs-appellants to ask for an account of the profits made by the respondents, in addition to damages for infringement of copyright. In the result, the appeal is allowed the decree and judgment of Ramaswami, J. are set aside and the appellants are given a decree, for injunction in terms of Clause (a) of paragraph 15 of the plaint, and also a decree for damages in the sum of ₹ 500 with interest at 6 per cent per annum payable from this date till recovery. All other claims made in the plaint are refused, 12. The appellants will be entitled to get their costs incurred during the trial before Ramaswami, J, from the respondents. But there will be no order as to costs in the appeal.
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1959 (2) TMI 31
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... ... ..... also to quash the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax passed in revision by which that order was confirmed. The question of issuing a writ of mandamus to direct the Income-tax Officer; to withdraw the notice of demand issued by him on the basis of the order under section 35 of the Income-tax Act does not arise because, once that order of rectification under section 35 of the Act is quashed, the notice of demand automatically become ineffective. For these reasons, we allow this petition and quash the order of the Income-tax Officer dated 13th December, 1954, passed under section 35 of the Income-tax Act and the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax dated 18th September, 1955, passed in revision confirming that order of the Income-tax Officer. The petitioner will be entitled to costs of this petition form the Department which we fix at ₹ 400. For purposes of taxation, the fee of learned counsel for the Department will be taken at the same amount. Petition allowed.
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1959 (2) TMI 30
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... ... ..... a party. We are unable to read s. 57 as making cl. XVI in the Sixth Schedule a statutory provision by which certain disputes between any and every person have to be referred to arbitration. It was said on behalf of the appellant that the licence is a statutory document’ That, in our view, is a loose way of putting the thing. By that the utmost that can be meant is that it is issued under the terms of a statutory provision and must comply with the provisions thereof. But that cannot convert it into a statutory provision for reference to arbitration of disputes irrespective of the parties between whom the disputes may exist. In our view, therefore, cl. XVI of the Sixth Schedule of the Act of 1948 contains no provision for arbitration, statutory or otherwise, for reference of the dispute of the nature we have before us, between a licensed supplier of electricity and a consumer of it from him. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (2) TMI 29
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... ... ..... agreement which is for the benefit of one of the parties and which he may waive. This is a provision in an Act of Parliament, which, though to some extent it may be for the benefit of the parties to the difference, must be regarded as inserted in the interest of the public also In that case there was a provision made by the Legislature that disputes mentioned in the section of the Act were to be determined by an Expert nominated by the Board of Trade and it was contended that though not in the strict technical sense estoppel, it was a waiver of the provisions introduced into the Statute for the benefit of private rights. No doubt that was a case which proceeded on a question of jurisdiction but the judgment proceeded on the principle of waiver of a statutory provision inserted in public interest. Thus the plea of waiver is unsustainable. In our opinion, therefore, the judgment of the High Court is sound and the appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (2) TMI 28
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... ... ..... son and recovered the marked notes and other articles from him ; he searched the person of the informant and recovered the other notes marked but not given to the accused ; he took possession of the twenty wooden boxes intended to be booked and the forwarding note together with the record copy of the R/R; he got prepared relevant memoranda for the aforesaid recoveries and got them duly attested by witnesses; and thereafter on the basis of his investigation he sent a report to the Special Police Establishment Office, Indore. We do not know on the material placed before us what further things he did in the matter of investigation between the 14th and 21st when be obtained the permission of the District Magistrate. In the circumstances, we must hold, agreeing with the High Court that the investigation in this case was started by the Sub-Inspector on the 11th, i.e., ten days prior to his obtaining permission of the Magistrate. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (2) TMI 27
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... ... ..... done so, merely confirmed the additions of the income-tax authorities, probably under the impression that the two items of yield of oil and cake from unaccounted kernel and the value of deficit yield of oil and cake from kernel disclosed in the books would amount to ₹ 1,37,189. We cannot, having regard to the categorical observations of the Tribunal that the additions should be unitary where the proviso to section 13 of the Act is applied by making an estimate, assume that the Tribunal intended to negative the statement by also adding cash credits in computing the gross profits. In the circumstances we have no hesitation in holding that the addition on the flat rate of 9.5% adopted by the Tribunal in estimating the gross profit is proper and that the amount of ₹ 1,37,189, was wrongly computed. Our answer to the reference is in the negative. The assessee will receive costs from the Department. Advocate's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1959 (2) TMI 26
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... ... ..... pellate authority prescribed under the Assam Sales Tax Act, by implication repealed the provision in rule 74 of the relevant Rules to that extent. The question is not so much whether there was due legislative competence for the amendment of the Court-fees Act aforesaid, or for enactment of rule 74 of the Rules, as about the obvious conflict between the two provisions which admittedly relate to the self-same subject, namely, payment of fees for the above purpose. The two provisions, in my opinion, could not stand together and the later legislation under the Court-fees Act, which is an act of the Legislature itself and not merely that of a delegate, should prevail. But, I find that the Court-fees Act has since been again amended and the above provision has been deleted. It is, therefore, unnecessary to pursue the matter any further and, for purposes of this case, I would be content to give my assent to the answers proposed by my learned brother. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (2) TMI 25
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... ... ..... the purpose of the Act and be detrimental to its object, namely, the collection of revenue. In such a case it is not for the Courts to lay down as to what procedure should be adopted for the better collection of the revenue, nor is it for the Courts to add to the Rules and Regulations, or to the wordings of a Statute or the Rules made under it, and in the particular case I find myself unable to do so. It cannot be an unreasonable restriction upon a fundamental right to provide that it should be exercised without negligence. The result is that although in this particular case it is quite possible that there may ensue a case of hardship, I am unable to direct the respondents to allow exemption under section 5 (2) (a) (ii) of the Act upon secondary evidence of the issue of declaration forms, which is in reality the relief claimed. The application, therefore, fails and must be dismissed. The rule is discharged, interim orders vacated no order as to costs. Application dismissed.
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1959 (2) TMI 24
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... ... ..... e of the question, were sold by the assessee from their depot at Calcutta in the year 1948-49. These goods thus are of the class mentioned by the Supreme Court in their judgment cited above. They were manufactured by the assessee in U.P. and the question of taxing them has arisen on the basis that they were eventually sold by the assessee in the assessment year in question from their depot at Calcutta outside the State of U.P. In such a case the State of U.P. had power to tax the sale of goods to the extent of the nexus between the sale and the taxing State of U.P. in accordance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the second question must be answered in the affirmative. As a result, we answer the first question in the negative and the second question in the affirmative. The Department will be entitled to its costs from the assessee for this reference. We fix the fee of learned counsel for the Department at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (2) TMI 23
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... ... ..... an absence of jurisdiction the situation is materially altered. And, it would not make any difference whether the absence of jurisdiction arises out of an attempt to usurp jurisdiction, or because the officer has through ignorance or otherwise strayed beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. In relation to a tax, where an assessing officer acts outside the boundaries of his jurisdiction, his acts would to that extent be null and void. No one would have any power to call upon a citizen to make payment of a tax so imposed, and, if any authority seeks to collect a tax so imposed the citizen can call in aid Article 265, and seek the assistance of this Court. There was some argument as to the exact nature of the writ that may issue in a case of this kind. We are of opinion that a writ of mandamus should issue directing the respondents to forbear from collecting the amounts which form the subject-matter of these petitions. There will be no order as regards costs. Petitions allowed.
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1959 (2) TMI 22
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... ... ..... ndia Act, 1935, and this again excluding the entries in List I relating to any tax or duty. Before us however learned counsel rested on the coming into force of the TravancoreCochin Sales Tax Act, 1125, on 30th May, 1950, after the date of the Constitution to argue that Article 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution applied and that brought in the principle of ultra vires. But this is nothing original for the argument was already addressed in Gannon Dunkerley and Co. Madras (Private) Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, Mattancheri 1957 8 S.T.C. 347 1957 Ker. L.T. 380., and then not by reference to the definition of law in force in Article 372 of the Constitution which gave importance to the passing or making of the Act rather than its operativeness either at all or in particular areas. There is therefore no substance in this point either. 6.. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 200. Appeal dismissed.
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