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Showing 1 to 20 of 90 Records
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1961 (3) TMI 149
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... ... ..... f the Administration of Evacuee Property Act in so far as the question of cancellation of allotment is concerned. We cannot accept the argument because, apart from the fact that the acquired properties have ceased to be evacuee properties, clause (d) of r. 102 permits the managing officer or managing corporation to cancel allotment for any other sufficient reason to be recorded in writing . The only effect of r. 102 is to permit cancellation of an allotment for reasons stated. That is all. In our opinion, therefore, this rule does not help the appellants. 17. Mr. Khanna had raised three other points but upon the view which we have taken as to the effect of Sections 12 and 19 of the Act, it is not necessary to consider them. 18. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. We, however, make no order as to costs because had there been no delay on the part of the Custodian General in dealing with the revision application the present situation would not have arisen. 19. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (3) TMI 148
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... ... ..... es while there is no such appeal against the findings and recommendations of the Tribunal, the proceedings were substantially different. The court further pointed out that as inquiries could be directed according to procedures substantially different at the discretion of the executive authority exercise whereof is not governed by any principles having any rational relation to the purpose to be achieved by the inquiry, the order selecting a prejudicial procedure, out of the two open for selection, is hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution. I cannot find anything here that would justify a revision of the view taken by us in that case. 33. As in my judgment the U.P. Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947 are hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution, I would allow the appeal and set aside the order of dismissal passed against the appellant. By Court 34. In view of the majority Judgment of the Court, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 35. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (3) TMI 147
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... ... ..... Thus in law the word "modify" may just mean "vary", i.e., amend; and when Art. 370(1) says that the President may apply the provisions of the Constitution to the State of Jammu and Kashmir with such modifications as he may by order specify it means that he may vary (i.e., amend) the provisions of the Constitution in its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. We are therefore of opinion that in the context of the Constitution we must give the widest effect to the meaning of the word "modification" used in Art. 370(1) and in that sense it includes an amendment. There is no reason to limit the word "modifications" as used in Art. 370(1) only to such modifications as do not make any "radical transformation". We are therefore of opinion that the President had the power to make the modification which he did in Art. 81 of the Constitution. The petition therefore fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. 7. Petition dismissed.
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1961 (3) TMI 146
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... ... ..... s. WE express our concurrence with the decision of the RangoonHigh Court in ILR 11 Rang 467 AIR 1934 Rang 8 but our respectful dissent from the decision n ILR 12 Rang 437 AIR 1934 Rang 321, 14 Rang 292 AIR 1936 Rang 290 and that of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in ILR (1957) AP 505. (52) In the result C. M. A. No. 120 of 1957 is allowed and the judgment of the Court below in I. A. No. 245 of 1956, Sub-Court, Tiruchi, is set aside, and there will be an order in favour of the Collector as prayed for by him in that application. AS the order of the Court below ah s been set aside in the C. M. A.., C. R. P. No. 512 of 1957 is unnecessary and it is hereby directed to be dismissed. (53) C. M. A. No. 103 of 1957 and C. R. P. No. 443 of 1957 are dismissed and the order of the Court below in E. A. Nos. 350 of 1955 and 423 of 1956 are hereby confirmed. (54) There will be no order to costs in all the civil miscellaneous appeals and the civil revision petitions. (55) Order accordingly.
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1961 (3) TMI 145
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... ... ..... in Kalindi's case we cannot agree that as a counsel or an outsider was not allowed to appear on behalf of the employees there was no fair or full enquiry in the case. The enquiry proceedings show that after the workmen withdrew from the enquiry the enquiry officer carried on the enquiry ex prate as he could not do otherwise and examined a large number of witnesses. Thereafter he recorded his conclusions and held the charges proved. In the circumstances there was nothing more that the Enquiry Officer could do and the conclusion of the Commissioner of Labour that the enquiry in the two cases was not full and fair must fail. In the circumstances this is a proper case in which the permission asked for should have been granted. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Commissioner of Labour and grant the permission to the appellant under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act to dismiss the two respondents. In the circumstances we pass no order as to costs.
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1961 (3) TMI 144
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... ... ..... der Sections 466 and 467 were only means to that end, the trial was not vitiated simply because no sanction was obtained for prosecuting the accused for offences of criminal conspiracy to commit non-cognizable offences under Sections 466 and 467 I.P.C. We do not think it necessary to say anything on the point because in any case the case has to go back to the Special Judge for re-framing the charges and there is time enough for the Government to consider whether it should accord sanction to the prosecution of the various accused for the non-cognizable offences alleged to have been committed by them in pursuance of conspiracy, assuming of course, that sanction is necessary. 16. In the result we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and direct that Special Judge to frame fresh charges and proceed with the trial. The matter has been pending for a long time and we direct that the trial will proceed with all expedition. 17. Appeal allowed. 18. Retrial ordered.
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1961 (3) TMI 143
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... ... ..... Tax did not apply. It is impossible to give any weight to this argument at this stage. In paragraph 2 of the order of the Tribunal dated April 20, 1959, it is mentioned that on December 31, 1954, the activity of the distribution of electricity of the company was sold along with the assets and liabilities of that activity to the newly floated company. The argument on behalf of the assessee before the Tribunal was also that this part of the activity had ceased on December 31, 1954. It is, therefore, futile to argue that the machinery and plant pertaining to the distribution activity of the assessee were used in the assessees business during any part of the accounting year. The result therefore is that the first contention advanced by Mr. Kapur on behalf of the assessee must prevail and our answer to the reference is in the negative. The assessee will have costs against the respondent which are assessed at ₹ 250. A.N. Grover, J. I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1961 (3) TMI 142
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... ... ..... der the authorities under section 38 and the following sections of Part V of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act and contended that the said note having been incorporated in the statute the defect in the certificate by omission to mention correctly in the certificate other particulars, namely, the period for which the demand is due and the reasons for the imposition of the penalty, renders the certificate invalid. I am unable to hold that the principles of law as decided in the case of Abanindra Kumar Maity v. A.K. Biswas have been incorporated in the Statutory Rule No. 84 framed under the authority of the Act by the note. The note added to Rule No. 84 has only given interpretation made thereof by the decision in the case of Abanindra Kumar Maity v. A.K. Biswas and the said "Note" to the rule has no more sanctity than the said decision itself and in my view no statutory force has been given to the note by its incorporation in the statutory rules. Rule discharged.
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1961 (3) TMI 141
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... ... ..... had made a report to the Income-tax Officer. On a perusal of the report, the Income-tax Officer ordered Mr. Thade to effect service by affixing it to the business premises. thereafter, Mr. Thade went to effect the service. He again was unable to get information about the whereabouts of the assessee. He then effected service of the notice under section 34 by affixing a copy thereof to the business premises. Thereafter, he made a report of these facts to the Income-tax Officer (page 18 of the record) and on perusal of the report, the Income-tax Officer has made an order on March 28, 1958, in the following terms "I am satisfied that the service is in order". This being the material on record, it is difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Palkhivala that the provisions of Order V, rule 19 had not been complied with. The second contention, therefore, in our opinion, also should fail. 14. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 15. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (3) TMI 140
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... ... ..... value of the claim will fail. We do not wish to deal with this submission of Mr. Kolah in the present petitions in none of which such a difficulty arises. In an appropriate case, where such a difficulty arises it may be dealt with and decided. (29) In view of our conclusion that the present applications are not governed by article 16 of the new Act, the further question which relates to the correct interpretation of the said article as it stood when the present applications were filed, does not remain to be considered. We have, however, expressed our view on this question earlier in the judgment while dealing with one of the argument relating to the constitutional validity of the article. According to us even under the article as it stood when the applications were filed the fee payable was one half of the ad valorem fee leviable on the difference between the amount of tax actually assessed and the amount of tax admitted by the assessee as assessable. (30) Order accordingly.
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1961 (3) TMI 139
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... ... ..... ts between persons who are comparable, and there is no comparison between persons suing the better kind of roads and those who use roads which are not so good. It is the cost of construction and maintenance which makes the difference in the tax, and no case of discrimination can be said to be made out. 19. The last contention is that the proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 3 is extraterritorial in nature, because it makes the tax payable on fares and freights attributable to the territory of another State when the route passes through such territory, even though the journey starts and ends in Rajasthan. We were informed that now there are no such routes, but even otherwise, such portions must have been very short and negligible. No affidavit was sworn to show how many such routes were involved and what their extent was, and in view of lack of adequate averments, we must reject the contention. 20. In the result, the petition fails, and is dismissed with costs. 21. Petition dismissed.
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1961 (3) TMI 138
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... ... ..... said to have been arbitrarily made. The formation of a different class of those who retired after September 8, 1948, from those who had retired before that date on which the decision was taken is a reasonable classification and does not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. This contention is therefore also rejected. The High Court was therefore right in our opinion in holding that there was a reasonable classification of the ministerial servants who had been retired under Rule 2046 (2) (a) on attaining the age of 55 into two classes one class consisting of those who had been retired after September 8, 1948, and the other consisting of those who retired up to September 8, 1948. There is, therefore, no denial of equal protection of laws guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs, as the appellant is a pauper. We make no order under Order XIV, rule 9 of the Supreme Court Rules. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (3) TMI 137
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... ... ..... nt had claimed the privilege of s. 21 the Tribunal was fully justified in not discussing the figures in its award. He, therefore, faintly suggested that we may remand the case subject to any order as to costs that we may deem fit to make and ask the Tribunal to reconsider the matter in the light of the relevant documents, and he assured us that he would not claim privilege under s. 21 after remand. This request is plainly untenable. If the appellant wanted the tribunal to consider the figures and state its conclusions in the light of the said figures in its award it need not have claimed privilege under s. 21 at the trial. It is now too late to suggest that the privilege be waived and that the matter be considered afresh by the tribunal or by us in the appeal. Therefore we see no reason to interfere with the direction given by the Tribunal in regard to the framing of the provident fund scheme. 8. The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 9. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (3) TMI 136
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... ... ..... ave not been deducted. It now appears that this has been done on an erroneous view of the law. It is no good contending that the petitioner should have appealed against this order. As the assessment order has not laid down clearly the method of assessment it was scarcely possible for the petitioner to go on an appeal. In the absence of particulars he was scarcely in a position to formulate his objections. The result is that this rule must be made absolute and the assessment of gift-tax for the year 1958-59 dated February 24, 1960, and the notice of demand in relation thereto dated February 24, 1960 must be quashed and/or set aside by a writ in the nature of certiorari and there will be a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to give effect to the same. This means that the assessment will have to be made once again upon notice to the petitioner and in accordance with law. Interim orders are vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.
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1961 (3) TMI 135
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... ... ..... ner had no doubt raised this point before the revisional authority but it was overruled. In the absence of any indication in exhibit P7 to the contrary, it is reasonable to think that the Income-tax Officer had been influenced also by the fact that this amount was received by the petitioner just a few days before he filed his counter-estimate. The error which the Income-tax Officer could then be deemed to have committed in this respect consisted in allowing himself to be influenced by the receipt by the petitioner of this sum of money which accounted for a substantial part of the disparity between the counter-estimate made by him and the amount on which he was ultimately assessed for the year. This conclusion as to the error is of course a matter of inference though as I think a reasonable inference to make. However I prefer to rest my decision in this petition on the first ground set forth earlier. The result is that exhibit P7 is quashed but without costs. Petition allowed.
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1961 (3) TMI 134
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... ... ..... e defendants have themselves pleaded that the rent payable by them to Tribeni Prasad Singh and Baldeo Prasad Singh or their heirs used to be adjusted towards their account for washing clothes. Thus, it is their admitted case that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between them and the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs. There is no valid lease in their favour and, therefore, the duration of the tenancy must be determined by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act--vide the Full Bench decision in Bastacolla Colliery Co., Ltd. v. Bandhu Beldar 1960 BLJR 245 AIR 1959 Pat 344. It cannot, therefore, be he-Id that the defendants have acquired any right as permanent tenants. They are, therefore, manifestly liable to be evicted. 38. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge are set aside, and the suit is decreed with costs throughout. V. Ramaswami, C. J. 39. I agree. Kanhaiya Singh, J. 40. I entirely agree.
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1961 (3) TMI 133
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... ... ..... any limit for the prior period. The Validating Act, though passed in 1941, can be read only as affecting a period for which there was no limit. If the sub-section said that tax shall not be payable in excess of ₹ 50 without indicating the period or date, the argument would have some support, but it puts in a date, and the operation of the prohibition is confined to a period after the date. 19. The Validating Act, being thus completely within the powers of the Governor, could remove retrospectively the defect in the earlier Act. Though it reimposed the tax from the date of the earlier Act, it took care to impose the tax for a period ending with March 31, 1938. The impugned Act did not need the support of the proviso, because it did not fall within the ban of the second sub-section. In our opinion, the Validating Act of 1941 was within the powers of the Governor, and was a valid piece of legislation. 20. The appeal fails, and is dismissed with costs. 21. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (3) TMI 132
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... ... ..... in which it could be legally raised instead of in a form in which the defendant could not have raised it. The necessary facts had been mentioned and evidence had been led with respect to them. It was in this setting that it was observed at p. 408 “Their Lordships have felt that it would not be satisfactory to decide against the defendant on a view which might have been obviated by a mere amendment of the pleadings, and that in a case where the parties had been allowed to go to proof. They have, therefore, felt themselves entitled to consider the evidence led.” 14. The case more to the point is the Privy Council case relied on by the Courts below viz. Siddik Mahomed Shah v. Mt. Saran where it was held that “where a claim has been never made in the defence presented no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward. 15. We therefore are of opinion that there is no force in this appeal. We accordingly dismiss the same with costs.
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1961 (3) TMI 131
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... ... ..... of the rule lies in an assumed uniformity of return per square foot which structures of different classes which are in their nature not similar, may reasonably fetch if let out to tenants and in the virtual deprivation to the rate-payer of his statutory right to object to the valuation. 9. Another judgment of the Bombay High Court in Motiram Keshavdas v. Ahmedabad Municipal Borough (1942) Bom. L.R. 280 calls for reference. It was held in Motiram's case that a water-tax imposed by the Ahmedabad Municipality as a rate not depending upon the value of the property assessed but in lump sum was not a rate for the purpose of s. 73(x) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 and the rule which authorised the levy of such a lump sum was ultra vires. 10. These appeals must be allowed and the decrees passed by the High Court set aside and the decrees passed by the District Court of Sholapur restored with costs in this court and the High Court. One hearing fee. 11. Appeals allowed.
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1961 (3) TMI 130
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... ... ..... rmation was given up but that would be immaterial because even in the previous proceedings the want of definite information was not the reason for setting aside the assessment. In these circumstances, it would appear that the amendment of section 34 in no way brought about any change in the nature or validity of the proceedings under section 34 in respect of this interest income and consequently the mere fact that there was an amendment would give no right to the department to take a fresh proceedings. Consequently, our view earlier that the final order passed by the Tribunal on April 25, 1949, was a bar to the proceedings subsequently taken under the notice dated January 19, 1950, remains unaltered. As a result of the question referred to us is answered in the negative. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference which we fix at ₹ 400. The same amount shall be treated as the fee of learned counsel for the department. Question answered in the negative.
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