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1966 (4) TMI 92
... ... ... ... ..... luded definition and can throw on light upon the construction of instrument as such, nor do this decision in any way militate against the construction placed by us. 13. For the reasons stated above we are clear in our minds that the deletion of the exemption in Art. 4 (b) makes affidavits sworn or declared, for the immediate purpose of filing in Court, liable to stamp duty under that Article. The Legislature intended that result and, however, much we may agree with the submission of the learned Advocate that this will make....... + More
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1966 (4) TMI 91
... ... ... ... ..... rectify any flaw in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court. Whatever the reasons for the amendment may be, it is clear that without the new expression as introduced in the amendment in Section 21 of the Act, the trustee holding the trust property for me benefit of the beneficiaries could not be assessed under that section in respect of the assets held by him in trust. We need not consider in this case if a trustee's liability under Section 21 can validly arise, even after the amendment of 1964 in that section. ....... + More
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1966 (4) TMI 90
... ... ... ... ..... hese two decisions. 12. We, therefore, reach the conclusion that the plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser of the suit property for consideration without notice of the charge in favour of the Municipal Corporation and the charge was, therefore, not enforceable against the suit property in the hands of the plain tiff. There will accordingly be a decree for the plaintiff declaring that he is the owner of the suit property and that the charge of the Municipal Corporation for arrears of municipal taxes is not enforceable against....... + More
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1966 (4) TMI 89
... ... ... ... ..... Tribunal very clearly misdirected itself. The form itself clearly mentions that particulars of Part B were to be filled in only in cases where the application is made after the end of the relevant previous year; this is given in the heading of Part B itself. In the present case, the facts given by the Tribunal itself show that the previous year in question began on 1st December, 1952, and ended on the 30th November, 1953, while the application was made on November 17, 1953. The application was made before the end of the re....... + More
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1966 (4) TMI 88
... ... ... ... ..... nt of capital gains, and in the reference made to the Gujarat High Court at the instance of the Commissioner, J. M. Shelat C.J. and P. N. Bhagwati J. held, largely on the strength of the decision in Bipinchandra Maganlal Co.s case, that the receipt of excess over written down value on sale of capital asset could not be held to be profit independently and apart from the legal fiction enacted in the second proviso to section 10 (2) (vii) and could not be regarded as dividend within the meaning of section 2 (6A) (c), and that....... + More
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1966 (4) TMI 87
... ... ... ... ..... al with the aspect where litigating expenses have been incurred for protection of capital assets which already existed in the hands of the assessee or had already been acquired by the assessee. In those, it has been held that litigation expenses incurred for the protection of capital assets were a legitimate charge as revenue expenditure. The facts of the case before us are quite different. Here no capital assets had been acquired when these litigation expenses were incurred. The litigation arose in the course of the proce....... + More
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1966 (4) TMI 85
... ... ... ... ..... sed as follows (1)The payment of income-tax amounting to ₹ 1,24,199 directly arose on an application of sub-section (7) of section 18 of the Act. (2)It contemplates that the payment is in the nature of punishment as the assessee was under a statutory obligation to deduct the said amount at the source under sub-section (3B) of section 18. (3)The liability has arisen out of an infraction of the statutory provisions and accordingly not deductible from the profits and gains of the business either under section 10(1) or u....... + More
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1966 (4) TMI 84
... ... ... ... ..... nless the court is forced to do so by the irresistible force of the language used. It is well-settled that the limitation Act, being an Act which takes away or restricts the right to take legal proceedings, must, where its language is ambiguous, be construed strictly, i.e., in favour of the right to proceed. We find as follows. We disagree with the finding of the Tribunal that the condition that the partnership should be registered with the Registrar must be already fulfilled at the time when the application was presented........ + More
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1966 (4) TMI 83
... ... ... ... ..... the absence of anything in the section enacting any time limit. In fact, no such time limit could be imposed by the State Government. There is no substance even in this contention of the learned Advocate General. (10) In the result, both the Courts were right in holding that the old order issued in November 1951 continued to remain in force and the company was bound to give legal effect to the said order and it could not unilaterally increase its charges in violation of the said order which was sustained by the old section....... + More
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1966 (4) TMI 82
... ... ... ... ..... was dismissed by the High Court. There is no appeal by him. On his behalf, it was not contended that we should exercise in his favour our powers under O. 41, r. 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or that we should set aside the decree of dismissal of the suit against him and remand the case to the High Court for decision of the question whether he is the adopted son and heir of Tarabai. Even if such prayer were made, on the facts of this case we would not be inclined to exercise our powers under O. 41, r. 33 and to set asi....... + More
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1966 (4) TMI 81
... ... ... ... ..... Judge, keeping in view the judgment of this Court will consider whether the other items of the schedule question before him in the appeal come within the meaning of the food' as laid down above. This Writ Petition is therefore partly allowed. There will be no order as to costs. 26. In regard to W.P. No. 163/65, it merely challenged the validity of the octroi and does not question any specific article as not falling within the definition of food'. It is true that a copy of the schedule is attached to the petition. A....... + More
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1966 (4) TMI 80
... ... ... ... ..... the other clauses which define and regulate the rights and liabilities of the parties. He based his contention on the principles enunciated in 1942-1 All ER 337 at p. 346. The contention is correct but it could help the appellant only if it were found that the contract made between the parties on 26-9-1957 was not a new and independent contract and left the previous contracts alive and therefore the arbitration clause which applied to the earlier contracts also governed the subsequent contract. In the result, we agree with....... + More
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1966 (4) TMI 79
... ... ... ... ..... hat both the parties should have an opportunity of adducing further evidence on the relevant aspects so as to place fuller data to enable the Court to decide correctly the value under Section 4 of the Act regarding the cheroots in Column 4. ( 34. ) In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the lower Court and remand the case to the trial Court for fresh disposal on Issues Nos. 1 to 3 and 6. The learned Additional Judge will dispose of the case in the light of the observations made in this ju....... + More
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1966 (4) TMI 78
... ... ... ... ..... on applies to the present case. I may again revert to the provisions of sub-section (2A) according to the closing words of which all the provisions of the Act shall apply to a return filed as provided in this sub-section as if it were a return under sub- section (1), and in Ranchhoddas Karsondas's case 1959 36 I.T.R. 569 ; 1960 1 S.C.R. 114, the Supreme Court held that the return showing an income under the taxable limit which was filed belatedly by virtue of the benefit of sub-section (3) was a return furnished under ....... + More
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1966 (4) TMI 77
... ... ... ... ..... House of Lords in the case of Southern Railway of Peru 1957 A.C. 334; 32 I.T.R. 737 (H.L.) is, therefore, not applicable to the present case. The decision that is relevant here, and which fully supports the view we have taken, is the decision of the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Indian Metal and Metallurgical Corporation 1964 51 I.T.R. 240. In that case, it has been ruled that the liability of an employer-assessee in respect of retrenchment compensation under section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act,....... + More
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1966 (4) TMI 76
... ... ... ... ..... ave been granted. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the contention of respondent no. is correct and that he is entitled to a declaratory decree that the compromise decree in O.P. no. 3 of 1950 was not valid and was not binding upon Sri Kodandaramaswami temple. We have gone into the question of the validity of the compromise decree because both the parties to the appeal invited us to decide the question and said that there was no use in court remanding the matter to the trial court on this question and the matter will ....... + More
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1966 (4) TMI 75
... ... ... ... ..... ntainable. The High Court accepted the defendants' contention that the claim for arrears must be limited to a period of three years prior to the institution of the suit. It allowed interest on the arrears at 6 p.a. and decreed the claim of the plaintiffs for partition and for arrears of compensation. The plaintiffs then moved the High Court under s. 151 read with O.XX, r. 18, Code of Civil Procedure for granting them appropriate relief with respect to their claim for compensation, for use and occupation of the house fr....... + More
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1966 (4) TMI 74
... ... ... ... ..... e reasons did not invalidate the order so as to render it liable to be quashed and set aside but this Court could in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 compel the conciliation officer by a mandamus to give reasons in support of the order and then proceed to examine whether the order was required to be quashed by certiorari. But we did not allow this argument to be raised before us because sitting as a Full Bench, we are concerned only with the question referred to us by the Division Bench and we cannot allo....... + More
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1966 (4) TMI 73
... ... ... ... ..... sclosed source, such income can be treated as business income if the assessee has no other source of income. In the instant case the assessee is a firm formed for the purpose of carrying on business. There is nothing on record to show that the firm had any source of income other than business. Therefore, in our opinion, it is not unreasonable to hold that any amount representing secret income arose out of the business of the firm. We, therefore, hold that the fixed deposits represented income from business and that they we....... + More
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1966 (4) TMI 72
... ... ... ... ..... ess ancillary to the work of a coal mine is being carried on . In our opinion, the change in the language of s. 2(b) of the earlier Act brought about by the amending Act (Act 45 of 1965) was not meant to bring about a change Sup5CI-19 of law in this respect but was meant to fix a proper interpretation upon the earlier Act. It is a well- recognised principle in dealing with matters of construction that subsequent legislation may be looked at in orderer to see what is the proper interpretation to be put upon the earlier Act ....... + More
