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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 67 Records
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1970 (10) TMI 85
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... ... ..... rinciple of law that the decisions of the civil Courts are binding on the criminal Courts. The converse is not true. The High Court after entertaining the writ petitions and hearing arguments on the merits of the case should not have dismissed the petitions merely because certain consequential proceedings had been taken on the basis that the exports in question were illegal. For the decision of the controversy between the parties to the writ petitions neither the presence of the State of West Bengal nor the authorities who took penal action was necessary. The validity of the steps taken by them, as mentioned earlier would depend upon the validity of otherwise of the export in question. 5. For the reasons mentioned above we allow these appeals, set aside the orders under appeal and remit the cases to the High Court for disposal OH merits. We hope that the High Court will be able to dispose of these cases at an early date. The costs of these appeals shall be costs in the cause.
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1970 (10) TMI 84
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... ... ..... to the rights of the railways under law. Even if the acknowledgment is held to be a conditional one, namely, that there should be a claim against the railways it has been fulfilled in this case once it is found that there was consignment of goods, as pleaded by the petitioners in their plaints. The trial Judge has rightly found that the certificate of short delivery in each of the first two suits clearly amounts to acknowledgment of liability on the part of the railways and the finding of the judges of the New Trial Bench, which is contrary to the said finding, is clearly wrong. I therefore find that even the first two suits are not barred by limitation. 12. In the result, the decrees and Judgment in N.T.A. Nos. 162 to 165 of 1966 on the file of the Court of Small Causes are set aside and the decrees and Judgment of the trial Court are restored. The petitioners are entitled to costs in this Court and in the Court of Appeal, in addition to the costs awarded by the trial Court.
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1970 (10) TMI 83
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... ... ..... empt the sale filed a suit against the defendants and obtained a decree. On the finding of the, High Court it is clear that except disclosing that the defendants intended to construct a factory, nothing more was said. The State Government still proceeded to issue, in exercise of the power under S. 8 (2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, a notification to exclude from the operation of the Act the land so as to defeat the right of preemption exercised by the plaintiffs in respect of which a decree was passed by the Civil Court. The State Government has filed no affidavit explaining the circumstances in which the order came to be passed they have merely offered "comments" on the petition filed by the plaintiffs. In our judgment, the conclusion of the High Court was home out by evidence and no ground is made out calling for our interference with that conclusion in this appeal with special leave. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. G.C. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (10) TMI 82
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... ... ..... stion (not otherwise settled by mutual consent) arising out of this indent, may at the instance of either party thereto be referred to arbitration to two European merchants with power, in the event of disagreement, to appoint an umpire." It will thus appear that the word "may" was followed immediately by the words "at the instance of either party", so that there could be no doubt that the words amounted to an agreement between the parties that if either of them desired that any dispute arising out of the indent should be submitted to arbitration, it will be submitted to arbitration. That agreement therefore fell squarely within the definition of "arbitration agreement" contained in Section 2(a) of the Arbitration Act so that the case is clearly distinguishable. 10. As I have taken the view that there is no arbitration agreement between the parties, the application of the respondent Company under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is rejected.
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1970 (10) TMI 81
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... ... ..... ith the intention of doing so. 23. Accordingly, the suits were not liable to be dismissed on the ground of their being barred by limitation, and the High Court was in error in allowing the appeals by the corporation and dismissing the suits. 24. The result is that the appeals are allowed, and the judgment and order passed by the High Court are set aside. The case will have to be remanded to the High Court for deciding the rest of the questions arising in the suits and ascertaining the amounts due to the appellants (the original plaintiffs) as the High Court has not gone into those questions as it dismissed the suits on the point of limitation. In view of the very long period having elapsed due to prolonged adjournments of the appeals while they were pending before the High Court, we earnestly hope that the High Court will dispose of the cases as expeditiously as possible. The corporation will pay to the appellants costs of these appeals, such costs to be in one set of costs.
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1970 (10) TMI 80
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... ... ..... lso figured similarly in the pre- vious contest between the two respondents. Free and fair elections are the very foundation of democratic institutions and just as it is said that justice must not only be done but must also seen to be done; similarly elections should not only be fairly and properly held but should also seem to be so conducted as to inspire confidence in the minds of the electors that everything has been above board and has been done to ensure free elections. It will be a sad day in the history of our country when the police and the Government officers create even an impression that they are interfering for the benefit of one or the other candidate. This is particularly so if a candidate is holding an important position or assignment like respondent No. 1, who, at the material time was a Minister in the State. The appeal fails and is dismissed. In view of all the facts and circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs in this Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (10) TMI 79
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... ... ..... in the aggregate. On this part of the case no argument has been advanced before us by either side. 23. On the view taken by us, without expressing any opinion on the question whether within the meaning of Rule 9 of the Schedule to the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911, disposition of the land at the date of the publication of the declaration relating thereto under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act justifies the Court in taking into account the potentialities of the land, we are of the view that the conclusion of the Tribunal was not vitiated by any such error as would attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 77A of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911. 24. The appeal filed by the appellants is therefore allowed. The order passed by the High Court is set aside and the order of the Tribunal restored. The appellants will be entitled to their costs in this Court. The order of costs passed by the High Court directing each party to bear its own costs is maintained.
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1970 (10) TMI 78
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... ... ..... ified in the exercise of his revisional powers in setting aside the view taken by the lower court. In fact in the course of his judgment he observed If the matter were res integra I might have agreed with one view or the other but in my opinion the court below has on a consideration of the material facts and relevant law came to the conclusion that the arbitration agreement in question showed that there was no intention to fill up the vacancy. I would not be justified in Revision in setting aside that finding even if I was disposed not to concur with the decision of the trial court on this point. 16. For the reasons mentioned above we allow these appeals, set aside the orders passed by the subordinate judge as well as by the Judicial Commissioner and remit the cases to the trial court for appointing a new arbitrator in place of the Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh. The respondents shall pay the costs of the appellants both in this Court as well as in the courts below.
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1970 (10) TMI 77
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... ... ..... the Government of India. 51. It may be stated that Mr. Nariman has not at all argued that the second defendant has waived the privilege of immunity as a foreign Sovereign State and it does not therefore arise for decision. 52. In our opinion, therefore, the second defendant is entitled to the immunity available to a foreign Sovereign State under the principles of International Law. We therefore hold that prayer (a) of the Notice of Motion should have been and should be granted as the Government of India has recognised the second defendant as a de facto Sovereign State. We, therefore, dismiss the suit as prayed for in prayer (a) of the Notice of Motion. 53. The costs must follow the event and we therefore direct that the plaintiffs to the suit do pay the second defendant's costs of this appeal and of the Notice of Motion. 54. The amount of ₹ 500/- deposited as security for the costs of the respondents in this appeal be refunded to the Appellants. 54. Appeal allowed.
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1970 (10) TMI 76
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... ... ..... g questions put to him during his examination as a witness and what answers he gave and should have given naturally depended upon the questions put to him. So long as he was asked to state only about the fact of execution of the promissory note, he gave the answers referred to already. If only he had been asked anything about the discharge of liability under the promissory note, the further question of the respondent denying it or pleading discharge would have arisen. Hence, there is no warrant for any assumption that simply because the respondent had acknowledged the execution of the promissory note and had not denied his liability under it, he must be deemed to have admitted the subsisting liability under the same. For the reasons I have already indicated, the conclusion of the learned District Judge is correct and does not call for any interference. Hence, the second appeal fails and the same is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. No leave. 9. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (10) TMI 75
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... ... ..... already referred to the majority decision of this Court in Raj Narain v. Superintendent, Central Jail, New Delhi that an order of remand passed under such circumstances is not illegal. It is true that on August 25, 1970, when the petitioner was in custody in Case No. 3(6) of 1970, there was actually no remand order in force. On that date, as we have already pointed out, the doctor had stated that the petitioner was sick and unfit to attend the court. But in view of the fact that we have to consider the legality of the petitioner's detention on the date when the return has been filed in this Court, that is, on September 24, 1970, the petitioner's detention on that date cannot be considered to be illegal because he was kept in detention under proper orders of remand as an undertrial prisoner. Therefore, the second contention of Mr Goyal has also to be rejected. 16. In the result we discharge the rule issued by this Court on September 7, 1970 and dismiss this petition.
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1970 (10) TMI 74
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... ... ..... still attaches to any person convicted of a truly criminal offence, and the more serious or more disgraceful the offence are greater the stigma. So he would have to consider whether, in a case of this gravity, the public interest really requires than an innocent person should be prevented from proving his innocence in order that fewer guilty men may escape." Section 35(1) of the Act creates a quasi-criminal offence. It is a regulatory provision. It is enacted with a view to safeguard the interest of the public regarding trust money. The offence in question is punishable only with fine. The conviction under that does not carry any stigma. The language of the provision appears to make its contravention an absolute liability. Under these circumstances, we think the offence mentioned in that section is an absolute one. Consequently we cannot read into it the requirement of mens rea. For the reasons mentioned above these appeals fail and they are dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (10) TMI 73
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... ... ..... the requirements of s. 1 17 (1 ). On the other hand, if the Magistrate does comply with s. 117 ( 1 ) by continuing the proceedings of inquiry expeditiously and without any delay, I do not think it can beaid that the detention of the person, against whom the proceeding are being taken, is not a reasonable restriction on his personal liberties when the Magistrate has already found that immediate, measures are necessary for prevention of breach of the peace and the person concerned has defaulted in furnishing bonds to keep the peace during the pendency of the inquiry. o p /o p These are the reasons why, in my opinion, the powers under section 117(3) can be exercised without the Magistrate recording evidence and finding a prima facie case after starting the inquiry under section 117(1). Even on this interpretation, section 117(3) is valid and is a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2). (3). (4) and (5) of the Constitution. o p /o p V.P.S. o p /o p Directions given. o p /o p
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1970 (10) TMI 72
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... ... ..... olly unable to understand how in the above circumstances any question of waiver could arise when the point had throughout been under consideration and discussion and how the appellant could be precluded from pressing that point before the High Court.. It has been urged on behalf of the respondent that in the interest of justice we should grant special leave against the judgment in the writ petition which was delivered in August 1958. The delay which has been sought to be condoned is of nearly 10 years and we find no reason or justification for condoning the same. The petition for special leave is therefore dismissed. 6. Civil Appeal No. 336 of 1969 is hereby allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The suit of the respondent shall stand dismissed. Consequently Civil Appeal No. 844 of 1966 becomes infructuous and is dismissed on that account In view of the previous orders, the appellant shall bear the cost of the respondent in both , the appeals in this Court.
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1970 (10) TMI 71
power of the assessing authority to re-assess the receipts that had escaped assessment under the Madras Entertainments Tax Act.
A court's decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered by legislature that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances.
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1970 (10) TMI 70
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... ... ..... in their opinion, it falls within the ambit of section 28. Then if the transaction is challenged by a notice given by the Inland Revenue, the taxpayer can (and in this case did) file a statutory declaration by virtue of sub-section (4), and then there is an appeal to a tribunal constituted as mentioned in sub-paragraph (7) who are empowered to determine whether or not there is prima facie case for proceeding in the matter. " Section 28 is a wide-ranging section, and having provided reasonable safeguards for the bona fide or ordinary transaction, I do not think that the legislature has given any indication of intending to use kid gloves in these cases. Be that as it may, in my judgment the tribunal's decision on the second point cannot stand. On the facts, the only possible conclusion on the meaning of the section as it appears to me is that the requirements of sub-section (2) are satisfied, and accordingly I allow the appeal by the Crown. Appeal allowed with costs.
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1970 (10) TMI 69
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... ... ..... vision, the rule cannot be held to be invalid as there is a provision for establishing the Identity of a customer by the production of a valid identity card issued to him by the postal authorities. A villager can easily produce such an Identity card and the licensed dealer may be satisfied regarding his identity on the production of such an identity card. Mr. Sinha did not argue that it is difficult under the rules to establish the identity of any other class of customers. As I am of the view that a villager can establish his Identity by producing an identity card issued to him by the postal authorities, the last contention raised by learned counsel regarding the validity of Rule 3 must be rejected. 14. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that Sections 16, 28, 30 and 31 of the Act and Rule 3 of Gold Control (Identification of Customers) Rules, 1969, are constitutionally valid. 15. In the result, the writ application is dismissed but there will be no order with regard to costs.
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1970 (10) TMI 68
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... ... ..... fore passing the impugned orders, I prefer to quash the impugned order on that short ground without expressing any opinion on the respective contentions relating to merits. 6. The order relating to the confiscation of the tobacco worth about ₹ 11,000/- is not questioned in this writ petition. As the petitioner states that it does not belong to him, it is unneccessary for me to go into that question, the impugned order is quashed in respect of the imposition of penalty of ₹ 100/- on the petitioner under Rules 151(c) and 32(i) of the Central Excise Rules, for improper reception of tobacco under T.P. 3s which contained gulla tobacco grown in that year. This order does not prevent the departmental authorities if they so desire, to proceed against afresh according to law and procedure after affording to reasonable opportunity to the petitioner. 7. In the result the writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1970 (10) TMI 67
On the whole therefore we are satisfied that the appellant was properly adjudged guilty of indiscipline in the departmental enquiry and the order of dismissal which was passed against him was merited. The appellant is one of those persons who thinks that other people in the world have to be corrected and that perhaps he is one who is impelled by his own thoughts, we think that the ends of justice would be served by not awarding costs against him - Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (10) TMI 66
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... ... ..... we held in that case that the turnover of biris was not exempt because the biris in question were not subject to additional excise duty at all. Upon the view that the mill-made cloth sold by the assessee did not fall within the scope of section 3 of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, we hold that the notification of 14th December, 1957, could not be invoked at all, and the assessee was, therefore, not entitled to the exemption claimed by him. No question arose of the exemption being denied on the ground that he had failed to prove payment of the additional excise duty. He was not entitled to the exemption because it did not extend at all to the turnover of the millmade cloth sold by him. We answer the question referred in each reference accordingly. As the assessee has not appeared before us, we make no order as to costs. The fee of learned counsel for the Commissioner is assessed at Rs. 50 in each case. Reference answered accordingly. .
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