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1971 (3) TMI 134
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... ... ..... s not entitled to the liberty sought for should have dismissed the application and given a liberty to the petitioner to proceed with the suit. But the lower court has, however, proceeded to order the petition permitting him to withdraw the suit without liberty and actually dismissed the suit as having been withdrawn. The order of the lower court cannot be supported and has to be set aside. I however uphold the order of the lower court that the petitioner has not made out a ground for giving liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The result is that the order giving him permission to withdraw the suit is set aside and the consequential order passed in the suit dismissing the suit as having been withdrawn on petition is also set aside. The lower court is directed to restore the suit to file and dispose of the same on merits. As the suit is of the year 1966, the lower court is directed to dispose of the suit as early as possible. No costs. 6. Order accordingly.
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1971 (3) TMI 133
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... ... ..... y of the Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee as at present constituted. Allegations have been made that the funds of the Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee are being squandered by the present Committee. These questions are irrelevant for the purpose of the present suit. In the case of a public trust where directions of the Court are considered necessary any two or more persons having an interest in the trust can file a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure after obtaining the necessary consent. The respondents could in their personal capacity have filed the suit and in this suit the only question which falls for consideration is whether the proposed donation should be made by the Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee irrespective of who its present office bearers may be. The allegations made in the written statement cannot be tried in this suit and did not call for any issue. 15. This appeal is, Therefore, dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. 16. Appeal dismissed.
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1971 (3) TMI 132
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... ... ..... arwan stated that the assailants were standing while assaulting the deceased. The High Court rightly held that the evidence of Munna Lal Sita Ram and Bhikari was not truthful that knife injuries were caused after the victim had fallen. 20. The medical evidence was that there were found injuries of abrasion. It could not be caused unless Lalu was dragged. The evidence was that Lalu was putting on a Baniyan and Tahmad at the time of the Incident The alleged eye-witnesses said that Lalu was not dragged at all but was assaulted. The medical evidence therefore showed that there was a false implication of several assailants including those alleged to be armed with knives. It could not be said without any reasonable doubt that the assailants who were there were armed with Phrases and lathi The prosecution case was therefore not established beyond any reasonable doubt. 21. The High Court rightly acquitted the accused. The appeal is therefore dismissed. The accused are set at liberty.
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1971 (3) TMI 131
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... ... ..... he immediate possession of land but under Clause (c) the requirement is that the appropriate Government must form the opinion that the acquisition is of urgent importance. under Clause (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-s, (2) of Section 17, the decision to acquire land has not to be made by the same authority but by different authorities. Further the conditions under which the acquisition has to be made differ from clause to clause. Therefore there is no basis to say that the general words in Clause (c) follow the particular and specific words in Clause (b) and (c). Nor can it be said that the specific words contained in Clause (a) and (b) constitute a category, class or genus. Hence we are unable to accept the contention that in interpreting Clause (c) of Section 17(2), we should apply the rule of ejusdem generis. 19. As none of the contentions taken by the appellants are acceptable, this appeal fails and is dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.
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1971 (3) TMI 130
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... ... ..... ed to the High Court. It is obvious that the case was not covered by Section 417 (3) as it was not a case instituted upon a complaint. The other decision was of the Supreme Court reported as Chinnaswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1963 3 SCR 412 . In that case also the matter originated on police investigation and not upon a private complaint. In neither of these two cases the question whether the right of appeal conferred by Sub-section (3) of Section 417 is limited to acquittal by the original court only had arisen for determination, because in none of the two cases the original case was instituted upon a private complaint Therefore, these two decisions do not help Mr. Shelat. 4. In the present case there is no reason to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction of this court suo motu. On this ground alone therefore the application will fail, and it is not necessary to examine the other contentions advanced. 5. In the result the application fails and is dismissed. Rule discharged.
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1971 (3) TMI 129
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... ... ..... eal. In view of this statement of Mr. Palkhivala we did not even consider it necessary to grant to the appellants their request to us for granting them leave to file these appeals which they applied for. Mr. Bhabha stated that he made this application because of the reason that they were not parties to the two petitions but only notices had been served upon them. Neither of the parties before us in either of the petitions has argued that point as they did not intend to take a decision on that point. We have, therefore, not at all dealt with the point and make it clear that parties have intended and we have accepted that the point should be deemed to have been decided but is left open and should not serve as a precedent. 48. On Mr. Mukhi's application for stay, after some arguments are advanced, Mr. Bharucha states that the respondents in the two appeals will not take any steps to implement the order sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation on or before the 24th April, 1971.
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1971 (3) TMI 128
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... ... ..... nary approval or disapproval of another authority cannot possibly be held to be required to be exercised in all cases without any discretion. The Division Bench was, therefore, perfectly correct in holding that the power under r. 27 is a discretionary power, and both the Military Estates Officer as well as the Central Government or the other authority appointed by it for that purpose in exercising their power have the discretion in suitable cases not to proceed under this rule. The High Court, in directing a reconsideration of the case in accordance with law, was, therefore, quite correct, so that the application of the appellants must be decided afresh, after keeping in view the principle that the power to grant a lease under rule 27 is discretionary ; but the refusal should only be in suitable cases where sufficient reasons exist for that purpose. The appeal fails and 'is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs. G. C. Appeal dismissed.
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1971 (3) TMI 127
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... ... ..... ge, of alleged false affidavit that the appellant had not acted as Sarpanch during the period of the stay order. The subject matter of the charge before the District Magistrate was substantially the same as in the present case. Lastly, there is also the question of long lapse of time of more than ten years since the filing of the affidavit which is the subject matter of the charge. This factor is also not wholly irrelevant for considering the question of expediency of initiating prosecution for the alleged perjury. In view of the nature of the alleged perjury in this case this long delay also militates against expediency of prosecution. And then by reason of the pendency of these proceedings since 1962 and earlier similar proceedings before the District Magistrate also the appellant must have suffered both mentally and financially. In view of all these circumstances we are constrained to allow the appeal and set aside the order directing complaint to be filed. Appeal allowed.
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1971 (3) TMI 126
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... ... ..... out any enquiry whether they were so made and without taking into account the fact of the deletion of Chs. II and IV from the Act in 1939, and its impact on the rule-making power of the Government, the re-issuance of the rules thereafter and the distinction made by the Madras Government itself between Part I and Part II Rules in the headings which it gave to those two parts. The more recent view of the Andhra High Court, however, is reflected in Moss v. The Management 1970(II) An. W.R. 157 where a Division Bench of that High Court has held that Part II Rules relating to recognition and aid are not statutory rules but are only executive instructions, and therefore, are not legally enforceable in a court of law. 30. On the reasons aforesaid, the suit filed by the appellant must be held to be misconceived, and consequently, the High Court rightly dismissed her suit The appeal fails and is dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, we decline to make any order as to costs.
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1971 (3) TMI 125
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... ... ..... efendants are entitled to continue in occupation of the above portion as sub - tenants? 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the sum of ₹ 120/- claimed in prayer (e) of the plaint? 8. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a sum of ₹ 1320 as claimed in prayer (f) of the plaint? 9. To what other reliefs is the plaintiff entitled? 10. Generally? 14. The issues as above which had properly arisen on the pleadings of the parties were not framed and have not been properly discussed and decided by the trial Court. The decree passed by the trial Court is set aside. The suit is remanded back to the trial Court with a direction that the trial Court will allow parties to lead such further evidence as they desire and decide the issues as formulated above in due course. The plaintiff must pay costs of this appeal. Since the suit is now of very old date, the trial court will give necessary directions and will dispose of the same before the end of July 1971. 15. Case remanded.
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1971 (3) TMI 124
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... ... ..... they drew their managing agency commission. The suit could, therefore, be brought within three years of the termination of the managing agency. The managing agency terminated in 1949, but the suit was brought in 1955. It was, therefore, barred by time so far as the suit for accounts was concerned. 46. Even if Article 120 applied, since a suit for accounts for every year had to be instituted within six years of that year because the cause of action for accounts of every particular year accrued at the end of that year and since the suit was instituted in 1955, it would have been within limitation for the year 1948-49 only provided the plaintiff succeeded in the declaration sought. 47. No doubt the suit was within time so far as the relief of declaration b concerned because it was instituted within six years, when the Court reopened after Dial holiday. 48. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. Appellant shall pay costs to all respondents except the company. One set of costs.
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1971 (3) TMI 123
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... ... ..... ce. But the incidents therein described were irrelevant on the question of adverse possession as they took place in 1948 and thereafter, that is to say, a long time after title by adverse possession would have been completed if such adverse possession were to be accepted as established. In view of the evidence discussed above the Division Bench was not justified in interfering with the rending of fact concurrently given by the Trial Court and the learned Single Judge that the adverse possession by Baijnath which commenced from 1933 was sufficiently interrupted by acts of possession by Nanhku, and therefore, his title was not extinguished by adverse possession. 27. In the view we take on both the questions, the appeal must be allowed and the judgment and decree of the Division Bench must be set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and upheld by the learned Single Judge must be restored. The respondents will pay to the appellant his costs all throughout.
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1971 (3) TMI 122
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... ... ..... he Government. Therefore, it is obvious that brick earth does not vest in the State. 69. Reference may also be made in this connection to Section 41 of the Land Revenue Act which is in these terms -- "41. All mines of metal and coal, and all earth-oil and gold washing shall be deemed to be the property of the Government for the purposes of the State and the State Government shall have all powers necessary for the proper enjoyment of the Government's right thereto." 70. In my opinion, the Wajib-ul-arz leaves no manner of doubt that the brick-earth in the present cases does not vest in the State and, therefore, the State has no right to levy royalty thereon. It is common case that royalty can only e levied on minerals which vest in the State. 71. With the above observations, I agree with the ultimate conclusion of my learned brother that these petitions should be allowed with no order as to costs. Pandit, J. 72. I agree with Sandhawalia, J. 73. Petitions allowed.
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1971 (3) TMI 121
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... ... ..... ately the High Court allowed itself to be influenced by what it says the practical considerations. It is likely that there were considerable foreign goods in Goa which had been imported into that territory before it was liberated, may be even without paying customs duty and those goods were available for being transmitted to other parts of India. But this circumstance does not change the position in law. It is not necessary for us to consider whether after integration of Goa, the Government could have imposed any duty on the goods that were sent from Goa to other parts of India. Suffice it to say that our attention was not invited to any law imposing such duties. That being so, the conclusion that the appellant had utilised his official position to evade customs duty must fail. In the result this appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant are set aside. He is on bail. His bail bond do stand cancelled, and fine if paid refunded. Appeal allowed.
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1971 (3) TMI 120
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... ... ..... Farmans or Section 63 of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act. In our view the pattas only indicating that the grant was for the purpose of cultivation or grazing of cattle with the express reservation of the trees on the land to the grantor, the question of grant of sub-soil rights by implication does not arise. It is therefore not necessary to consider the effect of the Farmans Exs. A-21 and A-22 or of Section 63 of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act. o p /o p The claim to compensation on the basis of the sub-soil rights to the hillock must therefore be negatived and the appeal allowed. o p /o p In the result the decree of the High Court regarding the minerals in the land or quarry rights will be set aside and the judgement and order of the District Judge on that point restored. The respondent will be entitled to the costs of the appeal in pursuance of the, order of this Court made as a condition for setting aside the abatement of the appeal. o p /o p V.P.S. Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1971 (3) TMI 119
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... ... ..... ion or having a claim to a share in the property in dispute. If the dispute which is settled is one between near relations then the settlement of such a dispute can be considered as a family arrangement-see Ramcharan Das's case(1) The courts lean strongly in favour of the family arrangements to bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various members and avoid in anticipation future disputes which might ruin them all-see Sahu Madho Das and ors. v. Pandit Mukanel Ram and anr.(2) For the reasons mentioned above we are of the opinion that in view of the compromise entered into between the parties in 1941, the suits from which these appeals arise are not maintainable. In that view, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the alienations were effected for valid necessity, a question that has not been gone into finally. In the result these appeals are allowed and the suits from which these appeals arise dismissed with costs throughout. Appeals allowed.
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1971 (3) TMI 118
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... ... ..... the tampering of the bottles was not done by the respondent and the bottles might have been received in defective condition with deteriorated liquor from the Warehouse itself, the High Court was quite justified in setting aside the orders of the appellant and the Board of Revenue. 5. Learned Counsel brought to our notice five decisions of this Court in which principles have been laid down for exercise of jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari by High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is unnecessary to quote from those judgments, because we have already indicated above how the orders of the appellant and the Board of Revenue suffer from an apparent error of law in the matter of the raising presumptions and how principles of natural justice have been violated. In these circumstances, no charge can be brought that the High Court exercised its jurisdiction in quashing the orders of the appellant and the Board of Revenue. 6. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1971 (3) TMI 117
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... ... ..... nd each witness cross-examined at length. The evidence as incorporated in the paper book before us runs into about 42 closely typed sheets. Such an enquiry can hardly be dubbed an empty formality. The findings given by the domestic Tribunal also show a very careful consideration of the evidence. 16. On the whole we are satisfied upon the findings given and the evidence, which we have reluctantly read at the instance of the petitioner's counsel because it is not our function normally to read it, that the petitioner acted in a most highhanded manner and wantonly intimidated a co-worker who desired to attend his work, with a view to deterring him from doing so. Even before the enquiry officer his attitude was throughout one which can only be characterized as an attempt to overawe the enquiry officer. Therefore, this was permanently a case where permission under S. 33(3) ought to have been granted. We uphold the findings of the Tribunal. The petition is dismissed with costs.
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1971 (3) TMI 116
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... ... ..... liament has provided for that contingency in S. 14 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951. On our interpretation other articles of the Constitution also have full play, e.g. Article 77(3) which contemplates allocation of. business among Ministers, and Article 78 which prescribes certain duties of Prime Minister. We are grateful to the learned Attorney General and the appellant for having supplied to us compilations containing extracts from various books on Constitutional Law and extracts from the debates in the Constituent Assembly. We need not burden this judgment with them. But on, the whole we receive assurance from the learned authors and the speeches that the view we have taken is the right one, and is in accordance with conventions followed not only in the United Kingdom but in other countries following a similar system of responsible Government. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs in this Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1971 (3) TMI 115
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... ... ..... the investigation has to be done by him in person or that he cannot take the assistance of his deputies or that he is bound to go through each and everyone of the steps in the investigation in every case. The above proposition also has been laid down by this Court in H. N. Rishbud and Inder Singh vs. The State of Bihar ( 1955 1 S. C. R. 1150.) are referring to the above aspect to emphasise that the mere fact that some of the statements have been written-by Ved Prakash to the dictation of P. W. 6 will not make the investigation as one not conducted by P. W. 6. Therefore, under the circumstances, we are not inclined to agree with the view of the High Court that there has been any irregularity or illegality in the conduct of the investigation. We however agree with the conclusions arrived at by the High Court holding the appellant guilty of the offence as well as the sentence imposed on him. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. The appellant will surrender his bail.
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