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1973 (2) TMI 142
... ... ... ... ..... king a practical view of the question, it does not appear to be the intention of the Act and casual employees should be brought within its pure view. The contribution that the employer and the employee make which goes to make up the fund is in the nature of a consideration for the benefits contemplated under the Act and to be derived by those entitled to them. The contribution necessarily has a relation to the benefits derived. It does not appear to be the intention of the Act that, however small the contribution made by a casual employee may be, nevertheless the fund should be devoted for extending the benefits to him. If the intention was to bring any such casual employee within the purview of the Act the Act would have clearly mentioned it. 7. On a perusal of the several sections of the Act, the intendment and the scheme thereof, we are of the view, agreeing with Ramamurti, J., that casual employees are not within the purview of the Act. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1973 (2) TMI 141
... ... ... ... ..... le would be applicable to a case of the present nature. In other words it can well be said that the question of ultra vires was wholly foreign to the scope and the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. As the appeals and the revisions which were later preferred were from the orders of the Rent Controller fixing the standard rent in accordance with the provisions of the Rent Control statute, we are unable to see any distinction between the present cases and those decided by this Court arising out of a taxing statute. If the Rent Controller could not have decided the Constitutional validity of the provisions which have been impugned in the same way as the taxing authorities could not have determined the Constitutional validity of the taxing statute it would not be open either to the High Court or to this Court to go into those questions in proceedings arising out of fixation of standard rent. 6. In the result the appeals fail and they are dismissed. We make no order as to costs.
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1973 (2) TMI 140
... ... ... ... ..... rted in ILR1906 33Cal927 at p. 930 that "for my part I am always slow to believe that the Court's powers are unequal to its desire to order that which it believes to be just." The ancillary contention also of Mr. Mukherjee accordingly fails. 10. In the result, I make the Rule absolute; set aside all the orders passed on and from 7-7-1972, based on an apparent non-conformance to the procedure established by law including the order dated 6-12-1972, rejecting the claim of the petitioner under Section 88(6-A), Criminal P. C. passed by Shri L. N. Roy, Senior Municipal Magistrate, Calcutta in Misc. Case No. 44 of 1972; and I direct that the case shall go back to the Court below for being disposed of in accordance with law and expeditiously from the stage reached on 7-7-1972 by some other learned Magistrate, in the light of the observations made above and in conformance to the procedure enjoined under the Criminal P. C. 11. Let the records go down as early as possible.
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1973 (2) TMI 139
... ... ... ... ..... of the value of the assets received by them from the original plaintiff. 24. The Courts below were in error In thinking that evidence ought to have been adduced to show that deposits have been made end deposits have been withdrawn by the plaintiff. It is a matter evidenced by the records of Court and the Court should have taken care to verify the records. Before this Court a statement has been filed by the petitioners showing the total amount deposited and the total amount withdrawn. Balance in deposit is also shown in the statement. This statement will be forwarded to the Court of first instance, which will take note of this. Balance, if any. will be recovered by the petitioners with six per cent interest on the amount paid from the date of withdrawal by the plaintiff subject to what I have said about the extent of the liability of the legal representatives of the plaintiff. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed as above. Parties are directed to suffer costs.
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1973 (2) TMI 138
... ... ... ... ..... he Chief Engineer while making promotions on the above mentioned three occasions was guided by the above mentioned principle in the Circular. There seems to be no basis to revise the orders passed by the Chief Engineer regarding promotions of those people and Government orders passed at P. 44/11 and P. 69/N may be accordingly modified and earlier orders issued to the Chief Engineer at p. 92C and p. 135C may be cancelled. He may be told that the representations made by Shri S.N. Naik and Shri B.C. Mohanty may be rejected. X X X Sd. C.B. Jain 6th November, 1969. 19-11-1969." The aforesaid discussion made by the Secretary (Works) illumines the position that the case of the petitioner that he was not considered for promotion at the time opposite parties 3 to 5 were promoted is wholly baseless. 17. For the reasons given above, the writ application has no merit and is dismissed; but in the circumstances there would be no order as to costs. Sachidananda Acharya, J. 18. I agree.
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1973 (2) TMI 137
... ... ... ... ..... iding the questions referred to us in this case we have to go into the facts, the field of interference is considerably limited, for this court is not exercising the powers of an appellate court. Though the learned counsel may be right in his submission that there is no positive material to establish that 500 pothis of kappas were held by the assessee on December 31, 1959, the Tribunal is justified in proceeding on the basis of the entries made in the declarations given by the assessee to the bank. The Tribunal has chosen to give an estimate after giving due allowance for the probable inflation which the assessee could have made. We are not, therefore, in a position to say that there was no material for the Tribunal to hold that there were unaccounted stocks of kappas on December 31, 1959. In this view, we have to answer both the questions referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the revenue. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
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1973 (2) TMI 136
... ... ... ... ..... authority, had no jurisdiction to remand the same. 10. Whilst, therefore, making the rule nisi partly absolute and allowing the writ petitions in part, I make it clear that the findings of the appellate authority in all other respects are confirmed and the subject-matter is remitted back to the file of the District Judge, East Thanjavur, as an appellate authority Under Section 29 of the Act to record, the market value of the properties within the town planning scheme in question as on the date of notification Under Section 12 and in accordance with the provisions of clause (a) of Section 24 of the Act. The appellate authority shall bear in mind that the relevant date for the purpose of such evaluation is 13th June, 1956. The parties are at liberty to adduce such evidence as they deem fit on the aspect which is still to be decided and which has to be disposed of in the light of this judgment by the appellate authority. There will be no order as to costs in all the petitions.
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1973 (2) TMI 135
... ... ... ... ..... of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. This is what the Government has done as far as these petitioners are concerned. 16. The learned Counsel next contends that there has been great delay in bringing this petition and we should not exercise our discretion. There has been some delay but on the facts of this case we are of the opinion that there has not been undue delay, especially as in his letter dated March 23, 1967 the President, Forest Research Institute and Colleges said that the points were being examined and if necessary the Ministry would be consulted. 17. In the result the petition is allowed and it is directed that the revised pay scales of the petitioners will have effect from July 1, 1959 in accordance with the recommendations of the Pay Commission. We further direct that the petitioners should be paid the amount payable to them as a consequence of the revision of the pay scales with effect from July 1959. The petitioners will have the costs of this petition.
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1973 (2) TMI 134
... ... ... ... ..... he was already paid to the party complaining of a breach of contract, the undertaking is of the nature of a penalty." It was further held that the amount deposited by way of security for guaranteeing the due performance of the contract cannot be regarded as earnest money. 4. It is important that the breach of contract caused no loss to the appellants. The stipulated quantity of sum was subsequently supplied to the appellants by the respondents themselves at the same rate. The appellants, in fact, made no attempt to establish that they had suffered any loss or damage on account of the breach committed by the respondents. 5. Following the decision in Maula Bux's case, we hold that the High Court was right in rejecting the appellants claim that they are entitled to forfeit the security deposit civil appeal 1346 of 1967 is accordingly dismissed with costs. 6. This judgment will govern the other no appeals except that these will be no order as to costs in these appeals.
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1973 (2) TMI 133
... ... ... ... ..... he Revenue Assistant was illegal and was not binding on the plaintiff. (69.) The Gaon Sabha appealed to the court of the Senior Sub Judge, Delhi. By order dated October, 4, 1965, the appeal of the Gaon Sabha was dismissed. Gaon Sabha has now come up in second appeal to this court. (70.) On the allegations made in the plaint it is abundantly clear that the plaintiff's claim in substance is that he has bhumidari rights in the suit land and the vesting order is contrary to law. As such, such a suit could not be brought in the civil court by reason of section 185(1) of the Act. In the result, the appeal of Gaon Sabha is allowed. The judgements and decrees of the courts below are set aside. The suit of the plaintiff-respondent is dismissed as being incompetent. In view of the fact that the question involved in all the ten appeals was one relating to jurisdiction, we think that the proper order will be to leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout in all the appeals.
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1973 (2) TMI 132
... ... ... ... ..... nd praying for transmission of the same to the executing Court cannot be said to be step for the enforcing of the judgment as contemplated under the abovesaid provisions. Therefore, the civil miscellaneous appeal fails. 4. The learned counsel for the judgment-debtor-appellants raised another point, vi., that the decree-holder has given the rate between the Malayan dollar and the Indian rupee wrongly and that has got to be corrected. But, that question is not before us. The only order that is appealed against is the order transmitting the decree to the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai. We are concerned only with the question whether that order is legal or not. As we said earlier, there is nothing wrong about that order. Therefore, the civil miscellaneous appeal has to be dismissed. The question as to the correct exchange value has to be agitated in the proper forum. The civil miscellaneous appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 5. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (2) TMI 131
... ... ... ... ..... e grounds is also immaterial because his liability to be tried in a court of law cannot debar the authority concerned from detaining him if his acts bring his case within the purview of Section 3 of the Act. In Borjaban Gorey v. State of W.B. it was ruled that the liability of the detenu to be tried in courts of law for being punished for the commission of an offence does not impinge upon the operation of the Act. The respective fields of operation of the law providing for trial and punishment for the commission of offences and of the Act are not co-extensive. One is meant to punish for past offences while the other is designed to prevent the person concerned from future mischief irrespective of his liability to be punished in a court of law on the basis of the same acts. Their operation is not alternative, the detenu's liability to be tried not invalidating his detention. This challenge is thus equally devoid of merit. 6. The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed.
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1973 (2) TMI 130
... ... ... ... ..... The appellant had in the present case, as observed by the High Court, admitted receipt of ₹ 30 from P.W. 1 on the date of the offence and his explanation was considered to be unconvincing. The defence evidence was also considered by the High Court to be unimpressive and unacceptable. In our view, it is not possible to find any infirmity in the judgment of the High Court upholding the prosecution story and convicting the appellant and indeed we are unable to find any cogent ground for re-appraising the evidence for ourselves in this appeal. There is absolutely no extraordinary reason for departing from the normal rule of practice according to which this Court accepts the conclusions of facts arrived at by the High Court to be final. There is no grave injustice as a result of any irregularity or other infirmity either in the trial or in the judgments of the trial court and the High Court. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (2) TMI 129
... ... ... ... ..... unless it is revoked prior to or at the time of filing of the returns, as contemplated in the rule above, he cannot be heard to say that he could revoke it at any time he desires and particularly, before the payment of the tax which he should suffer normally under section 7 of the Act. In these circumstances, both the contentions fail and I do not think that the petitioner can invoke any of the provisions of the Constitution so as to attack the sustainability or vires of the relevant provision which I have considered above. In this view, the petitioner s writ petition should fail. On the ground that he failed to avail himself of the alternative remedy of preferring an appeal before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, he cannot seek a rule under article 226. But, as I have considered the case on other merits also, I am not satisfied that the rule nisi should be sustained. It is discharged and the writ petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (2) TMI 128
... ... ... ... ..... ioner that the yardstick as to penalty adopted by the authorities is incorrect and inapplicable. Having regard to the fact that there were no accounts and the return was submitted at a time when almost a decision was made by the authorities to assess him on the best judgment method and when the petitioner did not avail himself of every opportunity to prove his return, the proposal made by the department in their notice to assess him under the best judgment basis under section 12(2) was quite in order again, as ultimately the authorities found that the assessee was a person who willy-nilly attempted to avoid and evade the payment of tax, I am of the view that the second compartment of sub-section (3) of section 12 is applicable and the Tribunal was right in having levied the penalty, as also the quantum thereof. The order does not pose any error of jurisdiction or any other apparent error. The writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (2) TMI 127
... ... ... ... ..... . Das Gupta relied on a copy of a letter dated 27th September, 1972, being annexure B to the petition, and submitted that that may also be treated to be a demand for justice. But it seems that the said letter was addressed to the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, North Circle, whereas the officers alleged to be delinquent in the instant case are respondents Nos. 4 and 5. The said letter cannot in that view of the matter be treated to be a notice of demand of justice. In fact, it seems that there has been no demand of justice made by the petitioner either to respondent No. 4 or respondent No. 5. There is not even an averment in the petition to that effect. In that view of the matter, this application must fail and is dismissed. The rule nisi is discharged. All interim orders shall stand vacated. In the facts and circumstances of this case, I direct that each party shall pay and bear his or its own costs of, and incidental to, this application. Application dismissed.
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1973 (2) TMI 126
... ... ... ... ..... e Shorter Oxford English Dictionary and in Hindi-Punjabi Kosh, published by the Department of Punjabi, Patiala, in its edition 1953, where it is defined to mean atte da chhanas, kanak, jaon ade da chhilka, chhan, bura . In the AngloHindi-Punjabi Glossary of Administrative and General Terms, published by the Department of Languages, Punjab, edition 1962, the Hindi meaning of the word bran is chokar, bhusi. It was observed that the definition of the word bran as given in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary covers chokar also. It is thus evident that the question of law referred to this court for opinion has already been answered by two Division Benches of this Court and respectfully agreeing with the reasoning of those two decisions we answer the question of law, referred to us, in the affirmative. Since the decisions of the above-noted Division Benches were rendered during the pendency of these references, we make no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1973 (2) TMI 125
... ... ... ... ..... he number of revisional proceedings would not be less and, therefore, cannot be completed within the time provided in the section. The period of limitation, no doubt, is subsequently enlarged but it is again reduced. For the aforesaid reasons the criteria is not the time when the final order is passed in the revision, but the point of time when the revision proceeding is initiated by the Commissioner. We, therefore, answer the question which has been referred to us holding that on the correct interpretation of section 57 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, the period of limitation of 5 years prescribed for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the Commissioner on his own motion applies only to the calling of the record of any order of any officer appointed under section 20 to assist him and it is not necessary that the entire revision proceeding should be completed within that period. There shall be no order as to costs. Orders accordingly. Reference answered accordingly.
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1973 (2) TMI 124
... ... ... ... ..... present case. In that case, certain inter-State sales were taxed in U.P. and also taxed by the officer in Delhi. The Bench held that the sales could only be taxed once under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and, that too, in the State from which the movement of the goods commenced. A similar position exists in the present case. In fact, if the Sales Tax Officer at Rewari had taxed the assessee on the ground that the sales were effected through that branch, that officer would be acting without authority because of the wording of section 9(1) as held in the authority referred to above. It, therefore, follows that the Sales Tax Officer at Delhi was the officer competent to collect the sales tax from the assessee. The result would be that the answer to the question referred would be in the affirmative in favour of the Commissioner of Sales Tax and against the assessee. The Commissioner would be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1973 (2) TMI 123
... ... ... ... ..... paying 3 per cent. he need pay only one per cent. on his sales of groundnut oil and cake. The purpose of the notification is to relieve such a miller and enable him to pay only 3 per cent. on the whole and not more. And the acceptance of the contention of the appellants will enable them to escape with a lesser levy, e.g., one per cent. If a miller goes out and purchases groundnut either in Tamil Nadu or in Andhra Pradesh and brings the same into Kerala and crushes it and converts it into oil and if he does not get the benefit of the impugned notification, he cannot complain the purpose of the notification is to give relief to a miller who purchases groundnut in the State paying 2 per cent. thereon and also pays tax on his sales of the oil and cake produced at 3 per cent. the purpose is not to give any relief to a miller who has not paid sales tax in the State under the State Sales Tax Act. The result is we dismiss all these appeals, however, without costs. Appeals dismissed.
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