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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 104 Records
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1977 (7) TMI 118
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... ... ..... tly nor by implication takes away the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain suits against the ex-owners of the collieries nationalised, and particularly so in respect of claims arising before the appointed day, i. e. May 1, 1973, The said Act does not prescribe any forum against the ex-owners of the colliery for such claims and only lays down a procedure for having certain claims admitted and adjudicated upon by the Commissioner at the instance of creditors, to be realised out of compensation monies in the hands of the Government payable to such owners. 27. In view of the above I answer the only issue raised in the affirmative and in favour of the plaintiff. There will be a decree for ₹ 1,83,082.52 p. against the defendant, interim interest at the rate of 6% per annum, interest on judgment at the rate of 6% and costs. In case any amount has been realised by the plaintiff from the Commissioner, the defendant will be entitled to pro tanto adjustment in the decree.
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1977 (7) TMI 117
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... ... ..... the rule of law, regardless of covert commands and indirect importunities of bosses inside and outside government. Lord Chesham said in the House of Lords in 1958 "He is answerable to law alone and not to any public authority.". A suppliant, obsequious, satellite public service-or one that responds to allurements promotional or pecuniary-is a danger to a democratic polity and to the supremacy of the rule of law. The courage and probity of the hierarchical election machinery and its engineers, even when handsome temptation entices or huffy higher power browbeats, is the guarantee of electoral purity. To conclude, we are unhappy that such aspersions against public servants affect the integrity and morale of the services but where the easy virtue of an election official or political power-wielder has distorted the assembly-line operations, he will suffer one day. Be that as it may, we express no final opinion beyond what has already been said. Appeal allowed in part.
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1977 (7) TMI 116
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... ... ..... . Thus. there was a dispute with regard to the question as to whether the subsequent agreement extinguished the original agreement or not. The learned Judge concluded that the arbitration agreement being sufficiently wide covered the said dispute and as such the dispute could be the subject-matter of reference. Accordingly, in my opinion, the learned Judge of the Court below has rightly held that the said question as to whether the subsequent contract had extinguished the original contract could be the subject-matter of the reference because it was covered by the said arbitration clause. (Rungta & Sons v. J. T R.) ; Damodar Valley v. K.K. Kar (supra). The learned Judge, according to me, has rightly stayed the suit against the defendant No. 1, the appellant herein. 46. The points argued herein, as indicated above, having been decided by me against the appellant, the appeal is bound to be and is hereby dismissed with costs. Certified for two counsel. Hazra, J. 47. I agree.
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1977 (7) TMI 115
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... ... ..... of the appellants to be put on trial. For these reasons, the order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Karnal dated November 15, 1976 cannot be said to be an interlocutory order and does not fall within the mischief of sub-s. (2) of s. 397 of the 1973 Code and is not covered by the same. That being the position, a revision against this order was fully competent under S. 397(1) or under s. 482 of the same Code, because the scope of both these sections in a matter of this kind is more or less the same. As we propose to remand this case to the High Court to decide the revision on merits, we refrain from making any observation regarding the merits of the case. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the order of the High Court dated February 14, 1977 refusing to entertain the revision petition of the appellants is 'set aside. The High Court is directed to admit the revision petition filed by the appellants and to decide it on merits in accordance with the law. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (7) TMI 114
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... ... ..... there is no remedy provided for being exposed to an improper adjudication without any material at all. 5. Learned advocate on behalf of the petitioner sought to contend that the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 in so far as it sought to amend Article 226 of the Constitution, was ultra vires. The said point had not been taken in this petition ; as a matter of fact it could not have been taken. Learned advocate sought adjournment on the ground that he proposed to make an application for amendment of the petition. In the view I have taken, it is not necessary for me to consider this prayer any longer, 6. This Rule, therefore, must succeed and impugned notice is quashed and the respondents are restrained from giving effect to the same so far as the petitioner is concerned. This, however, will not prevent the respondent authorities from issuing any fresh notice in accordance with law on proper materials, if they are so entitled. There will be no order as to costs.
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1977 (7) TMI 113
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... ... ..... said order was dismissed by the Additional Commissioner (Colonisation) Bikaner on 3-2-1961. They also concealed the fact that the revision preferred by Bhinya Ram and Sheokaran against the order of the Additional Commissioner of 3-2-1961 also failed. No rejoinder was filed to this objection. 13. But I do not think that the concealment of these facts has any bearing on the main point in the petition and therefore, it is not possible to say that by concealing the aforesaid facts, the petitioners have tried to mislead the Court and have not come with clean hands. 14. The result of the aforesaid discussions is that the second preliminary objection is rejected. The first objection is upheld and two weeks' time is allowed to the learned counsel for the petitioners to let this Court know as to on whose behalf the writ petition will be continued so that the matter may be heard further. It will be open to the several petitioners to file separate petitions, if they want to do so.
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1977 (7) TMI 112
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... ... ..... mpounded levy scheme was reintroduced by Notification No. 95/75, dated 30-4-75, they did not apply for or worked under that scheme. They have contended that their centrifugal stopped working in April, 75 before the Notification No. 95/75, dated 30-4-75 was issued and hence there was no need to apply for working under the compounded levy scheme after 1-5-75. 3. The explanation of the petitioners for non-application to work under the compounded levy scheme w.e.f. 1-5-75 is acceptable one. Under the circumstances, Government of India allow the Revision Application.
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1977 (7) TMI 111
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... ... ..... g lightning arresters using as one of their components porcelain shells. When the company sells the lightning arresters as manufactured by it, it cannot be said to be selling porcelain ware. lt is not the case of the department that the petitioner company is manufacturing any porcelain ware apart from the shells which it uses as component parts in the manufacture of lightning arresters. In one or two instances the petitioner company has manufactured fuses at the request of other companies according to the design and specifications given by them. This will not make the petitioner company a dealer or a manufacturer of porcelain shell as such. Therefore, the levy of excise duty on the porcelain content of the lightning arresters manufactured by the petitioner cannot be held valid. In this view, it is unnecessary to deal with the second contention. The writ petition is therefore allowed and the levy made on the petitioner company is set aside. There will be no order as to costs.
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1977 (7) TMI 110
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... ... ..... contract the defence put forward by the defendant cannot be accepted as valid. If, really, the defendant is allowed to get away with the stand that has now been taken, it would be open to the civil court to go into the question as to whether the liability of the plaintiff had been actually attracted. The hierarchy of authorities under the Sales Tax Act has been specifically provided for the purpose of determining such disputes. Liability to tax cannot be agitated in collateral proceedings. If civil courts can also go into such matters, the result will be that there will be parallel proceedings raising identical issues, one before the civil courts and the other before the tax authorities with the possibility of conflicting decisions. At any rate, clause (10) does not envisage such parallel proceedings. In these circumstances, we consider the court below acted rightly in granting the decree against the defendant. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1977 (7) TMI 109
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... ... ..... cluded in rule 77-A. To be effective service on an accountant, he must, according to rule 77-A, be authorised in writing. In the present case, there is no finding that the accountant, on whom the service was effected on 13th October, 1967, was authorised in writing by the dealer to accept notices. Learned standing counsel after going through the record stated that there is nothing on the record to indicate that the assessee had appointed the accountant in writing in that behalf. Consequently, it must be held that the service on the accountant was not valid. We, therefore, answer the questions referred to us as follows (1) The accountant of the assessee was not his agent within the meaning of rule 77(1)(a) of the Sales Tax Rules. (2) The service of the assessment order on the accountant was not valid and legal service. (3) The appeal filed by the assessee was within time. The assessee will be entitled to his costs which are assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (7) TMI 108
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... ... ..... or the assessee to obtain evidence regarding the payment of tax by the sellers as the commodity was exempt from tax on the basis of the aforesaid decision of this court. It is true that tax on purchase of kernel was introduced retrospectively in cases not falling under the second proviso to section 3(1). Nevertheless, for the purpose of claiming exemption, it is not reasonable to expect the assessee to produce the declaration in form No. 25 for an anterior period when there was no tax on the purchase of cashewnuts. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the Tribunal was perfectly justified in holding that notwithstanding the retrospective operation of the Act, the assessee was not obliged to produce the declaration for the purpose of claiming exemption from tax under the second proviso to section 3(1). This tax revision case challenging the order of the Tribunal as regards the year 1962-63 is dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs. Petition dismissed.
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1977 (7) TMI 107
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... ... ..... ll within the time stipulated under section 35. Any further steps which the assessing authority is directed to take pursuant to the order of the Deputy Commissioner would not be governed by the time-limit specified in section 35 nor will it constitute a proceeding under section 19 of the Act. It does not, therefore, matter that the investigation which is ordered within the time stipulated under section 35 is actually conducted and concluded outside such time-limit, for, once the revisional order is passed under section 35, the time bar mentioned thereunder can have no application to further proceedings, which emanate from such order. 7.. In the circumstances, we see no merits in the contention that the order of the Deputy Commissioner is in effect an assessment of escaped turnover, or that it is barred by limitation. In our view, the impugned order is perfectly valid. These tax revision cases are accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1977 (7) TMI 106
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... ... ..... was also a case where neither the Act nor the notification granted any general exemption. In the light of the foregoing discussion, our answers to the questions referred to us are as follows (1) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the turnover of the assessee was exempt generally from State sales tax in view of Notification No. ST-2409/X-902(15)-68 dated 28th May, 1969, as amended by Notification No. ST-6996/X-902(15)-68 dated 27th August, 1969, and, consequently, its inter-State sales were also exempt from Central sales tax under section 8(2A) of the Central Sales Tax Act. (2) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amendment of the aforesaid notification by clause 30(3) of U.P. Ordinance No. 12 of 1975, which was replaced by section 31(3)(a) of U.P. Act No. 38 of 1975, did not narrow down the exemption to intra-State sales only. In the circumstances of these cases, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (7) TMI 105
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... ... ..... in the meaning of the exemption under section 8(2A) of the Central Sales Tax Act. Here the notification under section 4(1)(b) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act did not lay down any condition as to the duration of time. It was a general exemption in respect of all the departments of the State Government and the Central Government in respect of all sales of foodgrains made by them. It is, therefore, quite evident that the exemption was general and was not under any specified conditions. The assessee was entitled to exemption from the Central Sales Tax Act on the inter-State sales made by him. In view of this answer to the first question, the second question becomes merely of academic value which is not necessary to decide. In the result, the first question is answered in the negative in favour of the assessee and against the department. The second question is returned without any answer. The assessee will be entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (7) TMI 104
Saving and construction of enactments conferring power to wind up partnership, association or company in certain cases
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1977 (7) TMI 94
Evidence - Testimony of Customs Officer ... ... ... ... ..... He was a personal bodyguard of the Prime Minister and he had served 30 years and had clean record and therefore he would not indulge in smuggling activities. This contention also cannot be accepted. The appellant would be the best person to answer this contention of Shri Ved. One can only sympathise with the appellant for falling prey to the temptation. The question is not whether the appellant would indulge in smuggling activities. The question is whether he did indulge in smuggling activities. The evidence on record did establish the nexus between the appellant and the briefcase containing contraband wrist watches. Therefore, the Additional Collector was right in imposing the penalty on the appellant. The Additional Collector had taken the appellant rsquo s character, his standing and other aspects while imposing a penalty and he had shown considerable leniency. 29. On careful consideration of all the aspects, I see no merit in this appeal and accordingly I reject the same.
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1977 (7) TMI 91
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... ... ..... f the case laws. 4. We have considered the facts of the case and we are of the view that this is not a fit case for imposition of penalty. Out of the total credit of Rs. 11,000 which was stated to be out of his past savings, the Appellate Tribunal accepted the claim of the assessee to the extent of Rs. 6.000. The claim of the assessee that he had a larger saving was not accepted, but it cannot be stated that it was not at all a probable case. The credits have also appeared at the beginning of the year which also indicate the possibility of the money having been available to the assessee prior to this year. There is no material to hold that this was the concealed income of the assessee of this year. Where addition is made by merely rejecting the explanation of the assessee, it cannot be held that the assessee is guilty of concealment. In such circumstances the imposition of penalty cannot be held to be justified. We, therefore, cancel the order of penalty and allow the appeal.
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1977 (7) TMI 88
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... ... ..... rom which it could be said that the account books were completed earlier and that Shri Kanmal was not ill in the years of account. As a matter of fact, the illness of Shri Kanmal was really of such a nature that it prevented him from doing him work regularly. 11. Looking to the aforesaid facts and the entire circumstances of the case, in our opinion, there were preponderance of probabilities which would go to show that there were reasonable causes which prevented the assessee from filing the returns in time. There is no positive evidence on record from which it could be said that the explanation given by the assessee was false and the assessee in conscious disregard of its obligation finding to file the returns in time. Thus, in our opinion, the filing of the learned AAC is not correct. 12. For the reasons discussed above, the impugned orders of penalty are liable to be cancelled. 13. In the result, all the appeals are allowed and the impugned orders of penalty are cancelled.
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1977 (7) TMI 87
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... ... ..... is property belonged to his wife. So the conduct of the assessee has been straight-forward and there was nothing to the contrary. 12. The wealth-tax on the net wealth, if the value of the said property is included, would also be nominal. For such a nominal tax no prudent business man would like to incur heavy penalties of Rs. 21,240, Rs. 16,500 and Rs. 7,410 for the respective assessment years under consideration. 13. Looking to the aforesaid facts, entirety of circumstances and the probability of the case, we are satisfied that in the present case there were reasonable causes which prevented the assessee from filing the returns in time. There is no evidence worth the name to establish that the conduct of the assessee has been contumacious or dishonest and the assessee in conscious disregard of his obligation failed to file the returns in time. Thus, in our opinion, the impugned orders of penalty could hardly be sustained. 14. In the result, all the three appeals are allowed.
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1977 (7) TMI 86
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... ... ..... ce of drawings may be correct but here it is not proper to ignore the fact that the assessee has been in service for quite sometime and might have accounts with her out of which her expenses during these years could be partly met. The additions on account of drawings therefore would be on the high side. Considering the position we would sustain an over-all addition of Rs. 2,500 for the first year in the place of Rs. 5,500 sustained by the AAC. For the second year on account of the above we would sustain by the AAC. As regards the increase in the capital account for the second year the assessee had given details about the loans taken from two parties. Nothing has been shown to dis-credit these loans. Looking to the nature and extent of the business the statement filed for receipts, etc. we do not see any justification for upholding another addition of Rs. 5,000 on account of capital. The addition of Rs. 5,000 for the second year is deleted. Both the appeals are partly allowed.
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