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1978 (2) TMI 234
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... ... ..... (1) of Section 468 which prohibits every Court from taking cognizance of an offence of the category specified in Sub-section (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation. It is hardly necessary to say that statutes of limitation have legislative policy behind them. For instance, they shut out belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused from unnecessary harassment. They also save the accused from the risk of having to face trial at a time when his evidence might have been lost because of the delay on the part of the prosecutor. As has been stated, a bar to the taking of cognizance has been prescribed Under Section 468 of the CrPC and there is no reason why the appellant should not be entitled to it in the facts and circumstances of this case. 9. The appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court dated March 2, 1977 is set aside and the order of the Magistrate dated September 15, 1976 taking cognizance of the offence against the appellant is quashed.
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1978 (2) TMI 233
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... ... ..... stallment of ₹ 600/- to the Bank on account of the money advanced to him against the security of this taxi. He could not have remained without payment of a single farthing for the period of all the said two week if really he was plying the taxi during the whole of that period. He claims to have received the entire sum of ₹ 2,100/ on or about the 15th June, 1975 No receipt, or any other documentary evidence, or any supporting witness was produced in regard to the alleged payment of ₹ 2,100/- to Rahimbhai. We find no substance in the argument put forward on behalf of respondent No. 1. attacking the finding of the High Court in this regard. 17. For the reasons stated above, this appeal is allowed the judgment of the High Court in so far as it is against the appellant is set aside; the election petition filed by respondent No. 1. is dismissed. The appellant must get his costs in this Court as also in the High Court from respondent No. 1, the election petitioner.
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1978 (2) TMI 232
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... ... ..... l v. Deccan Banking Co. AIR 1955 Hyd. 69. 12. Following these decisions, it has to be held that the instant case falls clearly under the maxim pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis. The respondent must have known when she paid ₹ 15,000, that she was paying the money for an illegal object or an object opposed to public policy. She cannot in any way be considered to be less guilty party as none of the situations contemplated in Sitaram v. Radha Bai 1968 1 SCR 805 is present. I therefore follow the decisions in Kunju Collieries v. Jharkhand Mines 1975 1 SCR 703 and in Ratanchand v. Askar AIR 1976 AP 112, and hold that the respondent is not entitled to a refund of the money from the appellant. The respondent herself could not get the relief she wanted without setting up and proving the illegal object for which she had paid the money. I therefore set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court, dismiss the suit and allow the appeal with costs. 13. Appeal allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 231
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... ... ..... s necessarily tied up with relevant ones (being in the same book or file) is a farcical process. It may be sheer waste of time for the accused to inspect totally irrelevant material. We are convinced that the Magistrate has afforded sufficient opportunity and he has rightly put his foot down on further procrastination. 3. We dismiss the petition generally speaking, but having regard to -the fact that the case begins tomorrow and the party has perhaps pinned his hopes upon something happening in this Court, and also because of the fact that the offence is a serious one, we direct the Magistrate to start the hearing and examine the approvers from 20-2-1978 onwards. We make it clear that the Committing Magistrate will take zealous care to dispose of the committal proceedings with despatch. We allow the Magistrate four days more time beyond the date fixed by this Court in the earlier order for tide commitment of the case and a like extension in the rest of the period fixed there.
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1978 (2) TMI 230
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... ... ..... hen the Union approached the Conciliation Officer the Management appeared and contested the claim for reinstatement. There is thus unimpeachable evidence that the concerned workman persistently demanded reinstatement. If in this background the Government came to the conclusion that there exists a dispute concerning workman S. N. Goyal and it was an industrial dispute because there was demand for reinstatement and a reference was made such reference could hardly be rejected on the ground that there was no demand and the industrial dispute did not come into existence. Therefore, the Tribunal was in error in rejecting the reference on the ground that the reference was incompetent. Accordingly this appeal is allowed and the Award of the Tribunal is set aside and the matter is remitted to tribunal for disposal according to law. The respondent shall pay costs of the appellant in tips Court. As the reference is very old the Tribunal should dispose it of as expeditiously as possible.
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1978 (2) TMI 229
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... ... ..... e not electors of constituency No. 33 and had no right to vote is constituency No. 33. 36. There has been thus no improper reception or refusal of any vote. Issue No. 2 in held against the petitioner. For the reasons already recorded, Issue No. 3 is held in favor of the respondent. 37. Issue No. 4 An election is not to be declared void under Section 100(1)(d) of the Act unless there is proof that the result of the election, so far as it concerns the respondent was materially affected. The correlation between the improper reception or refusal of the votes and securing by the returned candidate has to be established. In view of my findings on Issues Nos. 2 and 3, I do not intend to give a decision on hypothetical basis. The frame of the issue is also indicative in this direction. Issue No. 4, Therefore, does not arise for determination. 38. Issue No. 5 In the result the Election Petition No. 1 of 1977 is dismissed with costs. Counsel fee ₹ 1,000/- 39. Petition dismissed.
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1978 (2) TMI 228
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... ... ..... nce. Besides, as has been pointed out, the Court will not assist a party, who in assisting the other party would be a perpetrator of an illegality or to continue an illegal conduct or fraud of the parties. 11. In the present case since Clause 10 of the Foodgrain Order, in my view, was applicable to the transaction between the parties, the knowledge of its illegality must be imputed to the parties. Consequently, to allow the plaintiff to obtain a return from the defendant either of the paddy or money lent by the plaintiff to the defendant, would be to allow an illegality. As is pointed out no Court would render assistance, even assuming that one of the parties to the transaction did not know that the Foodgrain Control Order affected the transaction in question, to take advantage or benefit of the agreement. Consequently, it will have to be held that the suits were rightly dismissed. 12. Both the revision applications fail and are dismissed with costs. 13. Petitions dismissed.
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1978 (2) TMI 227
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... ... ..... decree for eviction on the ground mentioned in Section 13(1)(f), that is the only way and no other in which he could get relief. If so, his appeal would become incompetent. Remedy Under Section 17E is an additional remedy. More particularly it appears for the benefit of those tenants against whom decree for eviction was made Under Section 13(1)(f) and appeal by whom was not pending so that they could protect themselves against eviction by landlords whose suits had become incompetent in view of the provisions contained in Sub-section (3A) of Section 13. 21. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the decree for eviction made by all the Courts against the appellant is set aside and the suit is remanded to the trial court to proceed further from the stage after amendments of pleadings were granted by the High Court and the relevant issues were framed pursuant to the amended pleadings. In the circumstances of this case there shall be no order as to costs of appeal in this Court.
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1978 (2) TMI 226
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... ... ..... Court feel that the party was not straight-forward in his dealings with the Court The consequence was that the bail already granted was reversed. 2. Counsel for the State pressed before us that the corruption of which the appellant was guilty prima-facie (according to) the results of the investigation) was substantial. Let us assume so. Even then refusal of bail is not an indirect process of punishing an accused person before he is convicted. This is a confusion regarding the rationale of bail. This Court has explained the real basis of bail law in Gurcharan Singh and Ors. etc. v. State (Delhi Administration) 1978CriLJ129 . We do not think there is as yet any allegation against the appellant of interference with the course of justice or other well-established grounds for refusal of bail. In this view, we direct that the appellant be allowed to continue on bail until further orders to the contrary passed by the Sessions Court if good grounds are made out to its satisfaction.
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1978 (2) TMI 225
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... ... ..... r article 226 or under article 227 of the Constitution. In Babhutmal Raichand Oswal’s case (supra) this Court also said (at p. 1302) "It would, therefore, be seen that the High Court cannot, while exercising jurisdiction under Art. 227, interfere with findings of fact recorded by the subordinate court or tribunal. Its function is limited to seeing that the subordinate court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority." Even that certainty and predictability in the administration of justice in accordance with law which is possible only if lawyers and Courts care to scrupulously apply the law clearly declared by this Court, would not be attainable if this elementary duty is overlooked. For the reasons given above, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore that passed by the appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court on 22nd January, 1970. The respondent will pay the costs of the appellants. Appeal allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 224
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... ... ..... be shown to have withdrawn the amount. If the petition had mentioned that the decision of the appeal court had proceeded on the ground that the amount was taken out, it is difficult to imagine that this Court would have given special leave to decide a question of discretion. 11. We are constrained to observe that the tendency to file appeals in hopeless cases only to gain time and ward off eviction has assumed alarming proportions. We cannot mitigate possible rigours of any law by permitting defaulting tenants to hold up their evictions indefinitely or for inordinately long periods on flimsy or unsustainable grounds. We cannot permit abuses of the process of law and of law Courts. 12. Accordingly, we allow this application for revocation of special leave. We hereby revoke the special leave granted and reject the special leave petition. We also vacate the stay granted. The application for urging additional grounds is rejected. The plaintiff-respondent will get special costs.
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1978 (2) TMI 223
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... ... ..... l and Anr. 1960CriLJ150 this Court refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution and did not order the continuance of the criminal proceeding any further. In Food Inspector, Calicut Cororation v. Cherukattil Gopalan and Anr. 1971 Supp. S.C.R. 721 this Court said at page 730 - But in view of the fact that the appellant has argued the appeal only as a test case and does not challenge the acquittal of the respondents, we merely set aside the order and judgment of the High Court. But we may make it clear that apart from holding the respondents technically guilty, we are not setting aside the order of acquittal passed in their favour. 19. For the reasons stated above, we dispose of these appeals by merely laying down the correct proposition of law but do not make any consequential orders setting aside the acquittal of any of the respondents or sending back the cases to the Courts below or convicting any of them by an order of this Court.
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1978 (2) TMI 222
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... ... ..... t which could give any protection to the tenant against his eviction under section 12 (3) (b) of the Act The facts clearly show that he had incurred the liability to be evicted' under the said provisions, of law and the compromise decree was passed on the tenant's impliedly admitting such liability If a decree for possession Would have been passed in inviting the tenant would not have got three years' time to vacate the premises. He, therefore, agreed to suffer a decree by consent and gained three years' time under it. But the unavoidable uncertainties of litigation and the delay in disposal of cases at all stages have enabled him to gain a period of about 11 years more by now. In our judgment the decree under execution is not a nullity and has got to be executed by the Execution Court without any further loss of time, as quickly as possible. In the result, we allow this appeal with costs and set aside the judgment and order of the High Court. Appeal allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 221
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... ... ..... o questions may be regarded as important questions arising from this judgment of public importance which would require settlement by the Supreme Court. 1. Whether on a true construction of Section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, the words ' neglects to pay' would include omission to pay or refusal to pay a time-barred claim? 2. Whether on a true and proper construction of Section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, the word ' due' includes time-barred debts or excludes time-barred debts? Mr. Singhvi opposes. PER COURT 33. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court granted as, in our opinion, the two questions submitted by counsel for the appellants would seem to raise substantial questions of law of general importance which in our opinion are required to be decided by the Supreme Court in view of the nature of the statutory provisions under consideration. Accordingly we grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court as orally applied for. Order accordingly.
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1978 (2) TMI 220
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... ... ..... y are held to be valid, that part of those orders and the Rules which relates to the restriction of the option to officers originally borne on the Magistracy is invalid and the High Court's judgment is upheld to that extent. It is however clarified that it will be permissible for the authorities concerned to-suitably amend order Ex. P. 1 and the Rules so as to make the option to join the Kerala Criminal Judicial Service available to all those officers who had previous experience of Magisterial work on the date when those Rules came into force. For this purpose the authorities concerned will no doubt give a fresh opportunity to those officers who will become eligible to exercise the option for joining the criminal Judicial Service as a result of this judgment. In the circumstances of the case, no order as to the costs in this Court is necessary. ORDER In view of the majority opinion of this Court the appeals are allowed with no order as to costs. P. B. R. Appeals allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 219
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... ... ..... peals Nos. 1375 and 1384 of 1977 and having regard to that judgment, it is clear that the 1st respondent was not entitled to maintain the application under section 33C(2) without adjudication from a proper authority, either oh a complaint under section 33A or in a reference under section 10, that the order of dismissal passed against him was unjustified and directing his reinstatement. o p /o p We accordingly allow the allow the appeal set aside the judgment and order passed by the Labour Court and reject the application under section 33C(2) made by the 1st respondent Since at the time of grant of special leave in this appeal it was made a condition by this court that the appellant should in any event pay the costs of the workmen, we direct that, though the appellant has succeeded, the appellant will Pay the costs of this appeal to the workman. o p /o p We are told that such costs have already been paid by the appellant to the workman. o p /o p S.R. Appeals allowed. o p /o p
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1978 (2) TMI 218
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... ... ..... ffect from 1st August, 1977 and the letter having been communicated to the President and received by him, it was not open to Satish Chandra to withdraw or revoke that letter. Consequently, the letter dated 15th July, 1977 addressed to the President by Satish Chandra revoking-his resignation was null and void and must be completely ignored. The position, therefore, in my opinion, is that Satish Chandra ceased to be a Judge of the High Court with effect from 1st August, 1977. For these reasons, therefore, I fully agree with the majority view of the High Court (Misra, Shukla and Singh, JJ.). I am unable to persuade myself to agree with my Brother Judges who have taken a contrary view. I, therefore, uphold the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the appeals. We have already pronounced the opera- tive portion of the order on 8th December, 1977 and we have now given the reasons for the order pronounced. In the circumstances, there would be no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 217
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... ... ..... be satisfying not degrading. The Medical Officer concerned will also be consulted on the proper prescription in this behalf. Furthermore, if the behaviour of these two prisoners shows responsibility and trustworthiness, liberal though cautious, Parole will be allowed to them so that their family ties may be maintained and inner tensions may not further build up. After every period of one year, they should be enlarged on parole for two months interviews by family members must be afforded as often as ire sought. Useful crafts must be taught inside prison and studies encouraged. The Sessions Judge whose sentence we uphold, shall make jail visits to ensure compliance with these directions. Art. 21 of the Constitution is the juris- dictional root for this legal liberalism. The State Government will take proper steps to comply with this curial command. With these broad obligations cast on the State and the superintendent, we dismiss the special leave petition. Petition dismissed.
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1978 (2) TMI 216
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... ... ..... e was a factory worker within the meaning of clause (1) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948. Hence he was not an employee within the meaning of the Bihar Act and the petition of complaint filed by him under section 26(2) was not maintainable. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court as also those of the Labour Court and dismiss the petition of complaint filed by the respondent. As per the order of this Court made earlier the appellant must pay the cost in this appeal to Respondent No. 1. Before we part with this case, we would like to put on record that Mr. A. B. N. Sinha appearing for the appellant management assured us that whatever money has been paid to the respondent in lieu of wages so far pursuant to the interim order of the High Court or of this Court will not be claimed back from him. We think that the amount so paid should furnish a sufficient compensation to the respondent for losing his service. S.R. Appeal allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 215
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... ... ..... ted to urge that Article 465-A of the Civil Service Regulations has no application to the case by reason of the fact that the respondent was not holding any of the posts mentioned in Article 349-A and therefore, no action could be taken against him under Note 1 to Article 465-A for compulsorily retiring him. The argument does not appeal to us. But it is not necessary to consider it in any detail because a similar note is appended to Article 465 also and the application of that article is not restricted to officers mentioned in Article 349-A. Whether therefore the one or the other article applies to the respondent, the power to compulsorily retire him could be exercised by the Government either under Note 1 of Article 465-A or note 1 of Article 465. 21. For these reasons we allow the appeal affirm the minority judgment of the Full Bench and uphold the validity of the order passed by the State Government compulsorily retiring the respondent. There will be no order as to costs.
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