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Showing 1 to 20 of 200 Records
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1979 (7) TMI 258
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... ... ..... n there is no data on which the opinion is furnished by the so-called expert, the evidence of such a witness is neither legal nor sufficient. We respectfully agree with this view. It was for the prosecution to bring out such data in the evidence of P. W, 2. When it has failed to bring out the data on which P. W. 2 came to the conclusion and furnished opinion that each of the biscuits was of 24 carat purity and was of foreign origin because of the markings and fineness, the evidence of P. W. 2 would not be legal hence, becomes inadmissible. The prosecution has not produced any other evidence in proof of the fact that each one of the biscuits in question is gold and of particular purity and fineness. So, it has to fail. 10. It is unfortunate that what otherwise appears to be presentable case for prosecution, has to fail because of the inept handling by the concerned public Prosecutor. But, the law has to take it own course. 11. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1979 (7) TMI 257
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... ... ..... the petitioners ceased to be the Directors from July 9, 1969 in view of the notification issued by the Government of India. The demand notice calls upon the petitioners to pay the contributions for employer's for a period ending with March 31, 1970. Mr. Joshi submits that as the petitioners ceased to be the Directors from July 9, 1969, they cannot be held responsible for contribution after expiry of quarter immediately next to July, 1969. The submission is sound and Mr. Main, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, agreed that the demand notice will be re-served upon the petitioners in respect of the employer's contribution after calculating the correct amount. Save and except this relief, the petitioners are not entitled to any other relief in this petition as the respondents have agreed to issue a fresh demand notice in respect of the employers contribution after proper calculation. 12. In the result, the petition fails and the rule discharged with costs.
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1979 (7) TMI 256
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... ... ..... eing inconsistent with Section 5 of the Code of 1973 appears to be fully protected by the provisions of Section 5 of the Code of 1973 as indicated above. 7. In these circumstances, we are clearly of the opinion that the High Court was in error in holding that the Code of 1973 over-ruled the Haryana Act and that the appellant should have been tried under the Code of 1973. We are satisfied that the view taken by the Sessions Judge on this point was correct and the case of the appellant should have been referred to the Magistrate concerned for trial in accordance with the provisions of the Haryana Act. 8. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the Sessions Judge as a result of which the appellant will now be tried by the Magistrate empowered under the Haryana Act and in accordance with the provisions of that Act. The case is an old one. The Magistrate concerned should try to dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible.
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1979 (7) TMI 255
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... ... ..... ection was not carried out, and it was urged that the appeal stood dismissed and, therefore, the appeal no more survived for consideration on merits. We find no merit in this contention, firstly, because this contention was not taken before the High Court though it was available to the present appellants who were respondents before the High Court. The contention could be said to have been abandoned and once it is abandoned it cannot be re-agitated before this Court vide decision of this Court in Jayarama Reddy and Anr. v. Revenue Divisional Officer & Land Acquisition Officer, Kurnool.(1) Apart from this, if the Court fixes time for doing a certain thing, the Court always retains the power to extend the time and the same learned judge of the High Court who made order at entry 11 extended the time as per order at entry 14. therefore, it cannot be said that the appeal stood dismissed. 36. Accordingly, there is no merit in this appeal and it fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1979 (7) TMI 254
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... ... ..... s a partner but further clarified that he was a sleeping partner not connected with the management of the cinema house. This fact that he was not connected with the management of the cinema house has not been controverted either by adducing evidence nor by any allegation made in the complaint. Apparently therefore the Court below was bound to accept the plea raised by the respondent. The Court below was therefore left with the fact that this respondent is partner but a partner who is sleeping partner not connected with the management of the cinema house in any manner. To these facts if the definition of proprietor is applied as the Court below did, it could not be doubted that such a person would not fall within the ambit of the definition of proprietor as provided in section 2 sub-clause (f). The Court below was therefore right in acquitting the respondent. 10. I, therefore, see no merit in this appeal it is therefore dismissed. The acquittal of the respondent is maintained.
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1979 (7) TMI 253
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... ... ..... n by a Magistrate and a warrant of arrest in the first instance has been issued for his arrest may be released on bail under Section 437 CrPC by the Magistrate himself or under Section 439 CrPC by the High Court or the Sessions Judge after he appears or is arrested or brought before the Court. Hence the mere taking of cognizance against a person and issuing a warrant for his arrest does not debar the High Court or the Sessions Judge to consider the application of such person for anticipatory bail if such person genuinely apprehends that he is likely to be arrested in execution of the warrant and if the High Court or the Court of Sessions is satisfied after applying its mind to the materials available that if anticipatory bail is refused an irreparable wrong or injustice may result which it is desirable to avoid. The question referred to us is answered accordingly. The application for anticipatory bail filed by Nandram may be put up before the learned Single Judge for orders.
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1979 (7) TMI 252
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... ... ..... d, no question arises for holding the bailee liable for return of the goods. From the above discussion, it is obvious that the basic liability of the railway administration in such a case both under the provisions of the Indian Railways Act and under the general law as a common carrier is the same and to commence its liability, actual delivery of the goods to it by the consignor for carriage by rail must be proved. Unless that is shown, no contract of carriage is made out and, therefore, there is no occasion to fasten any liability on the railway administration to return the goods. In this case the very first essential requirement to commence the railway administrations' liability, not having been proved as stated earlier, the plaintiff's suit was rightly dismissed against the railway administrations. This appeal must, therefore fail. 18. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of this Court.
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1979 (7) TMI 251
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... ... ..... er to make appointments to certain posts has been delegated to him. Since the appellant was appointed by the Chief Electrical Engineer and has been removed from service by an order passed by respondent 1 who, at any rate, was subordinate in rank to the Chief Electrical Engineer on the date of appellant's appointment, it must be held the respondent 1 had no power to remove the appellant from service. The order of removal is in patent violation of the provisions of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution. For these reasons we allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court and hold that the order dated August 31, 1976 passed by respondent 1 removing the appellant from service is unconstitutional and, therefore, of no effect. The appellant must accordingly be deemed to continue in service until, if so advised, the government takes appropriate steps to bring his service to an end. Respondents will pay the costs of the appeal to the appellant. V.D.K. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (7) TMI 250
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... ... ..... n 7 of The Bahamas Nationality Act, 1973, viz " or if for any other sumcient reason of public policy he is satisfied that it is not conducive to the public good that the applicant should become a citizen of The Bahamas " are inconsistent with the Constitution of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas and are void, (3) A declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to have his application for registration as a citizen of The Bahamas dated 27 June 1974 reconsidered by the Minister according to law, as it has been stated in their Lordships' reasons for their humble advice to Her Majesty in this appeal. Although technically this involves allowing this appeal to the extent of varying the terms of the declaration made by the Court of Appeal, it has in substance been a victory for the plaintiff/ respondent. The defendant/ appellant must pay to him his costs of the appeal to this Board. The Court of Appeal's order awarding him his costs there and below will not be disturbed.
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1979 (7) TMI 249
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... ... ..... circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was not liable to pay gift-tax in respect of that part of his right to share in the profits of the firm as a partner which he had surrendered in favour of his son?. " In both these questions, there is an assumption that there was a surrender in favour of the particular son by the respective partners. But actually there is no such surrender. At the time, when the other two partners left the firm taking the two branches for themselves, the two remaining partners took their respective sons into the firm. Therefore, there is no question of surrender as such in favour of the particular son by the particular partner. We do not think it necessary to reframe the question to remove this error. The questions referred to us in each case in answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessees. The respondent-assessees will be entitled to their costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250 in each.
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1979 (7) TMI 248
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... ... ..... State and having further acted thereon cannot now be defeated of their hopes which have crystallised into rights, thanks to the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Therefore, it is not open to the State, according to the law laid down by this Court, to backtrack. We, there fore, direct the State to implement Ex. P-1 and confer such rights and benefits as are promised thereunder in entirety. Shri B. Datta says that a little time may be necessary for the various Departments to readjust. We allow three months' time for implementation of Ex. P-1, failing which the State will be held in breach. No costs.
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1979 (7) TMI 247
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... ... ..... d for awarding compensation to him. And reading the plaint as a whole, it can legitimately be culled out that he had made out a case, whether it was right on fact or not, that is a different question, that he was wrongfully dismissed from service. This relief could be granted by the Civil Court if it found that the plaintiff's case was true. The High Court, in our opinion, is not right in saying that no such case had at all been made out in the plaint. In our opinion, as we have earlier said, reading the plaint as a whole, such case can be spelt out. That being so to this limited extent, the matter could be examined by the Civil Court. 5. We accordingly allow the appeal set aside the judgments of the courts below and send back the case to the Trial Court for disposing it of in accordance with law in the light of this judgment. There will be no order as to costs. Since the suit has become very old, the Trial Court is directed to dispose it of as expeditiously as possible.
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1979 (7) TMI 246
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... ... ..... fated child but also to avoid the risk of the vehicle falling into deep ditches on either side of the road, with the resultant possibility of far greater harm to the passengers in the bus. 37. After going through the English translation of the evidence of the witnesses, furnished by the counsel and closely analysing the happening and its circumstances in the light of arguments advanced on both side, we are of opinion that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had caused the death of the child by negligent or rash driving. All happened in fraction of a moment; and even if the worst was assumed against the appellant, the highest that could be said was that a misjudgment on his part too slight to be branded as culpable negligence, could well account for the accident resulting in the death of the child. 38. These, then, are the reasons which we give in support of our Order by which we had allowed Syad Akbar's appeal and acquitted him.
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1979 (7) TMI 245
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... ... ..... n employee leaves the service on his volition. The employer terminates his services without his consent and against his will. We, Therefore, think that the word "leave" does not include termination of the services by the employer. If so, clause 10 would not apply at all and the very basis of the injunction sought disappears. As for clause 11 if any secrets as having been passed on to the defendant had been pleaded by the plaintiff and the facts pleaded could have shown that they were trade secrets the plaintiff would have been entitled to a temporary injunction against the defendant ordering the defendant not to divulge these trade secrets. Since the meaning of the pleadings and of the law applicable is totally different in our view as compared to the view of the learned single Judge, we are constrained to interfere with the order under appeal. 25. The appeal is allowed and the temporary injunction is vacated. There will be no order as to costs. 26. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (7) TMI 244
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... ... ..... e is needed because everything needed is implied in that power. The last and perhaps the least valid submission, with meretricious attraction, is the challenge based on unequal legislation picking out one from among equals for hostile treatment. We have held that the royal family estate is being partitioned on principles similar to those applicable to all other Kerala Hindu families and the only difference is a Board instead of a court to allot shares by metes and bounds. This, we have shown, is fully justified by the special circumstances. The Cochin Kovilakam vis-a-vis the Kerala State is sui generis. It has been legislatively dealt with as a special class throughout the history of Kerala and before. The Act impugned has none of the characteristics of class legislation and, is on the other hand, an equalising measure with a pragmatic touch. We negative the specious submission. We find no merit in this Special Leave Petition and dismiss it without costs. Petition dismissed.
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1979 (7) TMI 243
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... ... ..... f the value of the suit, and that the provisions of S. 41 of the Punjab Courts Act have been brought in conformity with S. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. After the decision of the first appellate Court, a second appeal is maintainable in the High Court. As earlier observed, I fail to understand as to how the judicial control of the High Court over the subordinate Courts has been taken away by the impugned legislation. 53. No other point arises for consideration. 54. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I hold that the Punjab Courts (Haryana Amendment) Act (Act No. 20 of 1977), the Punjab Courts (Haryana Amendment) Act No. 24 of 1978 and the Punjab Courts (Amendment) Act, 1963 are valid and were enacted with the requisite legislative competence. Consequently, Civil Miscellaneous No. 1351-C.I/1978 in R. F. A. No. 359 of 1971 is dismissed, without there being any order as to costs. D.S. Tewatia, J. 55. I agree. Ajit Singh Bains, J. 56. I also agree. 57. Petition dismissed.
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1979 (7) TMI 242
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... ... ..... does not normally act in his capacity as a public servant. Since this rule is not absolute, the question being dependent on the facts of each case, we do not think it necessary to burden this judgment with a survey of all those cases. In the light of all that has been said above, we are of opinion that on the facts of the present case, sanction of the appropriate Government was not necessary for the prosecution of the appellants for an offence under Sections 409/120-B, Indian Penal Code, because the alleged act of criminal misappropriation complained of was not committed by them while they were acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty, the commission of the offence having no direct connection or inseparable link with their duties as public servants. At the most, the official status of the appellants furnished them with an opportunity or occasion to commit the alleged criminal act. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (7) TMI 241
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... ... ..... d Commissioner is not only bound to take into account the loss to the beneficiaries but also the default by the employer in making his contributions, which occasions the infliction of damages. The learned Additional Solicitor General was fair enough to concede that the entire amount of damages awarded under s. 14B, except for the amount relatable to administrative charges, must necessarily be transferred to the Employees’ Provident Fund and the Family Pension Fund. We hope that those charged with administering the Act will keep this in view while allocating the damages under s. 14B of the Act to different heads. The employees would, of course, get damages commensurate with their loss i.e., the amount of interest on delayed payments; but the remaining amount should go to augment the ’Fund’ constituted under s. 5, for implementing the Scheme under the Act. The result, therefore, is that this writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1979 (7) TMI 240
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... ... ..... in any financial year; (ii) Vegetable Non-Essential Oils cleared up to a maximum of 10 tons by any manufacturer for home consumption during the month of March, 1956.” Construing this Notification, the learned Judge held that “the words any manufacturer’ meant any one manufacturer. In other words, if the manufacturer was common, then it did not matter how many factories he had got but the exemption was not per factory but was consolidated one.” We are therefore, of the considered view that where the same manufacturer produces goods in more than one factory, the benefit of the Notification of exemption in question can be claimed only on the basis of consolidated output of all the factories. 9. In this view of the matter we do not find any infirmity in the demands made on behalf of the Central Excise Authorities and the orders passed by the Appellate Authority, confirming those demands. The Petition must, therefore, fail and is dismissed with costs.
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1979 (7) TMI 239
Whether it is necessary for the detaining authority to consider whether a person should be prosecuted before an order of detention is made against him’?
Held that:- This Court did not say in Hardhan Saha v. State of West Bengal [1974 (8) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT] that the possibility of a prosecution being launched was an irrelevant consideration which need never be present to the mind of the detaining authority. On the other hand, we do not also think that it is axiomatic, as sought to be contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant, that the detaining authority must invariably consider the possibility of launching a prosecution before making an order of detention and that, if not, the order of detention must necessarily be held to be bad.
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