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1980 (2) TMI 288
... ... ... ... ..... if the goods are intended for sale.... 11. Mr. Mehta finally urged that the products entered the stream of trade as the products of the petitioner company and hence the petitioner-Company must be deemed to be the manufacturer. This contention is fallacious. The products manufactured by the seller, namely, Cibatul Ltd., did not change when they entered the stream of trade merely because the foreign Company's trade marks were affixed on them. The products remained the same. They did not become new or different products m....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 287
... ... ... ... ..... and it was held that the words might maintain mean has the power , or is entitled, to maintain and that under S. 59 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, a suit or appeal which the receiver is required to continue is one relating to the property of the insolvent and therefore an appeal which relates to a money decree passed against file insolvent does not amount to a legal proceeding relating to the property of the insolvent and if the receiver declines to continue the appeal, the insolvent appellant is entitled to continue th....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 286
... ... ... ... ..... riti Ranjan Ghosh and Ors. v. The State 77 C.W.N. 865 the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Dharamvir Singh v. State 1975 Crl. L. J. 884 (Pb. Haryana), the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Brij Bhushan Raghunandan Prasad v. The State AIR1957MP106 , the Orissa High Court in Srikant Rout v. State of Orissa 1972 (2) Cutt. W.R.1332 and the Allahabad High Court in the judgment under appeal. A contrary view was taken by the Patha High Court in Gulzar Khan and Ors. v. State AIR1962Pat255 and the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in B....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 285
... ... ... ... ..... rt to hold that the accused received the gratification from P.W.3. In Suraj Mal v. The State (Delhi Administration) (supra) also it was said mere recovery of money divorced from the circumstances under which it was paid was not sufficient when the substantive evidence in the case was not reliable to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money. There can be no quarrel with that proposition but where the recovery of the money coupled with other circumstances leads to the conclusion that ....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 284
... ... ... ... ..... by the railway Administration. The mere fact that he was paid a stipend during the training period as an Apprentice, did not make a him an employee of the Railway Administration. Indeed Clause 17 of the agreement (Ext. 69) stated in clear terms that the Railway Administration did not bind itself to employ him on the completion of the training. In its narrow sense, the act of the accused-respondent did not amount to engaging in 'trade'. Even if the wider interpretation were to be put on the word 'trade' in S....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 283
... ... ... ... ..... legal illiteracy and pecuniary indigence may have forbidden their moving this Court or the High Court by way of habeas corpus petition. It is a bad state of affairs when we see the Bihar State being oblivious or callous to the prisoners whom it is warehousing. For what purpose, one knows not. It may be an act of penitence on the part of the authorities of the state and also of cleansing of conscience if only a special officer with judicial experience or other law officer familiar with criminal justice were appointed to mak....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 282
... ... ... ... ..... them any proposition of law, as advanced by the learned counsel, was laid down. It is a basic principle of natural justice that if a party at the appellate stage is allowed to lead additional evidence, the opposite party has to be afforded an opportunity to lead evidence, in rebuttal, if it so desires. Moreover, the Tribunal during the course of the arguments asked the assessee certain questions regarding both the matters, namely, the production of the additional evidence and the death of Hira Lal, one of the partners, but....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 281
... ... ... ... ..... ce of Pws 1, 2, 3, and 6 clearly proved that the house was purchase by the plaintiff. The trial Court believed the evidence of these witnesses which was supported by the document including Exhibits P2 and P4 as also a revenue receipt The High Court made on serious attempt to examine the intrinsic merits of the testimony of these witnesses. Even if the evidence of these witnesses is excluded from consideration, the registered sale deed duly executed was sufficient to prove the title of plaintiff in respect of the house in a....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 280
... ... ... ... ..... that the Bank established by a State had distinctive features which differentiated it from other Banks and formed a category in itself and the Act in setting up separate authorities for determination of disputes and in prescribing a special procedure to be followed by them for the recovery of the dues by summary process could not be considered to be discriminatory. 9. We are, therefore, of the view that Section 3 of the Act which enables the State Government to recover the sums advanced under the circumstances mentioned th....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 279
... ... ... ... ..... f 1980 save and except that the appellant is different and for the same reasons as are given by us in our Judgment disposing of Criminal Appeal No. 93 of 1980, we allow the present appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court as also the Order of Conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant by the learned Magistrate and remand the case to the learned Magistrate so that he may proceed with the case from the stage at which the appellant confessed to a plea of guilty. The learned trial Magistrate will ignore the....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 278
... ... ... ... ..... ear 1961 long after the partition, alleged and proved by the defendants 1st party and this being the position it cannot be made liable for partition and it is unnecessary to consider whether the joint family as it existed prior to partition, possessed sufficient nucleus which might have contributed to the acquisition of these properties or whether in fact defendant No. 8 had purchased the same out of her own khas fund. In addition to the relief for partition, the plaintiffs also claimed decree for mesne profits in respect ....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 277
... ... ... ... ..... d Janaki about succession to the estate of Kallyani. Both had applied to the exclusion of each other for being substituted as legal representatives of the deceased. For purposes of this appeal both were substituted for the deceased appellant. It is not necessary to decide this question in this appeal because whoever of the two establishes her right to inherit the property of Kallyani would be entitled to the same but the dispute would be between Yashoda and Janaki and the other defendants have no right to be heard in that ....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 276
... ... ... ... ..... ent of India also a very vague and evasive stand appears to have been taken. It is not said that any orders were passed on the representation or that it was considered but it is said that it was to abide by any stand taken by the State Government. Section 11(1) of the COFEPUSA Act clearly enjoins that the Central Government may revoke or modify an order passed by the State Government. Mr. Abdul Khadar fairly conceded that the Central Government had a discretion under Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act to revoke the order of de....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 275
... ... ... ... ..... resentation of appeal is that they should be carefully scrutinised at the initial stage soon after they are filed and the appellant required to remedy the defects . The principle laid down in the above decision should govern all defective proceedings filed in Court . It was this observation that I had in view in the above judgment. I observed that in rare cases application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal could be filed after the appeal was presented, though I had my own misgivings about the principle of law e....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 274
... ... ... ... ..... en made amply clear by the words and if he persists in such failure or refusal with further fine which may extend to one thousand rupees for every day, after the first, during which the offence continues. 12. The express language of the above section goes to indicate that failure or refusal to comply with the term of the said section creates an offence and continues to be an offence so long as such failure or refusal persists. In other words, so long as the requirement of the said section is not complied with the offence c....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 273
... ... ... ... ..... t;objects qualifies both the objects as well as purposes and it would not be correct to read charitable with objects and not with purposes. In fact, here the words. objects and purposes mean the same thing. This contention raised on behalf of the revenue is also without force. Thus, having regard to the terms of the trust deed and to the correct interpretation of the term charitable purpose in s. 2(15) of the Act (as interpreted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Addl. CIT v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Asso....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 271
... ... ... ... ..... ep in mind that what follows from the grant of special leave is an appeal, and the jurisdiction must, therefore, be invoked by a petitioner possessing a locus standi recognised in law. 26. In regard to the question whether the procedure followed by this Court in disposing of a petition for special leave under Article 136 is consistent with the procedure contemplated by Article 21, we have no hesitation in holding that the principle is inbuilt within the terms of Article 136 itself that the Court in exercising its jurisdict....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 270
... ... ... ... ..... al appeal was presented by Mr. M.L. Shrimal, who had no authority from the appellants to act on their behalf. 13. So far as this factual position is concerned, it appears to us unassailable and Mr. Raj Narain Munshi was unable to controvert it. It is well established that presentation of an appeal amounts to acting on behalf of the party, which requires an authority in writing. It is not the case of the appellants that Mr. Shrimal had any authority whatever from the appellants to present this appeal. The record is silent a....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 269
... ... ... ... ..... nstitute and the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Industrial Development. If the contention of the respondents is right, the order of the High Court would also be bad. But we do not think that the contention of the respondents is well founded. The three respondents to the application for eviction, in our opinion, sufficiently represented the Union of India and. therefore, there was no justification for the High Court to set aside the order of eviction. It is a little regrettable that the High Court should ....... + More
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1980 (2) TMI 268
... ... ... ... ..... n obligation on the transferee to report to the registering authority concerned regarding the transfer of the vehicle along with a certificate of registration and then get the registration transferred in his name. It was therefore the duty of the plaintiff to have applied to the registering authority under Section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act and got the registration transferred in his name. It has been found by the Courts below that all the registration papers as also the memo of sale were handed over to the plaintiff. In....... + More