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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 249 Records
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1984 (1) TMI 349
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... ... ..... there the parties are not in pari delicto; and in furtherance of these statutes, person injured after the transaction is finished and contemplated, may bring his action and defeat the contract. 12. The ground that the appellants cannot challenge the permission initially granted under Section 21 of the Act is not therefore, available in this case. 13. The Tribunal and the High Court have approached the present case in a mechanical way and have failed to apply correctly the ratio of the decision in Noronah's case to the facts before them. We are of the view that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the respondent is not entitled to invoke the remedy under Section 21 of the Act to recover possession of the premises. 14. In the result, the judgments of the High Court and of the Tribunal are set aside and the application filed by the respondent under Section 21 of the Act for recovery of the premises is dismissed. 15. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs.
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1984 (1) TMI 348
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... ... ..... fit of the new Act will be given to the tenant if the conditions contemplated in those sections are satisfied. Section 39 also indicates that the parties are entitled to make necessary amendment in their pleadings and to adduce additional evidence where necessary. 18. For the reasons given above the appeal must succeed. It is accordingly allowed in part and the judgment and decree of the High Court is set aside in so far as it relates to eviction but the judgment of the High Court setting aside the decree for arrears of rent and remanding the case to the trial court remains intact, and the case is sent back to the III Additional District Judge who will apply the new Rent Act and give the protection of the new Act to the appellant and will give him an opportunity to deposit the dues contemplated by Section 39 of the new rent Act after first determining whether any amount is due from the appellant towards rent as directed by the High Court. The costs here will abide the result.
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1984 (1) TMI 347
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... ... ..... er scrutiny, if it was finally decided to admit it. We, therefore, hereby direct that the ITO will take the audit report on record and process the assessee's plea for exemption under s. 11 of the IT Act afresh. Since the orders of the lower authorities have proceeded without consideration of the audit report, the assessment order is set aside. The ITO will reframe the assessment afresh in accordance with law. 9. In the circumstances, we find it unnecessary a deal with the assessee's other grounds of appeal, namely concerning the applicability of the provisions of s. 13(1)(bb) to the facts of the present case. As stated earlier, the assessee has appealed against the orders of the authorities below on as many as 13 grounds. The ITO will in the reassessment proceedings apply his mind to the assessee's objections taken before us to the denial of exemption by application of the provisions of s. 13(1)(bb). 10. In the result, the appeal will be treated as partly allowed.
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1984 (1) TMI 346
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... ... ..... , in my opinion the consolidation will cause unnecessary confusion inasmuch as that application is confined to only on aspect of the present case and that aspect relates to the validity of the registration of the design of the stoves. That application has nothing to do with the trade-mark and the copyrights of the cartons which have much more importance for the purpose of disposing of the suit. I, therefore, dismiss the application (I.A. 3500/83). However, that application will be listed on the same day and before same bench before whom the present suit is listed. 19. On account of I.A. 3149/83, I issue temporary injunction restraining the defendant from using the word 'PERFECT' as a trade-mark or in the words denoting his trade-mark in respect of the stoves manufactured by the defendant and from passing off his stoves as that manufactured by the plaintiff. This injunction will continue till the disposal of the suit. I.A. Nos. 3149 and 3500 of 1983 stand disposed of.
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1984 (1) TMI 345
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... ... ..... rty inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother". While doing so, he urged that property held by Smt. Shankari was inherited by her from her father or mother and it matters little that that inherited property stood enlarged by S. 14(1) of the Act. As already observed Shankari had inherited a limited estate on the rule of acceleration of succession under the gift. Before inheritance could open S. 14(1) came into force, and because of the legal fiction she became full owner as the smaller estate had merged into larger estate as held in Jai Singh v. Mughla (1967) 69 PLR 475 with the result that the larger estate has to be recognised in law, she will be deemed to be owner of this property for the first time, on the basis of S. 14(1) of the Act. Hence the words relied upon in S. 15(2) of the Act do not advance the case of the appellant. For the reasons recorded above, the appeal is devoid of merit and is dismissed but with no order as to costs. 6. Appeal dismissed.
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1984 (1) TMI 344
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... ... ..... facts of the present case are identical with Ramballabh Jasraj Marwadi's case AIR 1937 Nag 268 (supra). Here, the application under O.9, R. 13 of the Civil P. C. was dismissed in default and there was no determination that the second set of vendees were properly served and that the ex parte proceedings were properly taken. If there had been a decision in that application on merits, then it could certainly be argued that it was not open to the second set of vendees to take up the matter again in appeal from the decree following the decision in Ramballabh Jasraj Marwadi's case (supra). Therefore, I hold that the matter was rightly dealt with by the lower Appellate Court. 4. No argument was raised before me on merits of the decision of the lower Appellate Court. 5. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal is devoid of merit and is dismissed with costs. The parties, through their counsel, are directed to appear before the trial Court on 2-3-1984. 6. Appeal dismissed.
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1984 (1) TMI 343
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... ... ..... mself let the tenant into possession. We cannot read so much into the Statement of object and Reasons and into the Statute, via the Statement of objects and Reasons. The words 'regain possession' in the context, are merely meant to convey 'obtain possession'. To our mind, the intention of the legislature is expressed with sufficient clarity by the language of Section 13 A-1 and there is nothing either in the Statute or in the Statute or in the Statement of objects and Reasons to suggest that the intention of the legislature was other than what we have said. We therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore those of the Rent Controller and the appellate authority. The parties will bear their respective costs. The respondents are given time till 30th September, 1984 to vacate the premises subject to their filing within four weeks from today an undertaking which shall be in the form usually adopted in the Court. Appeal allowed.
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1984 (1) TMI 342
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... ... ..... t which has come to the same conclusion to which we have arrived, although the reasons given are not identical. We find that this decision of the Gujarat High Court has been followed by another Division Bench of the same High Court in CIT v. Suessin Textile Bearing Ltd. 1982 135 ITR 443. 12. In view of what we have held above, we are of the view that on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the assessee is entitled to the relief under section 84, in the assessment years 1964-65, 1965-66 and 1966-67 in respect of the aforesaid Raipur plant. Question No. 1 is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 13. As far as question No. 2 is concerned, Mrs. Visanji frankly stated that the assessee does not desire that the same should be answered. In view of this, we decline to answer the said question. 14. As far as the costs of the reference are concerned, looking to all the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1984 (1) TMI 341
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... ... ..... e, the impugned order is liable t be struck down. We accordingly set aside the judgment of the High Court and the impugned order dated November 5, 1981 discharging the appellant from service. The appellant should now be reinstated in service with the same rank and seniority he was entitled to before the impugned order was passed as if it had not been passed at all. He is also entitled to all consequential benefits including the appropriate year of allotment and the arrears of salary and allowances upto the date of his reinstatement. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The appellant had to face this case just at the commencement of his career. We have allowed his claim in the name of the Constitution. This should help him to regain his spirit and also encourage him to turn out to be a public servant in the true sense of that expression. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we feel that the parties should be directed to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.
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1984 (1) TMI 340
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... ... ..... 74 and was intended to benefit and protect agricultural consumers and prevent dealers from making undue profits. For the reasons stated above the appeals are allowed and the impugned State Government's notification dated 14.6.1974 is quashed. There will be an order directing the District Agricultural officers and other District Authorities in the State of Uttar Pradesh not to ask the dealers to refund the excess in respect of the sales completed prior to the date of the impugned notification. The District Magistrates concerned shall return the monies deposited with them by the dealers pursuant to this Court's orders dated 2.9.1974 and 30.10.1974. The respondents shall pay the appellants' costs. There will be one set of advocate's fees in the batch of appeals in which the appellants are represented by Mr. Govindan Nair and another set of advocate's fees in the other set of appeals in which Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad appears for the appellants. Appeals dismissed.
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1984 (1) TMI 339
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... ... ..... not be tried piecemeal. Before commencing a trial, a Sessions Judge must satisfy himself that all necessary evidence is available, If it is not, he may postpone the case, but only on the strongest possible ground and for the shortest possible period. Once the trial commences, he should, except for a very pressing reason which makes an adjournment inevitable, proceed de die in diem until the trial is concluded. We are unable to appreciate the difficulty said to be experienced by the petitioner. It is stated that his Advocate is finding it difficult to attend the court from day-to-day. It is the duty of every Advocate, who accepts the brief in a criminal case to attend the trial from day- today. We cannot over-stress the duty of the Advocate to attend to the trial from day-to-day. Having accepted the brief, he will be committing a breach of his professional duty, if he so fails to attend. The Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is, therefore, dismissed. H.S.K. Petition dismissed.
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1984 (1) TMI 338
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... ... ..... received by the assessee from the priority or new undertaking as the case may be, and not in respect of the income computed after making the deductions provided under the Act and after adjusting the profits or losses of different units against one another. 4. Our attention was drawn to a decision of the supreme Court in the case of Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. vs. CIT. Gujarat-II 1978 CTR (SC) 50 (1978) 113 ITR 84(SC) which deals with the provisions of s. 80E of the IT Act. Sec. 80E is worded differently from ss. 80-I, 80-J and 80M. Opening words of this section are where the total income (as computed in accordance with the other provisions of this Act) includes any profit and gains attributable the business. Those words are very different from the opening words of ss. 80M, 80J and 80-I. The ratio of that decision cannot apply in the present case. 5. In the circumstances the rule is discharged. The petitioner will pay to the respondents cost of the application.
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1984 (1) TMI 337
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... ... ..... s granted by the High Court with respect to the first question contained in it. The question as framed does not bring out the actual controversy between the parties. The controversy was not whether the conditions of a permit can be varied so as to increase the number of trips or the number of vehicles allowed to be operated under that permit as mentioned by the High Court in the certificate granted by it. The real controversy was whether when the condition of a permit is varied so as to increase the number of trips or the number of vehicles allowed to be operated under that permit it would amount to the grant of a new permit, the grant of which would not be in accordance with the provisions of the said Scheme by reason of the provisions of section 68-FF. For the reasons set out above, this Appeal fails and is dismissed. The Appellant will pay to Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 the costs of this Appeal. Respondent No. 4 will bear and pay his own costs of this Appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1984 (1) TMI 336
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... ... ..... e and thereafter ban the sale of the tickets of the lotteries organised by that State. In the Madras case it was also observed that the entrustment order carried with it all powers which the State Government might take to realise the maximum collection. We cannot subscribe to this view. That would really amount to the entrustment of vital legislative powers to the State Government which would be constitutionally, impermissible. We do not think it necessary to refer in any further detail to the decisions of the Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh Bombay and Madras decisions except to say that we generally agree with the reasoning in the Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh decisions and disagree with the reasoning in the Bombay and Madras decisions. In the result we allow the Write petitions and direct the State of Maharashtra to forbear from giving effect to the ban on the sale or distribution of tickets of lotteries organised by other States. There is no order regarding to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1984 (1) TMI 335
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... ... ..... ection 129 of the Customs Act, as made applicable to the Central Excises and Salt Act, and reference to the Special Bench having a minimum of three members in Section 35(d)(ii) would indicate that the reference to two members in sub-section (2) of Section 129 of the Customs Act, 1962 has to be construed as mandatory provision; in other words, matters other than valuation or classification shall always be heard by a Bench of only two members. If this view were to be adopted, constitution of a Special Bench consisting of more than two members for purposes of deciding matters, such as the one under reference would be beyond the scope of the Act. One could perhaps argue that it does not prevent constitution or an ad hoc Bench of just two members to decide such referred matters. These are, however, matters relating to jurisdiction which could be considered by the ad hoc Bench if one is ordered to be constituted by the President in terms of our request made in the last para."
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1984 (1) TMI 334
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... ... ..... et aside. The order of confiscation as well as redemption fine imposed by the Gold Control Officer is confirmed. 58. The matter shall now go back to the West Regional Bench for passing appropriate order in the appeal in the light of the opinion expressed by the majority of the Members. 59. Order per K. Gopal Hegde, Member (J) . - By reasons of difference of opinion between the two members who constituted this Bench, the matter was referred to the third member by the Hon’ble President under Section 129-C(5) of the Gold Control Act. The third member has recorded his finding allowing the appeal in part. The penalty imposed upon the appellant be set aside. The order of confiscation as well as redemption fine imposed by the Gold Control Officer was confirmed. 60. Following the majority decision we allow this appeal in part and set aside the penalty imposed upon the appellant. We, however, confirm the confiscation and the fine imposed in lieu of confiscation.
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1984 (1) TMI 333
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... ... ..... ird respondent levying penalty. Such a result has been brought about only by the default of the appellant in complying with the order of the first respondent to deposit half the amount of the penalty. Therefore, it follows that the rejection of the appeal of the first respondent was legal and the order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition is valid. The above decision of the Supreme Court is a complete answer to the contentions raised by Shri Canteenwala. 9. As in the case of the appellant before the Supreme Court the appellant herein neither complied with the provisions of Section 129-E nor the order passed on 20-10-1983 even though sufficient time has been given for compliance. In the present application he has pleaded that he cannot comply with the order. 10. In the said circumstance, we reject the Misc. Application and also dismiss the appeal C.D. (I) (Bom.) Appeal No. 538 of 1983 for non-compliance with the order dated 20-10-1983 passed by this Bench.
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1984 (1) TMI 332
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... ... ..... ter in the year 1961 from Kenya which was under the British Empire and, therefore, his pension was being deposited in the Standard Chartered Bank Ltd,. London. Thus, according to the appellant, his case was covered by Exception contained in Section 9(2)(b) of the Act. In any case Section 59 of the Act, provides for the presumption of culpable mental state. It further inter alia provides that it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence. As observed earlier, the Board found as a fact that the conduct of the appellant was undoubtedly bona fide. Once it was so held, then the appellant could not be held guilty because there was no mens rea as provided under Section 59 of the Act. 4. In this view of the matter, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Board is set aside. The appellant is not found guilty of any charge framed against him and he is, thus liable to no penalty.
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1984 (1) TMI 331
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... ... ..... 1977 which came into effect from August 6, 1977. It provided that such a demand has to be made within the period specified in Rule 10. Rule 10, after the amendment, prescribed a period of six months for this purpose. Thus it is clear that prior to August 6, 1977 no limitation was prescribed. 43. Rule 10(1), as it stood prior to the amendment, had no application for the simple reason that it covered a case where duty or charges had been short-levied. It would not cover a case where duty or charge had not at all been levied. It is clear from the fact that under Rule 10(1) three months period would start to run from the date on which the duty or charge was paid or adjusted in the owner’s account-current or from the date of making the refund. None of these three contingencies would arise in a case where no duty has been levied at all. 44. In conclusion, I find no merit in this petition and dismiss the same. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.
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1984 (1) TMI 330
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... ... ..... the case. Thus read, there can be no doubt that the appeal to the Tribunal involved questions relating to interpretation of Rule 56A of the Rules and Notification No. 144/75-C.E., dated 7-6-1975. These would be questions relating to rate of duty of excise. Section 35G of the Act is clear that it is excluded in its application where the order among other things relates to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise. In view of this, Shri Lakshmikumaran, learned Sr. D.R’s objection regarding maintainability of the application is well founded. In view of this finding, it is not necessary to consider the other grounds urged by the parties whether or not any question of law arises out of the order, whether the Tribunal was in error in holding that ‘the communication was not a decision and not appealable and whether the Tribunal could itself enrer into this question. The application is rejected as incompetent and not maintainable.
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