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Showing 1 to 20 of 280 Records
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1984 (2) TMI 366
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... ... ..... ssioner is satisfied on the aforesaid two aspects, he cannot straightway proceed to pass an order for sale of the seized essential commodity or for distribution of the same by public distribution system. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the two impugned orders are not sustainable. (2) But, in view of the fact that the essential commodity in question itself has already been distributed, no purpose whatsoever is served by quashing these two orders. Therefore, the only way left open is to direct the Dy. Commissioner to complete the proceeding under S. 6A of the Act, at the earliest. (3) The learned H.C.G.P. submits that the proceeding, under S. 6A of the Act, will be completed within two months. Accordingly, the 2nd respondent is directed to complete the proceeding under S. 6A of the Act, within two months from the date of receipt of this order. 7. All the contentions of the petitioner are left open. 8. A copy of this order be sent to the 2nd respondent. 9. Order accordingly.
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1984 (2) TMI 365
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... ... ..... no way departs from the ratio laid down in Sahodrabai's case (supra). The aforesaid case however, rested on the ground that the document (pamphlet) was expressly referred to in the election petition and thus became an integral part of the same and ought to have been served on the respondent. It is, therefore, manifest that the facts of the case cited above are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. Furthermore, the decision in M. Karunanidhi's case (supra) has noticed the previous decision and has fully endorsed the same. For these reasons, therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that the view taken by the High Court was correct and no interference is called for with the judgment of the High Court. As the matter was clearly concluded by authorities of this Court we did not think it necessary to grant special leave and hearing the parties at length we disposed of and dismiss the petition in terms of the aforesaid observations. Petition dismissed.
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1984 (2) TMI 364
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... ... ..... pecific performance of a contract in question was also a factor against the plaintiff appellant. It is well settled that under rule of law so long as the period prescribed by the Limitation Act does not expire there is no question of waiver or acquiescence on the part of a person claiming specific performance of a contract. Even though the Court of appeal below took erroneous view on this point, this delay factor has been taken by the Court of appeal below as only one of the factors and hence even though the view taken by the Court of appeal below on this matter is erroneous. It does not help the plaintiff at all, as on the main legal aspect of the matter. I have already held above that the Courts below have, on the facts of the instant case, properly thrown the onus upon the plaintiff to prove that the contesting defendant had knowledge of the prior contract. 12. In the result, the appeal is dismissed but, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1984 (2) TMI 363
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... ... ..... be treated as a loan transaction in substance. There may be very many factors which may compel a person to sell a property at a price which may not reflect the market value. The cumulative effect of all the relevant facts will determine the real character of the transaction and not one or two factors considered in isolation. 36. Having regard to the evidence on record and the language used in the deed which is unambiguous and on a fair construction of the deed upon reading as a whole, and taking everything into consideration, I am of the opinion that the impugned transaction is not a mortgage by conditional sale. Nor I have been able to persuade myself to hold that the transaction in substance is a loan transaction within the meaning of Section 2(12) of the Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1940. This is a case of sale out and out. This is an absolute sale and not an ostensible sale. 37. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be, however, no order as to costs.
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1984 (2) TMI 362
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... ... ..... falls on the giver or the receiver of that entertainment. Nor is the impugned tax a tax imposed on every show, that is to say on every instance of the exercise of the particular trade calling or employment if there is no show, there is no tax. in the result each of these petitions is allowed. It is hereby declared that clauses c and d of S. 3 1 of the Bombay Entertainment Duty Act, 1923, as amended by the Maharashtra Ordinance No. XXII of 1983 are ultra vires the Constitution and therefore are invalid. There will be no order as to costs. 19. In has been mentioned to us that some of the petitioners, who are owners of the touring cinemas have in the meantime paid certain have in the meantime paid certain amounts under clause c of S. 3 1 of the Act, it has also been men honed to us that certain video exhibition have also paid by way of entertainment duty certain amounts under clause d of the Act. if this is so, they are entitled to the refund of the same. 20. Petitions allowed.
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1984 (2) TMI 361
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... ... ..... al does not show how the best judgment assessment made by it is related to any material which was available to it. The Tribunal itself said that the non-maintenance of account of manufacture was a technical lapse in the instant case. No other material was indicated to enhance the disclosed turnover. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was not justified in fixing the taxable turnover at a higher figure than ₹ 68,636/-. If the authorities so felt, they could proceed to penalise the dealer for non-compliance with Section 12 (2) under Section 15-A of the Act. But, without anything more, this lapse could not be a ground for enhancing the disclosed turnover in this case. 5. The question of law which arises for consideration in this revision is decided accordingly. 6. The revision is allowed. A copy of this order will be sent to the Tribunal under Section 11 (8) of the Act for passing an appropriate consequential order. There will be no order as to costs.
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1984 (2) TMI 360
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... ... ..... requirement for the ITO to record any reasons. 10. The only other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that on the facts, no penalty could be levied and, therefore, the assessment could not have been made after the expiry of the ordinary period of four years. The question as to whether any penalty could be levied is different from the question as to whether the assessee is one to whom the provisions of section 28(1)(c) would apply. In this case, we are concerned with the earlier stage of assessment itself and all that has to be seen is whether the provisions of section 28(1)(c) apply or not. The Tribunal has rightly not expressed any opinion on the question whether the imposition of penalty ultimately would be justified or not. 11. For the reasons recorded above, our answer to the question referred, is in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department will be entitled to its costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250
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1984 (2) TMI 359
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... ... ..... ection 80(1) C.P.C., legislature has made it amply clear that no relief by interim order or otherwise can be granted in such a suit without service of notice to the State or a Public Officer concerned. The scope and ambit of Section 80, C.P.C. has been the subject matter of series of decisions and it is well settled that the provisions are mandatory in nature and should be strictly construed. Since the matter is to be considered by the court below, it is not necessary to deal with the point in detail. 4. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there was absolutely no justification for the trial court to postpone consideration of the objection filed by the petitioners on the grounds stated in the impugned order. Accordingly, the impugned order is vacated. The learned Munsif is directed to dispose of the injunction matter in accordance with law within four weeks hence. Both the parties are directed to appear before the trial court on 1-3-1984 for receiving appropriate directions.
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1984 (2) TMI 358
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... ... ..... r this view is obvious that considerations of form cannot over-ride the legitimate considerations of substance. With great respect, Therefore, to the view taken by Sultan Singh, J., I would prefer to agree with the other view that an amendment of the plaint can be allowed if a prayer is made bonafide before the plaint is actually rejected under Order Vii, Rule 11 by furnishing particulars and making averments which were somehow omitted and rendered the cause of action incomplete or vague and obscure provided, of course, the other party can be compensated by way of costs and no valuable right has accrued to the opposite party by lapse of time which would debar the plaintiffs from instituting a new suit on the same cause of action. (30) To sum up, Therefore, I reject 1.A. 383/83 as being without any merit and allow the proposed amendments to be made in the plaint as prayed in I.A. 3553/83. The plaintiffs shall, however, pay ₹ 250.00 as costs to the contesting defendants.
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1984 (2) TMI 357
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... ... ..... consider the request of the institution to be recognised under s. 3 of the Act. If it is so recognised the institution would be able to confer degrees as provided in s. 22 of the Act. It is for the Central Government next to consider whether an institution covered by s. 3 of the Act would not satisfy the provision of s. 23 of the Act and if in the opinion of the Central Government such an institution is not covered, whether an appropriate amendment to s. 23 should not be made so as to exclude recognised institutions under s. 3 of the Act from the field of prohibition covered by s. 23 of the Act. CUL should make the application within one month from now and the Central Government should examine the matter appropriately and pass proper orders or directions within six months thereafter. At any rate the institution should have reasonable time-until end of 1984-to take such appropriate steps as it may be advised, to avoid further Prosecution under the Act. Appeal partly allowed.
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1984 (2) TMI 356
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... ... ..... ₹ 50 to carry a bag containing gold upto a taxi which was standing on Kalbadevi Road. The Tribunal has therefore, on the basis of these facts came to the conclusion that the assessee was a small person with insufficient means and that he was not the owner of the gold in question. The Tribunal has, therefore, come to the conclusion that the addition of ₹ 65,000 made by the ITO under s. 69A of the IT Act, 1961 was not justified. 3. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the finding of the Tribunal was not based on any evidence. This is a matter where the Tribunal has come to a finding of fact on an appreciation of evidence which was before the Tribunal. 4. In the premises, the question are answered as follows Question (1) In the affirmative i.e. in favour of the assessee and against the Department. Question (2) In the affirmative i.e. in favour of the assessee and against the Department. 5. The applicant will pay to the respondent the cost of the reference.
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1984 (2) TMI 355
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... ... ..... in directing the Tribunal to refer that question to us for determination. 3. As far as question No. 2 is concerned, we find that the Tribunal has referred to its two earlier orders in respect of earlier assessments in the case of the same assessee and in those orders the Tribunal has considered all the evidence produced, including the resolution passed by the board of directors, authorizing the payment of secret commission and the conditions in the trade of selling dyes and chemicals, which the Tribunal concluded was a highly competitive trade. It is in view of this evidence that the Tribunal has accepted the payment of the secret commission and allowed the same as a deduction. This finding is essentially a finding of fact. It is not sought to be contended by the department that the finding is based on no evidence at all or is perverse. Hence, we see no reason to direct the Tribunal to refer that question to us for determination. 4. Rule discharged with no order as to costs.
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1984 (2) TMI 354
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... ... ..... t by a Division Bench of this Court in Goodlas Nerolac Paints Ltd. v. CIT 1982 137 ITR 58 the Court observed "...It was for the Tribunal to decide, as the final judge of facts, as to whether the case of the assessee that these amounts were actually paid by way of secret commissions, should be believed or not, in the absence of the names and addresses of the persons to whom secret commissions were alleged to have been paid ..." (p. 62) 4. In that case, on the facts, the Tribunal had disbelieved the case of the assessee regarding payments of such amounts as secret commission and we declined to interfere with that finding for the reasons stated above. In the present case, the Tribunal has believed the case of the assessee that the payments were made as well as that there was nexus between the said payment and the business of the assessee and we do not see how these findings of fact can be interfered with in a reference. 5. In the result, rule is discharged with costs.
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1984 (2) TMI 353
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... ... ..... s and the opportunity contemplated by the proviso to Section 23(3) corresponding to proviso to Section 61(2) of the new Act can also be afforded in the course of an adjudication under Section 23-D(1). The ratio would govern the facts of this case also, even though the present prosecution has been launched under the 1973 Act, because the proviso under the old Act of 1947 and that under the 1973 Act are identical in terms. Hence it is not open to the petitioner to contend that he ought to have been issued a second show cause notice before the launching of the prosecution and in the absence of such a notice, the complaint is not maintainable. 20. For all the foregoing reasons, the petition for quashing of the proceedings deserves to fail and will accordingly stand dismissed. The trial Court, is however, instructed to dispose of the case according to merits, and not to be influenced in any manner, by the dismissal of this petition, or by any of the observations contained herein.
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1984 (2) TMI 352
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... ... ..... the part of the High Court to sanction the selection grade pay scale to the appellant when it become due automatically on the ground that he was not found fit to be sanctioned that scale of pay is erroneous. In view of what has been stated above, we need not go into the other points raised by the appellant regarding the above question. In the result the judgment of the High Court is set. aside in so far as the question of sanctioning of the selection grade pay scale to the appellant is concerned. It is hereby declared that the appellant is entitled to the pay in the selection grade pay scale from the date on which his immediate junior (seniority being counted on the length of continuous officiation in the cadre of District Judges) commenced to draw salary in the selection grade pay scale. He is also entitled to all other consequential reliefs flowing therefrom. A writ shall issue in the above terms. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part. No costs. Appeal partly allowed.
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1984 (2) TMI 351
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... ... ..... l proceed further from the stage where the accused was discharged. The accused was the Chief Minister of a premier State- the State of Maharashtra. By a prosecution launched as early as on September 11, 1981, his character and integrity came under a cloud. Nearly 2/1/2 years have rolled by and the case has not moved an inch further. An expeditious trial is primarily in the interest of the accused and a mandate of Art. 21. Expeditious disposal of a criminal case is in the interest of both, the prosecution and the accused. There, fore, Special Case No. 24 of 1982 and Special Case. No 3/83 pending in the Court of Special Judge, Greater Bombay Shri R.B. Sule are withdrawn and transferred to the High Court of Bombay with a request to the to the learned Chief Justice to assign these two cases to a sitting Judge of the High Court. On being so assigned, the learned Judge may proceed to expeditiously dispose of the cases Preferably by holding the trial from day to day. Appeal allowed
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1984 (2) TMI 350
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... ... ..... at was attributable only to the order of requisition and no payment of an amount described as rent could possibly alter the nature of his occupation of the flat or make him a tenant of Rukmanibai in respect of the flat. We are therefore of the view that the High Court was right in allowing the writ petition and directing the State Government and the Controller of Accommodation to deregulation the flat and to take steps to evict the appellant and to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the flat to the 3rd respondent. We accordingly dismiss the appeal, and confirm the order passed by the High Court but in the circumstances of the case, the appellant shall not be evicted from the flat until 28th February, 1985, provided the appellant files an undertaking in this Court within two weeks from today that he will vacate the flat and hand over its vacant possession to the 3rd respondent on or before that date. There will be no order as to costs of the appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1984 (2) TMI 349
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... ... ..... acquired by the notification in question. Over and above this amount, the appellants shall be entitled to statutory solatium of 15% as also interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the additional compensation from the date of dispossession till payment thereof. We direct the Collector to work out the compensation on the basis indicated above within two months from today. If the amount so determined is not paid within three months thereafter, the interest on the additional compensation shall be at the rate of 12% per annum till payment is made. Ordinarily, the appellants should have been entitled to costs. Keeping in view the history of the litigation and manner in which the Kausalya Devi group of appellants had conducted themselves on the earlier occasion before this Court, we do not award costs to them. In Civil Appeal No. 2462/81 appellant Syed Yusufuddin Syed Ziauddin will be entitled to his costs in this Court and hearing fee of ₹ 1,000. Appeals allowed.
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1984 (2) TMI 348
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... ... ..... bound to make an order under Sec. 53 of the Copyright Act so soon as an application is presented to him by the owner of the Copyright. He has naturally to consider the context of the mischief sought to be prevented. He must consider whether the copies would infringe the Copyright if the copies were made in India. He must consider whether the applicant owns the Copyright or is the duly authorised agent of the Copyright. He must hear these claiming to be affected if an order is made and consider any contention that may be put forward as an excuse for the import. He may consider any other relevant circumstance. Since all legitimate defences are open and the enquiry is quasi-judicial, no one can seriously complain. In the result, the judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and that of the learned single judge restored. There is no order as to costs. We are grateful to the learned Attorney General, who appeared at our instance, for the assistance given by him. Appeal allowed.
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1984 (2) TMI 347
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... ... ..... t on the same principle of lowering surface tension. The words “other materials and articles specified below” of the recast item 15A covers only those articles which are listed. To go strictly by technological fact, the materials and articles specified below in the recast item are similar in substance, nature, characteristics to artificial and synthetic resins and plastic materials. The words “other materials” cannot bring into this item anything which is not similar to 15A or which is not listed under 15A and it will be observed that this item lists only substances, materials and articles which have close similarity. It will not be correct to read the words “and other materials” as a separate definition. 13. We set aside the order of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) dated 11-3-1983 and direct assessment to be made in accordance with our order above. Refund of all moneys recovered in excess shall be given within three months.
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