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1990 (5) TMI 250
... ... ... ... ..... king that since the right to apply is a recurring one the question of limitation would not arise. 20. We have now, as per our preceding discussion, settled the question and we hold that Art. 137 of the Limitation Act would not apply to proceedings filed for grant of probate or letters of administration with or without the Will annexed. Before concluding, we must point out that though the proceedings filed for grant of probate or letters of administration may riot come within the mischief of Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, yet the delay aspect is relevant to test the genuineness of the Will propounded. Delay in taking steps gives rise to suspicion and the longer the delay the stronger the suspicion. This is an aspect for consideration of the Court while dealing with the request. We can only leave this aspect at that. Now we have answered the references, the matters will have to go before the learned single Judge, who could deal with them on merits. 21. Order accordingly.
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1990 (5) TMI 249
... ... ... ... ..... is a breach on account of submission of the bank guarantee instead of a demand draft, it cannot be said that the employer had accepted the bank guarantee No. 10 of 1989. On the contrary, that demand draft had been rejected finally by the employer, when it insisted on submission of demand draft only. The employer is, thus, not justified in claiming encashment of bank guarantee No. 10 of 1989, if it complains of breach of term of agreement because of submission of that bank guarantee instead of a demand draft. 47. In the result, this appeal is partly allowed inasmuch as the order of injunction passed by the learned lower court restraining enforcement of bank guarantee No. 4 of 1989 is liable to be set aside and is hereby set aside, while there remains no case for interference with the lower court's order of injunction restraining enforcement of the bank guarantee No. 10 of 1989. There shall, however, be no order as to costs of this appeal in the circumstances of this case.
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1990 (5) TMI 248
... ... ... ... ..... the reasons aforesaid, this writ petition is allowed and the order of District Magistrate, Ludhiana, Annexure P.1, issued under Section 3 of the Act is declared illegal, ultra vires and null and void the respondents are restrained from enforcing the same. However, in the interest of justice, operation of his judgment is stayed for two weeks from the receipt of the copy of the order of his Court, so as to enable the District Magistrate to fix the price according to the principles laid down in this judgment. The District Magistrate need not wait for two weeks. He should expeditiously decide this matter after taking into consideration the representation of the ice manufacturers. In case of difficulty, the District Magistrate may provisionally adopt the whole sale price and retail sale price fixed by the District Magistrate, Jalandhar, till he himself determines the price after applying his mind t) all the relevant facts. A copy of this order be given Dasti to the parties today.
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1990 (5) TMI 247
... ... ... ... ..... ad no difficulty in passing this account as they were satisfied about the way in which the account was prepared. The ITO did not examine the books of account of the assessee in course of the assessment proceeding to find out whether mistake has been committed or not by the assessee or the auditors. 6. This is not a case of glaring and obvious mistake apparent from the assessment order. There is no error apparent on the face of the records. According to the assessee, the records that were produced by the assessee were defective. But that cannot be a ground for invoking the jurisdiction under s. 154 for the rectification of mistake. 7. In that view of the matter we are of the view that the first question is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. The second question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. The third question is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. B.P. Banerjee, J. I agree.
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1990 (5) TMI 246
... ... ... ... ..... otiation, it is mandatory for the Central Government to constitute a Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute. We were shown the Bill where in Section 4 the word 'may' was used. Parliament, however, substituted that word by 'shall' in the Act. Once we come to the conclusion that a stage has reached when the Central Government must be held to be of the opinion that the water dispute can no longer be settled by negotiation, it thus becomes its obligation to constitute a Tribunal and refer the dispute to it as stipulated under Section 4 of the Act. We therefore, direct the Central Government to fulfil its statutory obligation and notify in the official gazette the Constitution of an appropriate tribunal for the adjudication of the water dispute referred to in earlier part of this judgment. We further direct that the same should be done within a period of one month from today. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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1990 (5) TMI 245
... ... ... ... ..... s were aware of the notification and that their grievance is not bona fide and further that they have approached the Court belatedly. There is no material on record to hold that the petitioners were aware of the notification. It is not possible to accept the plea of laches. 27. In the result, for the reasons stated above, rule is issued and made absolute. The writ petitions are allowed and the impugned notifications as well as the impugned demand notices are quashed. In the circumstances of the cases, there will be no order as to costs. 28. However, it is open to the authorities to follow the procedure prescribed under the Act for the purpose of establishing a market and on establishing the same, the respondents are at liberty to demand the market fee from the date of such establishment of the market. It is further directed that the State Government shall take appropriate action in accordance with law against the officials who swore to false affidavits. 29. Petitions allowed.
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1990 (5) TMI 244
... ... ... ... ..... ₹ 12,000. The principle laid down in this case is that here the assessee made a claim for loss as soon as the property was lost or destroyed. At first the assessee found that there was no likelihood of recovery of property and then it claimed for loss. When the assessee realised that in fact loss had taken place, it lodged its claim with the insurance company for compensation. The assessee stated that the amount of compensation will enable him to write off the loss. The assessee had actually shown its claim with the insurance company and made entry to this effect in the account book. It is only after the insurance company declares to pay the entire amount of claim the question of writing off the covered amount may take place. In view of the above the first question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue and the second question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. B.P. Banerjee, J. I agree.
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1990 (5) TMI 243
... ... ... ... ..... rtment filed an appeal before this Tribunal. The department submitted before the Tribunal that the Commissioner (Appeals) should not have allowed the amount under section 37(1) as it formed capital expenditure. The Tribunal held that the Commissioner (Appeals) was correct in allowing the expenditure of ₹ 78,000 for conversion of the oil-firing equipment to coal-firing one under section 37(1). The machine was changed. The only thing that was done was that there was a conversion of oil-firing equipment for better working of the machine. No plant and machinery was brought into existence. Only for better operation this expenditure was made. 4. On behalf of the assessee, nothing was stated to the effect that the order of the Tribunal was wrong. In our view, the Tribunal has taken a correct view in this matter. In that view of the matter, the question of law is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 5. There will be no order as to costs. Sen, J. - I agree.
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1990 (5) TMI 242
... ... ... ... ..... ember, 1975, 1976, 1977 and 1978 respectively. 3. The question No. 1 is now concluded by the decision of this Court in the case of D.D.C. Hansa vs. CIT (IT Ref. No. 78 of 1984) in which the judgment was delivered on 9th April, 1990 since reported in (1992) 105 CTR (Cal) 363. Following the said decision the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. 4. The question in R.A. No. 575 and 576 (Cal)/85 and question No. 1 in R.A. No. 577 (Cal) and 578 (Cal)/85 is also covered by the above decision and the said questions are also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. 5. The question No. 2 in R.A. No. 577 (Cal) and 578 (Cal)/85 is now concluded by the decision of this Court in the case of Universal Cargo Carriers Inc vs . CIT reported in 1987 165ITR209(Cal) . Following the said decision this question is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. pjudge S.C. Sen /pjudge , J. I agree.
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1990 (5) TMI 241
... ... ... ... ..... ecide such a dispute in the winding-up proceedings; and (3) If there is no bona fide dispute with regard to the sum payable towards the principal, it is open to the creditor to resort to both the remedies of filing of a civil suit as well as filing of a petition for winding-up of the company. 15. The case on hand also falls in the groove of the principles as referred to above and in such a circumstance, it goes without saying that the company petition deserves to be dismissed, on the face of existence of a bona fide claim of dispute between both the companies as regards the amount due. In the result, Company Petition No. 64 of 1988 is dismissed and as a consequence, I am constrained to allow CA No. 244 of 1990 setting aside the order dated 12-9-1989 of this Court made in CA No. 606 of 1989 appointing the official liquidator as provisional liquidator. C.A. Nos. 1077 of 1989 and 258 of 1990 are also dismissed. But, in the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.
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1990 (5) TMI 240
... ... ... ... ..... fidavit has been filed by Shri A.K. Roy, Under Secretary to the Government, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi although the order of detention was made by Nisha Sahai Achuthan, Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance. It is evident that the said Under Secretary was dealing with the papers relating to the particular order of detention and he placed those papers before the Minister concerned. In these circumstances, the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents cannot but be considered and there is no allegation of mala fide or malice or extraneous consideration personally against the detaining authority in making the impugned order of detention. This contention is, therefore, not tenable. In the premises aforesaid we dismiss the writ petition and hold that the impugned order of detention is quite in accordance with law and the same is valid. The observations made herein are confined to this application. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (5) TMI 238
... ... ... ... ..... ontrary to the injunction order and such an act is subject to the directions and orders of the Court appointing the Receiver. Therefore the tenancy created in favour of the Tatas was in breach of the order of the court and consequently the Tatas cannot claim any protection under the provisions of the Act and they are liable to be evicted. In the counter affidavit filed on their behalf, it is no doubt stated that they were inducted into possession and even sending the cheques. The case of the appellant is that cheques were never encashed. In any event as observed above, the new tenancy created in their favour contrary to the orders of the Court does not create a fight and is liable to be cancelled. Consequently the provisions of the Act cannot be invoked by them. The appeal is therefore dismissed as against respondent No. 1 Grindlays and allowed as against respondent No. 2 Tatas. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (5) TMI 237
... ... ... ... ..... ional imperative is ob- served in breach, it would amount to negation of the consti- tutional obligation rendering breach would defeat the very concept of liberty--the highly cherished right--which is enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution." However, in the same decision it has been pointed out that "what is reasonable dispatch depends on the facts and cir- cumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid in that regard." We have already expressed that the affidavit filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police is not worth consideration and there is absolutely no explana- tion for the delay caused at the hands of the Assistant Secretary. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, we set aside the impugned order of detention on the ground that there is a breach of constitutional obligation as enshrined under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the detenu is directed to be set at liberty forthwith.
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1990 (5) TMI 236
... ... ... ... ..... the Government rules and regulations which may come in force hereafter and the same shall be binding on all the members." It will be apparent from the Scheme that it was not meant for promoting music. It was a pure business-preposition meant to collect money and earn profits, and it was to be used as a device to evade the entertainment duty. The receipts and/or the invitation cards were nothing but tickets for the show and only for one show, and were collected at the door. In the circumstances, whatever be the description given to the receipts/cards they were liable to the entertainment duty. The impugned notices were, therefore, properly issued by the appellants. We are, therefore, unable to accept the reasoning of the High Court that ₹ 10 collected by the respondents were the membership subscription or that the duty could not have been collected at a time on ₹ 10. 6. Hence, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned decision with costs. Appeal allowed.
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1990 (5) TMI 235
... ... ... ... ..... authorities should consider the same and take action accordingly, as expeditiously as possible. In considering the question of the petitioner continuing his medical educa- tion, the appropriate authorities should bear in mind the justice of the situation.’ We, therefore, leave it to the authorities to take appropriate action about the continuance or discontinuance of the petitioner in his studies on the basis of the aforesaid consideration. We order accordingly. We do so only in the background of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. and the aforesaid observations should not be treated as a precedent for other situations. We, therefore, direct that the petitioner is not enti- tled to be admitted to the Medical College on the basis that he belonged to the scheduled tribes in Andhra Pradesh but his continuance in the College will depend upon the consid- eration indicated hereinbefore. The writ petition is thus disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (5) TMI 234
... ... ... ... ..... ders of this Court, primarily due to shortfalls in the guaranteed off-take and that four concerns, who have stopped taking supply of gas, are in arrears to the tune of about ₹ 12 lakhs. We need hardly say that the ONGC will be at liberty to take immediate steps to recover the charges due from the respondents in the light of this judgment. (ix) We wish to add that we are not called upon to, and do not, express any opinion regarding the notification dated 30.1.87 of the Government issued subsequently fixing the price at ₹ 1,400 plus. We do not know the circumstances or the statutory authority or the basis on which the said price fixation was made and that is totally outside the purview of these appeals. This concludes a discussion of all the points urged before us. For the reasons detailed above, we allow these appeals and uphold the prices charged by the ONGC for supply of gas to the various respondents. We, however, make no order regarding costs. Appeals allowed.
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1990 (5) TMI 233
... ... ... ... ..... consequential orders regarding the release of the seized goods. It, therefore, becomes clear that when the subsequent orders were passed on February 13 and 15, 1989, the appellant did not insist on the sale of the seized commodity as per the order of December 8, 1988. The matter came up for hearing on subsequent occasions also but at no time did the appellant press for the implementation of the said order of December 8, 1988. Even after the Special Judge recorded an acquittal and directed return of the goods, the appellant did not seek implementation of the said order. Nor did the appellant move the High Court for the implementation of the said order in the appeal pending against the order of acquital. It is, therefore, too late in the day now to contend that as the order of December 8, 1988 has remained unimplemented we should refuse to grant any relief to the respondent State. 11. For the reasons stated above we see no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same with costs.
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1990 (5) TMI 232
... ... ... ... ..... iew none of the decisions has any application in the facts and circumstances in the matter of consideration since none of the decisions did consider a situation like the present one and as such the decisions are clearly distinguishable on facts and in that view the same do not lend any assistance to this court. 21. In that view of the matter, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Chatterjee and as such this application fails and is dismissed, though, however, without any order as to costs. The purchaser is hereby directed to go on paying monthly rent as was last paid ; in the event however there being any arrear, the landlord would be at liberty to lodge its claim with the official liquidator for payment of the same and the official liquidator shall act in accordance with law in the matter of payment of the same. This order is, however, also passed without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the landlord to take appropriate steps, if any, in accordance with law.
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1990 (5) TMI 231
... ... ... ... ..... ess of leasing out generating sets. The assessee itself was not actually running the generating sets. The assessee's business was leasing out the generators. The generating set was being used by the assessee and is still being used by the assessee in its business of leasing out generating sets. Therefore, the claim of the assessee has to be allowed. Accordingly, question No. 4 is to be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. 9. In view of the above, the questions referred to are answered as follows Question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. Question No. 2 is answered as follows 2 (a) is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee; 2 (b) is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. Answer to question No. 3 is declined. Question No. 4 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. 10. There will be no order as to costs. Banerjee, J.-I agree. Other Information Partly in favour of revenue
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1990 (5) TMI 230
... ... ... ... ..... rived of it except in accordance with the procedure established by law." Reverting to the facts of the present case as submitted by the learned counsel, except merely mentioning that the representation was forwarded to the concerned sponsoring authority on 25.8.1989 and the comments from the sponsoring authority was received by the Department on 11.9.1989, there is absolutely no explanation as to why such a delay had occurred. Therefore, in the light of the proposition laid down in Rama Dhondu Borade's case (albeit), we have no other option except to allow this appeal on the ground that this undue and unexplained delay is in violation of the constitutional obligation enshrined in Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India rendering the impugned order invalid. For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the order of the High Court, allow the appeal and direct the detenu to be set at liberty forthwith, unless his detention is required for some other cause. Appeal allowed.
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