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Showing 1 to 20 of 317 Records
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1990 (7) TMI 379
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... ... ..... without the consent of the employee. In the cases in hand before us the right whatsoever conferred on the employees of the State Bank was on the basis of Regulation 55(2)(a) and the Central Board of the Bank was authorised to amend such regulations from any date under Section 50(2)(a) of the Act. 27. In the result the appeals filed by the State Bank of India in the case of Vijaya Kumar and T. Dayakar Rao are allowed, the impugned orders passed by the High Court are set aside and the cases are remanded to the High Court for deciding the writ petitions on other points in accordance with law. Now so far as the appeal filed by Sh. C A.K. Soundararajan is concerned, the point decided by us shall remain concluded but the appellant would be free to raise other points before this Court which are left undetermined. This case may now be listed for further hearing and final disposal at an early date. 28. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.
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1990 (7) TMI 378
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... ... ..... re appeared no Explanation for the said period. So the Magistrate had not exercised his discretion properly in allowing the application seeking condensation of delay when on the face of it no Explanation had been furnished for the aforesaid period. As already mentioned, the offence was committed on March 12, 1979 and the complaint could be filed up to March 12, 1980. Originally the complaint was filed within time but for want of proper sanction the petitioners were discharged and fresh complaint came to be filed on February Ii, 1982. So, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to have given some Explanation for total inactivity by the police and the complainant for the period September 1, 1981 to December 19, 1981. Hence, I hold that as no proper Explanation had been given the Magistrate was not justified in condoning the delay. (8) I, hence, allow the revision petition and quash the impugned order and dismiss the complaint as barred by limitation and discharge the petitioners.
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1990 (7) TMI 377
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... ... ..... l limits of jurisdiction of this court and that in considering such a transfer petition a liberal view in favour of the claimant has to be taken. Such a power of transfer can be exercised by this court both under Section 24, C.P.C. or under Article 227 of the Constitution. 14. In both the petitions before this court the petitioners have been able to make a case for transfer as all the parties are located in the District of Nagaon. 15. In the result, both the petitions are allowed with the direction that claim petitions being MACT Cases Nos. 19 and 20 of 1989 pending before the learned Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jorhat shall be transferred to the learned Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Nagaon. On receiving the records the learned Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Nagaon shall issue notice on the parties and thereafter proceed from the stage at which both the petitions were pending before the learned Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jorhat.
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1990 (7) TMI 376
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... ... ..... though he has obtained the transfer without notice of the original contract, cannot set up, against the plaintiff-agreement holder, any right defeating the rule of lis pendens, which is founded upon public policy. 14. So, I agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant and held that Ex. B-3 is hit by the rule of lis pendens. 15. Lastly, the learned counsel for the appellant also rightly pointed out to me Namazi, N. B. v. Central Chinmaya Mission Trust AIR 1988 Mad 84 to reiterate that escalation in price cannot be a defence in a suit for specific performance. 16. Therefore, I set aside the judgment and decree of the court below and allow the appeal with costs, granting a decree for specific performance of the abovesaid Ex. A-3 sale agreement in favour of the appellant. Time for depositing the balance of sale consideration of Rs. 25,000 in the trial Court is one month. Time for execution and registration of the sale deed is two months. 17. Appeal allowed.
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1990 (7) TMI 375
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... ... ..... s pointed out that all the prosecution witnesses were interested in the deceased. Prosecution witnesses 1 and 12 were sons of the deceased while witnesses Nos. 3, 4 and all belonged to the party of the prosecution till the deceased was taken to Bettiah hospital. Prosecution witnesses 3 and 4 were arraigned in a proceeding under Section 17 of the Criminal Procedure Code alongwith the other members of the prosecution party. 5. The High Court did not deal with any of these circumstances pointed out by the trial court and has given no reasons to negative them or to show as to how they were either improper, unjustified or unreasonable. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court has interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the trial court not only for no substantial reasons but also by ignoring material infirmities in the prosecution case. Hence, we allow the appeals and set aside the order of the High Court convicting and sentencing the accused in both the appeals.
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1990 (7) TMI 374
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... ... ..... ertain entries in the accounts books or the balance shown to be due at the end of the year in such accounts or in the balance sheets. The admitted position in the instant case is that no evidence has been adduced by the plaintiff to prove the transactions which had been categorically denied by the defendants in their written statement. In that view of the matter even on facts it has to be held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the amount claimed in the suit was due from the defendants. In view of the aforesaid finding, I am of the opinion that the learned trial court was not justified in decreeing the suit. The suit was barred by limitation except in so far as it relates to recovery of a sum of ₹ 30/-. Besides, the plaintiff also failed to prove the debt in accordance with law. Under the circumstances, the suit should have been dismissed. 11. Accordingly, the appeal of the defendants is allowed and the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed with costs all throughout.
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1990 (7) TMI 373
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... ... ..... nt. As regards the other point, it is true that there is no specific agreement with regard to the mode of payment but this does not necessarily make the agreement ineffective. The mere omission to settle the mode of payment does not affect the completeness of the contract because the vital terms of the contract like the price and area of the land and the time for completion of the sale were all fixed. 23. Thus even in the above case the time for completion of the sale was considered as one of the vital terms of the contract. Further in the above case part of the agreement had been performed i.e. partners having 98 shares had already executed sale deeds and this Court had believed the oral agreement for sale of 137 shares. Thus the above case is totally distinguishable and renders no assistance to the appellants in the case before us. 24. Thus we find no force in these appeals and the same are dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.
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1990 (7) TMI 372
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... ... ..... opting any of the Members of the Managing Committee to function as Stewards till the vacancies are filled up in accordance with law. Point No. (7) is answered accordingly. 47. Consequent upon my above findings on Points (1) to (7) I hold on Point No. (8) that all the three appeals have to be allowed and the suit of the first respondent-plaintiff will have to be dismissed by setting aside the impugned Judgment and decree. As regards costs, I consider it just and proper to direct the parties to bear their own costs having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and also taking into consideration the circumstance that the plaintiff is a long standing Member of the Club. 48. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, these appeals are allowed, the Judgment and decree dated 19-4-1990 passed in O.S. 10600/89 on the file of the XVIII Additional City Civil Judge, Mayohall, Bangalore, are set aside and the said suit is dismissed directing the parties to bear their own costs.
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1990 (7) TMI 371
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... ... ..... passed by the Central Government and communicated by the Registrar of Trade Marks is vitiated, it is necessary to set aside the order and direct the Central Government to re-examine the applications and arrive at a fresh conclusion. 10. Accordingly, petition succeeds and the order dated December 14, 1982 communicated by the Registrar of Trade Marks and copy of which is annexed as Ex.'I' to the petition is set aside and respondent No. 2 is directed to reconsider the applications jointly filed by petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 and arrive at a fresh decision. The respondent No. 2 may permit the petitioners to file additional material, if any, in support of their claim and is also at liberty to call upon the petitioners to produce further material which the Government deems proper. The Government should take decision within a period of three months from the date of service of this writ. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. 11. Petition allowed.
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1990 (7) TMI 370
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... ... ..... se. I am of the opinion that the decision relied upon by the learned Government Pleader is inapplicable to the facts of this case. I may also observe that the decision relied upon by the learned Government Pleader relates to an instrument, and not to a copy of the instrument received by the concerned authority and, therefore, this cannot be an authority for the proposition that even in respect of the copy of the instrument power could be exercised by the Special Deputy Commissioner under Section 33(2) read with Section 46- A of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957. (11.) In the light of the above discussion, I hold that the writ petition deserves to be allowed. Hence, I make the following order - The writ petition is allowed and the impugned orders under Annexurcs 'E' and 'F' are quashed. The rule is made absolute. 24. Sri Sateesh M. Doddamani, learned Government Pleader, is permitted to file his memo of appearance within two weeks from today. Writ Petition allowed.
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1990 (7) TMI 369
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... ... ..... ng section 6A read with section 7 would be defeated. We are, however, unable to accept this contention because normally under the Criminal Procedure Code, the Criminal Courts of the country have the jurisdiction and the ouster of the ordinary criminal Court in respect of a crime can only be inferred if that is the irresistible conclusion flowing from necessary implication of the new Act., In view of the language used and in the context in which this language has been used, we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the Criminal Court retained jurisdiction and was not completely ousted of the jurisdiction. In that view of the matter, the High Court was therefore right in passing the order under consideration and in the facts and circumstances of the case to return the vehicle to the respondent on furnishing the security In the premise the appeal must fail and is dismissed. There win, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (7) TMI 368
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... ... ..... a lump sum. In our view, the liability arising under such an agreement is not related to the actual turnover of the petitioner. The petitioner having elected to pay the sales tax in a lump sum could not be permitted to turn round and contend that he was not liable to pay the amount agreed to be paid by him because his turnover turned out to be either nil or that it was not adequate on account of various factors. 4. There is another reason why we are not persuaded to interfere. Clause 16 of the agreement specifically provides that it will not to open to the dealer to pay a reduced amount or to resile therefrom. This clause clearly contemplates that once the dealers agree to pay the tax in a lump sum, they cannot insist on payment of the tax on the basis of actual turnover. The dealers' rights are in our opinion regulated entirely by the terms of the agreement. 5. Thus in either view, we are not satisfied that there is any merit in this petition. The petition is dismissed.
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1990 (7) TMI 367
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... ... ..... competence was repelled. Further submission that there must be both giving and receiving of the luxury and that a tax on the mere existence of luxury would be insufficient to support a law imposing the tax, also did not appeal and it was held by this Court that taxable event need not necessarily be the actual utilisation or the actual consumption of the luxury. And luxury which can reasonably be said to be amenable to a potential consumer does provide the nexus for valid enactment. No more, therefore, is required to be said. 5. Turning to Section 3 the problem in our opinion presents really no difficulty as whatever has been said by this Court in relation to Section 4 is equally applicable to validity of Section 3. We do not find any merit in the submission that the provision is bad because taxable event is service rendered and not entertainment. In our opinion it ensures certainty. 6. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. But there shall be no order as to costs.
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1990 (7) TMI 366
Pension payment - whether there was any rationale behind the eligibility qualification and finding no rationale concluded?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The P.F. retirees and pension retirees having not belonged to a class, there is no discrimination. In the matter of expenditure includable in the Annual Financial Statement, this Court has to be loath to pass any order to give any direction, because of the division of functions between the three co-equal organs of the Government under the Constitution.
Lastly, the question of feasibility of converting all living P.F. retirees to Pension retirees was debated from the point of view of records and adjustments. Because of the view we have taken in the matter, we do not consider it necessary to express any opinion.
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1990 (7) TMI 365
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... ... ..... ment or suggestion against the correctness of the judgment in Harla v. The State of Rajasthan. On the other hand, the observations at page 163-G -H are on the same lines. It was stated that where there is no statutory requirement as to the mode or form of publication, "we conceive the rule to be that it is necessary that it should be published in the usual form i.e., by publication within the country in such media as generally adopted to notify to all persons concerned the making of the rules." Having regard to the nature and purpose of the power for rectification of the electoral roll by the Electoral Registration Officer, the principle enunciated in the abovementioned cases must be held to be applicable. We accordingly hold that in the eye of law the electoral roll in question was not modified by the inclusion of the names of the nominated members before 8.55 p.m. on 3.6.1988. We, therefore, affirm the decision of the High Court and dismiss the appeal with costs.
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1990 (7) TMI 364
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... ... ..... Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. , D.N. Agrawal and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. and Union of India and Ors. etc. v. Ansusekhar Guin and Ors. etc him. These authorities unequivocally make it clear that if the initial appointment is not made according to the Rules, subsequent regularisation of his service does not entitle an employee to the benefit of intervening service for seniority. 3. This is apart from the fact that as has been pointed out by Mr. Rao, appearing for the respondent- promotees, earlier similarly situated direct recruits like the, petitioners had raised the very same issue of seniority in a writ petition filed by them in she High Court of Madhya Pradesh and the High Court had answered the issue against them. The special leave petition preferred by the said employees against the said order was dismissed by this Court. Hence the issue, on principle, stands closed. We, therefore, dismiss the petitions.
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1990 (7) TMI 363
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... ... ..... essment for the year 1972-73 independently. There is no doubt that in absence of accounts being produced by the dealer, assessing officer was justified in completing the assessment to the best of the judgment. However, while so completing the assessment principles decided in 1957 8 STC 770 (SC) (Raghubar Mandal Harihar Mandal v. State of Bihar) and in 1973 32 STC 77 (SC) (Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. H.M. Esufali H.M. Abdulali) are to be kept in view and it is also to be kept in view that estimation without any nexus is arbitrary in nature. 4.. In this view of the matter the question is answered in favour of the dealer. 5.. On receiving the answer the Tribunal is to pass an order under section 24(5) of the Act. In these types of cases where there was non-application of mind, while passing the order under section 24(5) of the Act, Tribunal is to pass an order to hear the second appeal afresh. 6.. There shall be no order as to costs. J.M. Mahapatra, J.-I agree.
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1990 (7) TMI 362
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... ... ..... Orissa) decision of Orissa High Court was reversed. Said decision is quoted extenso It is agreed on all hands that the question raised in this appeal is covered by the decision of this Court in Maharaja Book Depot v. State of Gujarat 1979 2 SCR 138 and also by the ratio of the decision in Deputy Commissioner, Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Pio Food Packers 1980 46 STC 63 (SC) AIR 1980 SC 1227. The appeal is accordingly allowed with no order as to costs. 5.. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court reversing the decision reported in 1980 45 STC 115 (Rameswarlal Muralidhar v. State of Orissa) the question is to be answered in the negative in favour of the assessee, by stating that Tribunal was not justified in treating exercise books prepared out of paper purchased free of tax by giving declaration as a different commodity than the purchased paper. There shall be no order as to costs. J.M. Mahapatra, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1990 (7) TMI 361
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... ... ..... as a misconception on the part of the Commercial Tax Officer to demand turnover tax from the applicants and to refuse declaration forms for non-payment of turnover tax. 7.. That being our view, the application is allowed and the order dated April 26, 1988, refusing the prayer for issue of declaration forms is quashed. Respondents are directed to dispose of the application dated April 26, 1988 of the applicants for declaration forms afresh according to law and in terms of this judgment. Such disposal shall be made as promptly as possible and in any case not later than two weeks from this date. Respondents shall also similarly dispose of other applications for declaration forms, if already filed or if filed hereafter. If any such prayer is refused, the authorities should pass an order giving reasons for such refusal. Interim orders are vacated. There will be no order as to costs. B.C. CHAKRABARTI (Chairman).I agree. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).I agree. Application allowed.
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1990 (7) TMI 360
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... ... ..... ks and thereafter manufactured packing cases. In those circumstances, this Court held that a packing case in any sense of the term, cannot be called timber. For, it not only became a different commercial product, but its uses were also different. It was held further in that case, once timber was used in the manufacture of packing cases, the identity of the timber as such was lost as it stood converted by the process of manufacture into packing cases . But, on the facts, in our case, in the light of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court and other two Division Bench judgments of this Court, we have no doubt that the Tribunal was right in holding that the purchase turnover of timber is not exigible to tax under section 7-A(1)(a) of the Act. 10.. In the result, the tax (revision) cases are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 11.. We place on record our appreciation for the ready help rendered by Mr. Inbarajan, advocate, acting as amicus curiae. Petitions dismissed.
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