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1991 (12) TMI 294
... ... ... ... ..... e scheme on the pattern of the scheme governing Central Government employees and to extend the benefit to those Bank employees who had demanded the same. 17. For the above reasons we do not find any substance in the allegation that the cut-off date had been arbitrarily fixed by the Bank Authorities Or the Central Government while giving its approval or that it is devoid of rational consideration and is wholly whimsical. In fixing the cut-off date the respondents had not acted malafide with a view to deprive those who had retired on or before 31st December, 1985 of the benefit of the pension scheme but for reasons stated above it was not practicable to extend the benefit to such retirees. The rationale for fixing the cut-off date as 1st January, 1986 was the same as in the case of Central government employees based on the recommendation of the Fourth Central Pay Commission. 18. We, therefore, do not see any merit in this petition and dismiss the same with no order as to costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 293
... ... ... ... ..... t. In this case too, the principle affirmed is that a legal representative brought on record in place of mortgagor cannot raise a defence in the final decree proceedings that the mortgage being without legal necessity is not binding on them. 22. It would be evident that none of the decisions support the proposition that even where the subject matter of the suit is right to property and the legal representatives wish to continue the suit as originally framed, they cannot be permitted to do so if they are not natural heirs or if they claim on the basis of a deed of settlement and/or will. 23. The Civil Appeal, accordingly, succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the Orissa High Court in the three first appeals mentioned hereinabove are set aside. The High Court shall now hear and dispose of the said appeals on merits, in accordance with law. The appellants/defendants are entitled to costs in this appeal and costs of the appeals in the High Court from the defendants.
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1991 (12) TMI 292
... ... ... ... ..... lly operative and effective. We see no inconsistency in saying so. Indeed, saying otherwise would introduce an element of inconsistency. It has been held by this Court in Kanthimathy Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala and Ors. that the effect of amendment of Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the principal Act is the same as the repeal of the Kerala Act and that same consequences follow. It has been held that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897 applies in such a situation, even though, as a matter of fact, the Kerala Act becomes inoperative not by any repealing provision but by virtue of Clause (1) of Article 254 of the Constitution. Accordingly we reject the contention of Shri Iyer. 18. For the reasons recorded hereinabove the matter is referred to a larger Bench for considering the correctness of the decision in Zora Singh's case (supra). The papers may accordingly be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders in this behalf.
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1991 (12) TMI 291
... ... ... ... ..... ave been supplied to the contractor on specific rate for execution of the works contract, it is settled that the goods did not pass to the contractor and the same could not amount to sale within the meaning of section 2(h) of the Act. 23. In the result the revision is disposed of with the direction that the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) will decide the case ignoring the observations made by the Tribunal before the operative portion of the judgment and examine the documents referred in the judgment of the Tribunal after due notice to the parties and after examining the facts of the documents, will decide the case applying the principles laid down by this Court is Hindustan Housing Factory 1989 75 STC 233 (1989) UPTC 468 and Ansal Properties 1989 UPTC 1366 and the observations made in this judgment. However, there will be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Tribunal concerned as provided under section 11(8) of the Act for passing consequential order.
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1991 (12) TMI 290
... ... ... ... ..... l. 34 S.T.C. 209 Murarilal Ahuja v. Board of Revenue and Ors. Vol. 61 S.T.C. 393 and the observations of the Supreme Court in Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. v. State of Haryana Vol. 38 S.T.C. 108. (S.C) support our view. 12. We, therefore, hold that when the members of the first Petitioner Association effect sale of the goods mentioned in the writ petition, such sales are exempt "generally" under Item 52 of Schedule III of the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947 for the purpose of State Sales Tax Act and they are also exempt from the payment of Central Sales Tax under the Central Sales Tax. Act, 1956 by virtue of Section (2A) of Section 8. 13. The writ petition is disposed of with such a declaration. We direct that sale of such goods of the members of the first Petitioner Association shall not be taxed under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 as long as they possess the certificates, as contemplated in the second column of Entry 52 of Schedule III of the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947.
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1991 (12) TMI 289
... ... ... ... ..... as any objection to the election he would be entitled to make adequate representation before the Additional District Judge, 5th Court, Alipore who will consider the representation and pass necessary orders. For all other purposes not specifically indicated in our order, the parties should be at liberty to take proper directions and/or orders from the learned 5th Additional District Judge. The election should be held by secret ballot as indicated by the learned Single Judge. All necessary police protection including posting of public personnel at the time of election should be provided by Deputy Commissioner, Port in consultation with O.C. South Port Police Station. 14. The appeal accordingly, stands disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. 15. Let a xerox copy of the operative portion of this order be made available to all the parties concerned through their respective learned Advocates, countersigned by Assistant Registrar (Court). G.R. Bhattacharjee, J. 16. I agree.
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1991 (12) TMI 288
... ... ... ... ..... Chandrasekaran’s case (supra) does not apply to the facts of the case. The CBDT had given clear instructions not to pass orders under section 185(1)(b) if the ITO chooses not to condone the delay in filing Form No. 11A. The impugned order passed by the ITO in this case is wholly opposed to the instructions of the CBDT Circular cited above and for that reasons, the order of the ITO should not be allowed to stand. I therefore set aside the orders of the lower authorities. I also condone the delay in filing Form No. 11A since the delay was only three months 19 days and to my mind, the explanation offered by the assessee as to the cause of the delay wrings to be true. I therefore set aside the orders of the lower authorities and after condoning the delay in presenting Form No. 11A direct the ITO to consider Form No. 11A on merits and grant continuation of registration if the assessee is entitled to it as per law. 6. In the result, appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.
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1991 (12) TMI 287
... ... ... ... ..... Bar Associations, and particularly Delhi Bar Association which , I understand, is the largest Association in Asia have to put their heads together and devise and formulate their responsibilities in this regard. The members of the Bar should refrain from going on strike to avoid inconvenience to general public and thus facilitate administration of justice. Order Of The Court In view of the majority decision, we make the following order We do not propose to award the sentence at present and defer it as we would like to further watch their conduct and behavior for a period of one year from today. In case any of them repeats any act which tantamounts to contempt of court or undermining the judiciary, he will be called upon to appear in Court to receive the sentence. But if they maintain orderly, good and disciplined behavior and do not indulge themselves in the repetition of such acts within the stipulated period, then the rule shall stand discharged on the expiry of the period.
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1991 (12) TMI 286
... ... ... ... ..... can be a 'District Court' for purposes of section 44-A(1) C.P.C. The Delhi decision operates in a different setting. The decision in Raja Soap Factory (supra) goes against the 1971 Calcutta decision, when it says that even a State's Court at the apex is not to be construed as having ordinary original civil jurisdiction, unless the law so expressly states. Appellant's Counsel refers to the long standing practice in Bombay to file such suits in the City Court, and never an exception having been taken thereto. I would have considered this aspect of the matter for acceding to his request for a reference to a larger Bench, were it not for the patent lack of jurisdiction in the City Court. 10. Holding that the City Court did not have the jurisdiction to try the suit, I set aside the impugned order on that very ground. The status-quo shall continue for 8 more weeks to enable appellant to consider his position. Appeal allowed with costs left to be costs in the suit.
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1991 (12) TMI 285
... ... ... ... ..... nt case and that the order of termination (simpliciter) cannot be challenged. 33. Notwithstanding of the above conclusion, we cannot lose sight of the patent fact that the appellant was allowed to continue in service for more than 18 years in different capacity and the competent authority did not think of terminating his service in spite of a number of adverse entries in his Character Roll and allowed him to continue to work. Had the termination been effected at the earlier point of time, the appellant could have possibly secured some other employment. Having regard to the special facts and circumstances of the case and considering the equities arising in this matter, we feel that an amount of ₹ 50,000 should be paid as an ex-gratia payment. We, therefore, direct the Government of Uttar Pradesh to make payment of the said sum of ₹ 50,000 to the appellant within 4 months from today. 34. Subject to the above directions the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 284
... ... ... ... ..... of the trial Court are modified in the following terms The suit of the plaintiff as against defendant-4 and defendant-5 is dismissed with costs. There shall be a decree in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of ₹ 26,06,811.99 ps. against defendants 1 to 3A and 38 and 6 to 9, jointly and severally, and defendants 2 and 6 to 9 are also personally liable, with proportionate costs throughout, with interest at 15 on the principal amount of ₹ 15,63,690/- on OSL Account 17/82, and at 15.5 on the principal sum of ₹ 9,11,765/- under SODH Account 8/82, and at 18.5 on the principal amount of ₹ 1,31,356.99 ps. under PCL loan Account 1/82 from the date of the suit till the date of realisation. The liability of the defendants 3A and 38 is confined to the extent of the estate of the third - defendant devolved upon them. The parties shall give and receive costs proportionate to their success throughout. In all other respects, the decree of the trial Court is affirmed.
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1991 (12) TMI 283
... ... ... ... ..... use period of limitation is not prescribed does not mean that a petition under Article 226 can be filed a number of years after the cause of action had arisen. It was sought to be contended by Mr. Mohan that it is only when a Notification of 9th April, 1977 was issued making Skimmed Milk Powder expressly taxable that the petitioner got the cause of action because the mistake was discovered by the petitioner. We are unable to agree with this. The cause of action arose when the petitioner made the payment of Excise Duty between March 1970 and 8th April, 1977. At best it arose when the assessments were made. If the petitioner had to file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution it should have done so more expeditiously then wailing till 1980 before filing the present writ petition. 16. For the aforesaid reasons this writ petition is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs since there is no appearance on behalf of the respondents. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (12) TMI 282
... ... ... ... ..... lasticity, to meet myriad situations presented by man's ingenuity in given facts and circumstances, but always is hedged with sound exercise of judicial discretion to meet the ends of justice. The facts are eloquent and speak for themselves. It is well nigh impossible to find from facts prima facie case and balance of convenience. The respondents can be adequately compensated on their success. 7. In our considered view, the High Court committed manifest error of law in jumping to the above conclusion to allow the appeal. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is confirmed. It is made clear that any observations made either by the trial Court or the High Court or of this Court should be taken to be not relevant at the trial on merits. These are our only prima facie observations, subject to adduction of evidence and proof at the trial on merits in the suit. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 281
... ... ... ... ..... itional Registrar (Admn.). Since these are matters which require a more careful examination, it would be appropriate if a Committee of Judges is constituted which can go in the matter in greater detail and the matter is considered by the full Court in the light of the report of such a committee. We hope and trust that the recommendation that are made by the High Court after such consideration would receive due weight and regard from the State Government and a solution would be devised which would meet the aspirations of the staff and would also be acceptable to the Government. 25. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the judgment and order of the Learned Single Judge and the order of the Division Bench of the High Court are set aside and the Writ Petition field by the respondents is dismissed. The High Court, on its administrative side, may reconsider the matter relating to amendment of the rules in the light of the observations made above. There will be no orders as to costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 280
... ... ... ... ..... impugned detention orders are found to have been made under the preventive detention law, the COFEPOSA Act, by a detaining Authority empowered thereunder to make such orders, without any regard to the procedural safeguards provided under our Constitution and laws as a protection against arbitrary and unjustified invasion of personal liberty. 23. In the result, we allow these writ petitions, make the Rule issued in each of them absolute and quash the detention orders impugned therein, by which the petitioners are detained under thee COFEPOSA Act. 24. As the impugned detention orders themselves are quashed, the impugned declarations made under the COFEPOSA Act on the basis of such detention orders, cannot survive. Consequently, the declarations, by which detention of the petitioners is extended up to 7-3-1991, impugned in the writ petitions are also quashed. 25. However, in the facts and circumstances of the writ petitions, we made no order as to costs. 26. Petitions allowed.
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1991 (12) TMI 279
... ... ... ... ..... ce of an order of detention under S. 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and unless it is shown that the inference drawn by it on the basis of the material on record is wholly unwarranted and perverse, it cannot be interfered with in the writ jurisdiction of this Court. In the facts of the instant case, when the petitioner can come to Indian often because he is an Indian National and because his family is residing in India and further when he has undertaken the present illegal job of smuggling gold pieces in concealed form for monetary consideration, the inference drawn by the detaining authority that he can indulge in future also in such smuggling activity cannot be said to be unwarranted or perverse. 23. No interference is thus called for in the order of detention passed against the petitioner under S. 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. 24. In the result, the instant writ petition fails and is dismissed. 25. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (12) TMI 278
... ... ... ... ..... e purpose of taxation and there is no provision for taxation of building and land of which the annual letting value is up to ₹ 1800. But when aggregation of annual letting value of all buildings or lands is permitted, then, all such buildings or lands have to be taken as one unit for the purpose of taxation. Any other construction would render the proviso nugatory and defeat the object of the Act. The legislature could not have intended that all buildings or lands owned by a single individual should get exemption from taxation even if their total letting value exceeds ₹ 1800. 6. The decisions of the High Court taking contrary view cannot be said to have laid down the law correctly. 7. In the result we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. We, however, direct that this decision should be given effect prospectively and there shall not be recovery from or refund to any person with regard to the period antecedent hereto. 8. No costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 277
... ... ... ... ..... ed above that the realisation of fine had been stayed in one of the appeals which was none other than the case in which fine was imposed and it is clear from the order dated 16.12.1970 that there was stay of recovery of fine during the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court. Therefore, as observed by the Supreme Court in the earlier appeal, limitation for recovery of fine could not begin till the passing of the order by the Supreme Court dated 10.1.1975 confirming conviction and sentence. The recovery proceedings had been initiated on 4.6.1975 and they were thus within time. 15. It is most unfortunate that the order of the Supreme Court passed earlier in the recovery proceedings against Mehtab Singh was not brought to the notice of the High Court. 16. Thus the impugned order of the High Court dated 9.1.1980 is set aside and the order dated 2.2.1979 passed by the IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Mainpuri is restored. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 276
... ... ... ... ..... ed contrast with other fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution, it has to be read subject to the power of the State to regulate education, educational standards and allied matters. In Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society v. State of Gujarat ( 1974 (1) SCC 717 1975 (1) SCR 173) which was the decision of a nine Judge Bench, Ray, C.J., with whom Palekar, J., concurred, observed (at SCR pp. 197 - 200 SCC p. 7490 that upon affiliation to a University, the minority and non-minority institutions must agree in the pattern and standards of education. Regulations which will serve the interest of the students, regulations which will serve the interests of the teachers are of paramount importance in good administration. Regulations in the interest of efficiency of teachers, discipline and fairness in administration are necessary for preserving harmony among affiliated institutions. It was further observed (SCC p. 752, para 46)" That the ultimate goal of a minority.
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1991 (12) TMI 275
... ... ... ... ..... vestigation in respect of the offences committed between the night of July 12 and 13, 1990 as per the FIR lodged at Police Station, Gajraula. 11. We are, however, not inclined to accept the prayer of the petitioners to transfer the criminal case from the file of IXth Additional Sessions Judge, Muradabad. 12. We, therefore, direct the CBI to take up the investigation of the case immediately. We further direct the Senior Superintendent of Police, Muradabad and the Station House Officer, Gajraula Police Station to assist the CBI in conducting the investigation. The State of Uttar Pradesh through its Chief Secretary and the Home Secretary is further directed to provide all assistance to the CBI in this respect. 13. The CBI shall complete the investigation within three months from today and submit its report in accordance with law. The proceedings before IXth Additional Sessions Judge, Muradabad shall remain stayed till March 16, 1992. 14. The writ petition is, thus, disposed of.
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