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Showing 1 to 20 of 310 Records
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1992 (2) TMI 386
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... ... ..... osit Receipt in the said Bank and the amount of Rs. 18,727.80 ps. (Rupees eighteen thousand seven hundred twenty-seven and paise eighty only) is lying in the Current A/c. No. 31712. In view of this, we permit the petitioners to encash, if necessary, the F.D.R. with the Bank of India, Main Branch, Rajkot prematurely also, if the F.D.R. is not going to mature within three months from today. The petitioners are directed to disburse the amount deposited in the above referred F.D.R. and lying in Current A/c. No. 31712 to the employees, who are entitled to receive the same. For any reason, if such amount cannot be paid to the employee on account of his death or on account of his where about is not being known, shall be deposited with the prescribed Authority under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 who shall deal with the money so deposited with him in the manner prescribed under the Act. A copy of the writ is ordered to be sent to the Bank of India, Main Branch, Rajkot.
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1992 (2) TMI 385
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... ... ..... on the interpretation of a 'consent decree', as in the present case. Obviously, therefore, there is no such case or such a decision standing for a very long period or unchallenged. The compilation of the stamp attempted by Athavale was referred to support the contention of the writ petitioners. A crutch which is not of any effective held, when a total paralysis is the basic affliction. The prodigious industry of the compiler elicits admiration. Such a compilation is not substitute for the distilled proposition of law emerging from the expert processing made by the trained and talented hands. The compilation in that context loses its authority consequent on the attenuated competence of the compiler. I have thus made this supplemental Judgment; 'a poor thing; yet my own'. Per S.P. Kurdukar, J. Mr. Nanavati orally applies for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Leave refused. Certificate copy if applied for to be furnished on payment of costs within two weeks.
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1992 (2) TMI 384
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... ... ..... d to the facts of the case, it cannot be said that the amount was advanced on the promissory note and that Ex. A-1 or Ex.A-4 has to be treated as a letter postponing the date of payment. All the parties proceeded on the premise that Exs.A-1, A-3, and A-4 have to be read together to ascertain the terms and conditions of the loan and we have already held that suits of the description contained in Column 1 of Article 37, even though based on documents more than one read together, would be covered by Article 37. Therefore, on the facts of this case, the residuary Article 113 of the Limitation Act does not apply. 20. For the above reason, we set aside the judgments and decrees of the Courts below in these second appeals except Second Appeal No. 791 of 1987 which is filed by the Bank, and accordingly allow the second appeals except S.A.791 /87 which is dismissed. Having regard to the circumstances of the case the parties are directed to bear their own costs in these second appeals.
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1992 (2) TMI 383
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... ... ..... egal act done by his driver. We have not felt inclined to give much importance to this submission, first because, as per the authorities below the petitioner himself was driving the vehicle, and secondly because, even if the case of the petitioner be accepted in this regard that the vehicle was being driven by Mahadeb Singh of Jammu & Kashmir, this cannot be a relevant factor to determine the quantum of fine because in that case all the truck owners whose vehicles are driven by others would claim the benefit of leniency, which would not be advisable in the larger interest of the society which consists in curbing these anti-social activities. 19. The petition is accordingly disposed of by setting aside the order of confiscation and instead, awarding a fine of ₹ 60,000/-. The vehicle which is in the custody of the forest authorities shall be released forthwith in favour of the petitioner on his paying in cash the aforesaid amount., Bichitra Nanda Dash, J. 20. I agree.
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1992 (2) TMI 382
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... ... ..... c policy referred in the above decision. If that be so, if a Plaintiff is allowed to amend the plaint after issuing necessary notice as contemplated under this section, it cannot be said that it will defeat the very purpose for which Section 123 was enacted. 8. The Court below has committed an error in rejecting the application for amendment on the ground that it will change the nature of the suit. When the Plaintiff found that licence was already issued, it wets fully justified on his part to seek an amendment of the plaint for further relief challenging the licence granted and also the further proceedings pursuant to the issue of the licence. It is not necessary to file a fresh suit as observed by the Court below. In view of the above discussion, the order passed by the Court below is set aside and the revision petition stands allowed. Since the suit is of the year 1985, the Court below will expedite the trial of the suit and complete the same within a period of six months.
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1992 (2) TMI 381
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... ... ..... ever. We think the State Government ought to re-examine the question of the appropriate pay scale for Sub-Registrars in the light of the above and if it decides to upgrade the pay scale it may also consider if the pay scales of their superiors in the hierarchy need an upward revision. 18. In the result we allow these appeals and set aside the judgement and orders of the High Court impugned herein but make no order as to costs throughout. We, however, direct the State Government to re-examine the question of the appropriate pay scale for Sub-Registrars within three months by a speaking order after giving a hearing to the representative of the respondent association and communicate the decision so taken to the association. If the State Government decides on the upward revision of the salary of the Sub-Registrars, it will simultaneously consider the question of upward revision of the pay scales of higher posts in the department. I.A. Nos. 7-9 of 1991 will also stand disposed of.
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1992 (2) TMI 380
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... ... ..... gh Court that the only condition of sanction was the payment of an amount equal to fifteen times of full assessment of the land appears to be a just construction. That construction has stood for the last more than ten years and transactions must have been effected on the basis of the view of the law laid down by the Karnataka High Court. There is no good reason which would lead us to take a different view, nor can it be said that the view taken is in any manner unjust and unfair. 4. In these circumstances, we uphold the interpretation placed by the Karnataka High Court on the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the said Act. The question No. (vi), therefore, must be answered against the State. As we have upheld the view of the Karnataka High Court on question No. (vi), no decision is called for on question No. (vii). In the result, the special leave petitions and appeals preferred by the State of Karnataka are dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1992 (2) TMI 379
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... ... ..... t to the property in question. 9. Had there been any assertion before us that the fourth respondent insolvent had any other property or that the Official Assignee and or the learned single Judge were not informed about all the properties of the insolvent, we would have thought to give to the creditor another opportunity to agitate and seek a review of the order discharging the insolvent. Since the only property referred to is one which has been found to belong to the first respondent Kannammal, and in which property it has not been established that the insolvent ever had any interest, we think no interest will be served by making any observation as to the claim of the creditor still surviving and the insolvent still liable and not discharged. It is a case, in our opinion, in which the only possible view is one that has been taken by the learned single Judge. There is no merit in the appeals. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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1992 (2) TMI 378
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... ... ..... lication in various situations. The relief may be based on the principle that the manufactured product is taxed either in the hands of the same assessee or in someone else's hands, or that the manufactured goods are exported which may yield no tax but earn foreign exchange, or even that the purchases are utilised for manufacture of goods in the State thus contributing to the industrial development of the State. It is, therefore difficult to read into the provision a quantitative correlation of the goods resulting in a taxable turnover and the purchases of raw materials on which tax has been paid. In this background, the straight forward answer to the question raised lies in the literal interpretation of the language of the rules without straining to discover some doubtful principle for denying relief. 20. For the above reasons, we agree with the view taken by the High Court and followed by the Tribunal and dismiss these appeals. We, however, make no order regarding costs.
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1992 (2) TMI 377
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... ... ..... e ground that it pertained to the previous year. The assessee’s case is that the notice of demand has been received on 21-5-1984 a date which falls during the year under consideration and therefore the liability has arisen in the year under consideration should be allowed as such. We find force in this submission of the assessee and as the same is supported by the Supreme Court decision in the case of Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. ( supra), the ITO is directed to allow the same. 11. The other ground is against the disallowance of debit balance of ₹ 6,708 being the difference of the expenditure of ₹ 35,949 and the income of ₹ 29,241 pertaining to earlier years. As the above difference admittedly relates to the earlier years and the assessee-following the mercantile system of accounting the same would not be allowed and therefore, in our opinion the CIT was justified in directing to disallow the same. 12. In the result both the appeals are partly allowed.
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1992 (2) TMI 376
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... ... ..... t Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. We are unable to agree with the High Court on either ground. It is undoubtedly true that the Rules specify the procedure to enter into a mining lease for winning over the minor minerals and in terms to be complied with. But the question of liability to pay the royalty for the minerals removed and consumed by a contractor is to be considered in terms of the contract. In the light of the above extracted Rules, terms of the contract and the legal position, we are of the opinion that the respondents-contractors are liable to pay royalty in terms of the contract. It is next contended that the respondents are entitled to refund for the minerals used for the Government work as contained in the contract. This question was also not raised before the High Court. Therefore, we do not propose to go into and the matter is left open. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The writ petitions stand dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1992 (2) TMI 375
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... ... ..... le proceeds of fertilizers have been held in various accounts by the petitioners. In fact according to Cbi, there was no manufacture of fertilizers by Pppl at all and all the documents regarding alleged purchase of raw material for the same and its sale were forged/fabricated solely with the intention of cheating the Govt and realize subsidies from it and invest the same in fake names by the first petitioner. The issuance of directions by the Cbi to various bankers/financial institutions freezing the accounts of the petitioners is based on a sound footing in the present case. There is no reason to interfere in the steps taken by the CBI. (9) However, before parting, it must be said that the Cbi should file the chargesheet now within the shortest possible period, preferably within a period of three months. The petitioners will also co-operate with the further investigations, if any, and they will make themselves available to the Investigating officer as and when they require.
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1992 (2) TMI 374
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... ... ..... the Act. These factors go to expose non-application of mind by the authorities while issuing the impugned notification and it appears that they were not even sure about the "public purpose" for which the land was sought to be acquired. 20. We have, in view of the above discussion, not been persuaded to take a view different than the one taken by the High Court and we agree with the High Court that the impugned notification is vitiated on account of being vague and for non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of the Act. 21. In the view that we have taken, it is not necessary for us to express an opinion on the question as to whether recourse could at all be had, in the instant case, to the urgency provisions or the effect of the absence of even a draft or contemplated scheme, let alone a finalised scheme prepared by the Housing Board, before the issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the Act. 22. Special Leave Petitions (Civil) are, therefore, dismissed.
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1992 (2) TMI 373
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... ... ..... opped undertaking casual or temporary works though they are urgent and essential for fear that if those who are employed on such works are required to be continued for 240 or more days have to be absorbed as regular employees although the works are time-bound and there is no need of the workmen beyond the completion of the works undertaken. The public interests are thus jeopardised on both counts. 16. In the circumstances, it is not possible to accede to the request of the petitioners that the respondents be directed to regularise them. The most that can be done for them is to direct the respondent Delhi Administration to keep them on a panel and if they are registered with the Employment Exchange and are qualified to be appointed on the relevant posts, give them a preference in employment whenever there occurs a vacancy in the regular posts, which direction we give hereby. With the above recommendation, we dismiss the petition with no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1992 (2) TMI 372
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... ... ..... at the detenu who had appeared in person before the Advisory Board, had pleaded for mercy, in effect, admitting his involvement, in the violation referred to in the order of detention. That cannot make an order, otherwise invalid, valid. Further S. 8(e) of the Act states, that the proceedings of the Advisory Board and its Report, excepting that part of the report in which the opinion of the Advisory Board is specified, shall be confidential. We are unable to justify the impugned order of detention on the basis of some statements allegedly made by the detenu before the Advisory Board. We are satisfied, that in view of the detaining authority not having been alive to the fact of retraction of the confession by the detenu in his bail application dt. 30-8-91, the impugned order of detention cannot be sustained. The same is set aside and the detenu is directed to be released forthwith unless his detention is otherwise required. This writ petition is allowed. 10. Petition allowed.
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1992 (2) TMI 371
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... ... ..... zed from the appellant on 12.11.90 the authorities concerned passed these orders only on 7.1.1991, i.e. nearly after two months. o p /o p Under these circumstances, we are of the view that the order of detention cannot be sustained since the live and proximate link' between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped on account of the undue and unreasonable delay in securing the appellant/detenu and detaining him. As we have now come to the conclusion that the order of detention is liable to be set aside on this ground alone we are not dealing with other contentions raised in the Memorandum of Appeal as well as in the Writ Petition. o p /o p Hence for the reasons stated above we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and quash the impugned detention order and direct the detenu to be set at liberty forthwith. In view of the order in this present appeal, no order is necessary in the Writ Petition. o p /o p R.P. Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1992 (2) TMI 370
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... ... ..... the action has to be taken on the subjective satisfaction of the Government, there is no room for importing the said facet of natural justice in such a case, more particularly when an order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment nor does it involve any stigma. 34. So far as the appeals before us are concerned, the High Court which has looked into the relevant record and confidential records has opined that the order of compulsory retirement was based not merely upon the said adverse remarks but other material as well. Secondly, it has also found that the material placed before them does not justify the conclusion that the said remarks were not recorded duly or properly. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the order of compulsory retirement suffers from mala fides or that it is based on no evidence or that it is arbitrary. 35. For the above reason, both the appeals are dismissed but in circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1992 (2) TMI 369
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... ... ..... rson" includes individuals, partnerships and bodies corporate, Governments, their Departments, and Public Authorities. (4) "Claimant" means a person who alleges that a maritime claim exists in his favour. 17 See the Conventions listed above. 18 See the Conventions referred to above. See also Nagendra Singh, International Maritime Conventions, British Shipping Laws, Vol.4. 19 1955 1SCR280 ; Bracket supplied; Bracket supplied. 20 The Bol Bucclcugh (1851)7 P.C. 267; 21 The Hailey, L.R. 2 PC 193; 22 Halsbury's Laws of England IVth Edn., Vol.1; 23 Maritime Liens by D.R. Thomas. 24 Maritime Law by Christopher Hill; 25 The Ironsides, 167 English Reports 205, The St. Cloud, 167 English Reports 269, The Norway, 167 English Reports 347; 26 The Ironsides, 167 English Reports 205. 27 28 Carter History of English Courts (Lord Stowell in 'The Hercules' 2 Dod.371). 29 Hahbury's Laws of England IVth Edn. Vol.1.; 30 The Jade 1976 (1) All ER 921. 31 1927 AC 906.
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1992 (2) TMI 368
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... ... ..... ance also does not arise in the present case. Therefore, the conclusion is that the present case is also not hit by the explanation to the aforesaid Section 8 (2-A) of the Central Sales Tax Act. 4. Learned counsel for the Department has, however, relied upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Hindustan Patroleum Corporation Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 37 Sales Tax Cases 432. In that case emphasis has been laid on the words 'General sales tax law' and not on the goods as has been interpreted by this court in the case of Oudh Sugar Mills Ltd. (Supra). In view of the same I would like to prefer to the interpretation put by this court in the case of Oudh Sugar Mills Ltd. (Supra) and accordingly held that the assessee is not liable to pay tax under the Central Sales Tax Act for the assessment year 1974-75. 5. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed with no orders as to costs. The impugned order of the Tribunal dated 8 - 4 - 1985 is set aside.
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1992 (2) TMI 367
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... ... ..... ase shall be made within four weeks from the date of the receipt of the copy of this order or is produced before the respondent. The release shall be subject to payment of the entire sale price to the loan account. The respondent shall grant six months' time from the date of release to the appellant to pay the entire arrears outstanding towards the loan. If he fails to do so, the Corporation is directed to sell the same in open auction, after giving wide publicity in the press and by beat of drum/microphone in the town and neighbouring area. The transfree would be entitled, if available at law, to proceed against the Corporation, for such reliefs as is open to them in law for damages. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The writ of certiorari is issued quashing the sale. Mandamus is issued to the first respondent to immediately resume possession of the hypotheca and implement the directions contained in the judgment. The parties would bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.
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