|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 264 Records
-
1994 (10) TMI 333
... ...
... ... ..... tatus nor through the respondent. In Lala Durga Prasad and Anr. v. Lala Deep Chand Ors., 1954 SCR 360, in a suit for specific performance the subsequent purchaser was held to be a necessary party. In this case the petitioner is merely seeking the specific performance of the agreement of sale. Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, provides that except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, the specific performance of a contract may be obtained by any party thereto ; and under s. 16 the Court has been given discretion and personal bars to relief. Therefore, based on the fact situation, the court would the relief The respondent is neither a necessary nor a proper party to adjudicate upon the dispute arising in the suit so as to render an effective and complete adjudication of the dispute involved in this suit. 11.Therefore, the High Court, though for different reasons, has rightly refused to interfere with the order of the trial court. The S.L.P. is accordingly dismissed.
-
1994 (10) TMI 332
... ...
... ... ..... supra) has no relevance or bearing on the present case. 16. In view of the discussion referred to hereinabove, the order passed by the Appellate Court on 11-4-1991 is liable to be quashed and set aside. 17. Consequently, this revision application is allowed and the order passed by District Judge, Amravati on 11-4-1991 in Misc. Appeal No. 34/87, Sheikh Shabbir s/o Sheikh Noor vs. M/s Chopda Automobiles Finance, is quashed and set aside and the District Judge, Amravati is directed to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law and in view of the discussion made in this order. Since the appeal before the District Judge, Amravati is of the year 1987, it is expected that the District Judge, Amravati shall give topmost priority for the disposal of the said appeal and in any case decide the same within three months of the appearance of the parties before the said Court. Both the parties are directed to appear before the District Judge, Amravati on 24-10-1994. Order accordingly.
-
1994 (10) TMI 331
... ...
... ... ..... n concerned is deprived of his right to hold property which is conferred on him either by a civil law or by a statutory provision and the procedure followed in such cases is not of a criminal proceeding. Similarly, so far as habeas corpus petition against the State is concerned, the nature of the proceeding would be a criminal proceeding. 11. Whether the civil writ will lie or criminal writ will lie in a given case is a procedural matter and it is well settled that on the ground of technicalities the person should not be deprived of justice. Accordingly, both the applications cannot be dismissed and the opportunity has to be given to the petitioners to convert the application into a civil writ jurisdiction applications. 12. In the result, it is held that the present criminal writ applications are not maintainable and the petitioners are given opportunity to convert the same into a civil writ jurisdiction case within a period of one week from today. I.P. Singh, J. 13. I agree.
-
1994 (10) TMI 330
... ...
... ... ..... single Judge of the Delhi High Court in the matter of Shri Krishna Prasad reported in (1978) 48 Comp Cas 397 1978 Tax LR 1896 supports this view. It is laid down in the aforesaid decision that if the apprehended proceeding has already commenced then the officer concerned has no other course open but to apply to the relevant court under Section 633(1). Similar is the case in the matter of S.S. Sahani v. Registrar of Companies reported in (1990) 69 Comp Cas 556 decided by a single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court. 15. For the aforesaid reasons I am not inclined to entertain this company petition No. 470 of 1992 and the same accordingly stands dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs. On the application of Shri Bharucha, the learned counsel for the petitioners, ad interim orders are continued for a period of 4 weeks from today. 16. In view of the order passed in Company petition No. 470 of 1992, Company application No. 470/92 stands disposed of. Petition dismissed.
-
1994 (10) TMI 329
... ...
... ... ..... are entitled to 12% additional compensation under Section 23(l-A) from the date of notification till date of taking possession till date of deposit into court. In the first case possession was taken on March 15, 1985 and in the second case on May 25, 1985. Therefore, 12% additional compensation shall be paid to the claimants from the respective dates of Section 4(1) notification till the date of taking possession. The claimants are entitled to solatium under Section 23(2) at 30% and the interest under Section 28 at 9% on the enhanced compensation from the date of the taking possession for one year and 15% after the expiry of one year till date of deposit into the court. 14. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The award and decree of the reference court under Section 26 and the judgment and decree of the High Court under Section 54 are set aside. The claimants are entitled to the aforesaid amounts. In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own respective costs.
-
1994 (10) TMI 328
... ...
... ... ..... t is incorrect to side-track or bypass the decision of the High Court. From the Judgment and Order dated 19-9-1990 of the High Court of Orissa Admn. Tribunal, Bhubaneswar in T.A. No. 446 of 1986 2.However, on the merits of the matter, we do not think that there is any case for interference. The order of the Tribunal appears to be just. We accordingly dismiss the special leave petition.
-
1994 (10) TMI 327
... ...
... ... ..... to adduce oral evidence to contradict the terms of the recital therein, no issue in this behalf on the validity of the sale-deed or its binding nature was raised nor a finding recorded that the sale-deed is void under Section 23 of the Contract Act. Pleading itself is not sufficient. Since the appellant is seeking to have the document avoided or cancelled, necessarily, a declaration has to be given by the court in that behalf. Until the document is avoided or cancelled by proper declaration, the duly registered document remains valid and binds the parties. So the suit necessarily has to be laid within three years from the date when the cause of action had occurred. Since the cause of action had arisen on January 29, 1947, the date on which the sale-deed was executed and registered and the suit was filed on July 30, 1966, the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. The courts below, therefore, were right in dismissing the suit. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
-
1994 (10) TMI 326
... ...
... ... ..... ued the remedy of review and that remedy was held to be not available on account of defect of jurisdiction in the sense that review application was not maintainable on the grounds mentioned therein, and the said review application was based on the same cause of action as the present appeal. So, the ingredients of Section 14 of the Limitation Act stood satisfied. If that is so, they furnish sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to enable the appellant to seek condensation of delay and in view of the ratio of law laid down by the Privy Council in the judgments mentioned above, the period spent by the appellant in prosecuting the review application has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation and in doing so, it is evident that appeal has been filed within the period of said 90 days. Even otherwise there exists sufficient cause for condensation of delay. I allow the application and condone the delay made in filing the appeal. 32. Application allowed.
-
1994 (10) TMI 325
... ...
... ... ..... g manufactured by the assessee. The assessee was therefore entitled to the deductions under s. 32A. In this we are fortified by the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Singh Engg. Works P. Ltd. vs. CIT (1979) 119 ITR 891 (All) and the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of IBM World Trade Corpn. (supra) and the four judgments of Tribunal relied upon by the assessees counsel referred to supra. 8. As regards the second issue i.e. disallowance of additional depreciation by the CIT, since we have held that the computer machinery installed by the assessee are plant and machinery as a natural corollary the assessee would be entitled to additional depreciation and we accordingly hold that the CIT is not justified in setting aside the assessments on this issue. 9. As regards the third issue i.e. extra shift allowance the assessee has not pressed this issue and to this extent we uphold the orders of the CIT. 10. In the result, the appeals are allowed in part.
-
1994 (10) TMI 324
... ...
... ... ..... her in his official capacity or if there is a personal element contributing to contempt, in his personal capacity, liable in contempt. 31. We find that the undertaking given by Sri Kalyan Singh was both in his personal capacity and on behalf of his Government. There has been a flagrant breach of that undertaking. There has been willful disobedience of the order. 32. It is unhappy that a leader of a political party and Chief Minister has to be convicted of an offence of Contempt of Court. But it has to be done to uphold the majesty of law. We convict him of the offence of contempt of Court. Since the contempt raises larger issues which affect the very foundation of the secular fabric of our nation, we also sentence him to a token imprisonment of one day. We also sentence him to pay a fine of ₹ 2,000/-. The fine shall be paid within a period of two months. For the sentence of imprisonment a warrant will issue. 33. The contempt petitions are partly disposed of accordingly.
-
1994 (10) TMI 323
... ...
... ... ..... n view of the fact that the Union in course of the proceedings before the Umpire has reiterated that the Union intends to buy the entire lot and the reference has continued for determination of the just and fair value of the 173 items of jewellery." Before parting with the order, we would also like to clarify that in the event the items of jewellery, all or selected items, are not purchased by the Central Government as per the modified Award made by us, the rights in the items of jewellery shall stand crystallised in favour of the Trustees and they shall be entitled to deal with the jewellery in any manner they should choose, subject, however, to the provisions of the existing law/laws. I.A. No. 8/91 and I.A. No. 9/91 are hereby dismissed as not pressed. The modified Award as detailed above is directed to be made a Rule of the Court. Decree in terms of the Award shall follow. The parties shall bear their own costs in so far as the proceedings in this Court are concerned.
-
1994 (10) TMI 322
... ...
... ... ..... 357 and Sri Lakshmi Machine Works v. State of Madras, (1973) 32 STC 407. In all of, it has been held that where the dealer bona fide believes that the goods are covered by the registration certificate penalty cannot be levied. In my view it was a case in which the revisionist acted bona fide in purchasing the generator under Form-C and making a statement that this machinery was covered by its registration certificate cannot be said to be false. It was, thus a case in which it could not be said that the dealer had made a false statement and no penalty can be levied unless the representation is false to the knowledge of the dealer. This was, therefore, not a case in which the penalty under Section 10 (b) of the Central Sales Tax Act could be levied. The revision petition is, accordingly, allowed and setting aside the order of the Tribunal, it is ordered that the revisionist's second appeal before the Tribunal stands allowed and the penalty in question is hereby cancelled.
-
1994 (10) TMI 320
... ...
... ... ..... ut. Coming to the sentence the High Court pointed out that the accused-appellant was a police employee and instead of checking the crime he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. As mentioned above Section 304B I.P.C. only raises presumption and lays down that minimum sentence should be seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be in rare cases and not in every case. 8. Hence, we are of the view that a sentence of 10 years' R.I. would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly while confirming the conviction of the appellant under Section 304B I.P.C., reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to 10 years' R.I. The other conviction and sentence passed against the appellant are, however, confirmed. In the result, the appeal is dismissed subject to the above modification of sentence.
-
1994 (10) TMI 319
... ...
... ... ..... can be pressed into service only to lend assurance to other substantive and reliable evidence, we proceed to consider the evidence relating to the discovery of the ring. The admissible part of the statement of Shiba, pursuant to which the ring was recovered, only proves that he knew that the ring was concealed in the ash dump. From such knowledge no inference of Shiba's committing theft of the ring from the person of Pabitra at the time of his murder and for that matter, of his participation in the murder can be drawn, more particularly when the recovery was made almost six months after the murder. In absence of any other substantive evidence against appellant Shiba, the confessions of the two co-accused cannot be called in aid. 17. On the conclusions as above we dismiss the appeal, so far as it relates to Mahabir, appellant No. 1 but allow that of Shiba @ Bijoy Krishna Dutta, appellant No. 2. Let the appellant No. 2 be released forthwith. The appeal is thus disposed of.
-
1994 (10) TMI 318
... ...
... ... ..... lcutta when the goods were imported and they were unloaded at Shed No. 3, Netaji Subhas Docks of the appellant and the liability of payment had also arisen and on its failure to clear the goods the respondent instituted the suit in District Court at Bharatpur, Rajasthan. No part of the cause of action arose at Bharatpur. The appellant's office is at Calcutta. Under s.20 CPC the only court competent to take cognizance of the action is the appropriate court at Calcutta. The order passed by the District Court, Bharatpur in the suit filed by the respondent, is without jurisdiction and is void. when the appellant approached the High Court it has dismissed the case. Therefore High Court has committed manifest error of law in refusing to interface with such an abviously illigal and void order. Therefore, the impurgned order passed by the High Court of Rajasthan and district Court, Bharatpur are set aside. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs as none appears in the court.
-
1994 (10) TMI 317
... ...
... ... ..... embers, declaring the issue of the impugned shares as void and illegal. The effect of relief, if granted, would be that there will be reduction of capital and we do not have any such powers under Section 111 to order reduction of share capital. Therefore, even the relief sought by the petitioner in the petition is beyond the scope of the section and the powers of the Company Law Board. 19. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the petitioners have not made out a case for any relief under Section 111 and as such we dismiss this petition. Interim orders passed are vacated. 20. Before parting with the case, we record herein that counsel for the respondents made a statement at the Bar that the company would be prepared to allot to the petitioners all the shares which still remain unallotted out of the present authorised capital of the company of ₹ 10 lakhs, if they apply for the same. 21. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1994 (10) TMI 316
... ...
... ... ..... ant by the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff, viz., Kowtha Suryanarayana Rao is not the land alone to enable the defendant to file an application under section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act. Therefore, even assuming that the plaintiff is entitled to file the suit, if we consider the claim of the defendant in the interlocutory application filed under section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, we are driven to the conclusion that the petitioner in the interlocutory application, viz., the appellant in the C.M.A. No. 922 of 1986, is not entitled to the benefits under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act and, therefore, he is not entitled to an order under section 9 of the Act and I hold on the point accordingly. 19. In the result, the appeal is allowed setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissing the suit O.S. No. 491 of 1982. C.M.A. No. 922 of 1986 is dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.
-
1994 (10) TMI 315
... ...
... ... ..... arenterals). Equally well settled is the proposition that publicity and advertisement of one's product with a view to boosting sales is a legitimate market strategy, provided, of course, the undertaking or the individual keeps within the bounds of the provisions of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act. In this connection, another principle which has been recognised by the Commission time and again is that a certain degree of puffing up of one's product is permissible. The impugned advertisement, at worst, is in our opinion simply an instance of puffing up, but certainly not disparagement of the goods of any identifiable manufacturer. 12. The second issue must, therefore, be answered in the negative in favour of the respondent. The second issue having been answered in the negative the remaining issues do not arise for consideration and are disposed of accordingly. In the premise the notice of enquiry is discharged but there will be no orders as to costs.
-
1994 (10) TMI 314
... ...
... ... ..... . Moreover, as stated by the counsel for the plaintiff, the plaintiffs do not object to the fair being held by the defendants. They may proceed with the fair as proposed and as planned except under the banner of Sunder Nagar Dewali Mela. 9. If the defendants are not restrained the plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable injury. The prospective visitors to Mela would always be under an impression that Sunder Nagar Dewali Mela of established repute has already been held on 22nd and 23rd October, 1994. The plaintiff may draw a blank on 29th and 30th October, 1994. The plaintiffs do have a prima facie case. The balance of convenience lies in their favour. They are likely to suffer irreparable injury if not protected. The application is allowed. The defendants are restrained from holding Dewali Mela by associating the word "Sunder Nagar" therewith. Nothing said herein above shall come in the way of the case being decided on its own merits after a full fledged trial.
-
1994 (10) TMI 313
... ...
... ... ..... ication. .Appreciation is placed on record of useful assistance rend erred by Shri Ishwar Sahai Sr Advocate and Ms Ritu Bhalla advocate both from civil side of High Court Bar who brought to the notice of the court quite a few aspects relevant to the issues at hand. (27) Appreciation is placed on record of useful assistance rendered by Sh. Ishwar Sahai Sr. Adv. and Ms. Ritu Bhalla advocate both from civil side of High Court Bar who brought to the notice of the court quite a few aspects relevant to the issues at hand. (28) In view of what has been stated hereinabove, the objection raised by the defendant is upheld. Leave to file replication dated 18.5.94 ( filed on 19.5.94) by the plaintiff is refused. Replication is directed to be taken off the file and returned to the counsel for the plaintiff. The plaintiff is, how- ever, allowed time to move a fresh application seeking leave to file a replication confined to the plea introduced by way of amendment in the written statement.
........
|
