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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 382 Records
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1996 (1) TMI 485
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... ... ..... cree in execution proceedings. The preposition that a Judgment debtor may claim the decree to be a nullity in execution proceedings and that the decree is void is too well settled. A collateral attack is not barred because an opportunity to raise the same question by direct attack was not availed. This is a well settled principle applicable to civil Courts executing decrees. (24) For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal by the Union of India is allowed, the award passed by Mr. Chandwani on 5.12.90 after he relinquished office as Arbitrator on 30.11.90 is declared void and consequently the decree is also declared void. It will be open to the Competent authority to refer the matter to any other person as per clause 25 of the contract between the parties. (25) We have gone into the matter in detail because the same person Mr. Chandwani has, it appears, passed more than 60 awards after he relinquished office as arbitrator on 30.11.90. (26) Appeal allowed and disposed of accordingly.
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1996 (1) TMI 484
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... ... ..... arriage in accordance with Latin Catholic rites and acceptance of her as member of that community. Unfortunately they did not advert to the constitutional mandate adverted to hereinbefore. Consequently, the learned single Judge and the Division Bench did not correctly decide the law. Equally, in Khazan Singh's case the learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court too did not lay the law correctly. The Full Bench, for the aforesaid reasons, had rightly concluded that the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of reservation under Article 16(4) as a lecturer which post was reserved for the backward class Latin Catholic community. 38. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. The orders of the Division Bench and the single Judge stand set aside. The Full Bench judgment stands confirmed but, in the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout. C.A. No. 1197/81 39. Consequent upon dismissal of C.A. Nos. 3163-64 of 1995 as above, this appeal is allowed.
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1996 (1) TMI 483
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... ... ..... o be decided by the authority of the court or revenue authority and it is not open for the respondent company to withhold the transmission of shares in the name of the appellant on this ground, once the succession certificate has been produced from the competent court who has declared the appellant as legal heir for the shares in question, and there is no other claimant for the said shares ; the company ought to have effected the transmission of shares on the basis of the succession certificate produced. 8. Accordingly, in pursuance of Sub-section (5) of Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956, the respondent company is hereby directed to effect the transmission of 50 equity shares standing in the name of Dr. Kewalram Baniram Israni at the time of his death and various bonus shares, dividends and rights accrued from time to time on the said shares in the name of the appellant on the basis of succession certificate produced within 10 days from the date of receipt of this order.
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1996 (1) TMI 482
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... ... ..... xpress terms of Sections 6 and 12, would not be applicable where a joint Hindu family property is sold/disposed of by the Karta involving an undivided interest of the minor in the said joint Hindu family property. The question posed at the outset therefore is so answered. In the instant case the finding recorded by the courts below is that Jagabandhu, the eldest male member in the family acted as a Karta in executing the sale and had joined with him the two widows for themselves and as guardians of the minor members of joint Hindu family, as supporting executants. That act by itself is not indicative of the minors having a divided interest in the joint Hindu family property commencing before or at the time of the sale. In this view of the matter, section 8 of the Act can be of no avail to the appellant's claim to nullify the sale. For the reasons above-stated, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1996 (1) TMI 481
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... ... ..... on of the premises admeasuring 15' x 30' in his own right as a tenant. In the compromise decree, ultimately, the High Court granted possession of the premises in occupation of the appellant. The appellant having been found in possession, he is entitled to obstruct execution defending his his illegal dispossession in execution proceedings and he is also independently entitled to file application under Order 21 Rule 97 claiming his possession. In view of the fact that he was found to be in possession, the finding recorded by the Executing Court as upheld by the High Court that he is a licensee on behalf of Harkesh Rai Agarwal is clearly illegal. We, therefore, hold that the appellant cannot be ejected from the premises in his possession except in accordance with law. As regards the execution of the compromise decree is concerned, it would be open to the respondent to proceed against Harkesh Rai Agarwal in accordance with law. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.
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1996 (1) TMI 480
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... ... ..... own conclusion on the proof of the charge. The only consideration the Court/Tribunal has in its judicial review is to consider whether the conclusion is based on evidence on record and supports the finding or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence. This is consistent view of this Court vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1996) ILLJ 1231 SC; State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V. Venugopalan (1994) 6 SCC 302; Union of India v. Upendra Singh (1994) ILLJ 808 SC; Government of Tamil Nadu and Anr. v. A. Rajapandian (1995) ILLJ 953 SC and Union of India v. B.S. Chaturvedi (1996) ILLJ 1231 SC . In view of the settled legal position, the Tribunal has committed serious error of law in appreciation of the evidence and in coming to its own conclusion that the charge had not been proved. Thus we hold that the view of the Tribunal is ex facie illegal. The order is accordingly set aside. OA/TP/WP stand dismissed. 5. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The I.A. stands dismissed. No. costs.
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1996 (1) TMI 479
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... ... ..... rosecution evidence is over. The accused was questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and he was asked to enter into defence. It is at that stage he filed the application to send the cheque to an expert. This Court, as per the decision rendered in Retnakumar v. Registrar, High Court (1993 (2) KLT 677) has held that an accused cannot be permitted to collect evidence at the time of defence evidence. This Court further added that if the accused wanted to have the disputed cheque examined by the expert, he himself could take steps for doing so and cannot request the Court to send the cheque to an expert at the time of defence evidence. The Court cannot be asked to conduct an investigation at the stage of defence evidence. The decision referred to above was relied on by the Trial Court and it rightly dismissed the application for sending the cheque to the Hand-Writing Expert. I find no reason to interfere with the order and accordingly the Criminal Revision Petition is also dismissed.
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1996 (1) TMI 478
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... ... ..... the impugned order of the High Court is tested, the conclusion becomes irresistible that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by trying to appreciate the evidence and coming to a conclusion that no offence is made out. On examining the material on record and the impugned judgment of the High Court we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was wholly unjustified in invoking its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the cognizance taken in as much as the allegation in the F.I.R. and material referred to in the charge sheet do make out an offence under Section 414 of the Indian Penal Code, so far as the respondent is concerned. In the aforesaid premise the impugned order of the High Court dated 5.3.1992 passed in Criminal Miscellaneous No, 475 of 1992 is quashed and this appeal is allowed. The Magistrate is directed to proceed with the trial against the respondent. The respondent may now appear before the Magistrate forthwith.
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1996 (1) TMI 477
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... ... ..... condoned. The special leave petition is dismissed.
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1996 (1) TMI 476
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... ... ..... respondent is not produced. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the genuineness of the will is not admitted. Under these circumstances, without an adjudication regarding the validity of the will, the petitioner cannot be prosecuted, Counsel submits that these are matters for the trial court to decide in the course of the trial. But, on a reading of the complaints, if it is satisfied that the complaints should not have been taken cognizance of by the court below, it is the duty of this court to interfere in the matter so that the accused will not be unnecessarily harassed and time and money will not be wasted in meaningless litigation. So, I am inclined to interfere in the matter. 8. In the result, I hold that as the complaints were not made by the payee or holder in due course, they should not have been taken into file by the court below. Accordingly, C. C. Nos. 971 of 1993, 974 of 1993 and 207 of 1994 are quashed. 9. The criminal miscellaneous cases are allowed as above.
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1996 (1) TMI 475
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... ... ..... i Bohra needs to be also given appropriate consideration which shows that appellant had come to stay in the said house because she was not keeping good health at Bombay. It appears to be a frustration in the mind of such ailing daughter against her father which needs to be dealt with sympathetically, properly by the concerned relatives of the family. 19. Thus, I come to the conclusion that the trial Court has rightly dismissed the application for injunction sought against Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and has rightly dismissed the suit of the plaintiff by deciding preliminary issue in respect of the jurisdiction. I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that first Appellate Court has rightly confirmed the said decree. It being so, this appeal deserves to be dismissed with costs. The fee of lawyers appearing for Respondents shall be ₹ 151/- (One hundred fifty one. A token money exemplary one, for a woman litigant in the situation in which the appellant happens to be).
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1996 (1) TMI 474
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... ... ..... mp; Anr. v. Collector of Central Excise Appeal Nos. E/1264/91-A & E/3313/92-A (Final Order No. 100 and 101/95-A). 6. It cannot be that in the above cases the Tribunal purported to go against the dictum laid by the Supreme Court. Reading of the two decisions clearly indicates that in the opinion of the Tribunal in the fact -- situation of the cases the supplier and the processor were not in the position of principal and principal but were in the position of principal and agent. Such is not the position in the present appeal, which is, therefore, clearly governed by the dictum in the clarificatory order in the Ujagar Prints case in 1989 (21) ECR 1 (SC) ECR C 1347 SC 1989 (39) ELT 493. It is unnecessary for the purpose of this case to consider the correctness of the earlier decision of the Tribunal even in the context of Principal and Agent relationship. We, therefore, find no ground to interfere and accordingly dismiss the appeal. Pronounced and dictated in the open Court.
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1996 (1) TMI 473
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... ... ..... Accounting year 1992-97. Indirectly, it has been suggested that they should not be deprived of refund at least to the above extent. I am not persuaded to accept the above plea as the loss suffered by the company may be purely notional on account of non-receipt of some of the payments that are due in the very same accounting year but received in the next accounting year. The companies are at liberty to make retrospective adjustments when the payments due in the previous accounting year are received in the next accounting year. Thus, the loss of ₹ 78,452.57, as indicated in their Balance Sheet of 1992-97 shall not, by itself, warrant a grant of refund to the appellant when it is established beyond doubt that the impugned excess customs duty that was refundable was included in the landed cost of the moulds in question and by way of depreciation had been passed on to the buyers, being included proportionately in the sale prices. In the result, the appeal merits rejection.
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1996 (1) TMI 472
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... ... ..... udar, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (1) TMI 471
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... ... ..... ORDER Delay condoned. The S.L.P. is dismissed.
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1996 (1) TMI 470
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... ... ..... 9Pat239 and the High Court of Madras in T. Savariraj Pillai v. R.S.S. Vastrad & Co., AIR1990Mad198 take a contrary view and hold that the suit is incompetent ab initio. We have considered these decisions, but in the light of the plain language of Section 69 of the Partnership Act read with Section 20 of the Arbitration Act and in view of the decision of this Court reported in Shreeram Finance Corporation, 1989 3SCR484 we are clearly of the opinion that proceedings under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act were ab initio defective since the firm was not registered and the subsequent registration of the firm cannot cure that defect. 5. In view of the above, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and hold that the proceedings were ab initio defective as they could not have been instituted since the firm in whose name the proceedings were instituted was not registered at the date of the institution of the proceedings. We, however, make no order as to costs.
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1996 (1) TMI 469
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... ... ..... een paid the some be refunded to the revisionist. Thus, there is no decision by the Tribunal in so far as the taxability of certain transactions under Section 3-D is concerned and the concerned questions as reproduced above do not arise from the order of the Tribunal. 6. As regards the levy of interest under Section 8. the Tribunal has quashed the same as the dealer was claiming exemption in respect of the disputed transactions and, therefore, the tax levied in respect of those transactions could not be treated as admitted tax. This finding of the Tribunal is in accordance with law. The mere fact that exemption is not granted will not amount to the tax being admitted and, therefore, no interest under Section 8 (1) could be levied. The Tribunal's order in so far as levy of interest is concerned does not suffer from any legal error. 7. For the above reasons, I find no force in these revision petitions and the same are hereby dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1996 (1) TMI 468
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... ... ..... t Drug Controller, dated September 16, 1994.) 15. Necessary steps be taken to ensure that Drugs Inspectors duly trained in blood banking operations are posted in adequate numbers so as to ensure periodical checking of the operations of the blood banks throughout the country. 16. The Union Government should consider the advisability of enacting a separate legislation for regulating the collection, processing, storage, distribution and transportation of blood and the operation of the blood banks in the country. 17. The Director General of Health Services in the Government of India, Ministry of Health shall submit a report by July 15, 1996 about the action taken in pursuance of these directions. 18. It will be open to the Director General of Health Services, Government of India as well as the National Council to seek clarification/modification of these directions or further directions in this matter. 15. The writ petition is disposed with these directions. No order as to costs.
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1996 (1) TMI 467
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... ... ..... true that this court in the special leave petition arising from the orissa High Court judgment, leave was declined holding it to be of peculiar facts. This Court has not laid down any law therein, Shri Nariman has contended that it would operate as a precedent. Since the entire controversies between the parties is at large and his Court has seisen of the issue and pending decision, Orissa case should have got posted with these appeals. That case did not lay any law. The decision does not operate as res judicata. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the contentions. Accordingly, we hold that the view expressed by the Andhra Pradesh and the Karnataka High Courts is correct in law. The appellant, therefore, is liable to pay contribution from the respective date of demand of 1975 in Andhra Pradesh case, and on the respective date in Karnataka case under Section 39 read with first schedule to the Act. The appeals are accordingly dismissed with the above modifications. No costs.
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1996 (1) TMI 466
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... ... ..... the appeal is presented and is pending disposal. Since the statute had intervened and the Act has taken away the right of pre-emption of the co-owners and confined the right and remedy to be only in favour of the tenants, the respondents have lost their right of preemption. In other words, co-owners' right of pre-emption has been taken away by amendment to the Act. Consequentially, the respondents have lost the right, pending the appeals. This Court under Section 57 of the Indian Evidence Act shall take judicial notice of all the laws in force in the territory of India. The Court would take judicial notice of the Acts of State Legislature and the Parliament. Accordingly, taking notice of the change in law the right end remedy to the respondent have been lost. As a result, the suit for pre-emption is not maintainable. The main appeal as well as connected appeals are accordingly allowed. Consequentially, the suits stand dismissed. But, in the circumstances, without costs.
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