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Showing 1 to 20 of 280 Records
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1996 (6) TMI 356
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... ... ..... o resist the application has to be compensated. There may be grounds which establish sufficient cause for condonation of delay, but that does not necessarily mean the application is to be allowed without cost. A balance has to be struck between the sufficient cause and the compensation. We are of the view that in the present case while condoning the delay in filing the Title Appeal by the petitioner and the opp, parties 7 to 9 and directing for hearing of the appeal on merits, substantial cost is to be awarded to the plaintiff-opp. parties 1 to 4 and we determine quantum of Rs. 1,000/- which should be paid within a period of six weeks from today to the learned counsel for the opp. parties. On cost being paid, the appeal being an old one should be disposed of by the appellate Court by end of October, 1996. 10. The writ application is accordingly allowed and the orders passed in Annexures 3 and 4 are hereby quashed. There shall be no order as to costs. Pradipta Ray, J. I agree.
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1996 (6) TMI 355
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... ... ..... ne of the Director's of the appellant's sister concern. 9. In the light what we have indicated above, the fine in regard to valuation, duty payable, misdeclaration and penalty cannot stand. As pointed out by Shri Handa, SDR, the intention of the appellant was not honourable. That is clear from the circumstance that the two certificates of the same Chartered Engineers bearing the same date and showing different particulars regarding year of manufacture and value of new machine were procured by the appellant, one through the banking channel and other through ordinary channel. This must certainly be motivated. The Custom House has not succeeded in discovering the motivation behind this action. The department is not able to point out any provision of law by which such an action can be regarded as an offence on a violation of law. Therefore, the penalty levied cannot be sustained to any extent. 10. In the result, the impugned order is set aside and the appeals are allowed.
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1996 (6) TMI 354
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... ... ..... his part to disclose all the material facts. The Court, it is well known, may not exercise its jurisdiction if the writ application suffers from suppression of material facts. Reference in this connection, may be placed in Suraj Kumari v. District Judge, Mirzapur and Ors. reported in AIR 1991 Allahabad 75; M/s. Krishna Utensils, Rampur v. State Financial Corporation and Others reported in AIR 1989 Allahabad 226 and The Chancellor and Anr. v. Dr. Bijayananda Kar and Ors. reported in AIR 1994 SC 579. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the writ petitioners were not entitled to any relief. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Judge is set aside and the writ application of the writ petitioner is dismissed. As the cross-objection had not been pressed by Mr. De, the said cross-objection is also dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. S.N. Chakrabarty, J. I agree.
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1996 (6) TMI 353
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... ... ..... Inputs (India) Ltd. and M/s Shakti Rubbers for the sale of the unit of respondent No. 1. The writ petition filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. During the pendency of this appeal in this Court, respondent No. 1 had placed before the Court an offer made by M/s Sunny Brooks to purchase the unit for ₹ 28 lakhs. The said offer cannot be said to be substantially higher than the offers made by M/s Prime Inputs (India) Ltd. and M/s Shakti Rubbers in September 1992 so to justify interference with the sale by the appellant in favour of the said offers. We are, therefore, not inclined to uphold the impugned judgment of the High Court in view of the said offer. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court dated February 15, 1994 as well as the judgment of the learned single judge dated August 11, 1993 are set aside and writ petition filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 is dismissed with costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 352
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... ... ..... n why leave should not be granted. It is the said therein that both the defendants are carrying on business outside India, and even the credit report was received in England, and all the documents pertaining to the correspondence are in England. The defendants are also permanent residents of England and even as against the first defendant, liquidation proceedings are pending only in England. If the second defendant is asked to contest the suit before this court, naturally, it will be put to great difficulties. Taking into consideration these facts also, we feel that this is a fit case where leave to sue as against the second defendant has to be revoked. 42. In the result, the order of the learned judge is set aside, and we hold that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as against the second defendant, and the leave granted by the learned judge is liable to be revoked, and is accordingly revoked. The appeals are allowed, however, without any order as to costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 351
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... ... ..... of the Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 1996, and, accordingly, the matter was heard again. His submission is that the Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 1996, is applicable since there is no commencement of arbitration proceeding upto now. He has referred to the relevant provisions of the Ordinance in this connection. The application filed by Mr. Ghosh's client before me is an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The said application was filed on March 28, 1995. The question, therefore, of applying and converting the same into an application under the Ordinance does not arise. Accordingly, the said submission of Mr. Ghosh, cannot be accepted. 47. Considering the facts and circumstances in my view, this is not a fit case where the relief should be granted under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. 48. The application under Section 34, therefore, fails and is dismissed. 49. There will be no order as to costs. 50. Stay prayed for is refused.
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1996 (6) TMI 350
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... ... ..... the petitioner, though very feebly, is that the business activities of the petitioner, which it intends to carry on, cannot be held to be covered by the provisions of the Central Act, as also Karnataka Excise (denatured spirit and denatured spiritious preparations) Rules 1967 which have been framed under the provisions of Karnataka Excise Act, 1965. Though a prayer for seeking said declaration has been made in the Writ Petition but nothing substantial could be canvassed by Mr. Naik, in support of seeking such a declaration. It is for obvious reasons. The Central and the State Act have been enacted on two different legislative topics enumerated under the VII Schedule to the Constitution of India, namely entry 84 of the Central List and entry 51 of the State List. The provisions of either of the two Acts have not been challenged on the ground of legislative competance or repugnancy. 12. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed as devoid of any merits. No order as to costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 349
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... ... ..... pure questions of law that relate to the leviability of interest under sections 234A & 234B of the Act and reliance was placed on the order of the Special Court Judge where it was held that interest under section 234A alone could be levied. The Revenue consented that these being pure questions of law may be admitted. 20. After considering the rival submissions, and considering the decision of the Supreme Court in Asstt. Commissioner v. A.K. Menon (1995) 215 ITR 364 (SC), Income-tax Act being a separate statute which has not been superseded by the Securities Transactions Act of 1992, the question of levy of interest under the sections 234A & B need to be examined with reference to the provisions of the Act alone. However, because the notice had been found to be invalid and the proceedings having been quashed, the issue becomes academic and we, therefore, do not express any opinion on these questions. 21. In the result, the appeals by the assessee are allowed in part.
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1996 (6) TMI 348
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... ... ..... e the entire issue afresh in the light of the observations made in this order. For this purpose the entire matter requires to be remanded to the first respondent for fresh inquiry in the light of the observations made in this respondent No. 1 must hold a detailed enquiry afresh and pass appropriate orders after examining all the facts and circumstances of the case in the light of this order and after applying all the relevant tests. 14. For the reasons, petition deserves to be allowed. The impugned order of 1st respondent in No. KN 10761, dated September 9, 1986 is quashed and the matter is remanded to the first in accordance with the observations made in this order. Before passing the final order, the first respondent is directed to afford sufficient opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. 15. With these observations and directions, writ petition is disposed off. Rule made absolute. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 347
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... ... ..... officer was challenged in appeals before the CIT (Appeals). It was stated before him that the assessee only want consequential relief. The CIT (Appeals) had allowed some relief in the appeals filed against the order passed under section 201(1) of the Act. Therefore, he had directed the Assessing Officer to work out short deduction of tax at source on the part of the assessee. He had also directed the Assessing Officer to modify the quantum of interest as a result of that order. Aggrieved thereby, the assessee is in appeal before us. 15. No arguments were advanced before us. The direction issued by the CIT (Appeals) is appropriate. Since in the appeals arising out of the order under section 201(1) of the Act we have also allowed some relief to the assessee, we direct the Assessing Officer to modify the quantum of interest taking into consideration the said order of the Tribunal. 16. Subject to the above observations, the appeals by the assessee would be treated as dismissed.
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1996 (6) TMI 346
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... ... ..... ompanies on amounts payable to the foreign company should be at the rate of 55 per cent. as provided under the First Schedule, Part II(2) (b)(ix) of the Finance Act, 1995, or at the estimated net profits from the local operations of the foreign company. This is in view of the fact that the foreign company estimates that the net profits from the Indian operations will not be more than 10 per cent. of the amount received on installation of celluar systems from the Indian companies. The Indian companies shall not withhold tax on amounts payable to the applicant-company at the rate of 55 per cent. They should deduct tax only at the rate of 30 per cent. being the rate applicable to such payments under paragraph 2(b)(vii) of Part II of the First Schedule to the Finance Act, 1995. The Authority does not express any opinion about the net profits of the applicant-company from the local operations and leaves the question open to be agitated by the applicant in appropriate proceedings.
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1996 (6) TMI 345
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... ... ..... ped. The same turnover was sought to be taxed by the successor-assessing authority. The correctness of that order was questioned before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner in appeal, but the appeal was dismissed. So also the second appeal by the petitioner before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal was unsuccessful as the same was dismissed on September 28, 1987. 2.. The question raised is covered by a decision of this Court in Girdharlal and Company v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1995 97 STC 442. We make it clear that for purposes of exercising the power under section 14(4) of the Act, what is required to be seen is not whether the earlier order of the assessing authority was correct in law but whether there was fresh material justifying interference. If there is no fresh material, no subsequent assessment should be made even though the earlier order was erroneous in law. 3.. The order of the Tribunal is set aside and the tax revision cases are accordingly allowed. Petitions allowed.
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1996 (6) TMI 344
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... ... ..... the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax was not justified in holding that the petitioner did not deserve adjournment. However, that aspect can be considered by the appellate authority. 7.. In the peculiar circumstances, we direct that on the petitioner filing an appeal within three weeks from today along with an application for condonation of delay, the Commissioner shall condone the delay and admit the appeal, if it is otherwise free from defects, for adjudication on merits. This Court by an interim order dated March 29, 1996 had stayed recovery of extra demand on payment 25 per cent thereof. It is stated that payment has been made. No further steps shall be taken for recovery of the balance amount, till disposal of the appeal to be filed by the petitioner. The writ application is disposed of accordingly. No costs. Original of annexure 4 be returned to the petitioner on being substituted by attested copy thereof. A. DEB, J.-I agree. Writ application disposed of accordingly.
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1996 (6) TMI 343
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... ... ..... he applicants, were not furnished to the applicants at the time of hearing of the assessment case. For that reason, it is clear that it was not possible for the applicants to meet the charge that false names and addresses of the consignees of the concerned goods were disclosed by the applicants. Since the assessment order has to be set aside on this ground, we do not want to enter into other points raised in the application. 6.. Accordingly, the application is allowed. The impugned assessment order dated November 22, 1995 and the demand notice in consequence thereof are set aside on the ground that reasonable opportunity of hearing was not given to the applicants by not furnishing the denials in writing given by the purported consignees. If respondent No. 1 wants to proceed afresh in the matter, he can do so according to law. 7.. The interim order dated January 10, 1996 stands vacated. The application is finally disposed of without any order as to costs. Application allowed.
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1996 (6) TMI 342
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... ... ..... took the same view and dismissed the appeal of the petitioner on May 25, 1996. On the question that arises in these revisions all the three authorities have concurrently held against the petitioner. In these C.M.Ps. nothing is pointed out to us to conclude that there has been any miscarriage of justice and indeed there is nothing. It is also not a case where grave hardship or irreparable loss would be caused to the petitioner if direction is not granted in favour of the petitioner. Therefore, in our view, it is not a fit case where direction not to recover tax in toto, should be granted. 15.. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view interest of justice would be met if the petitioner is permitted to deposit the tax due in two equal instalments, the first instalment should be paid on or before June 20, 1996 and the second instalment on or before July 4, 1996. The civil miscellaneous petitions are accordingly ordered. Petitions ordered accordingly.
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1996 (6) TMI 341
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... ... ..... 88 (SC) 1992 3 SCC 78 upon which also strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Paul has no application in the present case. In that case, it was held that a reasonable and purposive construction is necessary to make the provision meaningful while adopting a literal construction would result in defeating the very purpose of section 15C of the Indian Income-tax Act. No exception can be taken to the aforementioned ratio. 43.. Having regard to the provision of the Act, we are satisfied that the Legislature of the State was entitled to delete section 6B(2)(e) with retrospective effect and no discrimination has been committed thereby. For the aforementioned reasons, we are unable to uphold the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Judge. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner is dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. SATYA NARAYAN CHAKRABORTY, J.-I agree. Appeal allowed.
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1996 (6) TMI 340
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... ... ..... he final bill for the works done by the contractor as per the terms of the agreement. On considering the said clause, the Supreme Court held that read in the proper light that clause indicated that by use or consumption of materials in the work of construction, there was passing of the property in the goods to the assessee from the P.W.D. A Division Bench of this Court of which one of us (Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.) was a member in T.R.C. No. 256 of 1990, dated February 6, 1996 (reported as Rashtreeya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1996 102 STC 454), held that supply of steel, cement and A.C. sheets for construction of its own building by the assessee-company to the contractor amounts to sale of those goods and the turnover was liable to be taxed. From the above discussion, it follows that the order of the Tribunal has to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside. The T.R.C. is allowed but, in the circumstances of the case, without costs. Petition allowed.
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1996 (6) TMI 339
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... ... ..... tices as contained in annexures III, X, XI, XII and XV of the writ petition. 4.. The Legislature has entrusted the taxing authority to administer and enforce the law and make a decision of the facts and circumstances of the case. Judicial review cannot be used for a review of a decision on merits. Judicial review as observed by Lord Brightman in Chief Constable of North Wales Police v. Evans 1982 2 All ER 141 (154) as the words imply is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision was made...... . Judicial review therefore is not an appeal on merit. On careful consideration of the factual situation I do not find any infirmity in the decision making process of any of the respondents. The respondents have not in any way exceeded their bounds in exercising of their power requiring interference from this Court. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Rule is discharged accordingly. Writ petition dismissed.
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1996 (6) TMI 338
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... ... ..... rsial issues are involved, it would not be appropriate for the check-post officer to delve into that aspect. Such controversies should be left to be determined and adjudicated by the Sales Tax Officer under whose jurisdiction the concerned purchaser is registered as a registered dealer. 7.. Judged in the aforesaid background, action of the check-post officer in directing payment of tax cannot be maintained, and is vacated. Petitioner shall file details of the purchase of excavator before the Sales Tax Officer, Cuttack-I, West Circle, who is its assessing officer, and shall file an undertaking to abide by the result of assessment so far as that article is concerned, as would be finally determined. The undertaking shall be filed within ten days from today. The check-post officer would do well to send all relevant materials to the assessing officer to facilitate a proper adjudication. The writ application is accordingly disposed of. A. DEB, J.-I agree. Writ application allowed.
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1996 (6) TMI 337
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... ... ..... these circumstances in the case before us there was no transfer of ownership so as to attract the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 9 of the RST Act. The liability to pay tax under the RST Act on the Rs. 16,45,497 worth of tractor spares to ETL by EGL fastens, therefore, on EGL. Once the incidence in law of the tax fastens on EGL, its agreement with ETL for the latter to bears the burden of the tax is of no consequence. 25.. In this view of the matter it follows that the CTO determined this aspect of the matter correctly and the DC (Appeals) and the Board did so erroneously. The order dated November 26, 1990 of the CTO holding that EGL had not transferred the ownership of part of its business to ETL and assessing EGL as liable to pay tax on the Rs. 16,45,497 worth of tractor spares transferred to ETL treating it as a sale is upheld and to that extent the judgment dated March 27, 1991 of the DC (Appeals) and judgment dated November 22, 1994 of the Board are set aside.
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