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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 547 Records
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1997 (12) TMI 670
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... ... ..... alance in the excise duty Modvat account, noted that the assessee was following mercantile system of accounting. The CIT (Appeals) had decided a similar point in Kodidas Patel's case and the Assessing Officer was directed to follow that decision in the present case also. It would appear that in view of the assessee following mercantile system of accounting, these directions were given in consonance with the earlier decision. It is brought to our notice that the Department has not challenged the decision of the Bombay Bench of the Tribunal on a similar issue in I.T.A No. 4726/Ahd/1989 in favour of the assessee, who belongs to the group of the present assessee. The Tribunal has followed that decision and confirmed the findings of the CIT (Appeals) on this question. As the Department has accepted the decision of the Bombay Bench, no such question of law arises as proposed by the applicant. This application is therefore, rejected. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.
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1997 (12) TMI 669
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... ... ..... or not. The revenue authorities did not go into these aspects at all, because they held that the appellant was not entitled for exemption at all as according to them it is a commercial organisation. As the other conditions specified in sections 11 to 13 have not been looked into at all, we are of the view that the matter deserves to be set aside so that the Revenue authorities get an opportunity of looking into this aspect of the matter. We accordingly set aside the orders of the Revenue authorities and restore the matter for all the three years to the file of the Assessing Officer who may examine whether the conditions as specified in sections 11 to 13 are satisfied or not. He has to proceed on the basis that the appellant society is a charitable organisation and so it is in principle entitled for the exemption under section 11 of the Income-tax Act. Subject to this remark, we set aside the matter for all the three years. 8. For statistical purposes, the appeals are allowed.
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1997 (12) TMI 668
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... ... ..... Land Acquisition Officer vs. Veerabhadrappa (1984) 42 CTR (SC) 357 (1984) 154 ITR 190 (SC), wherein the question to be considered was that the function of the Court in awarding compensation under the Land Acquisition Act is to be ascertained on market value of the land on the date of the notification under s. 4(1) of the Act and the method of valuation may be'(1) opinion of experts; (2) prices paid within the reasonable time in bona fide transaction on purchase and sale of the land acquired or the land adjustment to those acquired and possessing similar advantages; and (3) a number of year's purchase of actual or immediately prospective profits from the lands acquired. But that principle has got no relevance to the facts of the instant case. The IT Act is a self-contained code. No other case worth discussion, touching the controversy in hand, has been cited. Thus agreeing with the finding of the learned single judge, all the three special appeals are hereby dismissed.
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1997 (12) TMI 667
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... ... ..... ight of speedy justice is a fundamental right. It would bring within its sweep even the period spent in appeal. However, if an accused himself is delaying and adopting tactics in this regard, he will not be entitled to take the advantage of his own wrong to play the tune of speedy trial. Otherwise, if there is an inordinate delay, it would be a mitigating circumstance. In the present case, the appellants have already undergone more than 13 months of imprisonment during the course of trial and some time while the appeal was pending in this Court. The occurrence pertains to 12 years earlier. While they were on bail, there is nothing to indicate that any such event has taken place which may prompt this Court to take a serious view. Therefore, it is a fit case where the sentence should be reduced to the one already undergone. 30. For these reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The order of the trial court is modified and the sentence is reduced to the one already undergone.
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1997 (12) TMI 666
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... ... ..... 's case is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Having not succeeded in getting stay in Suit No. 3064/96, in our view, the Lawyer should have refused to move an application for stay in the second suit. 21. We are of the view that an attempt has been made by the respondent to over reach the court and the respondents have played fraud upon the Court as well as upon the opposite party and is thus clearly guilty of contempt. Respondents cannot be heard in the case unless it purges itself of the contempt so committed and in our view it can only be if we non suit the respondents in Suit No. 261/97. While, Therefore, we do not propose to take action against the respondent for contempt except to issue a warning to respondent No. 2 to be more careful in future, we direct the dismissal of the suit (being Suit No. 261/97) itself. While, Therefore, allowing this appeal, we dismiss Suit No. 261/97 and dispose of the contempt petition in the above terms.
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1997 (12) TMI 665
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... ... ..... stock from the factory without being accounted for in the books of account, yet in view of the statement made that full particulars would be given, we do not propose to give a finding on this allegation at this point of time. But at the same time, considering that the company has been consistently following the same method of exhibiting the physical quantity in the annual report for a long time, we do not consider that the discrepancies in the stock as pointed out by Shri Pal could be taken as an act of such a grave mismanagement as would warrant appointment of an administrator at this interim stage when the petition is still to be heard. 13. The company will furnish a statement of reconciliation during the next hearing, as undertaken by Shri Raghavan to enable us to take a view on this allegation. 14. With the above observation, we reject the prayer of the petitioner for appointment of an administrator at this interim stage based on allegations relating to subsequent events.
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1997 (12) TMI 664
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... ... ..... s only when the liability of the insured has been upheld for the purpose of indemnifying the insured under the contract of insurance. There is, thus, a basic fallacy in the conclusion reached by the High Court on this point. 4. The question now is of the final order to make in the present case. We find that the insurer has made the payment to the claimants in the present case in satisfaction of the entire claim and it has been fairly stated by the insurer that this appeal was filed only for getting a decision on this point pertaining to its liability in such a situation. In the circumstances of the case, we deem it fit to say that the amount already paid by the insurer to the claimants is not required to be refunded by the claimants to the insurer. 5. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court and Tribunal are set aside. However, as indicated earlier, the claimants are not required to refund the amount already paid to them by the insurer.
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1997 (12) TMI 663
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... ... ..... ould demand no indulgence from the Court in equity or in law. Such cases would be squarely hit by the maxim Malitiis Hominum Non Est Indulgendum. In my opinion the objector-petitioner is not entitled to any relief either in equity or in law. 40. The executing Court has passed a well reasoned order upon consideration of various judgments and I see no reason to interfere with the said order. There is no jurisdictional or any other error apparent on the face of the record which would call for any interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, which is of a limited scope. In the facts and circumstances of this case there can be no reason whatsoever, to hold that the impugned order is Coram Non Judice. The order is in consonance with the settled principles of law and squarely falls within the jurisdiction exercised by the executing Court. Consequently, this revision fails and is dismissed with costs which are assessed at ₹ 2,000/-. Revision dismissed.
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1997 (12) TMI 662
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... ... ..... s limited purpose. 39. Our conclusion is that on the induction of the second respondent,' the existing firm was only reconstituted on the facts of this case and, therefore, there is no necessity to get a fresh registration. If by virtue of non-compliance of certain mandatory provisions in not informing the Registrar of Firms about the change in the Constitution of the firm, certain penalties provided in the Act alone are attracted and that will not lead to the conclusion that the registration of the firm ceased. This conclusion is based on a conjoint reading of Sections 58-63 and the Forms prescribed thereunder. Further, this conclusion does not in any way militate the object of the Maharashtra Amendment introduced by Act 29 of 84. 39. In the result, we hold that the suit in question is not hit by Section 69(2A) of the Act and, therefore, the Division Bench is right in allowing the Appeal. Consequently, the Appeal is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (12) TMI 661
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... ... ..... against the appellants, in that, they have assisted the operations of ULFA (which has been declared as an unlawful association Under Section 3 of the Act) through contributions and also in other ways. However, when those material allegations leveled against the appellants are considered vis-a-vis the 'unlawful activities' envisaged under the Act it cannot be said that they are liable for an offence Under Section 13 of the Act, much less the aforesaid offences under the Indian Penal Code. Resultantly, the question of granting anticipatory bail to the appellants Under Section 438 of the CrPC cannot and does not arise for an offence Under Section 10 of the Act is bailable; and a direction under the former can be issued only in respect of a non-bailable offence. Viewed in that context the merits of the appellants' contention that they have not committed any offence alleged against them need not be gone into. 10. With the above observations we dispose of these appeals.
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1997 (12) TMI 660
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... ... ..... ng. Since there is no command issued to the judgment-debtor to obey, the civil process cannot be issued for the compliance of that mandate or command. The decree-holder is free to seek his legal remedies by way of suit or otherwise on the basis of the declaration given in his favour." In our view, it is a correct statement of law except that it may not be fully applicable in the case of a Government servant who acquires a status and his service conditions are governed by statutory rules as noticed above. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the courts below did not exercise their jurisdiction properly and the respondent could not have sought execution of the declaratory decree when no relief was granted to him towards arrears of salary and other consequential benefits. The appeal is allowed with costs, impugned order of the High Court as well as orders of the courts below are set aside and the execution application filed by the respondent is dismissed. Appeal allowed.
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1997 (12) TMI 659
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... ... ..... the application which was made before it under Section 256(1) for referring the aforesaid two questions for the opinion of this Court, it transpires that earlier in the case of the assessee itself in respect of Assessment Years 1984-85 and 1985-86, the Tribunal has rejected such application for referring question No.1. It is stated by the learned Counsel for the applicant that thereafter, Income Tax Applications Nos. 50 and 51 of 1994 was made by the applicant before this Court for referring similar questions, but those applications were rejected by this Court on 4th April, 1994. We do not find any valid reason for taking a different view of the matter. This application is therefore, rejected. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.
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1997 (12) TMI 658
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... ... ..... e. In the present case, the issues like whether the articles had been violated, whether there were calls due and whether the petitioners failed to pay the calls, whether notice of forfeiture was issued to the petitioners, etc., are complicated questions of law and fact requiring a detailed enquiry. 15. Therefore, we are of the firm view that the complicated questions of law and fact cannot be decided at the preliminary stage without going through the pleadings and hearing arguments. Accordingly, the maintainability of the petition will be decided after hearing of the petition and afterwards if we hold that the petitioners do not satisfy the requirements of Section 399, we shall pass orders only on the maintainability. In case we hold that the petition is maintainable, then a comprehensive order will be issued both in terms of maintainability as well as on the merits of the case. 16. Since the pleadings are complete, the petition will be heard on April 30, 1998, at 10.30 a.m.
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1997 (12) TMI 657
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... ... ..... egations and orders made by the learned Judge in connection with and relating to the disposed of Writ Petition No. 2949/96 in the impugned order, are illegal, misconceived and without jurisdiction. The same are quashed and are hereby directed to be expunged from the record. 69. The direction to issue show cause notice to the Chief Justice of the High Court Respondent No. 2, being wholly unwarranted, unjustified and legally unsustainable is hereby quashed and set aside. 70. Nothing said hereinabove shall however be construed as any expression of opinion on the pending criminal revision petition filed by respondent No. 1, which has been admitted to hearing and in which respondent No. 1 has been granted bail. That criminal revision petition shall be decided by the High Court on its own merits. 71. Before parting with this Judgment, we wish to say that we hope there shall not be any other occasion for us to deal with such a case. 72. The appeal therefore succeeds and is allowed.
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1997 (12) TMI 656
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... ... ..... decision to withdraw from acquisition can be challenged on the ground that power has been exercised mala fide or in an arbitrary manner. Therefore, we cannot accept the submission of the learned counsel for the State that the discretion of the State Government in this behalf is absolute and not justiciable at all. 11. We, therefore, allow this appeal and quash the impugned order dated 16.4.1996. However, we make it clear that it will be open to the State Government to reconsider this question of withdrawal from acquisition and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Writ Petition (c) No. 716 of 1996 12. As we are allowing the appeal the learned counsel for the petitioner does not press the writ petition at this stage and reserves his right to challenge the validity of Section 48 if such an occasion arises in future. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed as not pressed.
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1997 (12) TMI 655
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... ... ..... bail" the following words be substituted - "he shall be released on bail unless the court for reasons recorded in writing otherwise directs". The Report observed "We are unable to accept the suggestion either. Its acceptance would practically amount to an abolition of distinction between bailable and non-bailable offences" I have no manner of doubt that the argument of Mr.Chaudhary, if accepted, too would completely wash away the distinction between bailable and non-bailable offence. We cannot allow it to happen. 14. Keeping in view the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, I have absolutely no doubt that equipping the petitioner with an order as sought by her, would be hazardous to the victim and dangerous to the society in general. It may even impede the trial. Public interest would thus suffer as a consequence. The petition is thus dismissed. However, nothing said in this order shall be read as an expression of opinion on the case.
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1997 (12) TMI 654
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... ... ..... trification of the colony. 3. It is not the case of the revenue before this Court nor it was the case before the Tribunal that the expenditure claimed by the assessee was excessive or unreasonable. The question whether or not on the facts obtaining the liability to incur the expenditure should have been allowed as deduction in computing the taxable income, the law laid down by this Court in the case referred hereinabove applies with full force. The Tribunal in its order has referred to certain other decisions of other High Courts in support of the view it has taken but it is not necessary to multiply decisions. Suffice it to say that in Calcutta Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1959 37 ITR 1 (SC), the Supreme Court has also expressed a similar view as taken by this Court and by the Tribunal. That was also a case of development. 4. In view of the decisions cited above, in our opinion, no statable question of law arises from the order of the Tribunal. The application is, accordingly, rejected.
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1997 (12) TMI 653
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... ... ..... efer Para 4.1(b) Profit & Loss Account Units Rate Amount Units Rate Amount To Purchase of Raw Materials 100 12 1,200 By Sales 60 15 900 Less Stock of Raw Materials 40 12 480 Raw Materials Consumed 60 12 720 Less MODVAT credit 60 2 120 60 10 600 To Excise Duty 60 3 180 To Gross Profit 120 900 900 The following entries will be passed (i ) At the time when such credit is availed of and adjusted against the excise duty which becomes payable. Excise Duty paid Dr. ₹ 180 To MODVAT Credit Availed Account ₹ 180 (Being the payment of excise duty from the MODVAT credit available to the company) (ii ) At the year end, to the extent raw material items have been consumed in the production. MODVAT Credit Availed Account Dr. ₹ 120 To Materials Consumed ₹ 120 (Being the set-off of the MODVAT credit availed against materials consumed) (iii ) The credit balance in the MODVAT Credit Availed Account will be deducted from the value of the closing stock of raw material.
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1997 (12) TMI 652
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... ... ..... Appellate Tribunal Rules and since the right was sought to be assailed on behalf of the taxpayer also with reference to the same rule, we were constrained to hear both the sides so that the issue may be decided in the light of the rule. Otherwise, as we have said in the opening part of our order, both sides had initially agreed that Mr. Modi would assist Mr. Tralshawala who would address arguments in connection with the appeal. Perhaps the litigation was unfortunate and could have been avoided. However, we place on record that we derived able assistance from both the sides while deciding the point. 34. For the above reasons, we hold that we cannot hear arguments addressed by Mr. Modi either on the basis of the letter of the CIT-I, Mumbai, dated 1-9-1997 or on the basis of Mr. Tralshawala's letter of appointment dated 27-8-1997. 35. The appeal will now be taken up for hearing in the month of January 1998. Registry to issue notices to both the sides fixing a suitable date.
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1997 (12) TMI 651
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... ... ..... ear in question. Therefore, the learned counsel for the assessee argued that even in the cases of the other donors who did not appear in pursuance of the summons issued under section 131, the amounts cannot be held to represent the assessee’s undisclosed income. The learned Departmental Representative, in an attempt to counter the arguments advanced on behalf of the assessee, merely relied upon the orders of the lower authorities. 14. After hearing both sides and also after going through the ratios of the decisions cited above, which clearly support the case of the assessee, I hold that there is no evidence in the possession of the department to hold that the gifted amounts from these three parties represent the assessee’s undisclosed income. Therefore, the total of the gifted amounts from these three parties cannot be added as the undisclosed income of the assessee. Thus, the whole addition is to be deleted. 15. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.
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