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Showing 1 to 20 of 463 Records
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1998 (4) TMI 580
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... ... ..... half of the service rendered as Project Casual Labour on the basis of the order dated October 14, 1980 after being treated as temporary on the basis of the scheme as accepted in Inder Pal Yadav. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the judgment of the Tribunal dated February 8, 1991 when it holds that service rendered as Project Casual Labour by employees who were absorbed on regular permanent/temporary posts prior to 1.1. 1981 could not be counted for the purpose of retiral benefits and the said judgment as well as the judgment in which the said judgment has been followed have to be set aside. The judgements in which the Tribunal has taken a contrary view have to be affirmed. 15. In the result, the appeals filed by the Railway Administration are allowed and the judgments of the Tribunal impugned in these appeals are set aside. The Appeals arising out of Special Leave Petitions (c) Nos. 26790 of 1995 and 3423 of 1997 filed by the employees are dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1998 (4) TMI 579
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... ... ..... court of law to record conviction on mere conjectures and hypothesis. 20. As we have discussed earlier the investigating agency merely on suspicion have roped-in the persons belonging to the other community who were residing in the locality and then somehow trying to get them identified through the witnesses who belong to the community from where the people were burnt alive and the learned Designated Court was swayed away by the so-called evidence of identification and based the conviction. We have already discussed as to how unreliable the evidence of these eye-witnesses and no court on the basis of such unreliable evidence can base conviction, howsoever, ghastly the crime may be. In the aforesaid premises we set aside the conviction and sentence passed by the learned Designated Court under the provisions of TADA as well as under different Sections of the Indian Penal Code and direct that the appellants be set at liberty forthwith unless they are required in any other case.
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1998 (4) TMI 578
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... ... ..... rest of justice demands that such acts or omissions of the officers of the prosecution should not be taken in favour of the accused, for that would amount to giving premium for the wrongs of the prosecution designedly committed to favour the appellant. In such cases, the story of the prosecution will have to be examined de hors such omissions and contaminated conduct of the officials otherwise the mischief which was deliberately done would be perpetuated and justice would be denied to the complainant party and this would obviously shake the confidence of the people not merely in the law enforcing agency but also in the administration of justice. 14. For the above reasons, we are of the view that the Trial Court as well as the High Court has rightly based the conviction on Exh. 2, the dying declaration. We find no merit in the appeal and accordingly dismiss the same. The appellant, who is on bail, will now surrender to his bail bonds to serve out the sentence imposed upon him.
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1998 (4) TMI 577
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... ... ..... nsequences provided in the Act, it is difficult to accept the appellant s version that non-compliance of regulations is a mere technical lapse to be viewed leniently. The contention that the penalty of one lakh rupees imposed by the Adjudicating officer is high and that the quantum has been decided arbitrarily, disregarding the factors required to be taken into account as provided under section 15J of the Act , in my view, is not correct. The Adjudicating Officer in his order has clearly stated that while levying the penalty he had taken into consideration the nature of the offence, various other factors and circumstances as also the provisions of Section 15J of the Act. Against the maximum penalty of five lakh rupees provided in the Act, sum of one lakh rupees imposed, in my view is not unreasonable. I do not find any justification to interfere with the impugned order. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any merit in this appeal and accordingly the same is dismissed.
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1998 (4) TMI 576
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... ... ..... 9. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the protection by way of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal procedure is not applicable to the officers of Government Companies or the public undertakings even when such public undertakings are 'State ' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution on account of deep and pervasive control of the government. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. It is, however, made clear that we have not taken into consideration various other grounds raised in these appeals challenging the maintainability of the criminal proceedings initiated against the concerned officers of the public undertakings or the government companies. It will be open to the concerned accused to challenge the validity of the Criminal cases initiated against them on other grounds, if such challenge is available in law. Such questions, if raised, in these appeals are kept open to be considered in accordance with law by the appropriate authority.
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1998 (4) TMI 575
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... ... ..... llect its revenue from this source and to decide which methods would be most efficacious for this purpose. The provisions of the sales tax law of each State must, therefore, necessarily differ in various respects from the provisions of sales tax laws of other States. If the provisions of the legislation of every State on a particular topic are to be identical in every respect, there is no purpose in including that topic in the State List and it may as will be included in the Union List. Merely because the provisions of a State law differ from the provisions of other State laws on the same subject cannot make such provisions discriminatory." 15. For the reasons given above, we hold the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 45 of the Act as valid and the same are not ultra vires. 16. As the petitioner has remedy of appeal against the impugned assessment orders, this writ application is dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. No costs. A.K. Prasad, J. 17. I agree.
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1998 (4) TMI 574
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... ... ..... n of the bank guarantee raised by the plaintiff, although the invocation of bank guarantee by defendant no.2's letter dated 9 August 1997, asking the bank- defendant no.1 to remit the amount under the bank guarantee, prima facie, does not appear to be in terms of the bank guarantee. 26. For all these reasons, the application is allowed and the interim order dated 19 August 1997 is confirmed till the disposal of the suit subject to the condition that the entire material procured by the plaintiff from M/s. Hindalco under various invoices, filed in Court, for use in the defendant's building will be properly preserved and shall not be disposed of without the leave of the Court and further the plaintiff shall keep the bank guarantee alive till the disposal of the suit. 27. The view expressed hereinabove is tentative for the limited purpose of decision in this application and shall not be construed as expression of opinion on merits of the controversies between the parties.
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1998 (4) TMI 573
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... ... ..... 2 years imprisonment on the power of the Special Judge has to be harmoniously construed and I do not find any difficult in the same. The offence continues to attract the maximum sentence of 7 years. But the Special Judge trying the case does not have the jurisdiction to impose a sentence of more than 2 years. This does not mean that the offence itself is punishable by 2 years. It only means that although the offence is punishable by 7 years but the trial court cannot give a sentence beyond 2 years and if this construction is given then both section 7 and the proviso to clause (f) to section 12AA get their full play." AS the offence under Section 7A(1)9(ii) of the E.C. Act is punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years the offence would not attract the bar of limitation under Section 468 of the Code. It is, therefore, unnecessary for us to consider whether the curative provision in Section 473 of the Code should have been invoked. In the result we dismiss both the appeals.
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1998 (4) TMI 572
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... ... ..... that statute. If a statute requires personal signature of a person, which includes a mark, the signature or the mark must be that of the man himself. There must be physical contact between that person and the signature or the mark put on the document." 18. With great respect, we adopt the aforesaid reasoning and hold that for the purpose of valid attestation under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act it is absolutely necessary that the attesting witness should either sign or affix his thumb impression or mark himself as the Section does not permit an attesting witness to delegate that function to another. It follows that in the present case DW 2 is not an attesting witness and in the absence of the evidence of any other attesting witness the decision of the High Court that the Will propounded by the appellant has not been proved is unassailable. Hence the appeals fail and are dismissed. As the parties are closely related, we direct them to bear their respective costs.
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1998 (4) TMI 571
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... ... ..... uch, it cannot be pleaded that the petitioner had knowledge of the deprival only now. Hence, his statement in para. 2 of the petition that the cause of action arose out of a reply of the company in the petition under Section 237(b) before the Principal Bench of the Company Law Board in 1997 that the 200 shares stood compulsorily transferred carries no weight. We are convinced, therefore, that there has been an inordinate delay of, at least, 17 years from 1980 to 1997 during which period, the petitioner has pursued various alternate remedies. 11. The other preliminary objection referred by us in para. 2(ii) (page 942) above is really not a preliminary objection but a justification of the action of the company which relates to the merits of the case. 12. In view of the above two preliminary objections, we consider it inappropriate to go into and decide the merits of the case. Therefore, the petition is dismissed on the grounds as already referred to above. No order as to costs.
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1998 (4) TMI 570
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... ... ..... negligent in administering the same to him. He has certain reasons of his own for arriving at this conclusion. This conclusion may be scientifically wrong, but he cannot be prevented for that reason to take recourse to any legal remedy which is available to him. The plaintiff is no doubt a layman, but he is not an illiterate person. He approached the Court of law when he thought that there was a wrong committed by the defendants and that he should approach the Court for redressal of his wrong. I wonder how for this reason, the plaintiff can be saddled with the costs of the litigation or how he can be asked to pay exemplary costs as prayed by Mr. Merchant. In my opinion, such a prayer is improper. I, therefore, reject the same. 140. In view of the foregoing discussion and reasons given for all the findings, on all the issues, the following order is passed Suit is dismissed. Under the circumstances mentioned hereinabove, the parties to bear their own costs. 141. Suit dismissed.
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1998 (4) TMI 569
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... ... ..... f the present case. 21. In the instant case, admittedly the cheque was complete in all respects, except the date. It is the contention of the defendant that the handwriting of the date on the cheque is different and that the ink used for putting the date is also different. Assuming that if there is a difference in the handwriting with regard to the date as well as the ink used, that is not enough to rebut the presumption under Section 118(b) of the Act, since the payee has put the date on the basis of implied authority. We are therefore of the view that the defendant has not discharged the burden or rebutted the presumption under Section 118(b) of the Act. 22. We, therefore, hold that insertion of a date on an undated cheque would not amount to material alteration, since the holder in due course has got implied authority to do so, unless it is otherwise proved by the drawer of the cheque. Consequently, we uphold the judgment of the learned single judge and dismiss the appeal.
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1998 (4) TMI 568
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... ... ..... s, the 40 percent rate of tax would be applicable to the income of ₹ 1,36,396 which represents "income by way of fees for technical services". To this, should be added the income tax chargeable had its total income been reduced by the amounts of income by way of fees for technical services. This would be the dividend income of ₹ 3,12,500 (₹ 4,48,896-₹ 1,36,396). The aggregate of the taxes would be the assessee's tax liability. 7. For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the provisions of s. 115A can be applied in the assessee's case only in respect of the amount of ₹ 1,36,396 representing the income by way of fees for technical services, after adjusting the loss from the ONGC contract against the profits to the SPIC contract. 8. The contention of the learned counsel for the assessee based on s. 90(2) of the Act need not be examined in the view we have taken above. 9. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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1998 (4) TMI 567
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... ... ..... so now becomes purposeless. We, therefore, allow Civil Appeal No.s 8535 of 1997 and 8536 of 1997 to the extent of setting aside the impugned order of 21.11.1997. The order dated 20/21-08-97 has now become infructuous and hence no further orders are necessary in that connection. We however, make it clear that it the respondents or any of theme have any right to proceed against New Castle or the appellant in respect of the said sum of US 15 millions paid by New Castle to the appellant and held in escrow as stated earlier, the respondents or any of them shall be free to adopt appropriate proceedings in that connection in accordance with law. In view of the above, the appeals arising from S.LP.(C) Nos. 3 and 4 of 1998 are also allowed and the impugned order of 4th of December, 1997 in both the admiralty suits is set aside. All the appeals are accordingly allowed. Looking to the conduct of the appellant and the totality of circumstance, there will, however be no order as to costs.
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1998 (4) TMI 566
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... ... ..... U.P. State Electricity Board and Others, AIR1997SC3910 . The question in that case arose on the withdrawal of development rebate to the new industries for a period of three years. The court held that the principle of promissory estoppel applied on the facts and circumstances of the case and by entering into the standard agreement containing provision for revision of "rate schedule" from time to time, the consumer had not given up his claim for the rebate for a period of three years as per the promise held out by the Board. That case has no bearing here. VIII. CONCLUSION 45. In the result, we uphold the judgment and decree of the High Court in C.C.C.A.No. 38 of 1982 and dismiss Civil Appeal No. 2558 of 1988. We allow Civil Appeal Nos. 7139 to 7144 of 1997 and set aside the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court. The Writ Petitions and Writ Appeals shall be disposed of by the High Court in the light of this judgment. The parties will bear their respective costs.
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1998 (4) TMI 565
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... ... ..... of Central Excise v. Ram Body Builders reported in 1997 (94) E.L.T. 442 (S.C.), the appeals are dismissed.
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1998 (4) TMI 564
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... ... ..... able by the petitioner. The Assessing Officer shall make a calculation afresh of the tax liability of the petitioner giving effect to the appellate order. 2. The petitioner shall within three weeks of the date of calculation afresh by the Assessing Officer pay the amount of tax found due and payable by him. 3. This, however, shall not prejudice the petitioner’s appeal against the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and in the event of any interim order being passed by the Tribunal, the benefit thereof shall remain available to the petitioner. 4. So also if in the meantime the petition under section 154 of the Act is decided by the Commissioner (Appeals), the petitioner shall comply with that order as well but without prejudice to his right of appeal. 5. Subject to the abovesaid directions, order under sections 250 and 143(3) dated 23-3-1997 (Annexure P3), and notices based thereon under section 226(3) dated 27-3-1998 to Gail, Ujjain and Bank of India all hereby quashed.
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1998 (4) TMI 563
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... ... ..... ns made, or purporting to be made, thereunder, with respect to procedure or practice, in force or treated as in force in the Small cause Court on the thirty-first day of December, 1894, shall be in force, unless and until cancelled or varied by rules made by the High Court under this section." So, it is the High Court by rule to prescribe the procedure to be followed by the small Causes Court. The procedure is not what is under Civil Procedure Code. Hence, the argument that proceeding before the Charity Commissioner to be what is provided in Civil procedure Code is without any foundation. The same is accordingly rejected. So, we hold in view of the aforesaid finding that the proceeding under Section 50A of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 would not abate and he has powers to grant substitution even if belated or add parties in the said proceedings. For all the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. Cost on the parties.
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1998 (4) TMI 562
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... ... ..... v. Sree Chand Aggarwal, 1997 (95) E.L.T. A65 wherein the same question had arisen for consideration have already been dismissed, this appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs
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1998 (4) TMI 561
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... ... ..... the material on record specially when oral hearing is envisaged and has in fact been given to the party. The importance of oral hearing cannot be nullified by saying that the authority has considered all the submissions contained in the written arguments. Oral hearing generates discussion and leads to clarification of doubt, if any, which the authority while has to decide might be having in its mind. The importance of benefit of a healthy discussion can never be over emphasised. It is a basic tenet of law by which we are governed. If what has been urged on behalf of the respondent was to be accepted, it would be as good as saying that no oral hearing is required in judicial or quasi judicial matter. 28. For all these reasons the impugned assessment order dated 11th August 1997 passed by the Joint Assessor & Collector, Municipal Corporation of Delhi is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded back to the concerned authority for fresh assessment in accordance with law.
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