|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 418 Records
-
1999 (4) TMI 661
... ...
... ... ..... of Maharashtra AIR 1979 SC 94 1979 Cri LJ 41. This judgment was dealing with certain other issues and has not in fact directly dealt with the issue involved in this case. This judgment also lays down, if a prima facie case is made out the Magistrate must proceed under Section 254 (of the old Code corresponding to Section 246 of the new Code) and frame charge against the accused. Section 254 (old Code) shows that charge can be framed if after taking evidence or at any previous stage, the Magistrate thinks 'that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable as a warrant case. 4. Another judgment of Jammu and Kashmir High Court was pressed into service being Prithvi Nath v. R.C. Kaul (FB) which only deals with the meaning attached to the word 'hear' the prosecution as it appears in Section 252 of old Code (Section 244 of new Code). 5. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merit in this petition which is accordingly dismissed.
-
1999 (4) TMI 660
... ...
... ... ..... ff to show that all the items are available. The decisions of the lower Court regarding movables is only to be confirmed. 35. It was argued by learned counsel for appellant that one of the sisters, i.e., 17th defendant died pending suit and, therefore, her share also must be given to plaintiff. This aspect of the plaintiffs case has been dealt with by the lower Court in paragraphs 31 to 33 of the judgment. It was only thereafter, the Court has declared the share of the plaintiff over the divisible items. Therefore, there cannot be any change in the quantum of shares as argued by learned counsel for appellant. 36. No other point was argued by learned Counsel for appellant. In the result, I do not find any merit in this Appeal, and consequently the same in dismissed. Taking into consideration the close relationship between the parties and also in view of the fact that there is no appearance for respondents, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs in this Appeal.
-
1999 (4) TMI 659
... ...
... ... ..... omote efficacy of banking and of ensuring that in commercial or contractual transactions cheques are not dishonoured and credibility in transacting business through cheques is maintained. The above interpretation would be in accordance with the principle of interpretation quoted above "brush away the cobweb varnish, and show the transactions in their true light" (Wilmot, C.J.) or (by Maxwell) "to carry out effectively the breach of the statute, it must be so construed as to defeat all attempts to do, or avoid doing, in an indirect or circuitous manner that which it has prohibited". Hence, when the cheque is returned by a bank with an endorsement "account closed", it would amount to returning the cheque unpaid because "the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque" as envisaged in Section 138 of the Act. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
-
1999 (4) TMI 658
... ...
... ... ..... unal if there was no evidence to Justify such a conclusion and if no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the Court or Tribunal who has come or in other words it is a finding which was perverse in law. Except to the limited extent indicated above, the High Court has no Jurisdiction to Interfere with the findings of fact. Similar view was taken by the Apex Court in Chandauarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram. 1986 3SCR866 . Applying the aforementioned tests, this Court is unable to persuade itself to hold that the findings recorded by the Courts below suffer from such an infirmity so as to justify interference with the said finding under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. 14. In the result, the present petition fails as none of the grounds taken on behalf of the petitioner to challenge the order of issue of succession certificate in favour of the respondent No. 3 could withstand the test of judicial scrutiny. It is accordingly dismissed.
-
1999 (4) TMI 657
... ...
... ... ..... half. In fairness to Mr. Harish Salve, learned senior counsel for the appellant, however, we must record that after examining the original Annexure XV as filed along with the Election Petition and comparing it with the copy of Annexure XV supplied to the appellant, he did not press the challenge to the finding recorded by the High Court on that aspect, of course, reserving liberty to the appellant to raise all other points concerning Annexure XV at the trial of the election petition. 45. Thus, we find that the learned Single Judge of the High Court was justified in rejecting the preliminary objection and holding that the election petition did not suffer from any defect which could attract the provisions of Section 86(1) of the Act. This appeal has no merits and is dismissed as such, but, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. 46. We request the High Court to expeditiously dispose of the election petition which is pending since 1996.
-
1999 (4) TMI 656
... ...
... ... ..... ngaged in the avocation of vending some items on the Railway platform along with the victim woman. Another case which has come to our notice is the murder of an arrack shop proprietor a tribal by his servant for gain. The accused in the above said two cases were charged under the provisions of the Special Act. All this betrays either lack of comprehension of the true scope and purport of the Act or an anxiety to launch prosecutions for statistical purposes. It is necessary to arrest this trend. It is for the State and Central Governments to act in the matter. 63. We direct the State Government to pay an amount of ₹ 2,000/- (Rs. Two thousand) as fee to the Counsel Mrs. S. Nanda who appeared as Amkus Curiae on the directions of this Court. Let the copies be marked to the Secretary. Union Ministry of Law and Justice, Secretary, Union Ministry of Welfare, Law Secretary of the State of A.P., D.G. of Police and Superintendents of Police of Khammam, Warangal and Mahaboobnagar.
-
1999 (4) TMI 655
... ...
... ... ..... /4/96-CX dated 23.1.1996 which said as follows The matter has been clarified and it is hereby clarified that the proportionate cost of pattern has to be included in the assessable value of the casting even in cases where such patterns are being supplied by the buyers of the casting or are got prepared/manufactured by the job worker at the cost of the buyer. In cases where there is difficulty in apportioning the cost of pattern, apportionment can be made depending on the expected life and capability of the pattern and the quantity of castings that can be manufactured from it and thus working the cost to be apportioned per unit. For this purpose, a certificate from a Cost Accountant may be accepted. By applying this principle, it would follow that the demand for duty payable is required to be recalculated. 6. Appeal is accordingly allowed on this ground. Impugned order set aside. The Assistant Collector shall determine the duty payable in accordance with law. Dictated in Court.
-
1999 (4) TMI 654
... ...
... ... ..... hile deciding the application should not derive a sadistic pleasure in keeping the person in jail and he should not reject the application just for nothing. In a case like present the rejection of the application, on the ground that the earlier application was rejected after considering the merits, was not only contrary to the provisions of law but shows non-application of mind. The application deserves to and is accordingly allowed. Petitioner Mohan Raikwar be released immediately on his furnishing personal bond in the sum of ₹ 5,000/- (Rs. Five Thousand, only) with one surety in the like amount, to the satisfaction of C.J.M. Seoni for his appearance before the trial Court as and when ordered. Let a copy of this order be sent to the learned Magistrate before whom the matter is pending for trial and to the Additional Sessions Judge who had rejected the repeat application filed by the accused for understanding the letter of law in its true perspective. C.C. as per rules.
-
1999 (4) TMI 653
... ...
... ... ..... ructing a building or buildings. Under this document, no interest in the land is conveyed in favour of the appellants. The agreement does not create a lease, nor does it demise any interest in land in favour of the appellants. In this connection, a reference may also be made to subsequent decision of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Atur India (P) Ltd. 1994 1SCR881 where this Court has made a distinction between a lease and an agreement for lease. 9. Although it has been contended by the respondents that there is a demise of interest in the land under the said agreement, the agreement does not demise any such interest in the land. Clause 2 expressly sets out that this agreement is not to be construed as a demise in law of the said land so as to give to the licensee any legal interest in the land. Article 36 of the Bombay Stamp Act is, therefore, not attracted to the said document. 10. In the premises, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside.
-
1999 (4) TMI 652
... ...
... ... ..... red on payment of duty. There is no dispute that the inputs are received by the appellant. So in these circumstances the contention of the appellant that the Modvat credit taken in the instant case on the basis of the document showing the payment of duty by him has got some force and it has to be accepted. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dealing with the trade notice which had put an embargo that the Modvat credit was not available on the certified copy of the original document cannot be applied to the instant case in hand as no such trade notice is available in the instant case covering the jurisdictional area of the appellant. So under these circumstances there are sufficient grounds to allow the appeal. The point is answered in the affirmative. Hence the following order -- ORDER For the reasons indicated above, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside and the party is entitled to the consequential relief according to law. (Dictated in Court).
-
1999 (4) TMI 651
... ...
... ... ..... Sethi, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
-
1999 (4) TMI 650
... ...
... ... ..... not. Even if the argument that the property is custodia legis is to be accepted which to my mind it is not, a property to be custodia legis in a case where the defendant is in possession would require dispossession of the defendants and taking over possession by the Receiver. The Order of this Court is clear that pending the Receiver taking possession, the defendant has been restrained by an injunction with dealing with the property. If the property vested in the Receiver by his appointment, there would have been no need or necessity for this Court to grant the ad-interim relief in terms of prayer clause (b). Therefore alternatively on the facts of the present case, it is the defendant who is in possession, until possession is legally taken by the Court Receiver. The properties in Schedule "A" to the plaint are situated outside the jurisdiction of this Court. 8. In the light of that I find no merits in this matter, which is accordingly dismissed. 9. Suit dismissed.
-
1999 (4) TMI 649
... ...
... ... ..... n has been exercised improperly and/or in contravention of any law. Only because an appeal court may lake a different view the same by itself, would not be a ground to Interfere with the order of the first court. 29. Having found that the learned trial Judge has exercised his discretion which cannot be said to be an unsound one, or perverse, or had been exercised contrary to any principle of law, we are of the opinion that exercise of such discretion need not be interfere with. 30. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no Interference is called for with the order passed by the learned trial Judge. For the reasons aforementioned, this appeal is treated as on the day's list and is dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. Let plain copies of this order, duly countersigned by the Assistant Registrar (court), be handed over to the learned Advocates-on-record for the parties on usual undertaking. 31. Appeal dismissed.
-
1999 (4) TMI 648
... ...
... ... ..... bar that in the agreement entered into between the parties there was no escalation clause. The arbitrator has come to the clear finding that the present appellant was not pressurised by respondent No. 1 to agree 10% hike in the wages of the mining workers as recorded in the findings in respect of issue No. 34. In issue No. 35 the arbitrator has recorded that the present appellant acceded to for raise in the wages of mining workers. 20. The amount awarded under Claim No. 9 is not only beyond the scope of the agreement but also contrary to the findings recorded by the arbitrator. 21. Therefore, we hold that the arbitrator has misconducted himself in the proceedings and, therefore, the award is liable to be set aside on the ground of legal misconduct on the part of the arbitrator under Section 30 of the Act. The above being the position the present appeal has no merits and accordingly dismissed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case parties to bear their own costs.
-
1999 (4) TMI 647
... ...
... ... ..... two fact finding courts. Shri S.S. Khanduja, learned counsel for the respondent lastly pleaded that if ultimately the respondent is found to be the transferee under the Ext. P.11-sale deed the case may be remitted to the High Court for considering the question whether appellant's claim for eviction on the ground that he needs the building for his own use in bona fide. Shri G.L. Sanghi, learned senior counsel pointed out that there is concurrent finding by two courts on that aspect. We have noticed that the High Court which admitted the second appeal had formulated certain questions of law, and none of such questions pertained to the finding regarding the bona fides of appellant's claim for eviction. Hence no purpose would be served by remanding the case to High Court. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment. The decree passed by the trial court as confirmed by the first appellate court will stand restored. We pass no order as to costs.
-
1999 (4) TMI 646
... ...
... ... ..... evoid of any force. 7. The only other contention remains to be considered is whether in the case in hand it can be said that the Detaining Authority did not apply its mind while rejecting the application of the detenu. Such a contention had also not been raised before the High Court, but according to the learned counsel for the appellant the order that was served on the detenu would demonstrate the same. We are unable to appreciate this contention inasmuch as the communication is made only of the operative part of the order. If such a contention would have been raised in the High Court the Court would have called for the entire file. In the absence of the contention being raised in the High Court we do not think it is appropriate for us to hold from mere perusal of the order that the Detaining Authority did not apply its mind while rejecting the Representation. We, therefore, reject the said submission. 8. All the contentions having failed, this appeal fails and is dismissed.
-
1999 (4) TMI 645
... ...
... ... ..... appeals for which no satisfactory explanation is given. Hence, the Civil Appeals are dismissed.
-
1999 (4) TMI 644
... ...
... ... ..... t of Small Scale exemption from the date of application. At the end I would also mention that the ld. SDR filed an application dated 19-2-1999, after hearing of the case and pronouncement of the operative portion of the opinion, in which he has submitted that due to shortage of time, the proceedings were somewhat hurried and all the relevant facts could not be gone into sufficient details. The application is entirely misconceived as proceedings were not hurried at all and both the sides had presented their case completely. If there was any reservation in the mind of the ld. SDR he should have raised the same before the pronouncement. Further he had submitted the written submission dated 25-2-1999 which had also been considered. Sd/- (V.K. Agrawal) Member (T) FINAL ORDER 24. In view of the majority order, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed with consequential relief. Sd/- (Archana Wadhwa) Member (J) dated 22-4-1999 Sd/- (G.R. Sharma) Member (T)
-
1999 (4) TMI 643
... ...
... ... ..... to be taken as to what amount became due and when; the same has to be worked out. Whether all such details have to be worked out and whether the transactions between the appellant and the respondent did not become complete until the payment of final amount are matters for adjudication. Thus, it becomes very difficult to appreciate that the plea raised before the Arbitrators was sufficient to meet the situation to defeat the claim on the bar of limitation. Therefore, we do not think that we can examine the matter in the light suggested now by the learned senior counsel for the appellant when no foundation has been laid in the course of the proceedings before the Arbitrators either in the pleadings or in the evidence. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was justified in dismissing the appeal against the decree passed in terms of the award. 6. The appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
-
1999 (4) TMI 642
... ...
... ... ..... d therefore the Magistrate would be entitled to impose sentence on such a person continuing him in custody until payment is made. We are unable to accept this contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants. The language of Sub-section (3) of Section 125 is quite clear and it circumscribes the power of the Magistrate to impose imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until the payment, if sooner made. This power of the Magistrate cannot be enlarged and therefore, the only remedy would be after expiry of one month, for breach of non-compliance of the order of the Magistrate the wife can approach again to the Magistrate for similar relief. By no stretch of imagination the Magistrate can be permitted to impose sentence for more than one month. In that view of the matter the High Court was fully justified in passing the impugned order and we see no infirmity in the said order to be interfered with by this Court. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.
........
|
