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1999 (8) TMI 1022
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... ... ..... appeal is dismissed and that happens at the seat of the Appellate Authority, the fact that the appeal was filed after the Petitioner had come back to his native place would not make any difference. This is so, also because of our conclusion that the consequences of a dismissal or reduction in rank is suffered by the person concerned at the place Where he was working when the action was initiated and completed and not in his native place to which he might have returned on losing employment. In that view, nothing turns on the fact that the appeal was transmitted to the Appellate Authority located outside the jurisdiction of this Court when the Petitioner in O.P. 12019 of 1995 was within the jurisdiction of this High Court. We therefore dismiss these Original Petitions on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain these Original Petitions. In the light of that conclusion we do not think it necessary, to go into the merits of the contentions sought to be raised.
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1999 (8) TMI 1021
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... ... ..... uce totally new cause of action and change the nature of suit. It would also introduce a totally different case which is inconsistent with the prayer made in the application for referring the dispute to the arbitrator. Prima facie, such amendment would cause serious prejudice to the contention of the appellant that the claim of the respondent to recover the alleged amount was barred by the period of limitation as it was pointed out that cause of action for recovery of the said amount arose in the year 1975 and the amendment application was filed on 30.3.1986. Lastly, it is to be stated that in such cases, there is no question of invoking inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Section 151 of the C.P.C. as it would nullify the procedure prescribed under the Code. 9. In the view of the matter, the appeal is allowed with costs. The impugned order passed by the High Court of Kerala in C.R.P. No. 494/87 is quashed and set aside and the order passed by the trial court is restored.
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1999 (8) TMI 1020
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... ... ..... smissed the writ petition. Since leave of absence to the counsel had already been granted by the Chief Justice upto 23rd April, 1996, it is quite understandable that on 24th April, 1996, when the case was listed, the counsel was still unwell and could not come to the Court and, therefore, could not conduct the case which, in keeping with the high and noble tradition, should have been adjourned on the Illness Slip of that counsel. This having not been done has resulted in serious miscarriage of justice. 13. For the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order dated 24.4.1996 by which the writ petition was dismissed on merits, as also the judgment and order dated 27.8.1997 by which the application for recall of that order was rejected. We remand the case again to the High Court for a fresh decision of the writ petition in accordance with law after giving an opportunity of hearing to the counsel for the parties. There will be no order as to costs.
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1999 (8) TMI 1019
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... ... ..... s proper and valid service on the petitioners and the contention of the petitioners contra to this factual aspect of this case, cannot be accepted. From the foregoing discussion that as there is no evidence that A.3 to A.10 in CC.No. 7080 of 1997 and A.3. to A.11 in CC.No. 7081 of 1997 were incharge of and were responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company at the time when the offence was committed and therefore they are not liable and the proceedings against them shall be quashed. In the result, Crl.O.P.Nos. 2983 and 2984 of 1998 are allowed in part, and the proceedings in respect of Petitioners 3 to 10, who are accused Nos. 3 to 10 in CC.No. 7080 of 1997 and in respect of petitioners 3 to 11, who are accused Nos. 3 to 11 in CC No. 7081 of 1997, are quashed, and the learned Magistrate shall proceed against 1st and 2nd petitioners in both the cases in accordance with law. Consequently, there are no orders necessary in Crl.M.Ps.1776 to 1779 of 1998.
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1999 (8) TMI 1018
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... ... ..... cation under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for additional evidence, and directed that steps should be taken to impugned the affidavit in question and to keep the affidavit in safe custody for further action in the matter against the concerned persons. If really the High Court had applied its mind to the facts of the case, as understood by the two lower courts, then certainly it should have commented upon the above circumstances relied upon by the lower courts. All these facts noted above give us an impression that the High Court has interfered with the concurrent findings of the two courts below in a routine and casual manner by substituting its subjective satisfaction in the place of the lower courts. For the reasons stated above, this appeal succeeds and the judgment and decree of the High Court under appeal is set aside, and the judgment and decree of the trial court in OS No. 5/75 as affirmed by the first appellate court is restored. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed with costs.
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1999 (8) TMI 1017
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... ... ..... n appointed against any vacancy existing on January 1, 1992 is not true or that the respondents are intentionally or deliberately advancing this plea to deprive the appellants of their right to the arrears of the salary for some ulterior motive. That being so, it was not a case where proceedings for contempt could have been initiated against the respondents. High Court is right in dismissing the contempt petition. However, since there is a serious dispute whether any vacancy existed or not as on January 1, 1992 against which appellants or anyone of them could have been appointed the matter certainly needs examination but perhaps only by way of an interlocutory application in the writ petition and not by way of contempt. Thus, though upholding the order of the High Court, we send the matter back to the High Court to go into the question if any vacancy existed as on January 1, 1992 and, if so, pass appropriate orders. 13. With these observations, this appeal stands disposed of.
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1999 (8) TMI 1016
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... ... ..... pose of arriving at the annual value. We do not think that any argument is needed for us to hold that each such quarter or bungalow for the residence of employees of the Board would fall within the definition of 'building'. Stand of the Committee appears to us is rather incongruous. Just to get more revenue, the Committee could not change its stand and put interpretation on the term 'building' which is incomprehensible. The Committee was not justified in clubbing all the quarters/bungalows in one block together and term that as 'building'. 10. These appeals are accordingly dismissed with costs. Judgment of the High Court is affirmed. When leave was granted by this Court, there was stay of the operation of the impugned judgment of the High Court. With dismissal of these appeals, stay stands vacated and if in the meanwhile any excess amount have been paid by the Board to the Committee, it shall be refunded by the Committee to the Board within two months.
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1999 (8) TMI 1015
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... ... ..... Metropolitan Magistrate. In this view of the matter, I am constrained to observe, that the impugned order directing framing of a charge against the petitioner under Section 39/44 of the Act read with Section 379 IPC is an affront to law which could not be overlooked as it has resulted in miscarriage of justice. 12. Thus in this case, the impugned order of framing of a charge under Sections 39/44 of the Act read with Section 379 IPC against the petitioner clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court and for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference of this Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C. is absolutely necessary to annul the manifest illegality which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is allowed and the impugned charge framed against the petitioner under Sections 39/44 of the Act read with Section 379 IPC is quashed and the petitioner is discharged. His bail bonds are also discharged.
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1999 (8) TMI 1014
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... ... ..... it is mentioned in this Encyclopedia as under The best known of the ethers is ethyl ether, sometimes, called diethyl ether or simply ether, CHS CH2 OCH2 CH3. It is used in industry as a solvent and in medicine as an anesthetic 21. In view of the above, it is apparent that Ether Solvent is only a descriptive name for Ether which is widely used as a solvent not only in the industry, but also in chemical manufacture and in research laboratories. Ether and Ethyl Ether are the same substance and the term "Ether" is used synonymously with the "Ethyl Ether". 22. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and orders dated 24.4.1996 and 10.2.1997 passed by the State and National Commissions respectively are set aside, while the judgment dated 30.9.1995 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Alappuzha, is restored by which the Complaint (the Claim Petition of the respondent) was rightly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1999 (8) TMI 1013
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... ... ..... tive detention. 2. The issue raised in this petition is no longer res-integra. In Anukul Chandra Pradhan v. union of India and Ors. AIR1997SC2814 , a three Judge Bench of this Court speaking through Verma, CJI (as His Lordship then was) examined the ambit and scope of Section 62(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and after observing that criminalisation of politics is the bane of society and negation of democracy, rejected the challenge to the validity of the said Section. It was opined that the object of Section 62(5) is to prevent criminalisation of politics and maintain probity in elections and that any provision which furthers that aim and promotes the object has to be welcomed, as sub-serving a great constitutional purpose. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the three Judge Bench in Anukul Chandra Pradhan's case (supra) and are not persuaded to take a different view. This writ petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. No costs.
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1999 (8) TMI 1012
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... ... ..... d Shikshan Prapta Bakar-o-Sikshak Samiti, (supta) does not come in aid of the Appellants herein keeping in view then-stand taken by the Appellants in the writ application. 27. It is also well settled that discretions issued in one case are not to be issued automatically in another as has been done by the learned trial Judge without considering as to whether the appellants herein the similarly situated to that of the petitioners in the earlier case. 28. It is equally well settled that Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot be applied when the parties are not similarly situated. 29. For the reasons aforementioned we are of the opinion, that the Appellants cannot be granted any relief. The Appeals and the writ petitions fails and are dismissed accordingly. 30. In view of the stand taken by the Appellant that now they cannot claim appointment in view of the present rules, we are of the opinion that parties should bear their own costs throughout. M.H.S. Ansari, J. I agree.
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1999 (8) TMI 1011
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... ... ..... who has no interest in the litigation in question and in quashing the decision of the Indore Development Authority of referring the dispute to the arbitrator as well as the award of the competent arbitrator, by entering into an arena of conjecture and by assuming that the price of land must have gone up without having before them any materials in that respect. We have no hesitation, therefore to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and we accordingly do so. Necessarily, therefore, the award of the competent arbitrator remains operative and the rights of the parties flowing therefrom have to be worked out in accordance with law. The present appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Indore Bench dated 11.10.96 passed in Miscellaneous Petition No. 113 of 1991 is set aside and the said miscellaneous petition stands dismissed. The respondent No. 1 shall bear the costs of this appeal and the hearing fee is assessed as ₹ 20,000.
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1999 (8) TMI 1010
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... ... ..... , the Division Bench was right in the view that it took that the first respondent could not be made liable for the arrears of passenger tax as the operator of the vehicles. 9. Learned Counsel for the State then sought to base an argument upon Section 29(A)(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It was an argument that was raised before the learned single Judge but the learned single Judge did not uphold it. Though the learned single Judge decided for the most part in the State's favour on the writ petition, when an appeal was preferred even by State it was certainly open to the State to take the point and support the learned single Judge's decision basing itself on the said Section 29(A)(5). This was not done. Even in the grounds in the special leave petition, the point is not taken. We, therefore, decline to consider the argument based on Section 29(A)(5) and shall not be deemed to have expressed any view thereon. 10. The civil appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1999 (8) TMI 1009
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... ... ..... ated to us that there is no such rule in the Patna High Court rules. In that view of the matter the High court was not justified in rejecting the application for revision solely on the ground that the accused has not surrendered. 3. We therefore, set aside the impugned order and direct that the revision application be taken up by the High Court on merits. We make it clear that our order does not disentitle the High Court to dismiss the revision on merits. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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1999 (8) TMI 1008
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... ... ..... Court, that is, by taking out execution of the decree, Petition seeking special leave to appeal along with prayer for interim relief was filed in the Supreme Court on 2-1-1984. On 30-9-85 leave to appeal was granted and while directing notices to be issued to the respondents, this Court had also directed execution of the judgment and decree of the High Court to remain stayed if not already executed. Merely because the decree under appeal has been executed for want of stay order from the superior Court the right of the judgment debtor to prosecute the appeal is not lost without there being something to show that the judgment debtor had waived or consciously given up his right of prosecuting the appeal. 11. The appeals are allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the High Court are set aside and instead the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and as affirmed by the District Judge are restored. The appellant shall be entitled to costs throughout in both the appeals.
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1999 (8) TMI 1007
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... ... ..... e post of Assistant Engineer to be invalid in any manner. In this view of the matter, the part of the direction quashing the appointments made in favour of the respondents 3 and 5 before the High Court is set aside and we hold that the appointments of those two respondents to the post of Assistant Engineer made by the Board by its resolution is valid in law. The direction of the High Court to the State Government to frame rules in exercise of power under Section 21 of the Act, however, is not being interfered with and is upheld. We make it clear that until rules are framed by the State Government there would be no fetter on the power of the Board to make appointments in accordance with law by taking appropriate decisions. But this conclusion of ours does not, in any manner, dilute the direction of the High Court to State Government to frame rules under Section 21 of the Act. The appeals are accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
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1999 (8) TMI 1006
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... ... ..... sable if payment of duty is barred under Section 11A of Central Excise Act. The Third Member was bound to either agree or disagree with one or the other Member on the point of difference. He could never refuse to record an opinion whether there was suppression which resulted in contravention of Rule 173B. In fact that specific question has not been answered at all in Third Member’s Order. Hon’ble Third Member mainly held that if duty cannot be sustained penalty does not arise. In fact M/s. HMM case there were no ingredient such as would have attracted period of limitation and it was in that context it was held that the question of penalty would arise only if the department is able to sustain its demand. Therefore in view of the Court decisions it was incumbent on the Third member to give a finding as to whether there was contravention of Rule 173B and even if there was contravention whether imposition of penalty was barred because recovery of duty was time barred.
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1999 (8) TMI 1005
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... ... ..... smissed in view of the decision of this Court in Collector of Central Excise, Pune etc. etc. v. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd. etc. etc. 1999 (112) E.L.T. 353 (S.C.) 1999 (5) JT 595 .
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1999 (8) TMI 1004
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... ... ..... grant of interest at the rate of 12% was inadequate as admittedly the appellant was deprived of the user of a sum of Rs. One lakh for over a period of seven years. During the aforesaid period, the appellant had to suffer the winding up proceedings under the Companies Act, allegedly on the ground of financial crunch. We are of the opinion that awarding interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum would have served the ends of justice. Under the facts and circumstances of the case the appeal is partly allowed by modifying the orders of the State Commission as well as the National Commission with direction that the appellant shall be entitled to the payment of Rs. One lakh with interest at the rate of 15% per annum with quarterly rests from the date when the amount was received by it till the date of payment. The difference of the amount on account of enhancement of the rate of interest shall be paid to the appellant within a period of six weeks from the date of this judgment.
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1999 (8) TMI 1003
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... ... ..... y of the writ petitions in the High Court, the Graphite has not been paying electricity charges on the basis of revised rates which was the subject matter of the challenge in the High Court. We have upheld the validity of the revised tariff from April 8, 1991. Graphite is, therefore, bound to pay the differential amount with such charges for delayed payment as per agreement dated January 21, 1984. 30. Respondent Durgapur Projects Ltd. has pointed out that on that account an amount of ₹ 11,02,90,654,83 with delayed payment surcharge at the agreed rate as per Clause (23) of the agreement dated January 21, 1984 is due from Graphite to it. If there is any dispute regarding the amount claimed by the respondent the same shall be considered by the High Court and for that the party shall move the High Court which may pass appropriate orders. The amount which is not disputed by the Graphite shall be paid by it to the respondent within four weeks with charges for delayed payment.
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