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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 523 Records
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2002 (8) TMI 892
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... ... ..... t the plaintiff is rendered remediless. Remedy available under the relevant provisions of law can always be resorted to by the plaintiff for recovering the possession of the suit house, if it is so permissible. The question is as to whether the plaintiff can succeed in the present suit, which is based solely on a document, which is not registered and which is made compulsorily registrable under the Registration (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1982. The answer is 'No'. 15. In the result, the Second Appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree dated 31st March, 1978 passed in Civil Appeal No. 40 of 1977 by the learned 2nd Extra Assistant Judge, Baroda, and the judgment and decree dated 18th December, 1976 passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 222 of 1973 by the learned Civil Judge (J.D.), Karjan, are hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the Regular Civil Suit No. 222 of 1973 filed in the Court of learned Civil Judge (J.D.), Karjuan, also stands dismissed. No order as to costs.
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2002 (8) TMI 891
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... ... ..... ld ask for it. It has been held that without asking for such a certificate the State cannot reject a claim for subsistence allowance. 10. In the case of M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. (1999)ILLJ1094SC , this Court has held that a suspended employee is entitled to subsistence allowance as a relationship of employer-employee subsists. 11. For the above reasons, we hold that the Appellant is entitled to receive subsistence allowance, which should have been paid to her husband. As the only ground for not paying the subsistence allowance is that a certificate required by Rule 96(2) has not been, furnished, we direct the Appellant to file an affidavit Stating therein that her husband was not engaged in any other employment, business, profession or vocation. The subsistence allowance as per Rule 96 shall be released to the Appellant within 4 weeks of receipt of such an affidavit. 12. With these directions, the Appeal stands disposed of. There will be no Order as to costs.
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2002 (8) TMI 890
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... ... ..... . 26. Lastly, Mr. Goswami submits that the appellant has his mother, wife and children to support and if this Court so decides to confirm the conviction serious prejudice would be caused to his mother, wife and children and pleads for leniency. We are not at all persuaded by this submission. Human consideration is no ground for showing leniency to the perpetrator of the crime against organized civilized society, which is abhorrent to the concept of rule of law. In fact, this prayer has already been considered by the designated court and lenient punishment of 5 years R.I. has been awarded. We may say that offence of kidnapping in any form impinge upon human rights and right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. Such acts not only strike a terror in the mind of the people but have (sic) effects on the civilized society and have to be condemned by imposing (sic) punishment. 27. For the reasons abovestated there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.
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2002 (8) TMI 889
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... ... ..... urt in CIT v. Podar Cement (P) Ltd. 1997 226ITR625(SC) , it is not necessary to state the facts. In the said decision it has been held that for the purpose of section 22 of the Act, the requirement of registration of sale deed is not warranted. It is observed that having regard to the ground realities and the object of the Act, namely, to tax the income, owner is a person who is entitled to receive income from the property in his own right. In other words, what has been held is that if the purchaser has been put in possession of the property on his paying the full consideration, he can be treated as owner for the purpose of section 22 of the Act, even though no registered document as required under section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, has been executed in his favor. 3. In view of the said authoritative pronouncement, question referred is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favor of the assessed and against the revenue. 4. The reference stands disposed of accordingly.
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2002 (8) TMI 888
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... ... ..... n in the judgment cited at the trial and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the application of the petitioner Surinder Kairam deserved to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed. 15. As regards the anticipatory bail of Tarun Kairam it is admitted that charge sheet against him has already been filed. Now he has to approach the trial Court for grant of regular bail. Counsel for this petitioner has already stated that this petitioner will appear before trial court and apply for bail. He, however, wanted this court to give protection to this petitioner till trial court disposes of the application. but considering the role assigned to him which is as grave and serious as the role of his father is, he does not deserved even the limited anticipatory bail in this case. His application is also dismissed. But it is clarified that the trial court will decide his bail application un-influenced by any observation made by this court against this petitioner in this order.
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2002 (8) TMI 887
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... ... ..... J. ORDER Heard Counsel. The Civil Appeal is dismissed.
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2002 (8) TMI 886
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... ... ..... er has not been taken into consideration by the first respondent at the time of approving the resolution of the 2nd respondent. Though, non-compliance of Rules 3(3) and 7(1) of the Rules was not urged in the Writ Petition, this Court should have examined the legality and validity of the order from the record of the respondents 1 and 2 while exercising its writ of certiorari jurisdiction keeping in view the law applicable to the case on hand. However, this Court has not noticed the above said provisions of the Act and Rules referred to supra which is one of the ground for reviewing the impugned order in this petition as it has rendered the impugned order void abolition in law for non-compliance of the mandatory statutory duty by respondent No. 2. 9. For the reasons stated supra, this review petition is allowed. The impugned order is recalled and the impugned orders at Annexures 'F' and 'G' in the Writ Petition are hereby quashed. Rule issued and made absolute .
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2002 (8) TMI 885
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... ... ..... ay appears and says that the assessee does not want to come forward to contest the matter. Hence, the assessee shall be deemed to have been served. 3. The learned senior standing counsel for the department contends that this question is covered in favour of the revenue by the judgment of this court in CIT v. S. Antony 2000 242 ITR 363 (Mad), wherein it had already been held that the interest under sections 139(8) and 217 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is leviable even in the case of the assessments, which have been completed for the first time under section 147 read with section 143(3) of the Act. In that view, the question is answered against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. No costs.
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2002 (8) TMI 884
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... ... ..... face of the Judicial Officer is in fact a slap on the face of the Justice delivery system in the country and as such question of acceptance of any apology or an undertaking does not and cannot arise, neither there can be any question of any leniency as regards the sentence. 18. The High Court, in our view, has dealt with the matter in its proper perspective and we do feel it expedient to record our concurrence with the observations and conclusions as also findings of the High Court. 19. In that view of the matter, this appeal fails and is dismissed. 20. The bail as granted by this Court on an earlier occasion stands cancelled. The accused - appellant who is present in the Court be taken into custody immediately for undergoing remaining period of sentence. The appropriate police authorities to lodge him in Tihar Jail presently but upon proper intimation to the appropriate authority at Jaipur, the appellant be sent to Jaipur in terms of the earlier directions of the High Court.
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2002 (8) TMI 883
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... ... ..... be a valid ground for restoration of the complaint. 4. In our opinion, the learned Magistrate , and the High Court have adopted a very strict and unjust attitude resulting in failure of justice. In our opinion, the learned Magistrate committed a error in acquitting the accused only for absence of the complainant on one day and refusing to restore the complaint when sufficient cause for the absence was shown by the complainant. 5. The impugned orders dated 22.6.2001 of Metropolitan Magistrate and dated 24.7.2001 of the High Court respectively, are set aside. The complaint is restored and learned Magistrate is directed to proceed with the trial of the case after issuance of formal notices to both the parties of the next date to be fixed in the case. The learned counsel appearing for the parties are directed to inform the parties to appear before the court of Metropolitan Magistrate on or before 9th of September, 2002 to ascertain the date fixed by the trial Judge for the case.
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2002 (8) TMI 882
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... ... ..... ould not be entitled to deduct interest paid by itself to the bank. The argument made by the assessee that the interest-free loan was given by it to its subsidiary out of funds other than borrowed funds did not cut any ice with the AO. 3. We take note that almost in similar circumstances, for an earlier assessment year, viz. 1991-92 an appeal has been admitted by our Court. The amount involved there is about ₹ 10.53 lakh. The assessment year in question before us is 1993-94. 4. Since there is no res judicata involved nor any point of precedent involved in a mere matter of admission of appeals and since the questions raised before us sound in facts and facts only the petition of appeal is summarily rejected.
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2002 (8) TMI 881
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... ... ..... llant in full and final settlement and the same has been received by the Respondent 2, namely K.K. Chandran. In the receipt files in this court, it is stated that the said Chandran has no objection to the dismissal of the complaint or modification of the sentence imposed by the Court. 4. After hearing the counsel for the parties, we modify the sentence and direct that instead of the appellant suffering imprisonment for six months a fine of ₹ 1000 be imposed. 5. This appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
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2002 (8) TMI 880
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... ... ..... choose to do so. This fact itself is sufficient to prove that on her own accord, she had agreed to sign the divorce petition as the husband-respondent herein used to give mental torture to her by demanding a dowry of ₹ 25 lakhs for doing business. Demanding dowry after so many years of marriage and that is also a huge sum, drew the wife-appellant herein to go for divorce by mutual consent. If she had given up the custody of the child and her right of maintenance, she did so with open eyes for whatever reasons known to her. 25. Considering the facts on record, we are convinced that the husband-respondent herein did not play any type of fraud in obtaining her consent for mutual divorce under Section 13(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act and therefore we are of the considered view that there is no merit in the appeal. We further hold that the learned Judge rightly dismissed the said I.A. for reviewing/recalling the petition. 26. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.
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2002 (8) TMI 879
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... ... ..... ence and after the heated exchange, they picked up the sticks from the fence on the spot and assaulted the deceased. Appellant No. 3 came later and assaulted the deceased with a crow-bar. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that appellants 1 to 3 had any pre-meditation or any intention to cause death of the deceased. It is also not shown that how appellant No. 3 was concerned with the appellants 1 and 2. Nobody speaks about the common intention of the appellants to kill the deceased. With all this, strangely, the High Court convicts the appellants for an offence under Section 302 IPC taking the aid of Section 34 IPC. This finding of the High Court is patently unsustainable. 18. In the light of aforementioned reasons and discussions and to do substantial justice, the impugned judgment and order is set aside and that of the trial court is restored. The appellants be set at liberty forthwith if they are not required in any other case. The appeal is ordered accordingly.
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2002 (8) TMI 878
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... ... ..... d/ or that it was the son (Defendant No. 3) who by transgressing directions purchased the property in his own name. 20. Thus the contention of learned counsel for the defendant, that on the averments as made by the plaintiff/applicant himself in his application seeking amendment, the transaction is clearly a "benami" transaction, and therefore legal proceedings are prohibited in relation to such a transaction, are clearly hit by the prohibition of the Benami Act. 21. Resultantly, the amendment as proposed, cannot be allowed on account of the legal bar arising from the provisions of the Benami Transactions Act 1988, when applied to the averments of the plaintiff in the amendment application in question. 22. The same view as of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, is also reflected in AIR 71 J & K 81 reported as Sant Ram v. Abdul Haq; 1976 (78) PLR 424 reported as Sohan Lal Mehta v. Shiv Das Mehta. 23. The application for amendment is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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2002 (8) TMI 877
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... ... ..... by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, 8th Court, Alipore in Title Suit No. 33 of 1995 for specific performance is hereby set aside. The said Title Suit No. 33 of 1995 be and the same is hereby decreed for damages against the defendant No. 1 directing him to refund the earnest of ₹ 25,000/- together with damages assessed at ₹ 10,000/- and dismissed as against the defendant No. 2. The defendant No. 1 shall deposit the said sum of ₹ 35,000/- in aggregate in the trial Court or pay to the plaintiff by A/c payee demand draft or bankers cheque within two months from this date. In default, the said sum of ₹ 35,000/- will carry interest @ 9% per annum simple till deposit or payment as the case may be. There will, however, be no order as to costs. If an urgent xerox certified copy of this order is applied for, the same is to be supplied to the applicant at an early date, subject to compliance of all the required formalities. Joytosh Banerjee, J. I agree.
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2002 (8) TMI 876
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... ... ..... r a period of seventeen years would be a futile exercise, I agree the view taken by the ld. Member (Judicial) on this short ground itself. Sd/-(Archana Wadhwa)Member (J) FINAL ORDER In view of the majority decision in Appeal No. C-305/86-Cal. redemption fine is reduced from ₹ 4.50 lakh (Rupees four lakh fifty thousand only) to ₹ 1.50 lakh (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) and penalty on Shri G.R. Aggarwal is reduced from ₹ 1 lakh (Rupees one lakh only) to ₹ 33,000/- (Rupees thirty-three thousand only). In respect of Appeal No. C-306/86-Cal. fine in lieu of confiscation is reduced from ₹ 21 lakh (Rupees twenty-one lakh only) to ₹ 7 lakh (Rupees seven lakh only) and penalty on Shri G.R. Aggarwal is reduced from ₹ 4 lakh (Rupees four lakh only) to ₹ 1.33 lakh (Rupees one lakh thirty-three thousand only). Both the Appeals are disposed of in above terms. Sd/- (Archana Wadhwa)Member (J)7-8-2002 Sd/- (G.R. Sharma)Member (T)7-8-2002
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2002 (8) TMI 875
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... ... ..... ding to passing of the impugned orders. Thus, till this date the appellant-authorities have not yet exercised their discretion. Submission for the respondents was that this Court itself should examine and decide the question in issue based on the material on record to set at rest the long-standing issue. We have no hesitation to decline such a suggestion. The courts can either direct the statutory authorities, where it is not exercising its discretion, by mandamus to exercise its discretion, or when exercised, to see whether it has been validly exercised. It would be inappropriate for the Court to substitute itself for the statutory authorities to decide the matter." 18. For the reasons aforementioned, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the DPC to consider the question of the promotion of the petitioner afresh. 19. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2002 (8) TMI 874
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... ... ..... the assessee and there was no income available for consideration ?" 2. At the outset, the learned senior standing counsel for the department makes a statement that these questions are covered against the revenue by a decision of this Court in the case of CIT v. P.L. Ramiah 2002 254 ITR 238. Since a fair statement comes from the revenue against its own interest, there will be no necessity to hear the assessee in whose favour the order would naturally go. The questions are, therefore, answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. No costs.
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2002 (8) TMI 873
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... ... ..... ingh v. State (NCT) of Delhi 2002 (61) DRJ 670 (SC). In the later decision, the Supreme Court observed that imposition of a condition to deposit a sum of Rs. fifteen lakhs in the form of FDR was unreasonable since as per Sub-section (2) of Section 438 Cr.P.C. conditions which can be imposed should not be unreasonable. A condition, which would be difficult to comply with would amount to imposition of an unreasonable condition and would tantamount to refusal; of invoking the discretion under Sub-section (1) of Section 438 Cr.P.C. In Sandeep Jain v. State of Delhi condition of deposit of amount of Rs. two lakhs apart from furnishing a bond of ₹ 50,000/- with two solvent sureties, while granting bail was held by the Supreme Court to be unreasonable one. 21. Having answered the reference it will be now for the learned Single Judge to dispose of the petition in accordance with the law aforementioned. 22. Parties to appear before the learned Single Judge on 19th August, 2002.
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