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2004 (10) TMI 642
... ... ... ... ..... one of the borrowers deposited a sum of Rs. 27,000/- with the Bank on 10.7.2000 and despite that payment the amount of Rs. 40,000/- plus which included the above referred amount of Rs. 27,000/- was deducted from the retiral dues of the plaintiff on 5.12.2000. The said amount of Rs. 27,000/- had been paid to the writ petitioner almost after about 18 months. The Bank has not given any reason for not refunding the amount right in time or not paying the interest on the same. Be that as it may, though we cannot approve the Single Bench judgment of this Court in the matter of Md. Mahmoodul Haque Mallick v. The Bihar State Co-operative Bank Ltd. (supra) in the light of the judgments of the Supreme Court but on the sound legal principles we are of the opinion that in the present case the Bank was not justified in deducting the amount from the retiral dues of the petitioner. 27. The appeal is dismissed with costs quantified to Rs. 3,000/- (Three thousand). R.N. Prasad, J. 28. I agree.
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2004 (10) TMI 641
... ... ... ... ..... ppearing for the complainant company is also present and he has nothing to add. Ld. APP Mr. SS Patel has also nothing to add. In view of above, without entering into the merits of the contentions that are raised before the Court and without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the respective parties, the petitioners are directed to approach ld. Metropolitan Magistrate concerned with an appropriate relief to stay the proceedings of the Downloaded on Sat Oct 15 13 04 41 IST 2022 criminal case being Criminal Case No.105/1997 pending in the Court of ld. Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.16, Ahmedabad, pending Civil Suit No.4470/1998 and/or dropping of criminal proceedings in view of MOU dated 7.12.1996. If such an application is made, then the same shall be decided by the ld. Metropolitan Magistrate concerned in accordance with law. Order & Directions accordingly. Criminal Misc. Application stands disposed of accordingly subject to aforesaid observations and directions.
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2004 (10) TMI 640
... ... ... ... ..... t and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, 1973CriLJ1783 , Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat 1996CriLJ2867 , Jawant Singh v. State of Haryana, Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar and Ors. 2003CriLJ5040 , State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh and State of Punjab v. Pohla Singh and Anr. 2003CriLJ5010 and Suchdanand Pal v. Phani Pal and Anr. 2004CriLJ628 . 11. The High Court analysed the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 to conclude that it would not have been possible for PW-2 to hear the exhortation as he was at a distance. It is not the evidence that the exhortation was in a loud voice. Evidence of PW-1 was vague about the exhortation. The view taken by the High Court is a possible view. 12. In that view of the matter we dismiss the State's appeal. 13. In the ultimate, both the appeals are dismissed.
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2004 (10) TMI 639
... ... ... ... ..... e same as the amount of consideration that actually passed. The words "in whole or in part" of any debt or other liability assumes significance in this context. Even if the cheque is for a lesser amount than the actual amount of consideration, still a cause of action would be available to the payee under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. If that is so the question of a cheque for a larger amount than what is actually received by the accused also would make no difference provided the entire amount so mentioned is necessary to discharge the debt or legal liability. 20. In conclusion, it may be observed that the finding given by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class on both counts deserves to be set aside as erroneous and perverse. Consequently, it must be held that the complainant had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused. The accused, is, therefore, hereby held guilty under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
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2004 (10) TMI 638
... ... ... ... ..... ld be permitted to put the scheduled property to better use. We do not think in the facts and circumstances of this case, the lower appellate court and the High Court were justified in permitting the respondent to change the nature of property by putting up construction as also by permitting the alienation of the property, whatever may be the condition on which the same is done. In the event of the appellant's claim being found baseless ultimately, it is always open to the respondent to claim damages or, in an appropriate case, the court may itself award damages for the loss suffered, if any, in this regard. Since the facts of this case do not make out any extraordinary ground for permitting the respondent to put up construction and alienate the same, we think both the courts below, namely, the lower appellate court and the High Court erred in making the impugned orders. The said orders are set aside and the order of the trial court is restored. 11. The appeal is allowed.
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2004 (10) TMI 637
... ... ... ... ..... re was no negligence on the part of the treating doctor/ or hospital. Therefore, in any case, the hospital which is in better position to disclose that what care was taken or what medicine was administered to the patient. It is the duty of the hospital to satisfy that there was no lack of care or diligence. The hospitals are institutions, people expect better and efficient service, it the hospital fails to discharge their duties through their doctors being employed on job basis or employed on contract basis, it is the hospital which has to justify and by not impleading a particular doctor will not absolve the hospital of their responsibilities. 17. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the order dated 6.2.2003 passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in Original Petition No. 121 of 1995 and remit back the original petition to the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission to be decided in accordance with law. No order as to costs.
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2004 (10) TMI 636
... ... ... ... ..... the Civil Court's decision was that the FDR had in fact been pledged by Mam Chand to the bank. We have already quoted the observation of the Revisional Court earlier. In fact, the Revisional Court also held that the decision of the trial Court did not in any fashion bind the appellant. There is no independent finding by any of the for a that the pledge had indeed been created of the fixed deposit receipt by Mam Chand as claimed by the bank. 20. In the circumstances, the Bank had no right to refuse payment of the amount deposited to the appellant. The refusal as disclosed to this Court, was contrary to banking norms. We are therefore of the view that the District Forum was correct in accepting, and the State Commission and the National Commission erred in rejecting, the appellant's complaint. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the decisions of the State Commission and the National Commission are set aside and the order of the District Forum is confirmed with costs.
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2004 (10) TMI 635
... ... ... ... ..... whether to make an arrest or not. (2) The High Court should ordinarily not direct any Subordinate Court to decide the bail application the same day, as that would be interfering with the judicial discretion of the Court hearing the bail application. However, as stated above, when the bail application is under Section 437. CrPC ordinarily the Magistrate should himself decide the bail application the same day, and if he decides in a rare and exceptional case not to decide it on the same day, he must record his reasons in writing. As regards the application under Section 439, CrPC it is in the discretion of the learned Sessions Judge considering the facts and circumstances whether to decide the bail application the same day or not, and it is also in his discretion to grant interim bail the same day subject to the final decision on the bail application later. (3) The decision in Dr. Vinod Narain v. State of UP. (supra) is incorrect and is substituted accordingly by this judgment.
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2004 (10) TMI 633
... ... ... ... ..... hat the discretion which has been exercised in the facts and circumstances of the case in condoning the delay by the Central Registrar is in accordance with the established principles of law and justice and it was not a fanciful or arbitrary exercise of discretion. The exercise of the discretionary power can be interfered by the High Court only if the order passed is violative of some fundamental or basic principle of justice and fair play or suffers from any patent or flagrant error. We do not find any such element present vitiating the exercise of power vesting in the Central Registrar to condone the delay and entertain an election dispute. 13. For the aforesaid reasons the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi is set aside. The Central Registrar shall now proceed with the hearing of the petition of the appellant and expeditiously determine the same on merits. The appeal is allowed but in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.
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2004 (10) TMI 632
... ... ... ... ..... and original order passed under section 143(3) may please be restored. At the time of hearing before us, both the parties fairly agreed that the facts in the case of Smt. Kishori R. Mody are identical to the facts in the case of Shri Ravi K. Mody because both the assessees are directors in SBL and the sum of ₹ 1 crore was received by Smt. Kishori R. Mody on account of Restrictive Covenant Agreement from HCCBL. Therefore, both the parties stated that their arguments in the case of Shri Ravi K. Mody holds good for the case of Smt. Kishori R.Mody. We have already considered the rival contentions in detail in the case of Shri Ravi K. Mody. For the detailed discussion therein, we hold that the assessment order dated 31st December, 2002 was not erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue. Accordingly, we quash the order of CIT passed under section 263 and restore the assessment order dated 31st December, 2002. In the result, the appeals of the assessees are allowed.
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2004 (10) TMI 631
... ... ... ... ..... aside the order passed by the High Court. The matter is remitted to the High Court with a direction that the High Court shall consider the subsequent event of death of both the applicants and also the provisions of Sub-section (7) of Section 21 of the Act in the light of observations made hereinabove and pass an appropriate order in accordance with law after hearing the parties. 36. Regarding possession, as already noted earlier, according to respondents, after the dismissal of the appeal in default and before restoration, they have already taken over possession of the shop. According to the appellants, however, possession has remained with them. We express no opinion. When we are remitting the matter to the High Court with a direction that the High Court will decide the matter afresh according to law, appropriate order will be passed in consonance with the final decision by the High Court. Till then status quo as of today shall continue. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2004 (10) TMI 630
... ... ... ... ..... ade, no action shall be taken under this section after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that assessment year. In this case, there is no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment of income. Therefore, the impugned notice issued u/s 148 is barred by limitation and hence the impugned assessment cannot be sustained. Further, for all the reasons mentioned in the CIT (A) order, we hold that the reassessment proceeding is vitiated, bad in law, not sustainable and hence confirm the decision of the CIT (A) .All the grounds of the Revenue's appeal fail. 04. In the result, the Revenue's appeal is dismissed. Order pronounced in the open court on 25th January, 2017.
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2004 (10) TMI 629
... ... ... ... ..... tion of ₹ 7,30,15,125/- resulting in a positive income of ₹ 3,71,61,975/-. The assessee carried the issue in appeal before the CIT(A) who considering the past history of the assessee on the said issue upheld the AO’s action. Considering the order of the Tribunal relied upon by the assessee in its own case wherein 2002-03 assessment year the issue has been restored to the TPO following which the order in 2003-04 assessment year, we have restored the issue to the CIT(A), accordingly in the peculiar facts and circumstances herein also following the earlier orders the said issue is restored with identical direction. The TPO shall pass a speaking order in accordance with law after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 13. In the result the cross appeals of the parties in 2003-04 and the assessee’s appeal in 2005-06 assessment years are allowed for statistical purposes. The order is pronounced in the open court on 17th of October 2014.
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2004 (10) TMI 628
... ... ... ... ..... . Board of Directors, U.P.S.R.T.C. and Anr. (1995 Supp (2) SCC 726) and Commissioner/Secretary to Govt. Health and Medical Education Department Civil Sectt., Jammu v. Dr. Ashok Kumar Kohli (1995 Supp (4) SCC 214). No basis has been indicated as to why learned Single Judge thought the course as directed was necessary to be adopted. Even it was not indicated that a prima facie case was made out though as noted above that itself is not sufficient. We, therefore, set aside the order passed by learned Single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case we have interfered primarily on the ground that the final relief has been granted at an interim stage without justifiable reasons. Since the controversy lies within a very narrow compass, we request the High Court to dispose of the matter as early as practicable preferably within six months from the date of receipt of this judgment. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
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2004 (10) TMI 627
... ... ... ... ..... nnected records. We do not find any merit therein. The review petitions are, therefore, dismissed.
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2004 (10) TMI 626
... ... ... ... ..... , based on the plot area for giving permission to extend the period. We do not find that the Authority acted arbitrarily, and unfairly or that the amount fixed by the Authority for granting permission to the lessees for extension is unreasonable. The decision of the Authority is within the terms and conditions of the lease deed, and in order to rule out any arbitrariness in considering the exceptional circumstances, uniform extension charges were fixed to grant of extension. The petitioner has not disclosed any reason for grant of extension, much less exceptional circumstances for exercising discretion by the Authority. 11. The Court can neither create a contract nor can it modify nor extend its period, vide Anil Kumar Gupta v. Union of India 2003 (3) All WC 1819, Murari Lal v. D.M. 2003 (3) All WC 1872, Pole Ads Advertising (P) Ltd. v. Nagar Nigam 2003 (3) All WC 1880 and Shakti Narain Singh v. Anoop Singh(2004) 3 UPLBEC 2444. 12. The writ petition is consequently dismissed.
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2004 (10) TMI 625
... ... ... ... ..... nd pass order in accordance with law. 75. We also direct respondent Nos. 1 & 2 to collect non-agricultural permission charges and conversion charges for the lands bearing Survey No. 470/1, 471/2, 471/3 and 472 situated at village Vadva, Bhavnagar as prevalent in the year 1981. 76. We further direct respondent Nos. 1 & 2 to collect non-agricultural permission charges and conversion charges for the land bearing Survey No. 469/1 as prevalent on 24.2.2003, which is the date on which the appellants had applied for the grant of non-agricultural permission for the said survey number and on receipt of payment to grant the non-agricultural permission in respect thereof as applied for. 77. For the foregoing reasons, we dispose of the appeals arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 8718-8719/2004. In view of the disposal of the appeals, the Contempt Petition Nos. 410 and 411 of 2004 in Special Leave Petition No. 1562/2002 and Civil Appeal No. 5556 of 2001 are also disposed of accordingly.
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2004 (10) TMI 624
... ... ... ... ..... WANIYA HAI, UKTANUSAR KIYA JA RAHE SHEERE KE AARAKSHAN SE OOS SEEMA TAK BAHAR RAHEGI KI CHINI MILL SAH-AASHWANI DWARA SWAYAM KE VASTAVIK UPBHOG KE ATIRIKT JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED SHEERA BACHATA HAI, OOS PER 20 PRATISHAT KA AARAKSHAN LAGOO HOGA.” 19. From a reading of the aforesaid clause, it appears that the said clause is talking of reservation of molasses in favour of distilleries manufacturing country liquor and exception has been provided to such distilleries owned by sugar mills. Placing a harmonious construction to Clause 3, we are of the considered opinion that the benefit of exemption provided in clause 3 of the Government Order is available only to such distillery owned by sugar mills which manufactures country liquor and not to such distilleries owned by a Sugar Mill which do not manufacture country liquor. 20. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in this writ petition. It is dismissed. However, the parties shall bear their own costs.
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2004 (10) TMI 623
... ... ... ... ..... but none appears for the respondents to oppose the prayer for transfer. 3. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the transfer petition is allowed. MACT Petition No. 138 of 2000 titled Kahlon v. K. Parmasivam pending before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Cuddalore, Tamil Nadu, is directed to be transferred to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Gurdaspur, Punjab. 4. The Presiding Officer, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Cuddalore, Tamil Nadu shall, soon on communication of this order, transfer the record of proceedings in MACT Petition No. 138 of 2000 titled Kahlon v. K. Parmasivam to the Presiding Officer, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Gurdaspur, Punjab. 5. No order as to costs.
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2004 (10) TMI 622
... ... ... ... ..... ers should apply for additional shares along with consideration at par and within one month from the date of receipt of the application along with consideration, the 2nd and 3rd respondents should transfer requisite number of shares to the petitioners. 11. As far as the directorship of the 1st petitioner is concerned, since the civil court is already seized of the matter, I do not propose to deal with the same especially in view of the fact that the civil suit was instituted prior in time. In so far as late filing of statutory returns with the ROC is concerned, this allegation no longer survives since as per the records of the ROC which were called for by this Bench for scrutiny, all the returns have already been filed. The petitioners have also alleged that the income from the hotel business is being siphoned of by the respondents. Since there are no particulars other than a bald allegation, I am not dealing with the same. 12. The petition is disposed of in the above terms.
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