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2004 (12) TMI 735
... ... ... ... ..... could be done in law and hence the petitioners are not entitled to the relief sought for nor is it necessary on the part of this Court to cause its interference into the impugned orders passed in both the cases connected to both the above writ petitions and the only course that is open for this court is to dismiss both the above writ petitions as devoid of merits. In result, (i) Both the above writ petitions filed by the writ petitioners do not merit acceptance but only become liable to be dismissed and they are dismissed accordingly; (ii) the impugned order of third respondent passed in F. No. 373/38/B/2001-RA. Cus. Order No. 336/2001 dated 4.7.2001 in W.P. No. 15146 of 2001 and the impugned passed by the third respondent in F. No. 373/56/B/2001-RA. Cus. Order No. 34/2002 dated 31.1.2002 in W.P. No. 13230 of 2002 are hereby confirmed; and (iii) Consequently, W.P.M.P. No. 22497 of 2001 is also dismissed; However, there shall be no order as to costs in both the writ petitions.
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2004 (12) TMI 734
... ... ... ... ..... order of the High Court and remit the matter to the High Court to dispose of the Second Appeal in accordance with law after complying with the requirement of Sub- section 4 of Section 100. 8. It will be open to the respondent to contend that a substantial question of law is involved in the second appeal, and for the appellant to controvert that plea. Nothing said in this order should be construed as an expression of opinion on the merit of the case so as to prejudice the case of the parties. 9. We notice that this suit was filed in the year 1984 on the ground of bona fide personal need and therefore, it merits a quick disposal. We have no doubt that the High Court will, keeping in view the necessity and compulsions of the appellant, dispose of the Second Appeal as soon as possible. These appeals are accordingly, allowed with no order as to costs. 10. Since we are setting aside the judgment passed in the Second Appeal, the order passed in the Review Petition is also set aside.
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2004 (12) TMI 733
... ... ... ... ..... not help the assessee in establishing its bona fide or in supporting its contention that the changed method of accounting was regularly followed in the day-to-day course of its business. It is no doubt true that the assessing officer did accept the revised return in assessment year 1998-99 but that too does not help the assessee as the assessee is still obliged to prove its bona fide in effecting the change in the method of stock valuation in the first year of change, i.e., the assessment year under appeal which it has not been able to prove. Similarly, the method of stock valuation as changed in assessment year 1997-98 was not regularly followed in the day-to-day course of the business during the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1998-99. The submissions of the assessee in this behalf are therefore rejected. 24. In view of the foregoing, the order of the learned CIT(A) is reversed and that of the assessing officer restored. Appeal filed by the revenue is allowed.
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2004 (12) TMI 732
... ... ... ... ..... ding that Serial No. 26 of Notification No. 42/96, dated July 23, 1996 is applicable only to the water treatment plant and cannot be applied to the ductile pipes? 3. Admit. 4. It is clarified that the clearance of the consignment by the appellant on payment of duty shall be subject to the final decision in the appeal.
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2004 (12) TMI 731
... ... ... ... ..... eady filed the suit, questioning this Will and in this view, it may not be proper for us to give any finding, regarding the validity of the Will, except saying its execution is proved, entitling the plaintiff to get an order, for letters of administration. 43.The learned single Judge, considering all these points in detail, in the light of the above settled legal position, came to an unerring conclusion, that the execution of the Will is proved, in which finding, we are unable to see any perverse in nature or any error either on law or on facts, warranting our interference, to upset the findings. In this view, we find no reason, to conclude the appeal is meritorious, whereas it should be held, that the appeal is not meritorious, entitling its dismissal. In the result, the appeal is dismissed, confirming the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in T.O.S. No. 10/1991, but under the facts and circumstances of the case, directing the parties to bear their respective costs.
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2004 (12) TMI 730
... ... ... ... ..... ce are at liberty to visit, check and verify the petitioner-society for the purpose of satisfying themselves of the activities of petitioner-society. It is no doubt true that specific stand had been taken in the counter affidavit that at the time of raid, they found the playing of 52 cards Kothamukka and 46 persons were arrested and a crime also was registered. Though there is some factual controversy between the parties, the petitioner asserting that the petitioner is not permitting any other card game except rummy and on the contrary the respondents asserting otherwise, in the light of the relief prayed for in the Writ Petition, this question need not detain this Court any longer except making a clarification that liberty is given to the respondents to check and verify the activities of the petitioner society as and when they require to do so. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is hereby allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court makes no order as to costs.
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2004 (12) TMI 729
... ... ... ... ..... he State Government's intervention, but in our opinion, the aforesaid decision is confined to the facts of that particular case and does not lay down any principle of law that a Court can extend the period of licence or lease. 12. We reiterate that Courts have to maintain judicial restraint and cannot encroach into the domain of the Executive or the Legislature. It is entirely for the authorities to decide for what period a licence or lease is to be granted and it is not open to the Court to extend the period of licence or lease. 13. For the reasons given above, we set aside the impugned order. The writ appeal is allowed. Consequently, W.A.M.P. No. 7366 of 2004 for stay is closed. However if the writ petitioner makes an application to the authority concerned, the said authority may consider as to what appropriate compensation the writ petitioner should be given on the facts of the case, preferably within a period of two months from the date of receipt of such application.
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2004 (12) TMI 728
... ... ... ... ..... f Justice to perform the duties of the Chief Justice is available for the purpose of Section 16 of the Act. We may hasten to add that it is not the case of the petitioner in High Court that the Chief Justice of the High Court was going to be appointed shortly or the matter of appointment of President of the State Commission was such, which on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, did not call for an immediate decision by Acting Chief Justice and could have waited for the appointment of the Chief Justice of the High Court. In other words, no statutory provision can stand in the way of constitutional provision in case of conflict between them. 28. Thus, having examined all aspects and in the light of what is stated above we are of the view that the High Court was right in dismissing the writ petition. We do not find any good ground or valid reason to disturb the judgment under challenge. Consequently the appeal is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
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2004 (12) TMI 727
... ... ... ... ..... ccused cannot make any reference to them for any purpose. If any reference is made before any court to the supervision notes, as has noted above they are not to be taken note of by the concerned court. As many instances have come to light when the parties, as in the present case, make reference to the supervision notes, the inevitable conclusion is that they have unauthorized access to the official records. We, therefore, direct the Chief Secretary of each State and Union Territory and the concerned Director General of Police to ensure that the supervision notes are not made available to any person and to ensure that confidentiality of the supervision notes is protected. If it comes to light that any official is involved in enabling any person to get the same appropriate action should be taken against such official. Due care and caution should be taken to see that while supplying police papers supervision notes are not given. 29. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
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2004 (12) TMI 726
... ... ... ... ..... promise" only. In the above view, I do not agree that the view taken by the Delhi High Court in the case of Tulsiram (supra) and also of the Madras High Court in the case of N. E. ETHIRAJULU NAIDU v. K. R. CHINNAKRISHNAN CHETTIYAR, AIR1975Mad333 . 17. In the case on hand, not only there is acknowledgment, there is even part payment accepted by the plaintiff besides recital extending the period (limitation), though all this was after the expiry of the limitation period. It is a settled law that promise to pay time barred debt is also a valid consideration. So, whether the facts and circumstances show a 'promise' attracting Section 25(3) of the Act or not could be decided only after evidence is adduced by the parties at the trial and not earlier to that even before written statement is filed. In view of the above, there is no error of jurisdiction or illegality or perversity in the impugned Order to interfere at this stage. In the result, the petition is rejected.
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2004 (12) TMI 725
... ... ... ... ..... it was given in discharge of a debt or liability. Secondly, in this case the accused was able to show through the cross-examination of P.W. 1, Deepali that it is the company which owed him money on account of the work done by him. In order words, the accused has been able to rebut the presumption that he had no existing debt or liability towards the said company. Thirdly, P.W. 1, Deepali, in terms admitted "that the cheque was given by the accused to them to secure the loan from the Company". The accused has also stated in his statement recorded under section 313 of the Code that "the cheque was not to be presented for encashment. It was issued towards security", and, if that was the case the complainant was not justified in presenting the said cheque for payment and upon dishonour to initiate proceeding under section 138 of the Act. 27. I, therefore, find that there is no merit in this appeal. Consequently, the same is hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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2004 (12) TMI 724
... ... ... ... ..... of Jharkhand 2004 CriLJ 2527. 26. In Abarahim Sheikh and Ors. v. State of West Bengal 1964 CriLJ 350, this Court stated that no doubt a person is only responsible ordinarily for what he does and Section 38 IPC ensures that. But Section 34 as well as Section 35 provide that if the criminal act is the result of the common intention, then every person who did the criminal act with such intention would be responsible for the total offence irrespective of the share which he had in its perpetration. The logic, highlighted illuminatingly by the Judicial Committee in the illustrious case of Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor is that in crimes as in other things "they also serve who only stand and wait". 27. Section 34 has, therefore, been rightly applied. 28. In view of the legal and factual position noted above, the irresistible conclusion is that the accused appellant has been rightly held guilty and convicted. There is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
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2004 (12) TMI 723
... ... ... ... ..... tion against the 1st petitioner in terms of Sections 542/543 read with Schedule XI of the Act. The provisions of Section 542 would apply only in case of fraudulent conduct of business. The respondents have not furnished any material as to how the 1st petitioner had conducted the affairs of the company in a fraudulent manner. Even their allegation that the 1st petitioner had fraudulently taken over the control of the cement unit in collusion with RICCO had been negative by the Rajasthan High Court. Their allegation that either the 1st petitioner did not ensuring payment of dues to RICCO by Gauri Cement or that he has filed a civil suit for restraining RICCO from recovering its dues from Gaud Cement cannot be considered to be conducting the business of the company in a fraudulent manner to attract the provisions of Section 542 of the Act. Therefore, the said application of the respondents is dismissed. 11. The petition is disposed of in the above terms with no order as to cost.
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2004 (12) TMI 722
... ... ... ... ..... so is liable to quashed. There is an additional ground as well viz. decision dated 17th October, 1993 rendered by this court in Crl.M.M.No. 42 of 1996 entitled Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. v. Registrar of Companies. In those proceedings the company had challenged the complaint lodged by the ROC before the court of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi alleging offences committed by the company under Section 76(5), 17/291 readwith Section 629-A, Section 292(i)(d)/(e) r/w Section 629-A, Section 49(9) and Section 58-A read with Rule 2 (b) (x) read with Rule 3 (2) of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) rules, 1975 read with Section 58-A(6) of the Act. Those proceedings were quashed on the ground that there was no notification delegating powers of Central Government under Section 637 to the ROC and, therefore, ROC could not have filed suca complaint.32. This petition is also allowed and impugned show cause notice dated 9th November, 1994 is hereby quashed.
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2004 (12) TMI 721
... ... ... ... ..... P3 is the certificate evidencing the same. The petitioner, therefore, becomes entitled to either refund or adjustment of the third instalment which was paid after the due date, on 12th March, 1998 in terms of the decision referred to above. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue would submit that the petitioner ought to approach the CIT, Thiruvananthapuram, and that the said authority can be directed to pass orders on the application of the petitioner for either refund or for adjustment in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the petitioner shall file an application praying for refund or adjustment, as the case may be, of the third instalment, before the CIT, Thiruvananthapuram, within three weeks from today. If such an application is made, the CIT shall pass orders thereon in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision in Hemalatha Gargya v. CIT and Anr. (supra). The original petition is disposed of as above.
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2004 (12) TMI 720
... ... ... ... ..... ms", itself is a wide concept and we do not see why the objects attempted to be fulfilled by the specified Acts would not fall within the ambit of this compendious term. Looking at the preambles and the schemes of the five specified Acts, we are unable to find fault with the reasoning of the learned single Judge that the tribunal constituted to deal with the disputes arising under the said specified Acts was very much a tribunal within the meaning of Article 323B of the Constitution. 34. We, therefore, accept the reasoning of the learned single Judge and hold that the learned single Judge was justified in rejecting the contention that the tribunal constituted under the impugned Act was not a tribunal within the meaning of Article 323B of the Constitution. There is no merit in the contention. 35. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. 36. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2004 (12) TMI 719
... ... ... ... ..... uences. 12. Some contours of question as to what may be considered expenses wholly incurred for one's business have been explained by this Court in the case of Addl. CIT v. Rajasthan Spinning & Weaving Mills, IT Appeal No. 15 of 1999, decided on 15th Oct., 2003 which may be taken into consideration. 13. Accordingly, the Appeal Nos. 29 of 1999 and 26 of 2000 are allowed. The judgment of the Tribunal in each case is set aside to the extent it holds the amount in question is deductible under Section 37 and the case is sent back to the Tribunal for deciding the allowability of said amount as deductions afresh. So also IT Ref. No. 58 of 1999 is concerned, we direct the Tribunal to submit a supplementary statement of case in accordance with finding reached by it about this issue under the aforesaid directions. 14. The appeal may be decided as far as possible within four months from the date of receipt of this order. 15. There shall be no orders as to costs in these appeals.
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2004 (12) TMI 718
... ... ... ... ..... ich have been found to be in New Delhi in the form of both bank accounts and shares of Spice Communications Ltd. 21. To sum up the conclusions are (a) the DH holds a foreign arbitral award against the JD. (b) the award grants a sum of 33 million in favor of the decree holder and against the judgment debtor. (c) the JD had bank accounts in Delhi and held shares of a company having a registered office in Delhi. (d) these amounts and shares are undoubtedly assets of the JD company (e) a foreign award is executable as a decree (f) Order XXI Rule 30 of the Code permits the sale of the property of the JD company in execution of a decree. 22. Accordingly there is no merit in the preliminary plea of the judgment debtor of the maintainability of this execution petition in this Court on account of lack of territorial jurisdiction. This plea of lack of territorial jurisdiction to proceed with this execution petition is thus rejected. List this petition and the EAs on 7th February, 2005.
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2004 (12) TMI 717
... ... ... ... ..... difficult to accept the contention of the assessee. Taking into consideration the entire facts, the mere fact that Revenue has not filed appeal is not a reason to adopt the same yardstick in respect of the years 1990-91 and 1991-92. This is a case where assessee is doing wholesale business in liquor and not filed return. Return was filed only on 15th March, 2000 and claimed the benefit of VDIS. Further, we also notice that during the previous years assessee has not maintained defect-free accounts. All these factors weighed with the Tribunal to sustain the order of the assessing authority for the years 1990-91 and 1991-92 which is essentially a question of fact. Though there is some inconsistency in para 4 in the relief portion of the order, the Tribunal has accepted the order passed by the assessing authority in respect of the asst. y₹ 1990-91 and 1991-92. That being the position we find no illegality in the order of the Tribunal. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
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2004 (12) TMI 716
... ... ... ... ..... on or application for setting aside an award under Section 30 of the Act is extremely limited to the grounds mentioned therein and we do not think that grant or refusal of an adjournment by an arbitrator comes within the parameters of section 30 of the Act. At any rate the arbitrator's refusal of an adjournment sought in 1999 in an arbitration proceeding pending since 1995 cannot at all be said to be perverse keeping in mind the object of the Act as an alternate dispute resolution system aimed at speedy resolution of disputes. We think both the learned Single Judge and Division Bench have erred in setting aside the award only with a view to give an opportunity to the defaulting respondent to lead evidence which was rejected by the arbitrators by their reasoned order of 10.5.1999. For the reasons stated above we allow these appeals, set aside the orders of the learned Single Judge as confirmed by the Division Bench and restore the award of the arbitrators. Appeals allowed.
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