|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 581 Records
-
2005 (4) TMI 650
... ...
... ... ..... one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry . It is inconceivable that the solatium amount would attract only the escalated rate of interest from the expiry of one year and that there would be no interest on solatium during the preceding period. What the legislature intended was to make the aggregate amount under Section 23 of the Act to reach the hands of the person as and when the award is passed, at any rate as soon as he is deprived of the possession of his land. Any delay in making payment of the said sum should enable the party to have interest on the said sum until he receives the payment. Splitting up the compensation into different components for the purpose of payment of interest under Section 34 was not in the contemplation of the legislature when that section was framed or enacted. 34. These Appeals are disposed of with the aforementioned directions. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
2005 (4) TMI 649
... ...
... ... ..... ER Appeal dismissed on the ground of delay.
-
2005 (4) TMI 648
... ...
... ... ..... to the facts of the case, we are of the view that permission may be granted to the parties to compound the offence. Accordingly, permission is granted and order is passed in terms of the settlement reached between the parties which is extracted above. In view of the compounding of the offence, appellants are acquitted of the offence under Section 500 IPC with which they were charged and convicted. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms. It is agreed before us that the amount payable under the settlement to the respondent has already been deposited in the court of Judicial Magistrate, Tuticorin. The respondent may move an application before the court for withdrawal of that amount and the court shall pass appropriate orders.
-
2005 (4) TMI 647
... ...
... ... ..... tance of the present petitioner and it is also alleged that the present petitioner received a consideration of Rs.2 lakhs for the said purpose. However, apart from the statements under Section 67, there is no other evidence to implicate the present petitioner. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated that the witnesses being PW-3 and PW-4 have also not identified the present petitioner. 4. In view of the foregoing submissions, facts and circumstances and in particular the fact that Section 37 of the NDPS Act would not be attracted in this case as also the fact that the petitioner has already been in custody for over a year, he is directed to be released on bail on furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the concerned court with the further condition that he shall not leave the territorial limits of India without prior permission of the court concerned. The application stands disposed of. Dasti.
-
2005 (4) TMI 646
... ...
... ... ..... for the respondent. In view of the fact that controversy as raised in this petition has to be effectively adjudicated by leading evidence, we are not inclined to entertain this petition at the present juncture. 3. A submission is made by Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners would find it difficult to appear on each date when the matter is filed up by the trial court. Considering the nature of the controversy, we direct that in case application in terms of Sec. 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is filed, the trial court to do well to dispense with the personal attendance of the petitioners. 4. It shall, however, stipulate the terms and conditions in terms of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 205 of the Criminal Procedure Code. If any attempt is made to prolong the proceedings by taking advantage with the order dispensing with personal attendance, it shall be open to the court to pass such order as is felt necessary. Petition disposed of.
-
2005 (4) TMI 645
... ...
... ... ..... diction of Hajipur Sub Division of District Vaishali except for the purpose of attending the trial. If for any reason it becomes imperative for the appellant to visit Hajipur then he shall do so after informing the investigating agency in the case. This condition shall be in addition to the conditions imposed by the High Court for granting bail as per its order dated 19-9-2003. 11. For the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and restore that of the High Court dated 19-9-2003 granting bail to the appellant. 12. We make it clear that whatever conclusion we have expressed in this order of ours is purely prima facie and for the limited purpose of finding out whether the impugned order of the High Court is sustainable or not. The trial court shall not be in any manner be influenced by these observations of ours or that of the High Court made in the course of the order granting bail or order cancelling bail. 13. Appeal allowed.
-
2005 (4) TMI 644
... ...
... ... ..... by objective circumstances. Though it was his categorical case that all of them fired, no injury caused by rifle was found, and, only two wounds were found on the person of the deceased. Apart from this PW3 did not mention the presence of either PW1 or PW2 at the time of occurrence. All these circumstances, do create doubt about the truthfulness of the prosecution case. The presence of these three witnesses becomes doubtful if their evidence is critically scrutinised. May be it is also possible to take a view in favour of the prosecution, but since the High court, on an appreciation of the evidence on record, has recorded a finding in favour of the accused, we do not feel persuaded to interfere with the order of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. It is well settled that if on the same evidence two views are reasonably possible, the one in favour of the accused must be preferred. 7. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly, dismissed.
-
2005 (4) TMI 643
... ...
... ... ..... gh Court, gave the benefit to the pensioners as asked for by the pensioners in the present batch of cases; Delhi High Court sustained the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Delhi giving such a relief to the pensioners, which order was affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India by rejecting the special leave petition at the admission stage itself and all these judgments would have a persuasive value in our mind. It is a well settled position in law that when a special leave petition is dismissed at the admission stage itself confirming the order in challenge, it would not amount to the Supreme Court laying down a law on any particular point. On going through the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore; judgment of the Karnataka High Court and the judgment of the Delhi High Court, we are of the respectful opinion that it does not appeal to us at all. All the writ petitions are disposed of as indicated earlier. Connected W.P.M.Ps are closed.
-
2005 (4) TMI 642
... ...
... ... ..... g any further limitation will be contrary to intention of legislature. In our opinion, residuary article 137 of the Limitation Act,1963 will not govern the applications under section 46 of the Trade Merchandize and Marks Act, 1958. Thus, it cannot be inferred that the application of the appellants under Section 46 of Trade & Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 was barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. The finding of the learned Single Judge that the application of appellants was barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act,1963 is erroneous and is accordingly set aside. 48. No other point is canvassed before us. Consequently the appeal of the appellants fails and the application under Section 46 of the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 for removal of the trade mark of the respondent no. 1 from the Register of trade mark is liable to be dismissed. 49. The appeal is, Therefore, dismissed and the parties are left to bear their own costs.
-
2005 (4) TMI 641
... ...
... ... ..... verbatim the first one. Issuing of process on such a complaint, in my opinion, by the Magistrate amounts to reviewing the earlier order, which under the law is not permissible. In the instant case, the dismissal of first complaint was not a dismissal under Section 202 or 203 of the Code. Rather, it was dismissed under Section 256 of the Code. In that situation, filing of the second complaint without there being any manifest error or manifest miscarriage of justice could not be entertained. Thus, in my opinion, in the special facts and circumstances of the case, the issuing of summon by the Magistrate to the petitioner, on the second complaint which was filed verbatim on the same allegations is an abuse of the process of the Court, particularly keeping in view the fact that the alleged occurrence is of the year 1982. 26. In view of the aforesaid, both these petitions are allowed. The second complaints filed by respondent No. 2 and the subsequent proceedings are hereby quashed.
-
2005 (4) TMI 640
... ...
... ... ..... 97. Thus, from the aforesaid documents suit is well within limitation. It is not necessary for the bank to prove the deposit. Even if some deposits are made and deposit by borrower is not proved then also the suit is within limitation from 26th February, 1994. Since borrower has acknowledged his liability, the acknowledgment will also be binding upon the guarantors. Therefore, we hold that the suit is well within limitation and Trial Court has not committed any error in holding the suit to be within limitation. 9. As regards hypothecated goods are concerned, Bank Manager has admitted that he has published a notification in the news paper for sale of the machinery. However, bank is at liberty to recover the debt due from the borrower as well as guarantors. Bank should auction the property hypothecated with it and recover the balance amount from the borrower and guarantors. With the aforesaid modification in the decree appeal is dismissed with cost. Counsel fee as per schedule.
-
2005 (4) TMI 639
... ...
... ... ..... isions comprising of two learned Judges and three learned Judges, the opinion on the law laid down by the Bench decision of three Judges is to be followed in preference to the Bench decision of the two learned Judges. 27. We are of the opinion that the law laid down in the aforesaid two cases more specifically in Deccan Sugar and Abkari Co. Ltd. (supra) wherein it has been held that no duty on wastage of rectified spirit can be levied by the State Government, is a law declared by the Apex Court and is binding upon us under Article 141 of the Constitution. 28. Thus, we find ourselves unable to accept the plea of the learned Additional Advocate General that the State is competent to levy duty on loss in transit on rectified spirit. 29. In view of the foregoing discussion, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed with costs, which we assess at ₹ 10,000/-. The demand notices 20.5.1995 and 30.5.1995 (Annexures 21 and 22 respectively to the writ petition) are hereby quashed.
-
2005 (4) TMI 638
... ...
... ... ..... he petitioner is a resident of Thane within the jurisdiction of Thane Police Station, Crime Branch, Ulhas Nagar.9 3. The petitioner is directed to be released on bail and he shall report to the Police Inspector, Ulhas Nagar Unit, Crime Branch, Thane once in a week and the petitioner shall not leave the jurisdiction of Thane Police Station without the previous permission of the TADA Special Judge. If the petitioner has got any passport or any other travel documents, he shall surrender the same before the TADA Special Judge. Incorporating the above conditions, the petitioner shall execute a bond in favour of the TADA Special Judge. 4. With the above directions, the special leave petition is disposed of.
-
2005 (4) TMI 637
... ...
... ... ..... years, succumbed to the injury the following day. It is reasonable to infer, from the conduct of the 1st appellant and the manner of attack on an old person, that the appellant No. 1, by causing the injury with axe on the neck of the deceased Krishna, was having knowledge that the said act was likely to cause death; but, he had no intention to cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. We therefore find the 1st appellant - A1 guilty under Section 304 Part II. As regards sentence, we feel that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, five years of imprisonment and fine of ₹ 1,000/- will be adequate and proper. Accordingly, he is convicted and sentenced. In default of payment of fine, he will suffer further imprisonment of four months. The appellants will of course be given the benefit of set off of the period of detention already undergone. 22. Accordingly, the judgment of the High Court is modified and the appeal is partly allowed.
-
2005 (4) TMI 636
... ...
... ... ..... rder for the purposes of Section 264 of the Act. This being so, it was revisable under Section 264 of the Act and the Commissioner could exercise his powers thereunder. By Finance Act, 1999, the explanation to Section 143 was deleted with effect from 1.6.1999. The effect of this deletion is that the intimation under Section 143 ceases to be an order so as to be revised under Section 262 of the Act. This being so, after 1.6.1999, any intimation received by the assessee could not be revised. In this view of the matter, the Commissioner of Income Tax was right in rejecting the revision petitions filed by the assessee challenging the intimations after 1.6.1999 received in regard to the relevant assessment years and therefore, the order of the learned single Judge cannot be sustained. In the result, the writ appeals are allowed. The order of the learned single Judge set aside and the writ petitions giving rise to these appeals dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
-
2005 (4) TMI 635
... ...
... ... ..... . For the reasons aforesaid, in our view, the stranger to the contract, namely, the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 to 11 making claim independent and adverse to the title of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are neither necessary nor proper parties, and therefore, not entitled to join as party defendants in the suit for specific performance of contract for sale. 22. The judgments and orders of the High Court and the trial court are therefore liable to be set aside. The impugned orders are thus set aside and the application for addition of parties filed at the instance of respondent Nos. 1 and 4 to 11 stands rejected. The appeal is thus allowed. We, however, make it clear that we have not decided in this judgment as to the title and possession of respondent Nos. 1 and 4 to 11 of the suit property and all such questions are kept open in the event any approach is made either by the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 to 11 or by the appellant in any appropriate court. 23. There will be no order as to costs.
-
2005 (4) TMI 634
... ...
... ... ..... is alleged to have received, there is no other evidence to link the present petitioner with the recovery of the contraband from the co-accused (Mohd.Rafiq). Since the said secret information would not be admissible, in view of the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that the petitioner cannot be, prima facie, linked with the recovery of the contraband. That being the case, even if it is assumed that Section 37 of NDPS Act applies, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner is not guilty of the offence. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the present petitioner has no criminal antecedents and Therefore there is no question of there being any likelihood of him committing any offence while on bail. Accordingly, the petitioner is directed to be released on bail on his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of ₹ 25,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the concerned Court. The application stands disposed of.
-
2005 (4) TMI 633
... ...
... ... ..... dismissed and thereafter revisions filed by the appellant before the High Court having failed, the present appeals by way of special leave have been filed. 4. In the present case, both the parties have filed a joint petition for compromise and they have compromised their disputes in both the cases. In our view, compromise is lawful, as such we accord permission to compromise the same. 5. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed, convictions and sentences awarded against the appellant are set aside and he is acquitted of the charges in both the cases in view of the compromise.
-
2005 (4) TMI 632
... ...
... ... ..... ll as on the application for stay. Meanwhile, recovery of the differential duty is stayed.
-
2005 (4) TMI 631
... ...
... ... ..... y been examined and only one witness remains to be examined. We, therefore, restrict respondent No. 1, Smt. Usha Sinha, from putting any question challenging the genuineness of the agreement dated 2.9.1978 in the light of our findings made above. It is stated that some witnesses have already been examined on both the sides. If any question is put and any answer is extracted with regard to the genuineness/interpolation or forgery of agreement dated 02.09.1978, the said evidence cannot be looked into by the trial Court and should be eschewed from consideration and the judgment be passed on the merits of the rival claims on other related issues. 28. We answer all the questions in favour of the appellant and hold that respondent No. 1 is precluded from raising the genuineness/interpolation or forgery of agreement dated 02.09.1978. 29. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds. Though it is eminently a fit case for awarding exemplary cost, we refrain from doing so. No costs.
........
|
