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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 664 Records
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2005 (8) TMI 747
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... ... ..... the orders are liable to be set aside. For the reasons stated above, the appeal deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The orders passed by all the three Commissions are hereby set aside. The learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company, however, stated that the assured died in 1996 and the District Forum upheld the claim of the complainant in December, 2000. He fairly stated that the amount was not very high and has also been paid and the Insurance Company was not so serious about the amount, but since the question of law had been wrongly decided, the Insurance Company had to approach this Court so that the law is settled. Therefore, though we hold the orders not to be in accordance with law and we set aside them, but we direct that no recovery will be effected from the respondent-complainant pursuant to this order. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2005 (8) TMI 746
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... ... ..... right in holding that the appellant had failed to pay/tender arrears of rent for the period February 1, 1992 to January 31, 1995. The deposit made under the provisions of the Punjab Act was of no avail in view of the express provision of Section 27 of the Act. It was then faintly submitted before us that the High Court ought not to have exercised its revisional jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in view of the fact that the two courts below had concurrently found in favour of the appellant. The submission is misconceived. This is not a case where the High Court interfered with concurrent findings of fact. The High Court interfered because there was a serious error of law committed by the courts below and as a consequence thereof they failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law. The exercise of revisional jurisdiction in a case of this nature cannot be faulted. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.
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2005 (8) TMI 745
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... ... ..... context in which the word has been used in Section 299. In any event it is in dispute which structures are taken into account for the purposes of calculating FSI. 23. Apart from the language of Section 299, and the immediate context in which the Section appears the power to take over possession conferred on the Commissioner under Section 299 in respect of certain structures is a summary power. Having regard to the nature of the power, it is unlikely that the legislature intended that the Commissioner would exercise such summary powers in respect of independent structures which have been defined as 'building' under the Act. Needless to say it is always open to the municipal authority subject to the provisions of the Act, to acquire any land or building under Section 296 of the Act. 24. In the circumstances of the case, we allow the appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment as well as the impugned notice dated 16th November, 1999. There will be no order as to costs.
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2005 (8) TMI 744
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... ... ..... der the Act of 1985 are concluded. 5. The bar under Section 22(1) of the Act is applicable as soon as the reference under Section 15(1) of the Act is registered by BIFR and in such case, no company petition to wind up, such company, shall lie or be proceeded with, subject to exception that it may be instituted or proceeded with the sanction of the BIFR or as the case may be, by the Appellate Authority. 6. In the present case the petitioner has not applied to the BIFR for permission to file company petition, and as such, no exception can be taken. 7. The company petition is accordingly dismissed at this stage with liberty to the petitioner company to either apply to BIFR for permission to file a company petition to wind up the company or await the conclusion of the proceedings under the Act of 1985. It goes without saying that under Section 22(5), the period of limitation during the pendency of the proceedings before BIFR or AAIFR under the Act of 1985, shall remain suspended.
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2005 (8) TMI 743
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... ... ..... is dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits.
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2005 (8) TMI 742
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... ... ..... contention that in a matter involving seizure of commercial quantity of a substance prohibited by the N.D.P.S. Act when the Public Prosecutor appears on notice of the bail application he would be standing there as a mute spectator not opposing the bail application unless he was at the back of the accused. We find no substance in this argument. In our view, the very fact that the Public Prosecutor appeared would suggest that he appeared to oppose the bail application. In any event, the order of the High Court does not suggest that the Public Prosecutor had agreed for bail being granted. In the aforesaid circumstances, we find no substance whatsoever in the contention raised by Mr. Singh. 5. In the view that we have taken, both the orders dated 11.9.2003 and 25.9.2003, passed by the High Court are set aside and the appeals are allowed. 6. The bail bonds of the accused stand cancelled. They are directed to be taken back into custody forthwith. Compliance report within two weeks.
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2005 (8) TMI 741
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... ... ..... as Reed Powell, who said; "Judges have preferences for social policies as you and I. They form their judgments after the varying fashions in which you and I form ours. They have hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions. They are warmed by the same winter and summer and by the same ideas as a layman is." 17. In the present case, however, as we have already noted in the earlier part of the judgment, whether the order passed by the appellant was correct or not, but the remarks made, strictures passed and directions issued by the learned single Judge of the High Court against the appellant were improper, uncalled for and unwarranted. Apart from the fact that they were neither necessary for deciding the controversy raised before the Court nor integral part of the judgment, in the facts and circumstances of the case, they were not justified. We, therefore, direct deletion of those remarks. 18. The appeal is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above.
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2005 (8) TMI 740
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... ... ..... arisen because the appellant before the High Court was not vigilant. It was not for the defendants who were respondents before the High Court to invite any finding against them by agitating an issue which was decided in their favour by the first Appellate Court. As the findings recorded by the first Appellate Court were essentially factual, the High Court was required even otherwise to show as to how those were erroneous and which relevant material had been left out of consideration and/or which irrelevant material was taken into consideration. It has not been done. The High Court only referred to the principles on law, about which there is no dispute, without specifically pointing out which conclusions of the first Appellate Court suffered from deficiencies and in what way. That being so, the High Court's judgment, even if we accept that appropriate question could have been formulated would not have altered the situation. The appeal is allowed, with no order as to costs.
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2005 (8) TMI 739
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... ... ..... is therefore, provided that the petitioners can commence exhibition of advertisements in private properties of-course subject to fulfillment of other procedural requirements upon advance consolidated payment of 1/4th amount that would be payable as per the rates indicated in the chart mentioned here-in-above. The deposit to be made by the petitioner will cover first three months of the year commencing from 15th August, 2005. It is made clear that this arrangement is to provide an interim formula till disposal of the petition and subject to further orders that may be passed and is without prejudice to the rights and contentions of either side. 3.It is stated on behalf of the petitioners that all the members of the petitioner no.1 association have already paid the registration charges under protest. However, in case, any of the members have not paid such registration charges, same shall also be paid before availing of the permission granted by this Court in this interim order.
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2005 (8) TMI 738
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... ... ..... en this bench of this Tribunal, in the case of Glaxo Smithkline Consumer Healthcare Ltd. v. CCE (supra) has held that when the appellants had reversed the entire credit taken on the inputs used for exempted products the demand of 8% is not sustainable. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrapur Maganet Wires (P) Ltd. (supra) has held that the reversal in Modvat credit indicates as if no credit was taken on the inputs. In a Notification which gives the benefit of the Notification on condition that no Modvat credit has been taken on inputs, reversal of Modvat credit is permissible to avail exemption. Therefore, we hold that the orders in Appeal and Orders-in-Original cannot be sustained. We allow the appeal with consequential relief. There is also no justification for invoking the extended period as the fact of reversal of the Modvat credit had been intimated to the department in ER 1 Return. Both the appeals are allowed. (Operative part pronounced in open Court).
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2005 (8) TMI 737
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... ... ..... ate Director'. However, while sanctioning the leave, the Director scored out the words 'Associate Director'. The contention of the appellant is that in the additional affidavit, which was filed on behalf of the respondents before the Delhi High Court, it was stated that the appellant would be designated as Associate Director. The learned counsel produced a photocopy of the leave application in order to substantiate his submission. Since this document has been produced during the course of the hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the respondent was not in a position to give any reply. We do not consider it necessary to make any observation regarding the status of the appellant in DRDE, Gwalior. The appellant has already been promoted to the rank of Major General and we have no reason to doubt that he would be given the status to which he is entitled by virtue of the rank currently being held by him. 15. The appeal lacks merit and is dismissed with costs.
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2005 (8) TMI 736
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... ... ..... d that in addition to the Certificate of Registration, the principal business of the petitioner, during the relevant period, was receipt of deposits or lending of money, that it would come within the definition of a "non-banking financial company", rendering it liable for payment of service tax. 19. Since the period of fifteen days stipulated in the show cause notice has already expired, we deem it appropriate to permit the petitioner, if it so chooses, to file an additional reply to the show cause notice dated 27-12-2004 within fifteen days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. If any such reply is submitted by the petitioner within this period, the 2nd respondent shall, taking into account what has been stated above and on considering all the objections raised by the petitioner, in reply to the show cause notice dated 27-12-2004, pass appropriate orders thereon, in accordance with law. 20. Writ petition is accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.
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2005 (8) TMI 735
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... ... ..... lowed. Issue notice. Tag the petitions with S.L.P. (C) Nos.15872-15873 of 2005. The petitioner is granted liberty to file additional documents within two weeks.
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2005 (8) TMI 734
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... ... ..... ned CIT(A) upon which the learned CIT(A) obtained a remand report from the AO which is dt. 1st Aug., 2002. Perusal of the order of the learned CIT(A) does not show that a copy of the remand report was supplied to the assessee. Perusal of the orders passed by the Departmental authorities also do not show that the reasons required to be recorded by law for initiating proceedings under s. 147/148 were supplied to the assessee. We, therefore, consider it appropriate to set aside the order of the learned CIT(A) and restore the matter to his file with the direction to supply a copy of the reasons recorded by the AO for initiating the proceedings under s. 147/148 and also to give an opportunity of hearing to the assessee in this behalf. He shall thereafter pass a fresh order in accordance with law. Reasonable opportunity of hearing shall also be given to the assessee. 6. In view of the foregoing, both the appeals filed by the assessee are treated as allowed for statistical purposes.
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2005 (8) TMI 733
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... ... ..... s are permissible under law. It is now well-settled legal position in law that it is only after completion of the assessment proceedings, penalty proceedings could be initiated by an authority under the Act. 23. In IT Referred Case No. 120/1998 (Old TRC Nos. 120-123/1998), we have taken the view, that, in view of section 21AA of the Act, the assessee-club is exigible to Wealth Tax Act. Therefore, the reasoning of the Tribunal to cancel the order passed by the Wealth Tax Officer in levying penalty may not be justified. However, for the reasons stated by us, we are of the view that the order passed by the Wealth Tax Officer in levying penalty for belated filing of the wealth-tax returns for the assessment years 1981-82 and 1982-83 cannot be sustained. Accordingly, we answer the question of law referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. 24. With these observations, these reference proceedings are disposed off. Ordered accordingly.
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2005 (8) TMI 732
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... ... ..... e judgement and order passed in O.J. Appeal No.69 of 2004, shall dispose of O.J. Appeal No.70 of 2004. 2. Consequently, O.J. Civil Application No.132 of 2004 is disposed of. Rule is discharged.
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2005 (8) TMI 731
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... ... ..... then the said two expressions in the said Section 48(1)(a) and Section 48(1)(e) will mean two different things and "the law to which parties have subjected" the agreement would be the Indian Law and the country "under the law of which the award is made" will be England. We have, therefore, no doubt in our mind that the applications of the appellant under Section 34 of the Indian Act before the learned District Judge, Bilaspur for setting aside the two awards dated 10-11-2002 and 12-11-2003 which were made under the English Act were not maintainable and the two appeals filed by the appellant are liable to be dismissed. 26. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the applications filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Indian Act are not maintainable against the two foreign awards dated 10-11-2002 and 12-11-2002 and accordingly dismiss Misc. Appeal No. 889 of 2004 and Misc. Appeal No. 890 of 2004, but order that the parties shall bear their own costs.
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2005 (8) TMI 730
Jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit - Challenged the Validity Of order of termination - Entitlement to continue in service without any break - Appointment as conductor on daily wages with the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation - Suit for declaration - Termination on the basis of the remarks made by the checking staff on 01.05.1984 when the respondent was on duty - Violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- The services of the respondent were terminated simpliciter and does not contain any stigma and, therefore, there was no requirement under the law to hold any enquiry before terminating the services. The Courts below have also committed serious error in granting back wages along with reinstatement. Even otherwise, the respondent has not led any evidence before the trial Court except his own ipsi dixit to show that his services were terminated on the ground of any alleged misconduct. Therefore, it was not obligatory on the part of the Corporation to hold an enquiry before terminating the services. It is also settled that the employees of the Corporation are not civil servants and, therefore, they are not entitled to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Their terms of appointment is governed by the letter of appointment and, therefore, the management was well within its right to terminate the services of the respondent-probationer during the period of probation if his services were not found to be satisfactory during the said period. The Courts below and the High Court have committed serious error in decreeing the suit as prayed for and for directing reinstatement with full back wages.
The respondent is a temporary employee of the Corporation and a probationer and not a Government servant and, therefore, is not entitled for any protection under Article 311 of the Constitution. He was a party to the contract. In view of the fact that the respondent was appointed on probation and the services were terminated during the period of probation simpliciter as the same were not found to be satisfactory, the appellant-Corporation is not obliged to hold an enquiry before terminating the services. The respondent being a probationer has got no substantive right to hold the post and was not entitled to a decree of declaration as erroneously granted by the lower Courts and also of the High Court.
Thus, we hold that the respondent ought to have approached the remedies provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. He has miserably failed to do so but approached the Civil Court, which on the facts and circumstances of the case has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. The respondent has not acted bona fide in instituting the suit. It is seen from the order of the High Court that the respondent had been reinstated in service in the year 1990 and the back wages had also been paid to him. Though in law, the respondent is not entitled to any back wages, thus, we are not inclined to order refund of the back wages already paid to the respondent. But we make it very clear that the respondent shall not be allowed to continue in service any further. He shall not be entitled to any further emoluments or service benefits except the amount, which has already been paid to him. The respondent shall be discharged forthwith. No costs. The appeal stands allowed.
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2005 (8) TMI 729
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... ... ..... y the assessee to prove that the said turnover charges are not payable under the law enacted by the Central Government. We have also carefully examined the judgment referred to by the learned counsel for the assessee and we find that the facts of the case in the case of Varas International (P.) Ltd. (supra) are different as in that case assessee has paid certain licence fees to the State Government for manufacturing of liquor. It was not a regular tax which has to be payable regularly on the basis of the turnover like Sales Tax and Excise Duty. Since the Board has been given all powers by the Government to regulate the business and to recover its dues, the turnover charges payable by the assessee is certainly a cess or duty to be payable under the law. We, therefore, do not find ourselves in agreement with the order of the CIT(A). Accordingly, we, set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restore that of the Assessing Officer. 9. In the result, appeals of the revenue are allowed.
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2005 (8) TMI 727
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... ... ..... cuted by Ramdas and others in favour of the Respondent; and that in view of this admission, the case would fall under Clause (b) of Section 65 enabling him to let in secondary evidence. We, however, find that the alleged written admission (Plaint in the specific performance suit) was not produced and there is no material to decide whether the matter would fall under Section 65(b). Further, that is not the ground on which the trial Court allowed the application of the respondent herein to let in secondary evidence. It is open to the respondent to place material to show that the case would fall under Clause (b) in which even he may still be entitled to give secondary evidence in regard to sale deed. Alternatively, it is open to her to take steps to secure the original, We therefore set aside the order dated 22-2-2005 of the trial Court passed in Civil Suit No. 423-A/2002 (new No. 20-A/2004) and remit the matter for fresh consideration of the application in accordance with law.
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