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2009 (1) TMI 946
... ... ... ... ..... the Court, only on the ground that the accused has been tried in two or more cases separately and they arise from distinct and separate offences arising out of different transactions/ incidents. b) It is neither permissible nor possible to spell out universal principle or formula which would be applicable to all cases for exercise of power vested in Court under Section 427(1) of the Code. Such power and judicial discretion has to be exercised in terms of the settled precepts of criminal jurisprudence, sentencing policy and with reference to the facts and circumstances of a given case, where the previous and subsequent sentences of imprisonment awarded to the accused are in two or more cases for distinct and separate offences arising out of different transactions/incidents and even under different enactments. 59. Having answered the question of law as aforestated, we direct that the application now be placed before the learned single Judge for disposal in accordance with law.
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2009 (1) TMI 945
... ... ... ... ..... able and an enquiry is to be conducted by himself, is entitled to conduct an enquiry in the original complaint complying the procedures under Sections 200 and 202. Magistrate is also competent to order a further investigating under Section 156(3) and decide the matter afresh. If the Magistrate decides to conduct an enquiry on the first complaint on which originally direction was issued for investigation under Section 156(3) Magistrate has to decide whether process is to be issued under Section 204 on all the materials including the statements recorded in the inquiry and the final report. If Magistrate finds that there are materials to proceed further, then summons can be issued. If it is found that there are no ground to proceed, Magistrate can dismiss the complaint under Section 203. The complainant is entitled to bring to the notice of the Magistrate, why the final report cannot not be accepted and cognizance is to be taken. At the stage accused has no right to participate.
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2009 (1) TMI 944
... ... ... ... ..... from the AO on all the evidences that were there before him and no purpose would be served in again restoring the matter before the learned CIT (A). Accordingly, I agree with the view of the learned AM in respect of the said issue. The matter will now go before the Division Bench. HARI OM MARATHA, J.M. 1. In these cases, there was a difference of opinion between the Members constituting the original Bench. The learned Accountant Member had dismissed both the appeals by the assessee and the Revenue whereas the ld. Judicial Member had agreed with the dismissal of assessee's appeal, but allowed the appeal of Revenue for statistical purposes. The learned Third Member has agreed with the view taken by the learned Accountant Member. Thus, in the light of the majority view, both the appeals of the assessee and Revenue stand dismissed. 2. In the result, both the appeals of the assessee and the Revenue are dismissed. 3. The order pronounced in the open court on 2nd January, 2009.
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2009 (1) TMI 943
... ... ... ... ..... oresaid, even though a complainant that is the payee of the cheque or the holder in due course can present a complaint even through a Manager or an authorized representative, such complaint has to be on behalf of the payee or the holder in due course and cannot be filed in the personal capacity either by the Manager or by the authorized representative without filing the said complaint for and on behalf of the payee or the holder in due course. 14. In the light of the aforesaid legal position the appellant not being a payee in respect of two cheques which were dishonoured on presentation and the firm having not come forward either to file the complaint and the authority of the manager having not proved for filing of such complaint which again was not filed in the name of the firm, the order passed by the Learned M.M. dt. 16.03.2006 is fully justified. 15. Accordingly, criminal appeal filed by the appellant being without any merits is dismissed. Trial court record be sent back.
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2009 (1) TMI 942
... ... ... ... ..... ioner has placed reliance on a short order passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner v. Indchem. Electronic - 2003 (157) E.L.T. A206 (S.C.) where it has been noticed that Modvat/Cenvat credit is not deniable on inputs destroyed in fire accident when the fact that inputs were actually issued and thereafter destroyed in fire accident has been admitted by the department. On the basis of the afore-mentioned findings as well as clear position of law, we are of the view that no substantive question of law warranting admission of appeal would arise and, therefore, the same is accordingly dismissed.
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2009 (1) TMI 941
... ... ... ... ..... this Court in M/s Orient Crafts Ltd vs UOI and Anr. in WP(C) No. 14263/2006 dated 11.09.2006. We are in respectful agreement with said judgment. Resultantly, the writ petition is dismissed. All pending applications stand disposed of.
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2009 (1) TMI 940
... ... ... ... ..... pellant No. 1 was also stepped up to that of Shri Shori, as appears to have been done in the case of the appellant No. 2. 14. We are unable to accept the reasoning of the High Court in this regard or the submissions made in support thereof by Mr. Chhabra, since the very object to be achieved is to bring the pay scale of the appellant No. 1 at par with that of his junior. We are clearly of the opinion that the reasoning of the High Court was erroneous and the appellant No. 1 was also entitled to the same benefits of pay parity with Shri Shori as has been granted to the appellant No. 2. 15. We, accordingly, allow the appeals and set aside the judgment of the High Court. Consequently, the writ petition is also allowed and the respondents are directed to extend the benefits of pay parity with Shri Shori to the appellant No. 1, as was done in the case of the appellant No. 2. 16. The writ petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. 17. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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2009 (1) TMI 939
... ... ... ... ..... nue to remain in force. We may also add that if certificates are issued under Section 197 of the Act till today by the department, they shall also remain in force. However, if owner of the vessel in future makes an application for issuance of certificate under Section 197 of the Act, he may do so without prejudice to his rights and contentions in the pending writ petition and such application shall be considered and decided by the competent authority in accordance with law during the pendency of the writ petition No. 400/2007. Before concluding, we may also mention that if the writ petitioners in the High Court are so advised, they may consider amending the writ petition giving details of the members of the association who are likely to be affected by the result of the pending writ petition. However, if the petitioners decide to amend the writ petition, it shall be done within three weeks from today. The special leave petition is disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.
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2009 (1) TMI 938
... ... ... ... ..... 1 - Jiyalal is guilty for offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. He was unavailable, in order to know as to his stance in respect of quantum of sentence. I deem it proper to hold that much leniency is not warranted. 15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgement is set aside. The respondent No. 1 is held guilty for offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and is sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for three (3) months and to pay fine of Rs. 25,000/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for further three (3) months' period. If the fine amount is recovered, an amount of Rs. 20,000/- be made over to the appellant by way of compensation under Section 357(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Trial Court shall issue warrant of arrest of the respondent No. 1 - Jiyalal, for the purpose of execution of his sentence. The record and proceedings be sent to the Trial Court without delay.
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2009 (1) TMI 937
... ... ... ... ..... and OC', there was no reason to deprive the respondent from the said benefit. Respondent, therefore, was not appointed because of a mistake committed on the part of the authorities of the appellants. They, thus, cannot be permitted to take advantage of the same. 14. In that view of the matter, the delay in filing the original application should not be held to be a bar in granting him an equitable relief. Union of India as a benevolent litigant cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own wrong. Furthermore, the appellants are guilty of suppression of material facts before this Court. It, in its list of dates, did not state that the original order of the High Court dated 9.07.2004 had been recalled and reviewed by the Division of the said Court by an order dated 30.10.2004. 15. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment should not be interfered with and is directed accordingly. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 1,00,000/-.
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2009 (1) TMI 936
... ... ... ... ..... ritorial jurisdiction (See Banwarilal Jhunjhunwala v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1620). 17. A bare perusal of the complaint filed would clearly go to show that the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of Special Judge (CBI), Ranchi, the investigation is completed in Ranchi, all the records and the documents pertaining to complaint and the charge sheet are before the Special Judge (CBI), Ranchi, and therefore, in our considered view, the High Court of Judicature at Bombay was perfectly justified in declining to entertain the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner. 18. In view of the above reasons, we reject the appeal. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. T.P. (Crl.) No. 234 of 2006 19. In view of the orders passed in Criminal Appeal No. 142 of 2009 arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 3589 of 2006, the Transfer Petition does not survive and no further order is required. The Transfer Petition is disposed of accordingly.
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2009 (1) TMI 935
... ... ... ... ..... Section 11AB of Central Excise Act are set aside. Only the liability to duty of Rs. 1,25,375/- is maintained without interference. Accordingly, he has set aside the penalty and confirmation of interest against the appellant, without extending the benefit of limitation. We find that, in view of the above observations and findings of the appellate authority, the extended period of limitation would not be available to the Revenue. We also note that the above findings of the Commissioner (Appeals), for the purposes of setting aside penalty and interest, do not stand challenged by the Revenue. As such, they had attained finality. The same reasons, which are applicable for non-imposition of penalty, are applicable for non-invocation of the longer period of limitation. As such, we hold that the demand which is beyond the normal period of limitation, is barred. Accordingly, the original adjudicating authority would re-adjudicate the matter subject to limitation. (Pronounced in Court)
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2009 (1) TMI 934
... ... ... ... ..... d,Adv., Mr. Rahul Kaushik, Adv., Mr. B.V. Balaram Das, Adv. ORDER The special leave petition is dismissed on the ground of delay as also on merit.
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2009 (1) TMI 933
... ... ... ... ..... considered the merits of the appeal and then rejected the application for condonation of delay. While deciding an application for condonation of delay, it is well settled that the High Court ought not to have gone into the merits of the case and would have only seen whether sufficient cause had been shown by the appellant for condoning the delay in filing the appeal before it. We ourselves have also examined the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act before the High Court and, in our opinion, the delay of 178 days has been properly explained by the appellant. That being the position, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court. Consequently, the appeal filed before the High Court is restored to its original file. The High Court is requested to decide the appeal on merit in accordance with law after giving hearing to the parties and after passing a reasoned order. 4. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
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2009 (1) TMI 932
... ... ... ... ..... rging of excessive price for the goods sold, or offering of any goods hazardous to life and safety without displaying information regarding contents etc. If none of these is alleged and made out, the complaint will have to be rejected. When a lessee signs without protest an agreement agreeing to pay interest at a given rate from a given date in given circumstances, and does not contend that the term relating to instalments or interest is invalid or inequitable, it is not open to the consumer forum to grant any relief. A demand for any amount due in terms of the unchallenged terms of an agreement, does not furnish a cause of action to the lessee/allottee to approach the consumer forum. 9. Consequently, we allow this appeal, set aside the orders of the State Commission and National Commission and restore the order of the District Forum. We, however, make it clear that on payment of the balance amount due, the appellant shall execute the sale deed, if it is not already executed.
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2009 (1) TMI 931
... ... ... ... ..... tion 4 of section 378 of the said Code. 11. Another objection raised by the learned counsel for the first and second respondents is that the medical certificate of the proprietor of the applicant has not been annexed. The delay is of only seventeen days. The Apex Court has repeatedly held that the Court has to adopt a liberal approach while dealing with the application made under section 5 of the said Act of 1963. The Apex Court in the case of State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok Ao and others ( 2005 3-SCC-752) observed that the expression "sufficient cause" should be considered with pragmatism in a justice oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. Considering the fact that the delay is only of seventeen days, a case is made out for condonation of delay. 12. Accordingly, the application is allowed in terms of prayer clause (a). The application for leave shall be placed for admission on 23rd January 2008.
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2009 (1) TMI 930
... ... ... ... ..... 194LA was introduced, only after deducting 10% of the amount towards income tax, the Government can pay the compensation. If the owners of the land are not liable to pay income tax, they can get refund of the amount by producing the certificate of deduction. But such compulsory deduction at source is not mandated under Section 194LA when the land is purchased by executing sale deeds on the price paid by it. Only by proper legislation that can be done. If the purchasers are liable to pay tax, it is for the income tax department to demand from them. Here the lands were sold by executing sale deeds and therefore Section 194LA is not applicable. 3. All the contentions raised by the appellants were considered meticulously by the learned Single Judge and the appellants had no contention that any of the points were left out by the learned Single Judge. We fully agree with the views taken by the learned Single Judge and hence we are not reiterating the same. The appeal is dismissed.
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2009 (1) TMI 929
... ... ... ... ..... he society, the FIR specifically alleged collusion between Kailash Chand and the Special Officer of the Board, in regard to 20 bighas of land which was agreed to be sold to the society by Chauthmal. In fact the writ petition filed by Kailash Chand for quashing the FIR was rejected by the High Court. (Civil W.P. No. 9293/2005 decided on 23.11.2005). As the finding of the High Court that the Collector/Special Officer was a Judge has been set aside, the quashing of the FIR with reference to the Special Officer, cannot be upheld. To this extent, the contention of the appellants merits acceptance and the quashing of the FIR with reference to the then Special Officer is set aside. The quashing of FIR as against respondents 1 and 2 will have no bearing on the FIR in so far as the other accused with reference to the 20 bighas of land. Nor anything stated above shall be construed as a finding on the merits. 20. The appeals are accordingly allowed in part to the extent mentioned above.
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2009 (1) TMI 928
... ... ... ... ..... n the hostel availing a facility therein must be treated as rent. The submission made to bring the case under the first proviso which carves out an exception to the main Rule only needs to be noted for rejection, in the light of the provisions contained in the main part of the Rules.... 19. Therefore, in the light of the above, the writ petitions will stand allowed and the impugned demand notice as well as the resolution of the third respondent Town Panchayat in Ref. No. 76/99 dated 24.5.1999 will also stand set aside. However, there will be no order as to costs. 20. In the light of the petitioner Trust having succeeded in these two writ petitions and as it has also been held that they are not liable to pay property tax, the third respondent Town Panchayat is directed to refund the amounts collected from the petitioner Trust by virtue of the interim direction given by this Court dated 30.12.2002 within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
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2009 (1) TMI 927
... ... ... ... ..... tfully following the precedent it is held that learned Commissioner was not justified in assuming jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Act. 12. In the light of the discussions made above, and without entering into the merit of the dispute to which view would be sustainable in law, we cancel the order passed by the Commissioner under Section 263 and restore the order of the assessing officer on the issue involved in this appeal for the reason that view taken by the assessing officer was a possible view at the relevant point of time. We order accordingly. 13. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed. 8. Respectfully following the Tribunals order for earlier assessment year and in the light of the proposition laid down by the Tribunal in that order, we set aside the order passed by the learned CIT under Section 263 and restore the order of the assessing officer on the issue involved in this appeal. 9. In the result, the appeal field by the assessee is allowed.
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