TMI Blog1989 (9) TMI 194X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it was within time, the judgment of the Trial Court, the First Appellate Court and the High Court are set aside and the matter is remitted to the Trial Court for disposal in accordance with law. Too long a period has now intervened between the dismissal of the suit and our order of remand. We, therefore, direct the learned Trial Judge to take all effective steps open to him in law to ensure that the suit is disposed of finally before the 15th of December, 1989. - 207 of 1984 - - - Dated:- 6-9-1989 - E.S. Venkataramiah, CJI, Sabyasachi Mukharji, Ranganath Misra, G.L. Oza, B.C. Ray, K.N. Singh and S. Natarajan, JJ. REPRESENTED BY : M/s. Ranjit Kumar and Subhash Sharma, Advocates, for the Appellant. Mr. Prithvi Raj, Sr. Advocate and Mr. S.K. Agnihotri, Advocate with him, for the Respondent. [Judgment per : Ranganath Misra , J.]. - This appeal is by special leave and is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh by which the High Court has in second appeal upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff s suit on the plea of limitation. 2. The plaintiff, a Government servant of Madhya Pradesh, was dismissed from service by the Collector on 13th of Janu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... us the residuary Article 113 and has referred to a few decisions of some High Courts where in a situation as here reliance was placed on that Article. It is unnecessary to refer to those decisions as on the authority of the judgment of this Court in the case of Pierce Leslie Co. Ltd. v. Violet Ouchterlony Rapshare Ors. vice versa [1969 (3) SCR 203], it must be held that Article 113 of the Act of 1963, corresponding to Article 120 of the old Act, is a general one and would apply to suits to which no other Article in the Schedule applies. The fact of this appeal, therefore, rests upon the finding as to when the right to sue first accrued. All the three Courts have accepted the position that on 13-1-1966 when the order of dismissal was made by the Collector, the right to sue first accrued. Admittedly, the suit was not filed within a period of three years from that date. The appeal was dismissed on 31-8-1966. The sixty days time spent for complying with the requirement of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was available to the plaintiff in addition to the period of three years. If the date, therefore, counts from the date of the appellate order, the suit wou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ncil in Juscurn Boid v. Pirthichand Lal (46 Indian Appeals 52), whatever be the theory under other systems of law, under the Indian law and procedure an original decree is not suspended by the presentation of an appeal nor is its operation interrupted where the decree on appeal is merely one of dismissal. There is nothing in the Indian law to warrant the suggestion that the decree or order of the court or Tribunal of the first instance becomes final only on the termination of all proceedings by way of appeal or revision. The filing of the appeal or revision may put the decree or order in jeopardy but until it is reversed or modified it remains effective . Bhagwati, J. then said : The original decree being thus operative what we are really concerned with is the commencement of the period of limitation as prescribed in the relevant statute and if the statute prescribes that it commences from the date of the accrual of the cause of action there is no getting behind these words in spite of the apparent inequity of applying the same. 7. In Mohammad Nooh s case the question for consideration was whether the impugned order in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se cannot apply in the circumstances of the present case. The question there was whether the High Court could issue a writ under Article 226 in respect of a dismissal which was effective from 1948, simply because the revision against the order of dismissal was dismissed by the State Government in April, 1950 after the Constitution came into force. It was in these circumstances that this Court held that the dismissal having taken place in 1948 could not be the subject-matter of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for that would be giving retrospective effect to that Article. The argument that the order of dismissal merged in the order passed in appeal therefrom and in the final order of revision was repelled by this Court on two grounds. It was held, firstly, that the principle of merger applicable to decrees of courts would not apply to orders of departmental tribunals, and, secondly, that the original order of dismissal would be operative on its own strength and did not gain greater efficacy by the subsequent order of dismissal of the appeal or revision, and therefore the order of dismissal having been passed before the Constitution would not be open to attack und ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uthority in support of the position as accepted by the two Constitution Bench judgments referred to above. There, it was held in the case of a service dispute that the original order merged in the appellate order of the State Government and it is the appellate decision which subsisted and became operative in law and was capable of enforcement. That judgment relied upon another decision of this Court in support of its view being C.I.T. v. Amrit Lal Bhagilal Co. [1959 SCR 713]. 11. The distinction adopted in Mohammad Nooh s case between a court and a tribunal being the appellate or the revisional authority is one without any legal justification. Powers of adjudication ordinarily vested in courts are being exercised under the law by tribunals and other constituted authorities. In fact, in respect of many disputes the jurisdiction of the court is now barred and there is a vesting of jurisdiction in tribunals and authorities. That being the position, we see no justification for the distinction between courts and tribunals in regard to the principle of merger. On the authority of the precedents indicated, it must be held that the order of dismissal made by the Collector did merge int ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... racted period of litigation. We are satisfied that to meet the situation as has arisen here, it would be appropriate to hold that the cause of action first arises when the remedies available to the public servant under the relevant Service Rules as to redressal are disposed of. 14. The question for consideration is whether it should be disposal of one appeal or the entire hierarchy of reliefs as may have been provided. Statutory guidance is available from the provisions of sub-section (2) and (3) of Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. There, it has been laid down : 20.(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances,- (a) if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance; or (b) where no final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order with regard to the appeal preferre ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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