TMI Blog2002 (7) TMI 562X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rsy is, as to whether or not the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, could grant time to the respondent to file his reply, beyond a total period of 45 days, in view of section 13(2)( a ) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 ( the Act ). 2. The appellant filed a complaint before the Gujarat State Consumer Redressal Commission, claiming compensation against the respondent, on account of alleged failure on the part of the respondent in advancing the loan to the appellant despite of furnishing the security for the same. The respondent received notice, issued by the Commission, on 22-2-2000. According to the said notice, 4-4-2000 was the date fixed before the State Commission. The respondent appeared on 4-4-2000 and moved an application for adjournment of the case and grant of time to file reply. The case was adjourned for 4-5-2000. On the said date, namely, 4-5-2000, the respondent-bank filed its reply. The appellant thereafter seems to have filed their rejoinder to the reply filed by the respondent. On the next date, namely, 24-7-2000 the appellant moved an application before the State Commission saying that the reply filed by the respondent was beyond a period of 30 day ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e notice was received on 22-2-2000 and the appellant was required to be present before the State Commission on 4-4-2000, that is to say, after a period of 30 days. On application for adjournment the time was extended up to 4-5-2000. The respondent had submitted his reply within the time allowed. Extension was sought only once. The appellant had also filed their rejoinder to the reply. There was, therefore, no occasion to plead that the written statement be rejected and the rejoinder of the appellant be returned. 5. We may peruse the relevant provisions of section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It reads as under : "Section 13****** Sub-section (2)****** ( a )refer a copy of such complaint to the opposite party directing him to give his version of the case within a period of thirty days or such extended period not exceeding fifteen days as may be granted by the District Forum; ( b )where the opposite party, on receipt of a copy of the complaint, referred to him under clause ( a ) denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint, or omits or fails to take any action to represent his case within the time given by the District Forum, the District Forum ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... prescribe any kind of period of limitation. The provision appears to be directory in nature, which the Consumer Forums are ordinarily supposed to apply, in the proceedings before them. We do not find force in the submission made by the appellant, in person, that in no event, whatsoever, the reply of the respondent could be taken on record beyond the period of 45 days. The provision is more by way of procedure to achieve the object of speedy disposal of such disputes. It is an expression of desirability in strong terms. But it falls short of creating of any kind of substantive right in favour of the complainant by reason of which the respondent may be debarred from placing his version in defence in any circumstances whatsoever. It is for the Forum or the Commission to consider all facts and circumstances along with the provisions of the Act providing time frame to file reply, as a guideline, and then to exercise its discretion as best it may serve the ends of justice and achieve the object of speedy disposal of such cases keeping in mind principles of natural justice as well. The Forum may refuse to extend time beyond 15 days, in view of section 13(2)( a ) but exceeding the perio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... llows : ".These decisions illustrate the principle that where the literal meaning of the words used in a statutory provision would manifestly defeat its object by making a part of it meaningless and ineffective, It is legitimate and even necessary to adopt the rule of liberal construction so as to give meaning to all parts of the provision and to make the whole of it effective and operative." (p. 205) The above observations may perhaps help more to the respondent s stand. 9. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, placed reliance on a decision reported in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah AIR 1955 SC 425. The matter relates to an election petition where ex parte proceedings were ordered. This Court as a general proposition of interpretation of Statutes observed as follows : "Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded again ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... licable to the case at hand. In those cases it was held that a power which is vested in the Court can be exercised repeatedly in the absence of intention to the contrary contained in the Statute. Such a question is not involved in the present case. The power to extend time under Clause ( a ) is with a rider that the extension may not exceed 15 days. We have, however, already held that the provision saying that extended time may not exceed 15 days is directory in nature. It does not mean that orders extending the time to file reply may be passed repeatedly unmindful of and totally ignoring the provision that the extension may not exceed 15 days. This provision has always to be kept in mind while passing an order extending the time to file a reply to the petition. It is another matter, as we have found that in case time is extended exceeding 15 days, it may not be kind of an illegality which may deny or deprive the respondent to file his reply within the time granted by the Forum/Commission. 12. So far the facts of the present case are concerned, we find that at the first instance, the Commission itself had fixed the date beyond 30 days and the respondent sought further time whic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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