TMI Blog1957 (3) TMI 51X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1953, and 26th February, 1954. The assessment orders are annexed to the petition as A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-6 respectively. On the 27th April, 1954, opponent No. 1, who is the Inspector of Sales Tax, Gondia, Madhya Pradesh, visited the shop of the applicant and seized his account books. Opponent No. 2, who is the Sales Tax Officer, Gondia, Madhya Pradesh, thereafter served the applicant with a notice dated the 4th June, 1954, requiring the applicant to appear before him on the 23rd July, 1954, to show cause why the applicant should not be prosecuted under section 24 read with section 28 of the Sales Tax Act. Then, on the 18th June, 1954, opponent No. 2 issued six separate notices in form XII in respect of the aforesaid six periods of assessment, requiring the applicant to appear before him on the 23rd July, 1954, to show cause why he should not be re-assessed, and these six notices are annexures C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-5 and C-6 respectively. Opponent No. 2 then adjourned the proceedings to 18th August, 1954, when the applicant appeared before the said authority and protested, as the petition puts it, against the validity of the notices of the 18th June, 1954. Certain objecti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ions raised by him are questions of fact, which would require evidence in order to dispose of these contentions. It was also pointed out to him that he did not apply to the Sales Tax Officer asking that the books of account seized by the first opponent should be returned, either because the seizure was illegal, or because the detention of these books was also illegal. It is not, therefore, necessary to deal with these two contentions, and we are, therefore, required to deal with the principal contention and the ancillary contention referred to above. Dealing with the first contention, it is necessary to refer to some of the sections of the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, in order to understand the scheme underlying the act. There is no dispute that the applicant is a registered dealer, and the expression "dealer" has been defined in section 2(c), and the expression "registered dealer" has been defined in section 2(f). As there is no dispute with regard to the applicant being a registered dealer, it is not necessary to refer to these two definitions. Then, the expression "turnover" is defined in section 2(j). The expression "year" is defined in section 2(i). The principal sect ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the amount of tax so assessed, a sum not exceeding that amount". Section 11-A(1), therefore, deals with four categories: (i) a category in which a dealer has been under-assessed; (ii) a category in which a dealer has escaped assessment; (iii) a category in which he has been assessed at a lower rate; and (iv) a category in which a deduction has been wrongly made. Another thing to notice in regard to section 11-A(1) is that the authority may proceed to re-assess or assess at any time within three calendar years from the expiry of such period, and the expression "such period" is to be understood by reference to the expression "during any period" occurring in the earlier part of the section. Section 11-A(1), therefore, prescribes the period of time during which, it would be open to the Commissioner either to assess or to re-assess a dealer. It is not necessary to refer to all the four categories for the purpose of this case, because here is a case in which the applicant is being re-assessed because he has been under-assessed, and the question for consideration is whether all the notices issued to the applicant in form XII are in order, having regard to the provisions of section 11-A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ate the contention of Mr. Thakkar it may be necessary to re-state the different periods once again. The first period is a period covered by the 1st June, 1947, and the 12th November, 1947; the second period is covered by the 13th November, 1947, and the 1st November, 1948; the third is 2nd November, 1948, to 21st October, 1949; the fourth period is one concerned with the 22nd October, 1949, and the 9th November, 1950; the fifth is the 10th November, 1950, to 30th October, 1951; and the sixth and the last is the 31st October, 1951, to 18th October, 1952. Taking these different dates, it is obvious that according to the true intent and effect of section 11-A(1), the Commissioner has to proceed to reassess within three calendar years from the expiry of such period. Now, in each case, the period expired on the 12th November, 1950, 1st November, 1951, 21st October, 1952, 9th November, 1953, 30th October, 1954, and 18th October, 1955. All the notices given by the second opponent are of the date 18th June, 1954. Now, this date would be within three calendar years from the expiry of the periods which are in reference to the 5th and the 6th notices, i.e., for the periods between the 10th No ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to understand the meaning of the expression "any period", we must necessarily see the period for which the applicant had been previously assessed, and it is clear, having regard to the dates which I have mentioned above, and having regard to the facts which I have stated in an earlier part of this judgment, that the applicant had been previously assessed in respect of six different periods. In view of this position, there is no difficulty in construing the words "during any period", because the section says that "if in consequence of any information which has come into his possession, the Commissioner is satisfied that any turnover of a dealer during any period has been under-assessed", which means that a dealer has first been assessed for a particular period, and the subsequent information shows that the dealer has been underassessed, and this is precisely the present case. It is not disputed by Mr. Sheorey that the applicant had been previously assessed for six different periods. It is also not disputed by him that there were assessment orders passed against the applicant, and so it is clear that the applicant had been previously assessed for six different periods. Bearing that p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n suggested by Mr. Sheorey cannot be accepted in this case. The learned Advocate appearing for the applicant has referred us to a decision of this Court in S.C. Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas [1956] 29 I.T.R. 857., in which a point similar to the point which has been raised on this petition was decided in the sense in which we have decided it above, and following, with respect, the principle laid down in that case, we must hold that the first four notices issued by the second opponent would be without jurisdiction, but the remaining two, i.e., the 5th and the 6th, would be in order and would be within jurisdiction. Another contention raised by Mr. Thakkar is that having regard to Article 20(3) of the Constitution, it is not open to the assessing authorities to re-assess the applicant, because he says that his fundamental right has been invaded. Article 20(3) says that "no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." Mr. Thakkar says that the first opponent has seized his account books and has retained them, or detained them, and the consequence is that, in effect, there is a violation of Article 20(3), because these account books constitute e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... books of account of the applicant, in order to properly re-assess him, if the previous assessment has not been in order. It may be that in a prosecution, if one is launched against the applicant, he would be able to contend that it would be testimonial compulsion if the books of account are used against him, and upon that, we express no opinion. But I cannot understand the argument that these notices are not in order because the books of account of the applicant have been seized, and there has been in this case testimonial compulsion, and violation of Article 20(3) of the Constitution is the result. In our view, there is no substance in this contention. It was also argued by Mr. Thakkar that the notices issued against the applicant on the 18th June, 1954, were superseded by the subsequent notices issued either on the 14th May, 1956, or the 28th May, 1956, and the 23rd August, 1956. We have seen these notices, and there is nothing to suggest that the later notices superseded the previous notices. Reference was made to paragraph 10 of the petition to that effect, and it was pointed out that in the return this allegation was not specifically denied. It was contended which, speaking ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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