TMI Blog1968 (9) TMI 112X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f 1963 should be allowed and that a writ in the nature of certiorari should be granted to quash the order of the Assistant Collector of Excise and Customs dated November 26, 1962 and the order of the Collector of Excise dated November 12, 1963. This appeal is accordingly allowed - Civil Appeal No. 1049 of 1965 - - - Dated:- 27-9-1968 - V. Ramaswami, J.C. Shah, G. K. Mitter, K. S. Hegde and A. N. Grover, JJ. For the Appellant : Soli Sorabjee, D.M. Damodar, B. Datta and J.B. Dadachanji For the Respondents : V. A. Seyid Muhammad and S.P. Nayar JUDGMENT This appeal is brought by certificate from the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat, dated July 31, 1964 in Special Civil Application No. 1054 of 1963. The appellant is the sole proprietor of Messrs Gordhandas and Co. carrying on business as a dealer in textiles in Bombay. Under an agreement between the appellant on the one hand and the Gandevi Vanat Udhoog Sahkari Mandli Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the 'Society') the Society manufactured cotton fabrics during the period between June, 1959 and September 1959 and from October 1, 1959 to January 31, 1961 for the appellant on certain terms and conditions which were ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... posed upon the appellant for contravention of rule 9 and why duty should not be charged for the cotton fabrics so removed by the appellant. The appellant showed cause and on November 26, 1962 the Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Surat held that the appellant was liable to pay excise duty to. the extent of Rs.. 2,20,574.74, being the total amount of basic duty and a penalty of Rs. 250 was levied for contravention of rule 9. The appellant preferred an appeal to the Collector of Central Excise Baroda but the appeal was dismissed. Thereafter the appellant moved the High Court of Gujarat for grant of a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the writ petition by its judgment, dated July 31, 1964 but gave a direction that the: respondent was to work out the excise duty on the footing that the appellant was entitled to exemption from duty altogether in respect of goods supplied for the period from June 1, 1959 to September 30, 1959. As regards the two other periods i,e., October 1, 1959 to April 30, 1960 and from May 1, 1960 to January 31, 1961, the High Court dismissed the writ petition and directed the respondent to charge duty at the rate of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iety formed of owners of cotton powerlooms, which is registered or which may be registered on or before the 31st March, 1961 under any law relating to co-operative societies from the whole of the duty leviable thereon, subject to the following conditions :-- (a) that every member of the co-operative society has been exempt from excise duty for- three years immediately preceding the date of his joining such society; (b) that the total number of cotton powerlooms owned by the co.-operative society is not more than four times the number of members forming such society; (c) that a certificate is produced by each member of the co-operative society from the State Government concerned or such officer as may be nominated by the State Government that he is a bona fide member of the society and that the number of cotton powerlooms in his ownership and actually operated by him does not exceed four and did not exceed four at any time during the three years immediately preceding the date of his joining the society, and that he would have been exempt from excise duty even if he had not joined the co-operative society;................ The Central Government issued another notification, da ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion applied to. all cotton fabrics which were produced on power- looms owned by the Cooperative Society or on powerlooms. allotted to its members and it was not a relevant consideration as to who. produced or manufactured such fabrics, whether it was the Society itself or its members or even outsiders. It was conceded by the appellant that it was the owner of the cotton fabrics. But even upon that assumption the claim of the appellant is that it was entitled to exemption from excise duty as it was covered by the language of the two notifications already referred to. In our opinion, the argument of the appellant is well- founded and must be accepted as. correct. The notification, dated July 31, 1959 grants exemption to "cotton fabrics produced by any Co-operative Society formed of owners ,of cotton powerlooms which is registered or which may be registered on or before March 31, 1961" subject to four conditions set out in the notification. In the next notification, dated April 30, 1960 exemption was granted to "cotton fabrics. produced on powerlooms owned by any cooperative society or owned by or allotted to the members of the society, which is registered or which may be registered ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he plain terms of the exemption it cannot be denied its benefit by calling in aid any supposed intention of the exempting authority. If such intention can be gathered from the construction of the words of the notification or by necessary implication therefrom, the matter is different, but that is not the case here. In this connection we may refer to the observations of Lord Watson in Salomon v. Salomon Co.(1): "Intentlon of the legislature is a common but very slippery phrase, which, popularly understood may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the legislature probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to enact it. In a Court of Law or Equity, what the Legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from that which it has chosen to enact, either in express words o.r by reasonable and necessary implication." (1) [1897] A.C. 22, 38. It is an application of this principle that a statutory notification may not be extended so as to meet a casus omissus. As appears in the judgment of the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner(6 Moo. P.C.C. 8). "....we cannot aid th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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