TMI Blog2006 (2) TMI 610X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ered into a contract with the Respondent No. 1 herein (Company) for supply of stone chips. The company used to hand over post-dated cheques to the appellant towards the price of stone chips as also transport, handling, postage and other charges. The Company had issued six cheques of the following description in favour of the appellant: Sl. No. Cheque No. Dated Amount 1 455997 10.06.2004 Rs. 5,33,795 2. 455998 10.07.2004 Rs. 5,33,795 3. 455999 10.08.2004 Rs. 5,33,795 4. 455993 10.06.2004 Rs. 6,49,085 5. 455994 10.07.2004 Rs. 6,49,085 6. 455995 10.08.2004 Rs. 6,49,085 Total: Rs. 35,48,640 The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... spondents herein undertook the work of construction of major bridges between Dhankuni Kharagpur in the State of West Bengal as a part of ongoing project of the National Highway Authority of India to widen and strengthen the National Highway. It is furthermore not in dispute that for the purpose of executing the said work the company entered into an engineering contract with the National Highway Authority of India. In the writ petition, it was stated: The 1st respondent herein a stone quarry owner, is a person who supplied crushed stone aggregates a raw material that was needed for the aforesaid work undertaken by the 1st petitioner company. He along with another had entered into an agreement with the 1st petitioner company in that behalf, pursuant to which the supply was made. The 1st petitioner company gave good business to the 1st respondent, paying him for than Rs. 3 crores in the transaction. However, towards the end of the transactions, due to the aforesaid financial imbroglio in which the 1st petitioner company was placed in, an outstanding amount of about 35 lakhs remained payable to the 1st respondent herein. There is no question of the 1st petitioner company run ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t of the 6 dishonoured cheques, payment in respect of one cheque was sent from Ernakulam along with Ext. P2 reply. In Navinchandra N. Majithia (supra) a contract was entered into by and between a company, Indian Farmers Pvt. Ltd. (IFPL) and Chinar Exort Ltd. (CEL). The appellant therein was the Managing Director of the IFPL company. CEL entered into an agreement with IFPL for purchase of the entire shares of IFPL for which it paid earnest money. It, however, failed to fulfil its commitment to pay the balance purchase price within the specified time. The IFPL terminated the agreement. A suit was filed by CEL in the High Court of Bombay for specific performance of the said agreement. Two shareholders of CEL took over management and control of the company as Directors and they formed another company named JBHL at Shilong in the State of Meghalaya. Later the said suit was withdrawn upon the appellant's returning the amount paid by CEL which was earlier forfeited by the appellant. Pursuant to the said agreement JBHL made payments for the purchase of shares of IFPL. But the appellant therein contended that as JBHL committed default in making the balance payment and thereby commit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ssued to the State of Meghalaya to transfer the investigation to Mumbai Police. The High Court also did not take note of the averments in the writ petition that filing of the complaint at Shillong was a mala fide move on the part of the complainant to harass and pressurise the petitioners to reverse the transaction for transfer of shares. The relief sought in the writ petition may be one of the relevant criteria for consideration of the question but cannot be the sole consideration in the matter. On the averments made in the writ petition gist of which has been noted earlier it cannot be said that no part of the cause of action for filing the writ petition arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court. In Augustine (supra) a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court again on arriving at a finding of fact obtaining therein was of the opinion that the cause of action, therefore, arose within the jurisdiction of the Kerala High Court. It was, however, rightly held: So far as the question of territorial jurisdiction with reference to a criminal offence is concerned, the main factor to be considered is the place where the alleged offence was committed. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ons from Calcutta would not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. In Nakul Deo Singh v. Deputy Commandant [1999 (3) KLT 629], a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court speaking through one of us, P.K. Balasubramanyan, J., while considering the question as to whether receipt of an order passed by an appellate authority in a disciplinary proceeding would constitute cause of action, upon noticing the definition thereof as stated in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure, 15th Edn., Vol. 1 at page 251 and a decision of the Court of Appeal in Paragon Finance v. D.B. Thakerar Co. [(1999) 1 All ER 400], opined : The fact that a person who was dismissed from service while he was in service outside the State would have to suffer the consequence of that dismissal when he is in his native place by being rendered jobless, is not a fact which constitutes the bundle of facts giving rise to a cause of action in his favour to challenge his dismissal. That right accrued to him earlier when ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a criminal matter also the High Court may exercise its extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction but interference with an order of Magistrate taking cognizance under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will stand somewhat on a different footing as an order taking cognizance can be the subject matter of a revisional jurisdiction as well as of an application invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. A writ of certiorari ordinarily would not be issued by a writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against a Judicial Officer. [See Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra Anr. [AIR 1967 SC 1 : (1966) 3 SCR 744]. However, we are not oblivious of a decision of this Court in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai Ors. [(2003) 6 SCC 675] wherein this court upon noticing Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar (supra) and also relying on a Constitution Bench of this Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra [(2002) 4 SCC 388] opined that a Judicial Court would also be subject to exercise of writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The said decision has again been followed in Ranjeet Singh vs. Ravi Prakash [(2004) 3 SCC 692]. It is, however, not necessary to dilate o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words, as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority. Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India whereupon the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant placed strong reliance was rendered at a point of time when clause (2) of Article 226 had not been inserted. In that case the Court held that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, properly construed, depends not on the residence or location of the person affected by the order but of the person or authority passing the order and the place where the or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... arily interfere with an order taking cognizance passed by a competent court of law except in a proper case. Furthermore only such High Court within whose jurisdiction the order of subordinate court has been passed, would have the jurisdiction to entertain an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India unless it is established that the earlier cause of action arose within the jurisdiction thereof. The High Court, however, must remind themselves about the doctrine of forum non conveniens also. [See Mayar (H.K) Ltd. Ors. vs. Owners Parties Vessel M.V. Fortune Express Ors. - 2006 (2) SCALE 30] In terms of Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Section 178 provides for place of inquiry or trial in the following terms: (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or (c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several act ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or jurisdiction the emphasis is on the place where the offence has been committed. There is, however, a departure under Section 181(1) where additionally place of trial can also be the place where the accused is found, besides the court within whose jurisdiction the offence was committed. But the said section deals with offences committed by those who are likely to be on the move which is evident from the nature of offences mentioned in the section. Section 181(1) is in respect of the offences where the offenders are not normally located at a fixed place and that explains the departure. Section 183 deals with offences committed during journey or voyage. Section 186 deals with situation where two or more courts take cognizance of the same offence and in case of doubt as to which one of the courts has jurisdiction to proceed further, the High Court decides the matter. Section 187 deals with a situation where a person within the local jurisdiction of a Magistrate has committed an offence outside such jurisdiction. The Magistrate can compel such a person to appear before him and then send him to the Magistrate which has jurisdiction to inquire into or try such offence. 9. Under the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the provision of Section 138 of the Act is that for proper and smooth functioning of business transaction in particular, use of cheques as negotiable instruments would primarily depend upon the integrity and honesty of the parties. It was noticed that cheques used to be issued as a device inter alia for defrauding the creditors and stalling the payments. It was also noticed in a number of decisions of this Court that dishonour of a cheque by the bank causes incalculable loss, injury and inconvenience to the payee and the entire credibility of the business transactions within and outside the country suffers a serious setback. It was also found that the remedy available in a civil court is a long-drawn process and an unscrupulous drawer normally takes various pleas to defeat the genuine claim of the payee. [See Goa Plast (P) Ltd. vs. Chico Ursula D'Souza -(2004) 2 SCC 235] and Monaben Ketanbhai Shah and Anr. vs. State of Gujarat Ors. - (2004) 7 SCC 15]. In Prem Chand Vijay Kumar vs. Yashpal Singh Anr. [(2005) 4 SCC 417], we may, however, notice that it was held that for securing conviction under Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 the facts which are required to be proved are ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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