TMI Blog1992 (8) TMI 279X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as ultra vires. 3. Mr. Krishnamani, appearing on behalf of the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 5431-33 of 1985 (the term petitioners will also include the appellants in the Civil Appeals) and Mr. G.L. Sanghi, representing some other writ petitioners, have confined the ground of challenge to alleged lack of legislative competence on the part of the State legislatures in relation to debts which ar not agricultural. Mr. Vaidyanathan, counseled for the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 1326 of 1979, has besides raising the question of lack of legislative competence, contended that the impugned provisions are violative of the guarantee under Article 19(1) sub-clause (g), as also under under sub-clause(f), as the Karnataka Act was passed before the clause 1 (f) of Article 19 was omitted from the Constitution. 4. So far the question of legislative competence is concerned, the matter arising out of a similar Act passed by the Maharashtra legislature was considered by this Court in Fatehchand Himmatlal and others v. State of Maharashtra etc., [1977] 2 SCR 828 and the Act was upheld as a valid piece of legislation. The learned counsel for the petitioners have contended that the report ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the scope of the first part of entry 30 and confine it to cover only agricultural loans and debts. The learned counsel placed the entries No. 82, 86, 87 and 88 in List I, entries No. 14, 18, 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49 in List II and entries 6 and 7 in List III and invited us to discern, a constitutional policy for entrusting only such matters as may be concerning agriculture to the State and leaving the remaining field either for the Union's List I or the Concurrent List III. We have given our anxious consideration to the point raised by the learned counsel, but do not find ourselves in agreement with them and we proceed to indicate our reasons. 6. The principle to be followed while construing constitutional provisions is well-settled and need not detain us long. The cardinal rule of interpretaion that words should be read in their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning is subject to this rider that while construing a constitutional document conferring legislative power the most liberal construction should be put upon the words so that the same may have effect in their widest amplitude (see Navinchandra Mafatlal v. The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City, [1955] 1 SCR 89 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... easons for doing so. 7. The argument that if the opening general term in an entry is followed by some more words or phrases the wide application of the opening term should be interpreted to have been restricted has been addressed earlier and rejected by this Court disapproving the application of such a rule of construction. The Federal Court in Mannikkasundara v. R.s. Nayudu, 1946 F.C.R. 67 observed that the subsequent words and phrases are not intended to limit the ambit of the opening general term or phrase; on the contrary to illustrate the scope and objects of the legislation envisaged as comprised in the opening term or phrase. These observations were approved by the Supreme Court in the State of Madras v. Gannon Dynkerley Co., (Madras) Ltd., [1959] SCR 379. The purpose of inclusion of the subsequent words in entry No.30 was to illustrate the scope and the objects of the legislation envisaged by the opening expression. 8. The latter part serves another purpose also. Mr. Vaidyanathan himself referred to the case where the creditors had unsuccessfully attempted to construe the words money-lending and money lenders in a narrow sense excluding non-agricultural indebtedne ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... enders Act, 1940, however, was accepted by the Federal Court in Bank of Commerce Ltd. v. Kunja Behari Kar and Upendra Chandra Kar, (1944) F.C.R. 370, and some of the provisions of the Bengal Act were declared ultra vires. The matter was taken in appeal to the Privy Council in Prafull Kumar's case (supra) and the pith and substance test relied upon in Subrahmanyan Chettiar's case (supra) was accepted as correct. The Privy council, after taking note of the problem of overlapping of the subjects in the Federal and the provincial Lists pointed out that by addition of Concurrent List many difficulties were solved, but :- Subject must still overlap and where they do, the question must be asked what in pith and substance is the effect of the enactment of which complaint is made and in what list is its true nature and character to be found. If these question could not be asked, much beneficent legislation would be stifled at birth, and many of the subjects entrusted to provincial Legislation could never effectively be dealt with. This rule has been firmly established as aid to construction of laws in India and is a complete answer to the questions raised on behalf of the petit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f a decree for recovery of a debt. So far the pawn-brokers are concerned they are being deprived of not only the interest but the capital itself, and they may not now be able to carry on their business any further. As a direct consequence of the impugned provisions, the petitioners claim that they are being deprived of the right guaranteed to them by Article 19(1)(g). We do not find any substance in this argument either. So far subclause (g) is concerned the impugned law is not putting any restriction on the carrying of the business at all. What it purports to do is to relieve the burden only of a category of debtors, who by reason of their poverty deserve assistance. Both the Act of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka have identified this group in need of help. The liability of the other debtors is untouched. The legislative measures, thus taken , are clearly in furtherance of the directive principles of the State policy as mentioned in Part IV of the Constitution, specially Article 39 and are protected by the provision of clauses (5) and (6) of Articles 19. 14. The learned counsel has characterised the hardship placed on the petitioners as unreasonable within the meaning of clauses (5) a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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