TMI Blog1957 (2) TMI 71X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h offences under s. 161 read with s. 116 and further read either with s. 109 or s. 114 of the Indian Penal Code for offering to one Jibhai Chhotalal Barot, a sub-inspector of police attached to the Anti-Corruption Branch of the C. 1. D. the sum of ₹ 1,25,000 as illegal gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward for his showing favour to the accused and to the firm M/s. M. M. Baxabhoy Co., in the exercise of his official functions. The offence was alleged to have been committed on July 28, 1950, and the accused were charge-sheeted on June 16, 1951; the trial commenced on July 14, 1951 and charges were framed on September 27, 1951. 40 witnesses were examined and 226 documents were exhibited in the course of the trial, and the prosecution closed its case on July 15, 1952. During the course of the trial the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (XLVI of 1952) hereinafter called the impugned Act was enacted by Parliament on July 28, 1952, being an Act further to amend the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and to provide for a more speedy trial of certain offences, viz., offences punishable under s. 161,s.165 or s. 165A of the Indian ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... onsisting of Bavadekar Vyas JJ. These appeals were heard only on the preliminary point as to the jurisdiction of the learned Presidency Magistrate to try and decide the case. In reply to the point as to jurisdiction which had been taken by the State of Bombay, the appellant and the accused Nos. 4 and 5 urged that the provisions of the impugned Act were violative of the principle of equal protection of laws contained in Art. 14 of the Constitution and therefore the impugned Act was ultra vires the Constitution. If that was so, it was contended, the learned Presidency Magistrate had jurisdiction to continue the trial in spite of the commencement of the impugned Act and the order of acquittal of the appellant and accused Nos. 4 and 5 recorded by him was correct. The learned judges of the High Court rejected this contention of the appellant and held that the impugned Act was intra vires and that the learned Presidency Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the case after the commencement of the impugned Act. The learned Magistrate s order convicting the accused No. 2 and acquitting the appellant and the accused Nos. 4 and 5 complained of by the State of Bombay was accordingly set a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... udge under this Act unless he was or had been a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Section 7 of the Act is important and provided that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 or any other law the offences specified in sub-s. (1) of s. 6 shall be triable by special judges only. Section 7(2) further provided that when trying any case, a Special Judge. may also try any offence other than an offence specified in s. 6 with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 be charged at the same trial. The procedure and powers of special judges were laid down in s. 6 of the Act. A Special Judge was empowered to take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to him for trial, and in trying the accused persons, he was to follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 for the trial of warrant cases by magistrates. A Special Judge was also empowered to tender a pardon to any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, an offence on condition of his making a full and true disclosur ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... me trial. Committal proceedings were also done away with and the special judges were empowered to take cognizance of these offences without the accused being committed to them for trial and were empowered to try the accused persons of the same by following the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, for the trial of warrant cases by magistrates. The courts of the Special Judges were deemed to be courts of Sessions trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors and were also empowered to pass upon the persons convicted by them of any offence any sentence authorised by law for the punishment of such offences. The powers of appeal and revision vested in the High Court were to be exercised as if the courts of Special Judges were the courts of sessions trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court. The procedure for trial before the Special Judges was thus assimilated to that obtaining in the case of trial of the accused by the courts of sessions. Having thus provided for the trial by Special Judges of these offences which would be triable by them after the commencement of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... were without jurisdiction and void. The examination of the appellant under s. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the further proceedings by way of filing of the written statement and the arguments addressed by the prosecution as well as the defence were all without jurisdiction and so were the orders of conviction of the accused Nos. I and 2 and the acquittal of the appellant and the accused Nos. 4 and 5. It was however contended by the learned counsel for the appellant before us that the provisions of the impugned Act were violative of the fundamental right enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution and were therefore ultra vires. The respondents on the other hand urged that there was no classification at all and even if there was one, it was based on intelligible differentia and had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. The provisions of the impugned Act in substance amended the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 pro tanto making the speci. fied offences triable by special judges and all persons who committed these offences became punishable by higher sentences and were subjected to, procedure for trial of warrant cases, the c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... te purposes. (5) Every classification is in some degree likely to produce some inequality, and mere production of inequality is not enough. (6) If a law deals equally with members of a well defined class, it is not obnoxious and it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons. (7) While reasonable classification is permissible, such classification must be based upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be attained, and the classification cannot be made arbitrarily and without any substantial basis. The latest pronouncement on this topic is to be found in the judgment of this Court in the case of Budhan Choudhry and Others v. The State of Bihar ([1955] I S.C.R. I045 at p. 1048.) where it was observed as follows: The provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution have come up for discussion before this Court in a number of cases, namely, Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India (supra), The State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara (supra), The State of West-Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar ([1052] S.C.R. 284) Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saur ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... riminal Procedure, 1898 and if the offenders falling within this group or category were thus singled out for special treatment, there would be no question of any discriminatory treatment being meted out to, them as compared with other offenders who did not fall within the same group or category and who continued to be treated under the normal procedure. The next question to consider is whether this differentia had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the impugned Act. The preamble of the Act showed that it was enacted for providing a more speedy trial of certain offences. An argument was however addressed before us based on certain observations of Mahajan J. (as he then was) at page 314, and Mukherjea J. (as he then was) at p. 328 in Anwar Ali Sarkar s Case([1952] S.C.R. 284.) quoted at page 43 by Patanjali Sastri C.J. in the case of Kedar Nath Bajoria V. The State of West Bengal (2) that the speedier trial of offences could not afford a reasonable basis for such classification. Standing by themselves these passages might lend support to the contention urged before us by the learned counsel for the appellant. It must be noted, however, that this ratio was n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Constitution. It was next contended that even if the impugned Act was intra vires, the learned Presidency Magistrate trying the case of the appellant was not divested of jurisdiction to try the same after the commencement of the impugned Act and the acquittal of the appellant recorded by him could not be set aside. Reliance was placed upon s. 10 of the impugned Act in support of this contention. It was urged that even though the case related to the offence mentioned in s. 6(1) of the Act and was thus triable exclusively by the Special Judge, no Special Judge was appointed by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette until September 26,1952, that the arguments were concluded and the trial came to an end also on September 26, 1952 and the only thing which remained to be done thereafter was the pronouncement of the judgment by the learned Presidency Magistrate and that therefore even though the case may be deemed to have been pending before the learned Magistrate there was no occasion for forwarding the same for trial to the Special Judge appointed by the State Government on September 26, 1952. We do not accept this contention. It cannot be denied that on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... even on September 26, 1952, when by a notification in the Official Gazette the Special Judge was appointed having jurisdiction over such cases. The notification came into operation from the commencement of September 26, 1952, which was immediately after the midnight of September 25, 1952 and the defence address had not concluded by this time but was continued when the learned Presidency Magistrate s Court assembled at 11 a. m. on September 26, 1952 and was concluded thereafter. The word trial is also defined in Stroud s Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Vol. IV, at page 3092: TRIAL: (1) A trial is the conclusion, by a competent tribunal, of questions in issue in legal proceedings whether civil or criminal. (2) The trial (Criminal Justice Act, 1948 (11 12 Geo. 6. C. 58) s. 23 (1) is not complete until sentence has been passed or the offender has been ordered to be discharged (R. v. Grant (1951) 1 K. B. 500). The trial of the appellant therefore could not be said to have been concluded on July 28, 1952 and even on the September 26, 1952, assuming for the sake of argument that the effective commencement of the impugned Act could not be said to have come about u ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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