TMI Blog1990 (10) TMI 370X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e accepted by the Government of India in July, 1970. The Prantiya Vidyut Mandal Mazdoor Federation (in short the Federation) recognised trade union of the employees of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board presented their demands before the Labour Department of the Government of Rajasthan for implementation of the recommendations of the Wage Board. While the said industrial dispute between the management of the Board and its employees was pending before the Conciliation Officer, a settlement was arrived at on February 22. 1972. By this agreement the parties agreed that the existing scale of pay of various categories of posts would be revised w.e.f. 1st April, 1969. The schedule of the said agreement set out various categories of posts under different pay-scales. At St. No. 21 Meter Reader/Meter Checker was mentioned under scale No. 3 i.e. ₹ 126-8-150-10-250. In pursuance to the above settlement the Board issued a notification dated 22nd March, 1972 revising the pay-scales of its employees w.e.f. 1st April, 1969. Subsequent to this agreement the Board entered into another agreement with the Federation on December 2, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Second Settlement). In t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hecker Grade II i.e. in the pay scale of ₹ 80-5-110-6-152-7-194 between the period 1972-1979. Some of the employees again filed writ petitions in the High Court. The High Court vide its judgment dated 29th March, 1982 allowed the writ petitions on the ground that the second settlement had already been quashed by the earlier judgment given in Brij Lal v. Rajasthan State Electricity Board, [1979] WEN UC 221. The High Court inter alia held and observed as under: Once the second settlement dated December 6, 1972, no longer exists in view of non-compliance with Section 19(2) of the aforesaid Act and in view of the decision of this Court in Brijlal's case (supra), the only settlement which can be said to be in existence is the first settlement dated February 22, 1972. The aforesaid settlement only provides one grade (scale No. 3 item No. 21) for Meter Reader/ Checker, and, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to be fixed in that grade. Merely because the post of Meter Reader- II/Checker-II was advertised with pay-scale No. 2 and the petitioner applied and was selected, it cannot be said that the petitioner is estopped now from challenging his fixation in the aforesaid pay ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 7; 260-8-324-10-464. Dr. L.M. Singhvi, St. Advocate appearing on behalf of the Board contended that irrespective of the earlier judgment given by the High Court in Brij Lal v. R.S.E.B. (supra) quashing the second notification dated 6.12.1972 the present appeals having been filed against the Meter Readers appointed on or after 1.4.1974, they are not entitled to scale No. 3 as the first settlement dated 22.2. 1972 was to remain in force upto 31st March, 1974. It was also argued that in the appointment orders of the respondent employees appointed after 1.4.1974, it was clearly mentioned that they were appointed as Meter Reader/Meter Checker-II in pay-scale No. 2 i.e. ₹ 80-194. Dr. Singhvi further argued that the Board had also made regulations which had statutory force and were made applicable retrospectively from 1st April, 1974. Under these regulations also the post of Meter Reader-II/Meter Checker-II was mentioned in Scale No. 2. It was thus contended that considering the matter from any angle, the respondents were not entitled to scale No. 3 but were only entitled to scale No. 2 as revised from time to time. It was also pointed out by Dr. Singhvi that without prejudice to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ions was rightly negatived by the Division Bench of the High Court in the following manner: It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the learned Single Judge did not take into consideration the fact that first settlement came to an end on March 31, 1974 and was not in force after that date. He submitted that the Board had powers under Sec. 79(c) and (k) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 to frame Regulations regarding the fixation of pay scales. Learned counsel for the appellants was asked to show from the writ petitions whether this point was taken in the writ petitions or not. Learned counsel for the appellants candidly admitted that it was not raised in the writ petitions filed by the petitioners. It was, then. put to the learned counsel whether this point was argued before the learned Single Judge. Mr. S.N. Deedwania submitted that in the absence of the affidavit of the counsel who argued on behalf of the appellants before the learned Single Judge positive assertion to that effect cannot be made. In the memo of appeal this ground, of course, has been taken but not in the manner in which it has been stated hereinabove. As this point was not ta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d writ petitions only on the basis of the earlier judgment in the matter of R.S.E.B. v. Jagdish Prasad (Brij Lal). The Appellant-Board implemented the said order. The respondent is trying to raise the said question which was neither been decided by the High Court and has been raised for the first time in this supplementary affidavit. On account of lapse of time, the appellant is finding it difficult to give reply. The Deponent has tried his best to locate the records but in such a short period he could not get the file of the case which was decided about eight years back as it appears to have been mixed up in the old record. That the order passed in the matter of Shanti Lal was a Judgment inter parties and, therefore, simply because the Board did not challenge the said order, it does not mean that the respondent can also take advantage of the same and can raise the question of equal pay for equal work. In this the Appellants further state that all the persons except respondent Shri Lehar Singh and Gharsi Lal (Geharial) in civil appeal in the present case were appointed after 7th September, 1974 and 16th May,1974 i.e. the date on which three persons whose matters were decided a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 968 mentioned in the Notification was arbitrary and without any basis. An appeal filed by the Board against the aforesaid decision was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court on 19th December, 1979. This litigation was commenced by such employees who were appointed prior to 6.12.1972. Subsequently employees appointed between the period 1972- 1979 filed writ petitions in the High Court. The stand taken by these employees was that the Notification dated 6.12. 1972 had already been quashed by the High Court and as such they were to be governed by the First Settlement dated February 22, 1972 in which there was only one category Of Meter Reader/Meter Checker to whom pay-scale No. 3 had been given and as such they were also entitled to pay-scale No. 3. The High Court allowed the writ petitions and granted pay-scale No. 3 to all the 35 petitioners. the Board has now come before this Court against such employees who were appointed after 1.4.1974. The contention of the Board is that even if for arguments' sake the earlier decision given by the High Court may be considered as final, that was in respect of employees who were appointed before 6th December, 1972. As regards the pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... en the third stage opens where the award or the settlement does survive and is in force between the parties as a contract which has superseded the earlier contract and subsists until a new award or negotiated settlement takes its place. Like Nature, Law abhors a vacuum and even on the notice of termination under Sections 19(2) or (6) the sequence and consequence cannot be just void but a continuance of the earlier terms, but with liberty to both sides to raise disputes, negotiates settlements or seek a reference and award. Until such a new contract or award replaces the previous one, the former settlement or award will regulate the relations between the parties. Such is the understanding of industrial law at least for 30 years as precedents of the High Courts and of this court bear testimony. To hold to the contrary is to invite industrial chaos by an interpretation of the ID Act whose primary purpose is to obviate such a situation and to provide for industrial peace. To distil from the provisions of Sec. 19 a conclusion diametrically opposite of the objective, intendment and effect of the Section is an interpretative, stultification of the statutory ethos and purpose. Industrial l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to consider the above argument placed on behalf of the Board on the ground that learned counsel for the appellants was asked to show from the writ petitions whether this point was taken in the writ petitions or not and the learned counsel candidly admitted that it was not raised in the writ petitions filed by the petitioners. The High Court further observed in this regard that as this point was not taken in the writ petitions and it was not argued before the Learned Single Judge, they did not consider it necessary to examine it. We have already extracted in extenso the observations of the High Court in this regard in the earlier part of the Judgment. There is a complete fallacy, in the above order in as much as the Board was not the petitioner before the High Court and there was no question of taking any such ground in the writ petitions. In one of the above appeals No. 2901 of 1985 Rajasthan State Electricity Board Ors. v. Sharad Chander Nagar reply to the writ petition filed by the Board has been placed on record as Annexure 'C'. In the said reply in Para (8) it has been stated as under: That the contents of Para No. 8 of the writ petition are wrong and denied. The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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