TMI Blog1993 (8) TMI 299X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... housing problems of that city and published the impugned notification in the Gazette on September 8, 15 and 22 of 1973 under Section 28(1) of the Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 (Act 1 of 1966) amended as on that date, for short 'the Act' proposing to acquire 14 acres of land situated in civil area at an estimated cost of ₹ 25.21 lakhs. Local publications too were made. Notices under Section 29 inviting objections were served on the appellants and others on September 20, 1973. On October 28, 1973 objections were filed. On July 31, 1976 notice was given of hearing objections on August 28, 1976. The Committee constituted in that behalf after hearing the objections, consideration thereof and rejection by proceedings dated November 1, 1976, recommended to the Government to approve the scheme. The Government on June 25, 1977 approved it to the extent of 11 acres 27 cents and the notification was published on August 27, 1977 in the Gazette as required under Section 32(1). Appeal under Section 32(2) filed before the Government too was rejected on July 14, 1978. On its receipt the Board issued notices on February 1, 1979 under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... November 13, 1984 upheld the Full Bench judgment and dismissed the petition. In Abdul Wahab v. State of U.P. (Writ Petition No. 37 of 1987, dated August 9, 1988) another Division Bench following the Full Bench ratio held that Section 11-A of the L.A. Act had no application and award need not be made within one year as per 1984 amendment Act. In SLP No. 11310 of 1989, etc. another three-Judge bench confirmed the decision and dismissed the SLP on November 6, 1989. It would thus be clear that in interpreting the Act and the L.A. Act as incorporated therein a consistent and unbroken judicial flora has been nurturing in the State of U.P. that Sections 4 and 6 of L.A. Act have no application to the proceedings under the Act and the bar of three years prescribed in first proviso to Section 6 too does not apply. In this case while granting leave, by order dated March 13, 1981 this Court restricted the appeal to the question whether the limitation of three years prescribed in first proviso to Section 6 of the L.A. Act would apply to the notification under Section 32(1) and 28(1) of the Act. Other cases and writ petitions filed thereafter, were tagged with it. 4. The counsel appearing fo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f not invariably, it is desirable to maintain uniformity at the hearing of the point on which leave was granted and any other point would not be permitted to be canvassed unless the point touches the jurisdiction or constitutional validity of the offending provisions. Exceptions should not become the rule and permitting to reopen several points which this Court did not consider fit to be canvassed, would create uncertainty and inconsistence and would become a gamble and exceptions become the rule. To maintain this concomitant comity and certainty we declined to permit counsel for the appellants or writ petitioners to raise other points for adjudication. 6. Whether limitation of three years prescribed under the first proviso to Section 6 of the L.A. Act would apply to the acquisitions under Sections 28 and 32 of the Act is the crucial question. The object of the Act is the establishment, incorporation and functioning of a Housing and Development Board in U.P. to develop and land, construct the houses, acquire, hold and dispose of property and to contract and do all things necessary for the purposes of the Act, (Preamble and Section 4) to relieve housing shortage in urban areas du ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rticulars of the land comprised therein. Within 30 days from the date of service of the notice or within such extended time by the Board for sufficient reasons, the owner or persons having interest may file objections in writing to the Board against the scheme or against the proposed acquisition or levy. Under Section 31 the Board on receipt of the objections, after giving an opportunity of being heard to the objectors and consideration thereof, within six months from the date of the receipt of such objections, may either abandon the scheme or if the estimated cost of scheme does not exceed ₹ 20 lakhs, sanction it with or without modification. If the estimated cost of the scheme exceeds ₹ 20 lakhs, the Board should submit it to the State Government with such modifications, if any, as it may suggest, for sanction. The State Government having been empowered under Section 31(2), has to either accord or refuse or modify the sanction or return the proposed scheme for reconsideration. The details of sub-section (3) are not relevant. Under sub-section (1) of Section 32 whenever the Board or the State Government sanctions a scheme or improvement scheme, it shall be notified in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... arations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under sub-section (1) or sub-section (4). The first proviso postulates that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4, under sub-section (1), published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967) before the commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984 shall be made after expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification. Further provisos and explanation, etc. are not material, hence omitted. The publication of the declaration in the Official Gazette has been envisaged under sub-section (2). Under sub-section (3) the said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the case may be and the appropriate Government would acquire the land in the manner laid down thereafter. 8. It would, thus, be seen that Sections 28 and 32 operate in their own sphere within the time specified thereunder as a separate and complete code, while Section 4(1) and Section 6 of the earlier ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 of the said Act, so however, that any such modification shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under the original notification or declaration. Paragraph No. 3 amends Section 17 of the L.A. Act by substituting sub-section (1) for sub-sections (1) and (1-A) and omitting sub-section (4); paragraph 4 adds a new Section 17-A in L.A. Act providing for transfer of land to Board; paragraph 5 amends Section 23 of L.A. Act by substituting the Explanation to clause 'firstly' and adding sub-section (2) directing payment of 15% solatium on the market value. 10. Service of notice has been prescribed in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (Form and Manner of Service of Notice) Rules, 1967, the details of which are not material for the purpose of this case, hence omitted. 11. Before adverting to the main question it is well to keep in mind at the forefront that in Uttar Pradesh the legislature wherever it found necessary adapted (sic adopted) the L.A. Act either by reference or by incorporation in different Acts to suit its local needs and to remedy the alarming malady ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... liament, a court of justice will take into consideration the spirit and meaning of the Act apart from the words; in other words, there is still, as Jessel M.R. said, in Bethlem Hospital, Re ((1875) 19 Eq 457, 459) 'such a thing as construing an Act according to its intent though not according to its words'. 14. It would thus be clear that in construing a statute equity will not relieve against a public statute of general policy in cases admitted to fall within the statute and it is the duty of the court to give effect to the legislative intent. We have to advert, therefore, to the main question, whether the Act adapted Sections 4 to 6 of the L.A. Act, by incorporation or by reference. 15. In Clarke v. Bradlaugh ((1881) 8 QBD 63, 69 41 LJQB 1 (CA)) Brett, L.J. laid the rule of incorporation thus (T)here is a rule of construction that, where a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute, the repeal of the first statute by a third statute does not affect the second. This was reiterated by Lord Esher, M.R., dealing with legislation by incorporation, in Wood's Estate, Re ((1886) 31 Ch D 607, 615 34 WR 375 (CA)) thus If a subsequent Act b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s held that, we are therefore clearly of the opinion that neither the repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900, nor the consequential removal of the fetters imposed by Sections 14 and 23 have the effect of rendering the substantive provision contained in Section 15 not available to those who satisfy its terms . Sections 15 and 3(1) of the Pre-emption Act incorporated 'agricultural land' as defined in Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900, as amended by Act 1 of 1907, without giving any right of mortgage, whether usufructuary or not, in such a land. The Punjab Alienation of Land Act was repealed later on. The contention raised was that the Punjab Alienation of Land Act was applied only by reference, and not by incorporation. The repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act of 1900 had, therefore, affected the continued operation of the Pre-emption Act. While negating the contention it was held that 'the expression 'agricultural land' in the later Act has to be read as if the definition in the Alienation of Land Act had been bodily transposed into it and it was by incorporation. 18. In Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa ((1974) 2 SCC 777 (1975) 2 SCR 1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act. It was held in that case that exceptions (c) and (d) would get attracted to the facts of that case and corporation employee was a public servant and the IPC amendment by implication supplements the definition of public servant in P.C. Act. Otherwise P.C. Act becomes wholly unworkable and inefficient. 20. The same view was reiterated by this Court in State of Kerala v. Attesee (AIJ Corpn.) (1989 Supp 1 SCC 733, 739-40 1989 SCC (Tax) 536 AIR 1989 SC 222, 226). In Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad v. Municipal Corpn. of the City of Ahmedabad ((1976) 3 SCC 719 AIR 1976 SC 2095) the question was, whether Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act was incorporated and personal hearing was mandatory. While considering the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, the scheme envisaged therein, this Court held thus (SCC p. 723, para 17) Section 284-N referentially incorporates in the Bombay Act certain provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as detailed in Appendix I to the Bombay Act. Out of those provisions we are only concerned with Part II (Acquisiti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bodily therein as part of the later statute and became an integral scheme of that Act. The Legislature while incorporating them did not intend to speculate that any subsequent amendment to the previous Act or its repeal would alter the texture of the later Act, unless the previous Act is supplemental to the later Act or both are in pari materia in which case it would render the later Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual or by necessary intendment applies it. 23. Let us then proceed to consider the cases on reference. In Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty ((1962) 3 SCR 786 AIR 1962 SC 316) Section 23-A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act as amended in 1952 provided that the restriction imposed in Section 8 thereto shall be deemed to have been imposed under Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and all the provisions of the Act shall have effect accordingly. A contention was raised that the Sea Customs Act was incorporated and that, therefore, the procedure therein alone would be followed. Their constitutional validity was also assailed. This Court held that there is a distinction between a mere reference to or a citation of one statute in another and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Act to determine the market value. In Special Land Acquisition Officer City Improvement Trust Board, Mysore v. P. Govindan ((1976) 4 SCC 697 (1977) 1 SCR 549) a Full Bench of the Mysore High Court held that the date of the determination of the compensation under Section 23(1) of the L.A. Act was the date of the notification under Section 18 of the local Act which corresponds to Section 6 of the declaration of the Land Acquisition Act. This Court held that Section 23 of the Mysore Act provided that compensation for acquisition shall be governed by the Land Acquisition Act as they exist on the date of a particular acquisition proceedings except to the extent to which a different procedure is expressly laid down in the Mysore Act . No such different procedure was provided therein. In that background it was held that the L.A. Act was applied only by reference and the date to determine the market value was the date of the notification under Section 16 of the Mysore Act, corresponding to Section 4(i) of L.A. Act. At this stage it is relevant to notice that this Court laid emphasis that Section 23 of the Mysore Act declared that the general procedure provided in the Land Acquisition Ac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s practicable' used in Section 37 would indicate that it is only by reference and not by incorporation. 28. In Western Coalfields Ltd. v. Special Area Development Authority, Korba ((1982) 1 SCC 125 (1982) 2 SCR 1) the facts were that Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act empowered the Municipal Council to impose property tax. Similarly the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 also provided power to levy property tax. Sections 127, 127-A and 129 of the Municipalities Act and Section 132 of the Municipal Corporation Act provide the power and procedure to impose property tax. In 1973, the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam (23 of 1973) Act was made. Section 16 thereof conferred power on the Development Authorities to levy property tax. Subsequently it was amended in 1976 by Act 6 of 1976. Section 69(d) incorporated the provisions of Municipalities Act and Municipal Corporation Act in the 1973 Act to regulate the procedure to levy property tax. It was contended that the subsequent amendment of 1976 was not applicable, In that behalf relying upon Hindustan Coop. Insurance Societies Ltd. case (58 IA 259 AIR 1931 PC 149 35 CWN 794) this Court held that if an earlier legislati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al Dy. Collector, Madras ((1965) 1 SCR 614 AIR 1965 SC 1017) has no application since the vires of the Act has not been questioned. The ratio in Om Prakash v. Union of India ((1988) 1 SCC 356) has no relevance. Therein the question was whether the Governor of Delhi is the Central Government for the purpose of Section 15 of Delhi Development Act to acquire the land. Considering the definition of the Central Government it was held that appropriate Government would mean the Lt. Governor. In Krishna Chandra Gangopadhyaya v. Union of India ((1975) 2 SCC 302 AIR 1975 SC 1389) the contention was that the Bihar Mines and Minerals Rules, 1964 having been declared ultra vires in Baijnath Kadio v. State of Bihar ((1969) 3 SCC 838) which Parliament validated with retrospective effect, whether it was by reference and whether the validation Act was ultra vires as the vice was not cured. In that setting this Court held that the Parliament legislated for itself and statutorily adopted for itself the second proviso to Section 10 of the Bihar Act and the otherwise ultra vires sub-rule (2) of Rule 20. It was further contended that if the re-enacting technique adopted for the referential or incorporat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... L.A. Act would be automatically extended. We have, therefore, no hesitation to conclude that Section 55 and the schedule adapted only by incorporation Section 4(1) and 6(1) and the subsequent amendments to Section 6 did not become part of the Act and they have no effect on the operation of the provisions of the Act. 34. It is next contended that Section 55 and the schedule must be so read as to apply Section 6 as amended from time to time and shall be applicable to the proceedings taken under Sections 28 and 32 of the Act. We find no force in the contention. In Yuri Maru v. The Woron (1927 AC 906) the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 limited the jurisdiction of the High Court of England as colonial Admiralty court established under the Act as if existed at the passing of the Act . When suit for damages against charter party was laid in the Exchequer Court of Canada, which was established under the Admiralty Act, 1906, it was contended that it had ceased having jurisdiction for the action for damages for breach of charter party; the defendant being domiciled in London and the cause of action not having arisen within the limits of Exchequer Court of Canada, and the ship hav ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pted not by incorporation therein. The declaration under Section 6 was made beyond the period of 3 years. So to validate those acquisitions, Amendment Act came to be made. 37. It is next contended that by operation of proviso to Article 254(2) of the Constitution, Section 55 and the schedule became inconsistent with the first proviso to Section 6(1) of the L.A. Act. The Act received the assent of the President. The Amendment Acts of 1967 and 1984 brought on statute the first and second provisos into Section 6(1) of the L.A. Act. The Act being earlier Section 55 and the schedule became void, the first proviso to Section 6(1) of L.A. Act would be applied and the declarations made beyond three years became void and inoperative. We find no force in the contention. It is seen that the purpose of the Act is not acquisition simpliciter. It is only to constitute or incorporate a Housing Board or its branches to regulate planned development of the urban area. Power has been given to the Board to frame the schemes and if necessary to acquire the land by agreement with the persons having interests in the land or by exchange or otherwise. Therefore, compulsory acquisition is only incidental ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... slative competence to make the Act. Instead of enacting separately a separate procedure, with necessary modifications under Section 55 and the schedule it applied the procedure provided under Section 4 and 6 of the L.A. Act with modifications enacted thereunder. Since the Act is not an Act to acquire the land, the question of inconsistency does not arise and the proviso to Article 254(2) is not attracted. 39. There is no doubt or difficulty as to applicability of the law under Article 254 of the Constitution. As to what would happen in a case of conflict between a Central and State Law occupying the same field enumerated in the concurrent list, Article 254 was enacted to solve that conflict. Article 254(1) envisages the normal rule that in the event of a conflict between the law made by the Union and the State Legislature in the concurrent field, the former prevails over the latter; if the law relating to the concurrent subject made by the State Legislature is repealed by Union law, whether Union law is prior or later in point of time, the Union law will prevail and the State law shall, to the extent of such repugnancy, be void. An exception has been engrafted to this rule by cl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (emphasis supplied) prevail and the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy; (2) where, however, a law passed by the State comes into collision with a law passed by Parliament on an Entry in the Concurrent List, the State Act shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the provisions of the Central Act would become void provided the State Act has been passed in accordance with clause (2) of Article 254; (3) where, however, a law made by the State Legislature on a subject covered by the Concurrent List is inconsistent with or repugnant to a previous law made by Parliament, then such a law can be protected by obtaining the assent of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. The result of obtaining the assent of the President would be that so far as the State Act is concerned, it will prevail in the State and overruled the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. Such a state of affairs will exist only until Parliament may at any time make a law adding to, or amending, varying or repealing the law made by the State Legislature under the proviso to Article 254. In that case it was held that part of the provisions were not ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iterate that the State had undertaken, before the Full Bench, to properly compensate the land owners for the delayed period as it had occurred due to several supervening events beyond the State's control. The appeals and writ petitions are dismissed, but without costs. R. M. SAHAI, J. - Principal issue debated at length in these special leave petitions directed against Full Bench judgment of Allahabad High Court and writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, was if bar of three years on declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act 1 of 1894) (for brevity 'L.A. Act') added by way of proviso in 1967 applied to the housing or improvement scheme framed by the Board under Section 28 or sanctioned by State Government under Section 30 of the U.P. Avas and Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), as the L.A. having been adopted by Section 55 of the Act all subsequent amendments in it applied automatically. 43. Adopting or applying an earlier or existing Act by a competent Legislature to a later Act is an accepted device of legislation. If the adopting Act refers to certain provisions in an ear ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ny amendment or alteration in it can have no effect on its operation in the adopting Act as having become part of the new statute it remains untouched by what happens in the parent Act. One of the reasons to resort to such method of legislation is to ensure uniformity. For instance if a statute provides a remedy by way of second appeal on the same grounds as is specified in Section 100 CPC then it may for sake of brevity and uniformity incorporate those provisions as was the case in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India ((1979) 2 SCC 529 (1979) 2 SCR 1038) which permitted a second appeal to be filed on 'one or more of grounds of appeal specified in Section 100 of CPC'. Provisions of Section 100 CPC stood transposed in Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (in brief M.R.T.P. Act'). The legislature instead of reproducing the same words opted for incorporation by reference as such device brings all the learning given to it by the courts of law. Effect of it was that the provision of Section 100 of CPC having become part and parcel of the M.R.T.P. Act it could be amended, altered or repealed by exercising such power under the Act and not under CPC. State of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ct'. Therefore, in view of this exclusion the subsequent amendment in Section 54 of L.A. Act providing for second appeal could not be available in acquisition proceedings under the Act. The language of Section 55 of the Avas Vikas Act permitting acquisition under the provisions of the L.A. Act, 1894 (Act 1 of 1894), as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh, with modifications specified in the schedule, is widely different from the language used in Calcutta Improvement Act. Apart from it this Court in Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad v. Municipal Corpn. of the City of Ahmedabad ((1976) 3 SCC 719 AIR 1976 SC 2095) held Section 284-N of the Municipal Corporation Act was a referential legislation even though the section ran as under 284-N. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in this and the next succeeding sections referred to as 'the Land Acquisition Act') shall to the extent set forth in Appendix I regulate and apply to the acquisition of land under this Chapter, otherwise than by agreement, and shall for that purpose be deemed to form part of this Chapter in the same manner as if enacted in the body thereof, subject to the provisions of this Chapter and to the provisions f ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion or reference is more a matter of construction by the courts keeping in view the language employed by the Act, the purpose of referring or incorporating provisions of an existing Act and the effect of it on the day-to-day working. Reason for it is the courts' prime duty to assume that any law made by the Legislature is enacted to serve public interest. That is the rationale due to which the Court construed provisions in Western Coalfields Ltd. ((1982) 1 SCC 125 (1982) 2 SCR 1) or Attesee (1989 Supp 1 SCC 733, 739-40 1989 SCC (Tax) 536 AIR 1989 SC 222, 226) or Barnagore Jute Factory Co. v. Inspector of Central Excise ((1992) 1 SCC 401) as legislation by reference even though on literal and conservative test enunciated by English courts in Re Wood's Estate, ex parte, Works and Buildings Commrs. ((1886) 31 Ch D 607, 615 34 WR 375 (CA)) or Clarke v. Bradlaugh ((1881) 8 QBD 63, 69 41 LJQB 1 (CA)) the provisions appear more to be illustrative of legislation by incorporation. Same principle is discernible from those cases where this Court applied amendments made subsequently in L.A. Act to proceedings for acquisition taken under the Act which adopted the L.A. Act with modificat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... usly been made and is still in force.' held (SCC pp. 373-4, para 8) In the present case, however, we find that there is no question of incorporation of any of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act into the said Act at all. The said Act does not deal with acquisition of land for the purposes of a scheme as contemplated under the said Act. The acquisition of such land for the purposes of the scheme is left to the general law of the land in that connection, namely, the Land Acquisition Act which has to be resorted to for the purposes of acquisition of land for the purposes of the schemes contemplated under the said Act. The only difference is that some of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, as referred to in the relevant sections of said Act, are given effect to as amended by the relevant Section of the said Act. In these circumstances, it cannot be held that any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act have been incorporated into the said Act and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act which have to be applied, are the provisions as they stand at the relevant time, namely, at the time of acquisition, in the absence of a contrary intention. There is nothing ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lf was public interest. In the original Act compensation for the land acquired was payable on the market value at the date of declaration relating thereto under Section 6 . It was substituted by (Amendment) Act, 1923 (XXXVII of 1923) by the expression notification under Section 4 . But the experience of working of the Act indicated that declarations under Section 6 were issued long after publication of notification under Section 4 even where urgency clause was invoked resulting in grave injustice to the land owners. Consequently to mitigate such injustice the proviso was added to Section 6 reducing the gap between notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the L.A. Act to three years. The object and reasons for adding the proviso to Section 6 was, at the same time, care has been taken to ensure that land acquisition proceedings do not linger on for unduly long time. The aforesaid Ordinance, therefore, provides that no declaration under Section 6 of the Act should be issued in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4(1) published after the commencement of the Ordinance, after the expiry of three years from the date of such publ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... whether the petitioners who approached this Court under Article 32 can be denied hearing on points other than limitation only because their petitions had been tagged with special leave petition in which following order was passed Leave granted limited to the question as to whether the limitation provided in the proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act introduced by the amending Act of 1967 is also applicable in the facts of this case in view of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Adhiniyam. From the order granting leave extracted above it is clear that the order was confined to facts of that case. It may legitimately be argued that the Bench hearing the appeals is not bound by the order granting leave as even though other aspects shall be deemed to have been heard and decided yet in absence of any decision or adjudication on merits it has no binding effect. Whether it is so or not need to be gone into in these petitions except observing that the implied rejection of an order does not amount to deciding on merits but in propriety and comity it is just and proper that except in very rare cases where injustice is manifest the Bench hearing the matter finally is expected to respect ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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