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2017 (8) TMI 869

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..... ove to the changed ‘forum’ (to the Court of Session, after ‘the 2002 Amendment Act’ and, to the Special Court, after ‘the 2014 Amendment Act’). We are of the view, that the ‘forum’ for trial earlier vested in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate (-or, Judicial Magistrate of the first class) was retrospectively amended, inasmuch as, the ‘forum’ of trial after ‘the 2002 Amendment Act’ was retrospectively changed to the Court of Session. In this view of the matter, the trials even in respect of offences allegedly committed before 29.10.2002 (-the date with effect from which, ‘the 2002 Amendment Act’ became operational), whether in respect whereof trial had or had not been initiated, would stand jurisdictionally vested in a Court of Session. And likewise, trials of offences under the SEBI Act, consequent upon ‘the 2014 Amendment Act (which became operational, with effect from 18.07.2013) would stand jurisdictionally transferred for trial to a Special Court, irrespective of whether the offence under the SEBI Act was committed before 29.10.2002 and/or before 18.07.2013 (-the date with effect from which ‘the 2014 Amendment Act’ became operational), and irrespective of the fact whether .....

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..... ropolitan Magistrate (or, a Judicial Magistrate of the first class), was premised on a purely legal assertion, founded on the format of Sections 24 and 26 of the SEBI Act , as they existed prior to the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Amendment) Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the 2002 Amendment Act ). It was the submission of the private parties, that the amended provisions under the 2002 Amendment Act had no express or implied retrospective effect, and therefore, the amendment carried out through the 2002 Amendment Act , would not have any impact, particularly on the forum for trial (-the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, or Judicial Magistrate of the first class). It was submitted, that trial in all these matters, with reference to offences committed prior to 29.10.2002, whether or not put to trial, could only be conducted by the Metropolitan Magistrate (or, Judicial Magistrate of the first class). 3. In order to appreciate the gamut of the submissions advanced, it is imperative to extract hereunder, Sections 24 and 26 of the SEBI Act , in the format in which the provisions existed, prior to the 2002 Amendment Act . The same are accordingly reproduced be .....

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..... n years or with fine, which may extend to twenty-five crore rupees or with both. xxx xxx xxx 26. Cognizance of offences by courts.-(1) No court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act or any rules or regulations made thereunder, save on a complaint made by the Board. (2) No court inferior to that of a Court of Session shall try any offence punishable under this Act. 4. After the 2002 Amendment Act , all pending matters (-before Metropolitan Magistrates, or Judicial Magistrates of the first class) were committed to the concerned, Court of Session. This was done, under the assumption, that the 2002 Amendment Act had the effect of retrospectively altering the forum for trial. And as such, matters which were being tried by Metropolitan Magistrates (or, Judicial Magistrates of the first class), and were pending before such Courts, were transferred to the concerned Court of Session. The above change of forum for trial, was assailed by some of the private parties, before the court to which the matters were committed. Their challenge failed. The matters were then carried, to the jurisdictional High Court, i.e., the High Court of Judic .....

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..... d not refer to the above judgment dated 11.01.2008, since it may not have come to its notice, as the Bombay High Court had reserved orders in the matter on 22.02.2007 well before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, had pronounced its judgment (- on 11.01.2008). The judgment dated 11.01.2008 rendered by the Delhi High Court (recording a view, contrary to that expressed by the Bombay High Court) has been assailed by private parties, affected by the change of forum of trial, from the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate (or, a Judicial Magistrate of the first class), to the Court of Session. 8. Whilst these matters were pending before this Court, the SEBI Act was again amended, by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Amendment) Act, 2014 (hereinafter referred to, as the 2014 Amendment Act ). It is relevant for the present controversy to notice, that by the 2014 Amendment Act , Section 26(2) was omitted from the SEBI Act , and Sections 26A to 26E were inserted therein, with effect from 18.07.2013. During the course of hearing, one of the contentions advanced by learned counsel representing SEBI was, that the effect and impact of the 2002 Amendment Act with refe .....

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..... rt established for the area in which the offence is committed or where there are more Special Courts than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the High Court concerned. 26C. Appeal and revision.- The High Court may exercise, so far as may be applicable, all the powers conferred by Chapters XXIX and XXX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) on a High Court, as if a Special Court within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court were a Court of Session trying cases within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court. 26D. Application of Code to proceedings before Special Court.- (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) shall apply to the proceedings before a Special Court and for the purposes of the said provisions, the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Session and the person conducting prosecution before a Special Court shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor within the meaning of clause (u) of section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (2) The person conducting prosecution referred to in s .....

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..... s before this Court, and the absence of any such submissions, during the course of hearing (to demonstrate prejudice), according to learned counsel, leave no room for any doubt, that the litigation initiated by the private parties, based on the above mentioned jurisdictional issue, was only a ploy to delay the prosecution initiated against them, by SEBI. 12. It was also the contention of the learned Additional Solicitor General representing SEBI, that the SEBI Act was an enactment, which provided for a wholesome special procedure to deal with criminal implications, on account of the violation of the provisions of the SEBI Act . It was submitted, that the provisions of the SEBI Act , were separate and distinct, from the general provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since, according to learned counsel, a special enactment is always presumed to have an overriding effect over a general enactment, the postulation of a special forum under the SEBI Act , would have an overriding effect, over the general provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was also submitted, that the SEBI Act provided a complete code for prosecution of offences under t .....

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..... under the Criminal Procedure Code. (ii) Reliance was then placed on Ramesh Kumar Soni v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 14 SCC 696, wherefrom, our attention was drawn to the following observations: 2. The factual matrix in which the controversy arises may be summarised as under: Crime No. 129 of 2007 for commission of offences punishable under Sections 408, 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC was registered against the appellant on 18-5-2007, at Bheraghat Police Station. On the date of the registration of the case the offences in question were triable by a Magistrate of First Class in terms of the First Schedule of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. That position underwent a change on account of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act of 2007 introduced by Madhya Pradesh Act 2 of 2008 which amended the First Schedule of the 1973 Code and among others made offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC triable by the Court of Session instead of a Magistrate of First Class. The amendment received the assent of the President on 14-2-2008 and was published in Madhya Pradesh Gazette (Extraordinary) on 22-2-2008. xxx xxx xxx 9. Having said so, we may n .....

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..... sub-section (1) and over the area in which the accident occurred , mentioned in sub-section (2) clearly show that the change of forum was meant to be operative retrospectively irrespective of the fact as to when the accident occurred. To that extent there was no difficulty in giving the answer in a simple way. But the provision of limitation of 60 days contained in sub-section (3) created an obstacle in the straight application of the well-established principle of law. If the accident had occurred within 60 days prior to the constitution of the tribunal then the bar of limitation provided in sub-section (3) was not an impediment. An application to the tribunal could be said to be the only remedy. If such an application, due to one reason or the other, could not be made within 60 days then the tribunal had the power to condone the delay under the proviso. But if the accident occurred more than 60 days before the constitution of the tribunal then the bar of limitation provided in sub-section (3) of Section 110-A on its face was attracted. This difficulty of limitation led most of the High Courts to fall back upon the proviso and say that such a case will be a fit one where the tr .....

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..... ht in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law. (iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties in respect of transactions already accomplished. (v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary implication. 12. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Sudhir G. Angur v. M. Sanjeev (2006) 1 SCC 141 where a three-Judge Bench of this Court approved the decision of the Bombay High Court in Shiv Bhagwan Moti Ram Saraoji v. Onkarmal Ishar Dass (1952) 54 Bom. LR 330 and observed: (SCC p. 148, para 11) 11. It has been held that a court is bound to take notice of the change in the law and is bound to administer the law as it was when the suit came up for hearing. It has been held that if a court has jurisdiction to try the suit, when it comes on for disposal, it then cannot refuse to assume jurisdiction by reason of the fact that it had no jurisdiction to enterta .....

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..... on the following observations from the judgment rendered by H.L. Gokhale, J.: 19. The First Schedule to CrPC deals with the classification of offences. Part I thereof deals with the offences under the Penal Code, 1860, Part II deals with classification of offences against other laws, which would include offences under laws such as FERA. The petitioners were being prosecuted under Section 56 of FERA, wherein the maximum punishment that could be awarded was up to seven years. The second entry of this Part II laid down that such offences were triable by a Magistrate of the First Class, provided those offences were cognizable offences. As noted earlier, Section 62 of FERA made the offence under Section 56 non-cognizable. Besides, Section 61(1) of FERA stated that it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass the necessary sentence under Section 56. It does not state that the Magistrate alone is empowered to pass the necessary sentence, in which case the proceeding cannot be transferred from his Court. This provision is not like the one in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602 where under Section 7(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 the offence was triable by Speci .....

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..... s and appeals under Section 407 CrPC which is essentially a judicial power. Section 407(1)(c) CrPC lays down that, where it will tend to the general convenience of the parties or witnesses, or where it was expedient for the ends of justice, the High Court could transfer such a case for trial to a Court of Session. That does not mean that the High Court cannot transfer cases by exercising its administrative power of superintendence which is available to it under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. While repelling the objection to the exercise of this power, this Court observed in para 13 of Ranbir Yadav as follows: (SCC p. 400) 13 . We are unable to share the above view of Mr Jethmalani. So long as power can be and is exercised purely for administrative exigency without impinging upon and prejudicially affecting the rights or interests of the parties to any judicial proceeding we do not find any reason to hold that administrative powers must yield place to judicial powers simply because in a given circumstance they coexist. 22 . For the reasons stated above, there is no substance in the objections raised by the petitioners. The High Court has looked into Secti .....

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..... d in a forum provided for by the repealing Act. 34. In T. Bara i v. Henry Ah Hoe (1983) 1 SCC 177, it was observed in para 17 of the Report that a person accused of the commission of an offence has no right to trial by a particular procedure. This view was followed in Rai Bahadur Seth Shreeram Durgaprasad v. Director of Enforcement (1987) 3 SCC 27. 35. Therefore, it cannot be seriously urged that the petitioners were prejudiced by a change of the appellate forum. xxx xxx xxx 43. While the revisional power of a superior court actually enables it to correct a grave error, the existence of that power does not confer any corresponding right on a litigant. This is the reason why, in a given case, a superior court may decline to exercise its power of revision, if the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant the exercise of its discretion. This is also the reason why it is felicitously stated that a revision is not a right but only a procedural facility available to a party. If the matter is looked at in this light, the transfer of a case from a Magistrate to a Special Judge does not take away this procedural facility available to the petitioners. .....

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..... ed to be retrospective unless there is an express ban onto its retrospectivity. In this context, the observations of this Court in the case of Jose Da Costa v. Bascora Sadasiva Sinai Narcornim (1976) 2 SCC 917 is of some relevance. This Court in para 31 of the Report observed: (SCC p. 925) 31. Before ascertaining the effect of the enactments aforesaid passed by the Central Legislature on pending suits or appeals, it would be appropriate to bear in mind two well-established principles. The first is that while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment (see Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, AIR 1927 PC 242). The second is that a right of appeal being a substantive right the institution of a suit carries with it the implication that all successive appeals available under the law then in force would be preserved to the parties to the suit throughout the rest of .....

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..... e changed retrospectively, even if the cause of action had accrued prior to the change (of forum for trial). And further, that an accused has no vested right, to be tried by a particular procedure, or by a particular court (forum), except insofar as there is a mandate (express or implied) in the amending statute, or a constitutional bar or objection, or the violation of any fundamental right. Therefore, when the amendments herein vested exclusive jurisdiction in a particular court (-the Court of Session, consequent upon the 2002 Amendment Act , and the Special Court, consequent upon the 2014 Amendment Act ), adjudication could thereupon have only been rendered by the court with which special jurisdiction was vested (by the respective amendments). In such a situation, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the special enactment would also have an overriding effect. It was therefore contended, that in the absence of any prejudice shown to the private parties before this Court, it was not open to them, to assail the express determination rendered for change of forum , in the first instance, by the 2002 Amendment Act , and thereafter, by the 2014 A .....

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..... gh Court was erroneous in law. 28. Antulay subsequently came up for consideration in Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar (1995) 4 SCC 392. In para 14 of the Report, it was noted that the express language of Section 7(1) of the CLA Act, took away the right of transfer of cases contained in the Code to any other court which was not a Special Court and that this was notwithstanding anything contained in Section 406 and Section 407 of the Code. This is what was said in this regard: (SCC p. 400) 14. Coming now to A.R. Antulay case we find that the principles of law laid down in the majority judgment, to which Mr Jethmalani drew our attention have no manner of application herein. There questions arose as to whether (i) the High Court could transfer a case triable according to the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 ( the 1952 Act , for short) by a Special Court constituted thereunder to another court, which was not a Special Court and (ii) the earlier order of the Supreme Court transferring the case pending before the Special Court to the High Court was valid and proper. In answering both the questions in the negative the learned Judges, expressing the majority view, observed that (i) .....

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..... and 41, which are reproduced below: 40. Provisions of Section 11-B being procedural in nature can be applied retrospectively. The Appellate Tribunal made a manifest error by not appreciating that Section 11-B is procedural in nature. It is a time-honoured principle if the law affects matters of procedure, then prima facie it applies to all actions, pending as well as future. [See K. Kapen Chako v. Provident Investment Co. (P) Ltd. (1977) 1 SCC 593, wherein A.N. Ray, C.J. laid down those principles]. 41. Maxwell in his Interpretation of Statutes also indicated that no one has a vested right in any course of procedure. A person s right of either prosecution or defence is conditioned by the manner prescribed for the time being by the law and if by the Act of Parliament, the mode of proceeding is altered, then no one has any other right than to proceed under the alternate mode. (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., p. 216.) These principles, enunciated by Maxwell, have been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in its Constitution Bench judgment in Union of India v. Sukumar Pyne, AIR 1966 SC 1206. (iv) Last of all, reliance was placed on A.R. Antulay .....

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..... al/specific forum for adjudication, then only such special/specific forum can try matters arising under the enactment. It was submitted, that in such matters, the jurisdiction of all other courts stood excluded. 15. In order to support the contentions advanced on behalf of the SEBI, as have been recorded in the preceding two paragraphs, it was also the contention of the learned Additional Solicitor General, that procedure and forum for trial postulated by a special law the SEBI Act , would always have an overriding effect over the general law the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this behalf, it was contended, that Section 26 of the SEBI Act (consequent upon the 2002 Amendment Act ) expressly provided, that no court inferior to that of a court of session shall try any offence punishable under this Act . It was therefore asserted, that there was no room for any doubt, that the aforesaid amendment was made retrospectively, with effect from 29.10.2002. It was submitted, that there was no ambiguity in the aforesaid provisions and it was not possible even on a close examination of the text of the above amendment, to construe otherwise. And that, after 29.10.2002 (i.e., th .....

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..... learned senior counsel, Section 26(2) of the SEBI Act amended by the 2002 Amendment Act held the field (with effect from 29.10.2002), and that, adjudication after 29.10.2002 could only be made (for offences arising under the SEBI Act ), by a Court of Session. 16. Mr. C.A. Sundaram, Senior Advocate, represented most of the private parties (some appellants, and some respondents). He acknowledged the proposition canvassed on behalf of the SEBI, on the basis of the judgments cited during the course of hearing. It was however his contention, that the proposition canvassed on behalf of the SEBI was the general view, on the subject of change in procedural law, which included change of forum . It was his pointed assertion, that there was a basic difference between change in substantive law, change in procedural law, and change in procedure constituting a change in forum . He emphasized, that there was an important and subtle difference in the latter two. It was submitted, that change in forum need not always be procedural. Learned counsel acknowledged, that change in substantive law was generally prospective (more so, in a case of criminal jurisprudence). In this behalf, he pla .....

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..... m already seized of the matter is done away with, expressly or by necessary implication, all pending proceedings would continue to be dealt with by the forum where the matter was originally instituted. While expounding the aforesaid position, learned senior counsel, representing the private parties acknowledged, that the proposition canvassed on behalf of the SEBI, with reference to forum would be applicable, to the second category, namely, to cases wherein proceedings were yet to be instituted. It was acknowledged by learned counsel, that in matters where the proceedings were yet to be instituted, the legally justified assumption would be, that they would have to be instituted in the newly created forum , despite the fact, that the cause had occurred when the forum postulated was the one envisaged under the unamended enactment. 19. Insofar as the present controversy is concerned, it was sought to be asserted by learned senior counsel, that the amendment of forum for trial, through the 2002 Amendment Act could not be described as purely procedural, as the same was demonstrably substantive. Firstly, because the change in forum was merely consequential to substantive .....

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..... at Bheraghat Police Station. On the date of the registration of the case the offences in question were triable by a Magistrate of First Class in terms of the First Schedule of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. That position underwent a change on account of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act of 2007 introduced by Madhya Pradesh Act 2 of 2008 which amended the First Schedule of the 1973 Code and among others made offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC triable by the Court of Session instead of a Magistrate of First Class. The amendment received the assent of the President on 14-2-2008 and was published in Madhya Pradesh Gazette (Extraordinary) on 22-2-2008. 3. Consequent upon the amendment aforementioned, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class appears to have committed to the Sessions Court all cases involving commission of offences under the above provisions. In one such case the Sessions Judge, Jabalpur, made a reference to the High Court on the following two distinct questions of law: 3.1. (i) Whether the recent amendment dated 22-2-2008 in Schedule I of the Criminal Procedure Code is to be applied retrospectively? 3.2. (ii) Consequen .....

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..... riminal Procedure, 1973 in its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh. Be it enacted by the Madhya Pradesh Legislature in the Fifty-eighth Year of the Republic of India as follows: 1. Short title.-(1) This Act may be called the Code of Criminal Procedure (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 2007. 2. Amendment of Central Act No. 2 of 1974 in its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh.-The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act ), shall in its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh, be amended in the manner hereinafter provided. 3. Amendment of Section 167.- * * * 4. Amendment of the First Schedule.-In the First Schedule to the Principal Act, under the heading I-Offences under the Indian Penal Code in Column 6 against Sections 317, 318, 326, 363, 363-A, 365, 377, 392, 393, 394, 409, 435, 466, 467, 468, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477 and 477-A, for the words Magistrate of the First Class wherever they occur, the words Court of Session shall be substituted. 7. The First Schedule to the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 classifies offences under IPC for purposes of determining whether or not a particul .....

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..... e said to be instituted in a court only when the court takes cognizance of the offence alleged therein and that cognizance can be taken in the manner set out in clauses (a) to (c) of Section 190(1) CrPC. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Kamlapati Trived i v. State of W.B. (1980) 2 SCC 91, where this Court interpreted the provisions of Section 190 CrPC and reiterated the legal position set out in the earlier decisions. 8. Applying the test judicially recognised in the above pronouncements to the case at hand, we have no hesitation in holding that no case was pending before the Magistrate against the appellant as on the date the Amendment Act came into force. That being so, the Magistrate on receipt of a charge-sheet which was tantamount to institution of a case against the appellant was duty-bound to commit the case to the Sessions as three of the offences with which he was charged were triable only by the Court of Session. The case having been instituted after the Amendment Act had taken effect, there was no need to look for any provision in the Amendment Act for determining whether the amendment was applicable even to the pending matters as on the date of .....

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..... that the change in law was merely a change of forum i.e. a change of adjectival or procedural law and not of substantive law. It is a well-established proposition that such a change of law operates retrospectively and the person has to go to the new forum even if his cause of action or right of action accrued prior to the change of forum. He will have a vested right of action but not a vested right of forum. If by express words the new forum is made available only to causes of action arising after the creation of the forum, then the retrospective operation of the law is taken away. Otherwise the general rule is to make it retrospective. The expressions arising out of an accident occurring in sub-section (1) and over the area in which the accident occurred , mentioned in sub-section (2) clearly show that the change of forum was meant to be operative retrospectively irrespective of the fact as to when the accident occurred. To that extent there was no difficulty in giving the answer in a simple way. But the provision of limitation of 60 days contained in sub-section (3) created an obstacle in the straight application of the well-established principle of law. If the accident ha .....

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..... and that clauses (b) and (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20 of TADA apply to the cases which were pending investigation on the date when the amendment came into force. The Court summed up the legal position with regard to the procedural law being retrospective in its operation and the right of a litigant to claim that he be tried by a particular Court, in the following words: (SCC p. 633, para 26) (i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits. (ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature. (iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law. (iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively wh .....

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..... u Prosad Roy Chowdhury AIR 1967 SC 1419, CIT v. R. Sharadamma (1996) 8 SCC 388 and R. Kapilnath v. Krishna (2003) 1 SCC 444. The ratio of the above decisions, in our opinion, was not directly applicable to the fact situation before the Full Bench. The Full Bench of the High Court was concerned with cases where evidence had been wholly or partly recorded before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class when the same were committed to the Court of Session pursuant to the amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure. The decisions upon which the High Court placed reliance did not, however, deal with those kind of fact situations. 16. In Manujendra Dutt case the proceedings in the Court in which the suit was instituted had concluded. At any rate, no vested right could be claimed for a particular forum for litigation. The decisions of this Court referred to by us earlier settle the legal position which bears no repetition. It is also noteworthy that the decision in Manujendra Dutt case was subsequently overruled by a seven-Judge Bench of this Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal (1979) 4 SCC 214 though on a different legal point. 17. So also the decision of this Court in R .....

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..... rospectively. But there is another equally important principle viz. that a statute should not be so construed as to create new disabilities or obligations or impose new duties in respect of transactions which were complete at the time the amending Act came into force (see A Debtor, In re, ex p Debtor (1936) 1 Ch 237 (CA) and Attorney General v. Vernazza 1960 AC 965). The same principle is embodied in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act which is to the following effect: * * * 6. The effect of the application of this principle is that pending cases, although instituted under the old Act but still pending, are governed by the new procedure under the amended law, but whatever procedure was correctly adopted and concluded under the old law cannot be opened again for the purpose of applying the new procedure. In the present case, the trial of the appellant was taken up by the Special Judge, Santhal Parganas when Section 5(3) of the Act was still operative. The conviction of the appellant was pronounced on 31-3-1962 by the Special Judge, Santhal Parganas, long before the amending Act was promulgated. It is not hence possible to accept the argument of the appellant th .....

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..... re a Metropolitan Magistrate (or, a Judicial Magistrate, as the case may be). In order to substantiate the instant contention, learned counsel, in the first instance, placed reliance on the statement of objects and reasons of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Amendment) Act, 2002. The same is extracted hereunder: The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Act, 1992 was enacted to provide for the establishment of a Board to protect the interests of investors in securities and to promote the development of, and to regulate, the securities market and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 2. Recently many shortcomings in the legal provisions of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 have been noticed, particularly with respect to inspection, investigation and enforcement. Currently, the SEBI can call for information, undertake inspections, conduct enquiries and audits of stock exchanges, mutual funds, intermediaries, issue directions, initiate prosecution, order suspension or cancellation of registration. Penalties can also be imposed in case of violation of the provisions of the Act or the rules or the regulations . However, t .....

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..... ion of such investigation or inquiry for taking any of the following measures, namely, to-- (A) suspend the trading of any security in a recognised stock exchange; (B) restrain persons from accessing the securities market and prohibit any person associated with securities market to buy, sell or deal in securities; (C) suspend any office-bearer of any stock exchange or self-regulatory organisation from holding such position; (D) impound and retain the proceeds or securities in respect of any transaction which is under investigation; (E) attach, after passing of an order on an application made for approval by the Judicial Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction, for a period not exceeding one month, one or more bank account or accounts of any intermediary or any person associated with the securities market in any manner involved in violation of any of the provisions of this Act, or the rules or the regulations made thereunder; (F) direct any intermediary or any person associated with the securities market in any manner not to dispose of or alienate an asset forming part of any transaction which is under investigation; (iii) regulating or prohibiting for .....

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..... t proper for this Court to draw any inference, merely on the premise, that a procedural amendment had been contemplated by changing the existing forum (to that of the Court of Session). It was submitted, that an overall analysis of the 2002 Amendment Act would demonstrate, that the erstwhile penalties under the original SEBI Act (under Section 24), were of a trivial nature. Inasmuch as, the contravention of the provisions of the SEBI Act or any rules and regulations made thereunder, was punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both . Referring to sub-section (2) of Section 24 it was submitted, that for failing to comply with the directions or orders of adjudicating officers, under the SEBI Act , the punishment provided for, was of not less than one month, but which may extend to three years or with fine which shall not be less than two thousand rupees but which may extend to ten thousand rupees or with both. . In consonance with the above level of punishment, it was not only appropriate, but also justified, that the proceedings should be conducted by the Court of a Metropolitan Magistrate (or, a Judicial Magistrate, a .....

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..... nce of the case before the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Section 274(2) of the Act was amended with effect from April 1, 1971 by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act ) so as to read as follows: Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of Section 271 if in a case falling under clause (c) of that sub-section, the amount of income (as determined by the Income Tax Officer on assessment) in respect of which the particulars have been concealed or inaccurate particulars have been furnished exceeds a sum of twenty-five thousand rupees the Income Tax Officer shall refer the case to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, who shall, for the purpose, have all the powers conferred under this chapter for the imposition of penalty. xxx xxx xxx 18. It may be stated at the outset that the general principle is that a law which brings about a change in the forum does not affect pending actions unless intention to the contrary is clearly shown. One of the modes by which such an intention is shown is by making a provision for change-over of proceedings, from the court or the tribunal where they .....

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..... nto force w.e.f. the 18th day of May, 1994. The learned counsel for the appellant cited a number of decisions laying down the law as to how an amendment in legislation brought into force during the pendency of legal proceedings has to be given effect to. Without stating the decisions so cited, suffice it to observe that all those decisions deal with substantive rights having been created or abolished during the pendency of legal proceedings and depending on the legislative intent and the language employed by the legislature in the relevant enactment, this Court has determined the impact of the legislation on pending proceedings and the power of the court to take note of change in law and suitably mould the relief consistently with the legislative changes. So far as the present case is concerned, the only submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the effect of the amendment is to deprive the Court of Munsiff of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the proceedings for eviction over such premises as the suit premises are. In other words, it is a change in forum brought during the pendency of the proceedings. The correct approach to be adopted in such cases .....

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..... final conclusions. As such, it was submitted, that reliance on the instant judgment, would obviate the necessity of reference to other judgments of this Court (on the question in hand). Learned counsel placed reliance on the observations and conclusions, recorded in the Videocon International Limited case (supra), by placing reliance on the following paragraphs: 7. The High Court by the impugned order arrived at the conclusion, that such of the appeals as had been filed before the coming into force of the amended Section 15-Z, would not be affected by the amendment, and the High Court had the jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the same. The High Court also concluded, that such of the appeals as had been filed after the coming into force of the amended Section 15-Z, would not be maintainable. xxx xxx xxx 29. According to the learned counsel, a perusal of the above judgment in Dhadi Sahu case revealed, that change of forum could be substantive or procedural. It would be procedural when the remedy has yet to be availed of. But where the remedy had already been availed of (under an existing statutory provision), the right crystallised into a vested substantive rig .....

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..... privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. 25. The opening words of Section 6 specify the field over which it is operative. It is operative over all the enactments under the General Clauses Act, Central Act or regulations made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act. It also clarifies in case of repeal of any provision under the aforesaid Act or regulation, unless a different intention appears from such repeal, it would have no affect over the matters covered in its clauses viz. (a) to (e). It clearly specifies that the repeal shall not revive anything not in force or in existence or affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed statute, affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed under the repealed statute and a .....

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..... ealed statute had any vested right. In case he had, then pending proceedings would be saved . However, in cases where Section 6 is applicable, it is not merely a vested right but all those covered under various clauses from (a) to (e) of Section 6. We have already clarified that right and privilege under it is limited to those which is acquired and accrued . In such cases pending proceedings are to be continued as if the statute has not been repealed. 36. In view of the aforesaid legal principle emerging, we come to the conclusion that since proceeding for the eviction of the tenant was pending when the repealing Act came into operation, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would be applicable in the present case, as it is landlord s accrued right in terms of Section 6. Clause ( c ) of Section 6 refers to any right which may not be limited as a vested right but is limited to be an accrued right. The words any right accrued in Section 6( c ) are wide enough to include landlord s right to evict a tenant in case proceeding was pending when repeal came in. Thus a pending proceeding before the Rent Controller for the eviction of a tenant on the date when the repealing Act cam .....

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..... , the instant contention is wholly unacceptable in view of the mandate contained in Sections 6 ( c ) and ( e ) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. While interpreting the aforesaid provisions this Court has held, that the amendment of a statute, which is not retrospective in operation, does not affect pending proceedings, except where the amending provision expressly or by necessary intendment provides otherwise. Pending proceedings are to continue as if the unamended provision is still in force. This Court has clearly concluded, that when a lis commences, all rights and obligations of the parties get crystallised on that date, and the mandate of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, simply ensures, that pending proceedings under the unamended provision remain unaffected. Herein also, therefore, our conclusion is the same as has already been rendered by us, in the foregoing paragraphs . 45. Having concluded in the manner expressed in the foregoing paragraphs, it is not necessary for us to examine the main contention, advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant, namely, that the amendment to Section 15-Z of the SEBI Act, contemplates a mere change of forum of the .....

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..... udicated accordingly. 25. Learned counsel for the private parties, emphasized the manner in which legislative intent, in such matters, is usually expressed. It was submitted, that it was usually provided for the amending provision itself. This, according to learned counsel, could be done by expressly providing, that the pending matters would stand transferred to the new forum . The same objective could be achieved, by denuding the existing forum from jurisdiction. In order to demonstrate the aforesaid, learned counsel placed reliance on Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. Amrit Lal Co., (2001) 8 SCC 397, wherein this Court held as under: 17. The aforesaid decision holds that tenants have no vested right under the Rent Act. In effect, the law is well settled. Prior to the enactment of the Rent Act the relationship between the landlord and the tenant was governed by the general law, maybe the Transfer of Property Act or any other law in relation to the property. The Rent Act merely provides a protection to a tenant as against the unbridled power of the landlord under the general law of the land. The Rent Act gives protection to the tenant from being ejected except o .....

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..... he repealing Act came into force would not be affected by the repealing statute and will be continued and concluded in accordance with the law as existed under the repealed statute. 26. Reliance was also placed on Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa v. Dhadi Sahu, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 257, and invited our attention to the following: 5. Pending reference of the case before the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Section 274(2) of the Act was amended with effect from April 1, 1971 by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act ) so as to read as follows: Notwithstanding anything contained in clause ( iii ) of sub-section (1) of Section 271 if in a case falling under clause ( c ) of that sub-section, the amount of income (as determined by the Income Tax Officer on assessment) in respect of which the particulars have been concealed or inaccurate particulars have been furnished exceeds a sum of twenty-five thousand rupees the Income Tax Officer shall refer the case to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, who shall, for the purpose, have all the powers conferred under this chapter for the imposition of penalty . xxx xxx .....

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..... nt to note that the proceedings in the Court of Munsiff had already stood concluded by the time the amendment came into force. It is not disputed that Amendment Act 32 of 1994 has not been given a retrospective operation and there is nothing in the Act to infer retrospectivity by necessary implication. The Act has been specifically brought into force w.e.f. the 18th day of May, 1994 . The learned counsel for the appellant cited a number of decisions laying down the law as to how an amendment in legislation brought into force during the pendency of legal proceedings has to be given effect to. Without stating the decisions so cited, suffice it to observe that all those decisions deal with substantive rights having been created or abolished during the pendency of legal proceedings and depending on the legislative intent and the language employed by the legislature in the relevant enactment, this Court has determined the impact of the legislation on pending proceedings and the power of the court to take note of change in law and suitably mould the relief consistently with the legislative changes. So far as the present case is concerned, the only submission made by the learned couns .....

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..... n Exchange Management Act, 1999 and thereby effectively transferring the petitioners case pending before the Magistrate to the Special Judge is said to be unlawful since the transfer is to a court that has no jurisdiction to try the offence. 26. Part II of the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the Code ) provides that for an offence punishable with imprisonment for three years and upwards but not more than seven years, the case would be triable by a Magistrate of the First Class. Section 56 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (for short FERA ) now repealed by the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 provides, inter alia, that for a violation of its provisions, the maximum punishment would be imprisonment which may extend to seven years and with fine. Therefore, effectively transferring the petitioners case to a Special Judge (of the rank of a Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge) functioning under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (for short the CLA Act ) meant its trial by a court that lacked jurisdiction over the subject-matter . In support of this contention, great reliance was placed on some .....

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..... o be and will always be exercised in the interest of justice. But that is not to say that an order can be made by this Court which is inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. An order which this Court can make in order to do complete justice between the parties, must not only be consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws . Since the order of this Court transferring the case from the Special Judge to the High Court was contrary to the statutory law and (as held in a later part in Antulay) contrary to Article 14 and Article 19 of the Constitution, the order of transfer was liable to be set aside. In this context, this Court also noted that the power to create or enlarge jurisdiction is legislative in character and no court, whether superior or inferior or both combined, could enlarge the jurisdiction of a court. On this basis, inter alia, this Court concluded that the transfer of Antulay case from the Special Judge to the High Court was erroneous in law. 30. It was contended that assuming that at law .....

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..... tition was considered to be an appropriate form of appeal from the judgment in a suit of small causes nature. A full Bench of the Madras High Court in P.P.P. Chidambara Nadar v. C.P.A. Rama Nadar and Others AIR 1937 Mad 385, had to decide whether with reference to Article 182(2) of the Limitation Act 1908, the term appeal was used in a restrictive sense so as to exclude revision petitions and the expression appellate court was to be confined to a court exercising appellate, as opposed to, revisional powers. After an exhaustive examination of the case law including the decisions of the Privy Council mentioned above the full Bench expressed the view that Article 182(2) applied to civil revisions as well and not only to appeals in the narrow sense of that terms as used in the Civil Procedure Code. In Secretary of State for India in Counci l v. British India Steam Navigation Company 13 CLJ 90, an order passed by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, was held to be an order made or passed in appeal within the meaning of Section 39 of the Latters Patent. Mookerji, J., who delivered the judgment of the division Benc .....

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..... making a distinction between a petition for revision and an appeal. 28. While repudiating the submissions advanced by Mr. C.A. Sundaram, Ms. Pinky Anand, learned Additional Solicitor General of India, submitted that as long as the rights of the private parties, to prefer an appeal stands sustained, none of them can plead prejudice. In this behalf, reference was made to Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to contend, that the accused would not be deprived of any provision for preferring an appeal, after the forum was altered from that of the Metropolitan Magistrate (or, Judicial Magistrate of the first class), to the Court of Session. It was submitted, that Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly postulates, that an appeal from the conviction against trial by the Court of Session or Additional Sessions Judge, shall lie before the High Court. In this behalf, it was sought to be pointed out that even after the 2002 Amendment Act , upon trial of a case by the Court of Session (or, Additional Sessions Judge), an appeal would lie, before the High Court. It was sought to be highlighted, that the above position was further clarified in the 2014 Amendment .....

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..... thing which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. Deception of any person is common to the second and third requirements of the provision. The said requirements are alternative to each other and this is made significantly clear by use of disjunctive conjunction or . The definition of the offence of cheating embraces some cases in which no transfer of property is occasioned by the deception and some in which such a transfer occurs. Deception is the quintessence of the offence. The essential ingredients to attract Section 420 are: (i) cheating; (ii) dishonest inducement to deliver property or to make, alter or destroy any valuable security or anything which is sealed or signed or is capable of being converted into a valuable security; and (iii) the mens rea of the accused at the time of making the inducement. The making of a false representation is one of the ingredients for the offence of cheating under Section 420. (See Bashirbhai Mohamedbhai v. State of Bombay AIR 1960 SC 979.) Based on the observations extracted above, it was submitted, t .....

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..... ion pending in a High Court, should be dealt with on the same footing as a pending appeal, it would have enacted accordingly. But in the absence of any such enactment, we may infer that the power of revision vested in the High Court under Chapter XXXII of the Code, was left untouched - to be exercised according to the exigencies of each case. The High Court is not bound to entertain an application in revision, or having entertained one, to order substitution in every case. It is not bound the other way, namely, to treat a pending application in revision as having abated by reason of the fact that there was a composite sentence of imprisonment and fine, as some of the Single Judge decisions placed before us, would seem to indicate . The High Court has been left complete discretion to deal with a pending matter on the death of the petitioner in accordance with the requirements of justice. The petitioner in the High Court may have been an accused person who has been convicted and sentenced, or he may have been a complainant who may have been directed under S. 250 of the Code to pay compensation to an accused person upon his discharge or acquittal. Whether it was an accused person o .....

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..... nsfer of a case from a Magistrate to a Special Judge does not take away this procedural facility available to the petitioners. It only changes the forum and as already held above, the petitioners have no right to choose the forum in which to file an appeal or move a petition for revising an interlocutory order. It was accordingly the contention of learned counsel for SEBI, for the accused cannot make out any grievance to the effect that the change of forum , in the facts and circumstances of the present case, has adversely affected their vested right. 30. It was also highlighted by the Additional Solicitor General, that prior to the 2002 Amendment Act , the postulated punishment under Section 24(1) of the SEBI Act , extended to one year of sentence and fine, or both; and under Section 24(2) thereof, the prescribed punishment was a minimum of one month, which could extend to three years or with fine, which would not be less than rupees two thousand, but not more than rupees ten thousand, or with both. It was pointed out, that even at that juncture, the forum of trial under Sections 24(1) and 24(2) of the SEBI Act was the same, namely, No court inferior to that of a Me .....

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..... ng the provision absolute, peremptory and imperative becomes loud and clear and ordinarily has to be inferred as such . There being nothing in the context otherwise, in our judgment, there has to be clear ninety-six hours interval between the accused being charged for which he is to be tried and his arraignment and interval time in Rule 34 must be read as absolute. There is a purpose behind this provision: that purpose is that before the accused is called upon for trial, he must be given adequate time to give a cool thought to the charge or charges for which he is to be tried, decide about his defence and ask the authorities, if necessary, to take reasonable steps in procuring the attendance of his witnesses. He may even decide not to defend the charge(s) but before he decides his line of action, he must be given clear ninety-six hours. And, on the subject in hand, reference was made to Mannalal Khetan v. Kedar Nath Khetan, (1977) 2 SCC 424, wherefrom the Court s attention was drawn to the following observations: 17. In Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Rampur this Court referred to various tests for finding out when a provision is mandatory or directory. The .....

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..... of offences under the SEBI Act could have been conducted by a Court of Session even prior to the 2002 Amendment Act , there would be nothing wrong about it. The provision, as it existed prior to the 2002 Amendment Act , clearly contemplated that even a Court of Session could try offences postulated by the provisions of the SEBI Act . As such, when the 2002 Amendment Act provided that adjudication of offences under the SEBI Act would be by a court not inferior to that of a Court of Session, the position postulated prior to the aforesaid amendment cannot be stated to have been breached. It may well be said to be curtailed from the original position. But, it could not be said to be in conflict with the original position. In a similar manner of understanding, even after the 2014 Amendment Act , which provided that offences arising under the SEBI Act would be tried by a Special Court (- Section 26B), the position cannot be taken to be at variance from the one, as it existed prior to the 2002 amendment, as also, the position as it existed after the 2002 Amendment Act . The reason for the above inference is, that a Special Court (notified by the Central Government) was to .....

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..... , while projecting the claim of the accused. We are not oblivious of the conclusions recorded by this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa v. Dhadi Sahu, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 257, wherein it was held that a law which brings about a change in the forum does not affect pending actions, unless an intention to the contrary is clearly shown. One of the modes in which such intentions can be shown is, by making a provision for change for a proceeding from the court or the tribunal where it was pending, to the court or tribunal under which the new law gets jurisdiction. In the said judgment, this Court also observed, that it was true that no litigant had any vested right in the matter of procedural law, but where the question is of the change of forum , it ceases to be a question of procedure only, with reference to pending matter. The forum of appeal or proceedings, it was held, was a vested right as opposed to pure procedure to be followed before a particular forum . It was therefore concluded, that a right becomes vested when the proceedings are initiated, in spite of change of jurisdiction/forum by way of amendment thereafter. So also, in Manujendra Dutt v. Purnedu Prosad Roy .....

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..... could be substantive or procedural. It may well be procedural when the remedy was yet to be availed of, but where the remedy had already been availed of (under an existing statutory provision), the right may be treated as having crystalised into a vested substantive right. 37. In the latter situation referred to (and debated) in the preceding paragraph, where the remedy had been availed of prior to the amendment, even according to learned counsel for the private parties, unless the amending provision by express words, or by necessary implication, mandates the transfer of proceedings to the forum introduced by the amendment, the forum postulated by the unamended provision, would continue to have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon pending matters (matters filed before amendment). In view of the above, we are of the considered view, that no vested right can be claimed with reference to forum , where the concerned court, had not taken cognizance and commenced trial proceedings, in consonance with the unamended provision. 38. Insofar as the matters where proceedings had already commenced before the amendment, change of forum for trial came into effect, it is apparent from .....

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..... egregate the cases arising under the SEBI Act into two categories, is clearly and expressly ruled out, by the language adopted in the provision itself. We are of the view, that Section 26B was categorically explicit, because of the clear intent expressed therein, that all offences committed under the SEBI Act , prior to the introduction of the 2014 Amendment Act , would be tried by the Special Court. We are therefore of the view, that there is absolutely no ambiguity, that after the 2014 Amendment Act , proceedings in respect of offences committed prior thereto, could only be tried by a Special Court. 41. We have intentionally overlooked and not extracted the words shall be taken cognizance of and tried by the Special Court , relied upon by learned counsel for the accused, to emphasise that the amendment of forum contemplated under Section 26B would be applicable only to matters where cognizance had not been taken. It is not possible, either from the language of the provision, or even from the surrounding circumstances, to arrive at the advocated position. We are of the view, that the legislative intent was clearly contrary to the one suggested. Ordinarily, cognizanc .....

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..... ed as summons-cases. It was pointed out, that the trial of cases after the 2002 Amendment Act , could only be as warrant-cases. In this behalf, it was sought to be asserted, that under Section 2(x) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a warrant-case is a case relating to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years . In conjunction with the definition of warrant-cases, learned counsel placed reliance on the definition of summons cases by inviting the attention of the Court to Section 2(w), wherein a summons case is defined as a case relating to an offence, and not being a warrant-case . During the course of the instant submission, learned counsel inter alia invited our attention to Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which deals with trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws, so as to conclude, that for offences punishable with imprisonment for more than seven years, the trial is liable to be conducted by a Court of Session. In this behalf, the pointed attention of this Court was also drawn to Schedule I, Part II appended to the Code of Criminal Procedure, which comprises of classification of .....

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..... 454 and 456 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860); (vi) insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, under section 504 and criminal intimidation punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both, under section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860); (vii) abetment of any of the foregoing offences; (viii) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences, when such attempt is an offence; (ix) any offence constituted by an act in respect of which a complaint may be made under section 20 of the Cattle-trespass Act, 1871 (1 of 1871). (2) When, in the course of a summary trial it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that it is undesirable to try it summarily, the Magistrate shall recall any witnesses who may have been examined and proceed to re-hear, the case in the manner provided by this Code. xxx xxx xxx 262. Procedure for summary trials. (1) In trials under this Chapter, the procedure specified in this Code for the trial of summons-case shall be followed except as hereinafter mentioned. (2) No sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding three months s .....

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..... IR 1966 SC 1206; Nani Gopal Mitra v. State of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 1636; New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra (1975) 2 SCC 840; Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra (1994) 4 SCC 602; Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar (1995) 4 SCC 392, and Kamlesh Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 15 SCC 460. We are of the view, that the legal proposition canvassed, has been correctly advanced. The question however is, whether it can be applied to the instant case, based on the submissions recorded in the foregoing paragraph. 45. Learned Additional Solicitor General, vehemently contested the above submissions. It was pointed out, that prior to amendment in the SEBI Act with effect from 29.10.2002, the punishment prescribed was as under: (a) Section 24(1) of the SEBI Act imprisonment was for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine or both, (b) Section 24(2) of the SEBI Act imprisonment was for a term which may extend to three years or with fine which shall not be less than two thousand rupees but which may extend to ten thousand or with both. It was highlighted, that Section 2(x) of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines a warrant case , as a case relating to .....

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..... n 24(1) and 24(2) of the SEBI Act . As the SEBI Act had provided different punishment under Sections 24(1) and 24(2), for trial before the same forum , the plea raised by learned counsel for the accused, cannot be accepted. 47. Furthermore, it was pointed out, that the trial under Chapter XIX is for warrant cases (starting from Section 238 to 250). Chapter XX is for Summons Case (starting from Sections 251 to 259). Both these chapters are very exhaustive in nature, and prescribe complete procedure in itself, and provided sufficient protections. Provisions for summary trial, on the other hand, are in Chapter XXI. Further, summary trial is at the discretion of the magistrate and cannot be sought as a matter of right. The language of Section 260(1) is may, if he thinks fit, try in a summary way . The language of section is crystal clear. Section 260(2) even provides, that the magistrate can try the case in the regular manner even after deciding to proceed summarily, at any time, if he finds during the course of summary trial, that the nature of the case is such, that it is undesirable to try it summarily. It was accordingly asserted, that the accused under the SEBI Act .....

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..... 4 If punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for more than 7 years, Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session If punishable with imprisonment for 3 years, and upwards but not more than 7 years, Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first class If punishable with imprisonment for less than 3 years or with fine only. Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate It It is imperative for us to record, that the classification of offences other than the offences under the Indian Penal Code, and the courts by which such offences would be triable, expressed in Part II of the First Schedule, must essentially be read with Section 26 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Part II of the First Schedule, would therefore be applicable only in cases where, the other laws (-other than the Indian Penal Code) do not postulate the adjudicatory court. In such cases, offences (-provided for under other laws) if punishable with death, imprisonment for life or impri .....

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..... Code of Criminal Procedure, the same would need an express order of empowerment for holding summary proceedings, before the court concerned adopts the summary procedure. And that is exactly why, summary proceedings are expressly provided for, by different legislative enactments, i.e., where the competent court for trial is determined under Section 26(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It may illustratively be noticed, that when legislative intent was to provide for summary proceedings, the legislation itself expressly provided for the same, as under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and the Food Adulteration Act, 1954, wherein summary procedure has been legislatively provided for. It is therefore apparent, that the issue whether proceeding can be conducted by adopting the summary procedure cannot be inferred, when the court for trial is determined under Section 26(b) aforementioned. Both the above enactments (the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; and the Food Adulteration Act, 1954), are regulated by Section 26(b) aforementioned, just as the SEBI Act . The number of legislative enactments providing for summary proceedings can be multiplied. What is of importance is, t .....

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..... plications for the accused. It was pointed out, that the right of revision being a valuable right of the accused, the deprivation of the above valuable right, emerging from the change of forum from the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate (or, Judicial Magistrate of the first class) by the 2002 Amendment Act , and by the 2014 Amendment Act , should not be considered as a trivial procedural issue. It was submitted, that the taking away of the right of revision from an accused, has to be considered as a substantial procedural deprivation. It was submitted, that cases where an amending enactment, takes away favourable rights, by replacing the same with an alternative which is less advantageous, would violate the fundamental rights of the accused. On the instant aspect of the matter, learned counsel placed reliance on the State of West Bengal v. Anwar All Sarkar Habib Mohamed, AIR 1952 SC 75, and drew the Court s attention to the following: 27. It was suggested that the reply to this query is that the Act itself being general and applicable to all persons and to all offences, cannot be said to discriminate in favour of or against any particular case or classes of persons or cas .....

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..... ons almost identical with those of the Ordinance. Section 3 of the Act empowers the State Government to constitute, by notification, Special Courts of criminal jurisdiction for such areas and to sit at such places as may be notified in the notification. Section 4 provides for appointment of a Special Judge to preside over a Special Court and it mentions the qualifications which a Special Judge should possess. Section 5(1) then lays down that a Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases as the State Government may, by general or special orders, in writing direct. Sections 6 to 15 set out in details the procedure which the Special Court has to follow in the trial of cases referred to it. Briefly stated, the trial is to be without any jury or assessors, and the Court has to follow the procedure that is laid down for trial of warrant cases by the Magistrate under the Criminal Procedure Code. The procedure for committal in the sessions cases is omitted altogether; the court's powers of granting adjournment are restricted and special provisions are made to deal with refractory accused and also for cases which are transferred from .....

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..... re. It was therefore contended, that the amendment of forum of trial, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, could not be treated as a mere procedural amendment, but was liable to be considered as having substantive adverse implication for the accused. In order to support his above assertion, learned counsel placed reliance on Krishnan v. Krishnaveni, (1997) 4 SCC 241, and invited our attention to the following: 7. It is seen that exercise of the revisional power by the High Court under Section 397 read with Section 401 is to call for the records of any inferior criminal court and to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court and to pass appropriate orders. The Court of Sessions and the Magistrates are inferior criminal courts to the High Court and Courts of Judicial Magistrate are inferior criminal courts to the Sessions Judge. Ordinarily, in the matter of exercise of power of revision by any High Court, Section 397 and Section 401 are required to be read together . Section 397 gives powers to the High Court to call for the records as .....

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..... d in paragraph 6 of the above judgment, which is extracted hereunder: 6. In our opinion, in the absence of statutory provisions, in terms applying to an application in revision, as there are those in Section 431 in respect of criminal appeals, the High Court has the power to pass such orders as to it may seem fit and proper, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction vested in it by Section 439 of the Code. Indeed, it is a discretionary power which has to be exercised in aid of justice. Whether or not the High Court will exercise its revisional jurisdiction in a given case, must depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case. The revisional powers of the High Court vested in it by Section 439 of the Code, read with Section 435, do not create any right in the litigant, but only conserve the power of the High Court to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognized rules of criminal jurisprudence, and that subordinate Criminal Courts do not exceed their jurisdiction, or abuse their powers vested in them by the Code . On the other hand, as already indicated, a right of appeal is a statutory right which has got to be recognized by the courts, and the right to a .....

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..... an appeal, may not apply to the case of revisional applications. In our opinion, therefore, the Bombay majority decision, in the absence of any statutory provisions in respect of criminal revisional cases, lays down the correct approach. Reference on the above issue, may also be made to Kamlesh Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 15 SCC 460, wherein this Court held as under: 41. This question proceeds on the assumption that there is a right of revision. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranab Kumar Mitra v. State of W.B . set the right issue at rest several decades ago. It was held that the power to revise an order is a discretionary power which is to be exercised in aid of justice and the exercise of that power will depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case . It was held: (AIR p. 147, para 6) 6. The revisional powers of the High Court vested in it by Section 439 of the Code read with Section 435, do not create any right in the litigant, but only conserve the power of the High Court to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognised rules of criminal jurisprudence, and that subordinate criminal courts do not exceed their jurisdiction, .....

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