TMI Blog1973 (3) TMI 139X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a tenant of the suit premises under the vendor. After the purchase, he attorned in favour of the appellant and has been paying rent. An eviction order was passed by consent against the appellant in H.R.C. No. 1924 of 1967 on January 27, 1968. He was given time till January 27, 1969, to vacate the premises, of which he was in occupation as a tenant, by virtue of the said decree. On the same day i.e. January 27, 1968, the appellant issued two notices to the respondent, his tenant in respect of the suit premises, terminating tenancy of the Respondent under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and calling upon him to quit and deliver vacant possession on February 29, 1968. The two notices were given because of the fact that the first notice had asked for vacant possession on February 28,1968 and to avoid any objection regarding the first notice probably the second notice was also given asking for possession on February 29, 1968. In both the notices, the appellant had referred to the purchase of the bungalow in question for his own occupation and also attributed knowledge of the said purpose to the tenant. There is a reference to the appellant being a tenant of premises No. 2, L ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an eviction order had been passed against him in H.R.C. No. 1924 of 1967. In any event, the order of eviction against the appellant is a collusive one and is only a devise to evict the respondent. He further pleaded that the purchase by the appellant itself is not lawful. Finally he raised a contention that the tenant, M/s. R.M. Seshadri, has spent enormous amounts on the house acting on the assurance of its previous owner that the house would never be sold and the tenant of the premises would never be evicted. Finally there is a challenge also to the notices determining the tenancy not being in accordance with law. 5. The enquiry before the Court of Small Causes appears to have commenced on January 16, 1969. The appellant was examined on that day as PW 1 and his evidence appears to have spread over till February 20, 1969. In the course of his evidence, he has spoken to him being a tenant of a house of which one Seethalakshmi Animal was the landlady and to her having filed an application for eviction against him, to his purchasing the present suit premises on October 23, 1967, for purposes of his own occupation, to the respondent having been a tenant against the original landlor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1969. No cost. The terms of compromise, which have been already set out, were also incorporated in the order. 6. It will be noted that the respondent had raised substantially the following defence to the application filed by the appellant, namely- (1) he was not a tenant of the premises and that on the other hand, the tenant of the premises was M/s. R.M. Seshadri, a partnership firm; (2) the claim of the appellant that he requires the house for the occupation is not bona fide; (3) the purchase of the premises by the appellant is not lawful; (4) the tenant, M/s. R.M. Seshadri, has spent enormous amounts by way of repairs and improvements; and (5) the notice determining the tenancy is not in accordance with law.- It was to meet the above defence and also to establish his claim of requiring the premises bona fide for his own occupation, the landlord-appellant gave the evidence and also produced about 45 exhibits. It is needless to state that the respondent, who is a retired I.C.S. officer and an advocate, must have been fully aware of the averments made by the landlord, the pleas raised in defence as well as the nature of the evidence led by the land ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ndent himself in order to put off his eviction from the suit property. 9. After the dismissal of the above suit, the appellant filed Execution Petition No. 953 of 1969 in the City Civil Court, Madras (which was the competent Court for purposes of execution) to execute the order of eviction against the respondent in H.R.G. No. 983 of 1968. The respondent filed E. A. No. 1314 of 1969 objecting to the execution of the decree on the ground that it was a nullity and inexecutable; and as such he prayed for the warrant of possession issued in Execution Petition to be recalled and to dismiss the Execution Petition itself. His main plea hi this application was that the decree sought to be executed was one based on compromise or consent without the Rent Control Court having satisfied itself by an independent consideration regarding the bona fide requirement Of the property by the landlord for his own occupation; and as such the decree contravened section 10 of the Act. This application was opposed by the appellant in a lengthy counter-affidavit. In this counter-affidavit, the landlord, after referring to the various items of evidence adduced before the court, which have been referred to e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pted by the court and his defence rejected. It was under those circumstances that the respondent unconditionally withdrew his defence and submitted to a decree for eviction. That conduct of the respondent clearly establishes that he has accepted as true the claim of the landlord that he bona fide required the premises for his own use and occupation. The materials on record also show that the court was satisfied about the bona fide requirement of the landlord and hence it accepted the compromise and made it a decree of court. Under those circumstances, the counsel contended that it cannot he said that the decree is one passed only on the basis of the compromise so as to make it void. 12. Mr. Tarkunde, learned Counsel for the respondent, urged that the decree for eviction has been passed exclusively on the basis of the compromise entered into by the parties. There is no indication that the court at any stage applied its mind and satisfied itself regarding the premises being required by the landlord bona fide for his own occupation. The relevant provision of the Act, the counsel pointed out, is quite clear and it makes it mandatory that the court must apply its mind and satisfy its ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ned with Sections 14 to 16 in this case. Sub-section 2 enumerates certain circumstances under which a landlord can ask for eviction. We are not also concerned with that provision. Sub-section 3 again enumerates certain other circumstances under which a landlord, subject to the provisions of Clause (d), can ask for possession of the building from the tenant. It is accepted by both parties that Clause (d) has no application. Sub-clause (i), which deals with a residential building, enables a landlord to ask for possession of a building in the circumstances mentioned therein. Under Sub-Clause (e), if the Controller is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide he may pass an order of eviction. 15. In this case, the landlord has asked for eviction on the ground that he requires the premises for his own occupation. The Controller can pass an order in his favour only if he is satisfied that his claim is bona fide. The statute says so and that has to be given full effect. The question is whether in the case before us, it can be stated that the Controller was so satisfied when he passed the order of eviction on March 31, 1969. 16. Our attention has been drawn to certain Eng ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as required by the statute, existed. This decision is certainly an authority for the proposition that a court ordering eviction has to satisfy itself that a statutory ground of eviction has been made out by a landlord. How exactly that satisfaction is to be expressed by the court or gathered from the materials, has not been laid down in this decision, as this Court was not faced with such a problem. 19. In Kaushalya Devi and Ors. v. Shri K.L. Bansal [1969]2SCR1048 , the question again arose under the same Delhi statute regarding the validity of a decree passed for eviction on compromise. The plaintiff therein filed a suit for eviction of the tenant on two grounds :-- (a) the premises were required for their own use; and (b) the tenant had committed default in payment of rent. The tenant filed a written statement denying both these allegations. He disputed the claim of the landlord regarding his requiring the premises for his own use bona fide and also the fact of his being in arrears. When the pleadings of the landlord and the tenant were in this state, both parties filed a compromise memo in and by which they agreed to the passing of a decree of eviction against ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r recovery of possession can be passed only if the court concerned is satisfied that one or other of the grounds mentioned in the section is established. This Court, further observed : From the facts mentioned earlier, it is seen that at no stage, the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question whether the alleged subletting is true or not. Order made by it does not show that it was satisfied that the subletting complained of has taken place, nor is there any other material on record to show that it was so satisfied. It is clear from the record that the court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. That being so there can be hardly any doubt that the court was not competent to pass the impugned decree. Hence the decree under execution must be held to be a nullity. 21. Reference was also made to the two earlier decisions holding such decrees to be void. It is significant to note that this Court in the last mentioned decision referred to the facts leading upto the compromise decree, namely, the basis of the claim of the landlord, the denial by the tenant and both of them filing a memo of compromise without any reference ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the landlord being bona fide, nevertheless such an order will be a nullity unless the Rent Controller has given his decision in favour of the landlord. In our opinion, this view is erroneous. 24. We have very exhaustively referred to the plea of the landlord as well as the evidence let in by him regarding his requiring the building bona fide for his own occupation. There is no controversy that if such a plea is established, an order of eviction of the tenant can be obtained by the landlord under Section 10 of the Act. The respondent no doubt at the initial stage denied the claim of the landlord. The landlord gave evidence on various matters with particular reference to his requiring the house bona fide for his own occupation. He had also filed, as referred by us earlier, as many as 45 exhibits, one of which was the order of eviction obtained against him. being Ext. 45. The respondent did not cross-examine the appellant. When the evidence of the landlord was before the court supported, as it was, by the innumerable exhibits filed by him, it can surely be stated that a stage had been reached when the Controller was called upon to apply his mind to the question whether the plea of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry. It is no doubt true that each case will have to be decided on its own facts to find out whether there is any material to justify an inference that an admission, express or implied, has been made by the tenant about the existence of one or other of the statutory grounds. But in the case on hand, we have already referred to the specific claim of the landlord as well as the fact of the tenant withdrawing his defence. According to us, such withdrawal of the defence expressly amounts to the tenant admitting that the landlord has made out his case regarding his requiring the premises for his own occupation being bona fide. In the three decisions of this Court, to which we have already referred, the position was entirely different. In none of those cases was there any material to show that the tenant had expressly or impliedly accepted the plea of the landlord as true. Therefore those decisions do not assist the respondent-tenant. 27. For all the reasons mentioned above, it cannot be held, in the particular circumstances of this c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nly influenced by the judgments of this Court in Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass [1969]2SCR432, Ferozi Lal v. Man Mal AIR1970SC794 and Kaushalya Devi v. K.L. Bansal [1969]2SCR1048. Before him the cases in Remon v. City of London Real Property Co. Ltd . [1921] 1 K.B. 49, Thorone v. Smith [1947] 1 K.B. 307 and Middleton v. Baldock (T.W.) [1950] 1 KB. 657 were cited in support of the contention taken on behalf of the landlord, as also the decision in Jagan Nath v. Jatinder Nath and Vas Dev v. Milkhi Ram . In spite of this he felt bound by the decisions of this Court and on the ground that the order of the Rent Controller on the face of it does not show that he had applied his mind and was satisfied that there was a bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord for his personal occupation it was a nullity. He thought that even if there was enough material before the Court when it passed the order of eviction by consent so long as the Rent Controller had not applied his mind and given his decision in the matter as to whether the respondent was bona fide in requiring the premises for his own occupation, the eviction order cannot be held to be an order passed on me ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... withdrawal of the defence regarding the statutory condition pleaded by the landlord, and the compromise following it that was accepted by the court, the tenant has accepted the plea of the landlord and it is futile to hold that the Rent Controller must again embark upon an enquiry regarding the requirement of the landlord being bona fide and adjudicate upon the same. He has also pointed out that the true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact, viz. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in Section 10 were shown to have existed when the court made the order; that the satisfaction of the court, which is no doubt a pre-requisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation borne out by a judicial finding; and that if at some stage the court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate mat the court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based. He has further pointed out that if the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... document, the passing of consideration etc. before it can pass a decree on the basis of either the mortgage or the promissory note. Therefore, the fact that under Section 10 the Controller has to be satisfied that the ground for eviction exists does not mean that his satisfaction cannot be based on the same considerations on the basis of which the civil courts can be satisfied. Let us take a suit on a promissory note. The defendant can appear before the court and admit the plaintiffs The suit can be decreed on that basis. The defendant may be absent and the case may be set ex-parte. In such a case the plaintiff lets in the evidence and on the basis of that evidence the suit may be decreed. Or the defendant might appear and file a written statement denying the execution of the promissory note or denying the receipt of consideration or even putting forward a plea of discharge. Now in these circumstances the court will not pass a decree unless it is satisfied that the promissory note was executed, that consideration passed and that it had not been discharged. This does not prevent the defendant at any stage of the suit either submitting to a decree or entering into a compromise conse ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... been sufficiently discussed by our learned brother, Vaidialingam, J. 38. I may now refer to certain English decisions. In Barton v. Finchaml [1921] 2 L.K.B. 297 Lord Scrutton LJ. observed : If the tenant is willing to go out, I do not see why any order is wanted; let him go; but at present advised I do not see any reason why the judge on being satisfied that a tenant is then ready to go out (not that he was once willing but has changed his mind) should not make an order for possession. Lord Atkin L. J. observed : If the parties before the Court admit that one of the events has happened which give the Court jurisdiction, and there is no reason to doubt the bona fides of the admission, the Court is under no obligation to make further enquiry as to the question of fact In Thorne v. Smith after referring to the observations of Atkin, L.J. and Scrutton, LJ. (supra), Lord Bucknill, L.J. pointed out : But in the present case it is, I think, reasonably clear that the tenant, in effect, agreed to the order because at the time when the landlord asked the court to make the order the landlord by his own statements had satisfied the tenant that he intended to occupy the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... had to satisfy itself did not prevent a consent order. It also shows clearly that a compromise or arrangement as long as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act would not be objectionable. In Middleton v. Baldock (supra) it was held : that a landlord seeking to recover possession against a tenant protected by the Rent Restriction Acts must establish the right to possession on one of the grounds stated in the Acts, unless, after possession had been claimed on such a ground, the tenant admitted facts to support it, in which event the court need not itself investigate the matters of fact admitted. 39 In its decision in Babu Ram Sharma v. Pal Singh [1959] P.L.R. 33 the Division Bench of the Punjab High Court, of which our learned brother Dua, J. was a member, had this to say on the point at issue : According to this section the landlord is entitled to seek eviction of his tenant on certain grounds, and the Rent Controller, after giving notice to the tenant, is empowered, to give his own finding and then to pass the necessary order. In the present case the ground on which the landlord had sought eviction was non-payment of rent. Such a ground is within the e ..... 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