TMI Blog1966 (3) TMI 99X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on may, therefore, be first stated. The petitioner is a displaced person from West Pakistan. In lieu of agricultural land left behind by him in Pakistan the petitioner was allotted 137.22 Standard Acres equivalent to 330.40 ordinary acres to land in villages Kotli and Suchan, Tehsil Sirsa, District Hissar. Rights of permanent ownership of the said land had been conferred on the petitioner before 1953. 3. In proceedings for declaring surplus area of the petitioner under the Ceiling Act the final order left only 100 ordinary acres of land as permissible area with the petitioner. The particular 100 ordinary acres of land left with the petitioner are admittedly equivalent to only 48.42 standard acres. The complaint of the petitioner is that by the impugned orders he has been illegally deprived of at least 1.58 standard acres of his holding contrary to the provisions of the Ceiling Act under which he must be left with at least 50 standard acres of land which is his statutory permissible area. In March 1963 the petitioner invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the impugned orders of the Collector, Surplus Area, Sirsa a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s case was also directed by Jindra Lal, J. on 21-12-1965 to be heard with C. W. No. 396 of 1963 by the Full Bench. 7. Two real brothers, Hari Chand and Nanak Chand are the petitioners in C. W. No. 1605 of 1963. The only material difference in their case is that the original allotment of land in their favour in village Alipur Barota, Tahsil Fatehabad, District Hissar, in village Sheikhupura, Tehsil and District Hoshiarpur and in village Bawani, Tahsil Fatehabad, District Hissar is stated to have been made in ordinary acres and not in standard acres. The allotment in ordinary acres according to the petitioners was of an area measuring 389.39 acres (ordinary). This allegation in Para. 1 of the writ petition has been specifically admitted in the corresponding paragraph of the written statement of the respondents dated nil which is supported by an affidavit of the Under Secretary to the Government, Punjab, Revenue Department, dated 26th March 1965. In proceedings under the Ceiling Act only 100 ordinary acres were declared to be the permissible area which happened in this case to be equivalent to 49.9 standard acres. The writ petition was admitted on 2-9-1963 by the Motion Bench ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by Section 3 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures (Amendment) Act, 11 of 1955. In the Ceiling Act as amended up to date the definition of permissible area , which is now relevant for the decision of these cases, is in the following words:-- Permissible area in relation to a landowner or a tenant, means thirty standard acres and where such thirty standard acres on being converted into ordinary acres exceed sixty acres, such sixty acres: Provided that-- (i) no area under an orchard at the commencement of the Act, shall be taken into account in computing the permissible area; (ii) for a displaced person-- (a) who has been allotted land in excess of fifty standard acres, the permissible area shall be fifty standard acres or one hundred ordinary acres, as the case may be, (b) who has been allotted land in excess of thirty standard acres, but less than fifty standard acres, the permissible area shall be equal to his allotted area, (c) who has been allotted land less than thirty standard acres, the permissible area shall be thirty standard acres, including any other land or part thereof, if any, that he owns in addition. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... such standard Acres, the permissible area for such a displaced person shall be 50 standard acres. This contention is based on the use of the expression as the case may be at the end of the provision contained in Clause (a) of the above-said proviso, which expression does not exist in the purview of Sub-section (3) of Section 2. It is further pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in contra-distinction to the provisions of Sub-clause (a) of the second proviso contained in the Ceiling Act the conversion formula contained in the purview of this sub-section has been adopted even in the provision meant for displaced persons in the Pepsu Act. 12. Chaudhri Rup Chand, counsel for the petitioner in the main case referred us to the judgment of their Lordships of the King's Bench in Bluston and Bramley Ltd. v. Leigh (1950) 2 KB 548, and to the judgment of the Commission of Appeals of Texas (U. S. A.) in Hooker et al. v. Foster et al., 1 South Western Reporter 276. In Bluston's case (1950) 2 KB 548 it was held that the effect of the words as the case may be was that Sub-section (2) of Section 326 of the English Companies Act, 1948 applied only if notic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rence. 15. I do not, however, think that any assistance can be drawn from either of those cases as to the effect and meaning of the expression as the case may be as used in the provision in dispute. Each expression used in a statute has to be interpreted in its own particular context. 16. At this stage I may notice the various decisions of some of the Financial Commissioners and the various judgments of different Benches of this Court concerning the point in issue in these petitions. First, in order of time, is the judgment of Shri B. S. Grewal, Financial Commissioner, Punjab, dated September 7, 1960 in Mahia v. Dalip 1961 Lah LT 11. This case did not relate to a displaced person and so the question of interpretation or scope of the proviso in dispute did not arise therein. While interpreting the purview of Sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Ceiling Act the learned Financial Commissioner held that for the purposes of determining permissible area the reckoning must first be in terms of 30 standard acres and that if the total holding of a landowner does not exceed 30 standard acres but exceeds 60 ordinary acres, even then the landowner cannot be deprived of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h a landowner be pinned down to 100 ordinary acres only even though such 100 ordinary acres when converted back into standard acres are found to be less than 50 standard acres. The learned Financial Commissioner thought that the only difference which has been made by the second proviso in favour of a displaced person in contradistinction to a non-displaced person whose case is covered by the purview or that sub-section is that the 50 standard acres and 100 ordinary acres have been substituted in case of displaced persons for 30 standard acres and 60 ordinary acres for other persons. It was further held in that case that though the presence of the word or in Clause (a) of the second proviso given a superficial suggestion of a choice, in fact there was no such choice because of the addition of the words as the case may be at the end of that clause. Mr. Grewal held: The correct and logical interpretation would appear to be that while a non-displaced person is entitled to 30 standard acres as his permissible area, a displaced person is entitled to 50 standard acres, and only if those 50 standard acres on being converted into ordinary acres exceed 100 ordinary acre ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dinary acreage of standard acres is also mentioned in the order of the Collector, but this would not entitle the petitioner to choose the standard of acreage most suitable to him. Standard acreage is mentioned first and ordinary acreage later in Sub-clause (a) of Clause (ii) of the proviso. 20. The learned counsel for the petitioners have canvassed for the view which found favour with the learned Single Judge in Harcharan Singh's case 1963 Cur LJ 270 being adopted as the correct interpretation of Clause (a) of the second proviso in dispute. The learned Advocate General has, however, argued that the said decision needs reconsideration in view of the scheme and object of the Ceiling Act and also because, according to the Advocate General, all permanent allotment to displaced persons were in standard acres and there was no such allotment in ordinary acres. We do not think, it is open to the State counsel to urge the last part of his above-said argument in the face of the fact that the allegation of the petitioners in Hari Chand's case regarding the initial allotment in their favour having been in ordinary acres has been expressly admitted in the written statement of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eing based on a different clause of the relevant section is because the decision of the two Financial Commissioners in Basakha Singh's case 1964 Lah LT 77 was the subject-matter of a writ petition to this Court which petition was disposed of by the judgment of H. R. Khanna, J. dated 15-12-1965 in Basakha Singh v. State of Punjab 1966 Cur LJ 158 . The learned Single Judge accepted the writ petition of Basakha Singh and reversed the orders of the Financial Commissioners with the following observations: Bare perusal of Clause (b) goes to show that where an area allotted to a displaced person exceeds 30 standard acres but does not exceed 40 standard acres, the permissible limit in his case would be equal to the area of the land allotted to him. It is nowhere provided in Clause (b) that in order to arrive at the figure of permissible limit the area allotted should be converted into ordinary acres and in case the area after such conversion exceeds some prescribed limit it should be held to be beyond the permissible limit. On the contrary the language of Clause (b) makes it plain that if the area allotted is between 30 and 40 standard acres, the question of converting the ar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ly and no area of the land vesting in a person should be declared to be surplus unless the case strictly falls within the purview of the provisions of the Act....... There is nothing in Clause (b) referred to above, which either expressly or by necessary implication shows that an area not exceeding 40 standard acres can be held to be beyond the permissible limit if on its conversion into ordinary acres it exceeds 100 such acres, 24. According to proviso (b) to Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Pepsu Act in the case of an allottee who has been allotted land exceeding 30 standard acres but not exceeding 40 standard acres the permissible limit has to be equal to the area of the land allotted to him. The words as the case may be could not possibly find place in the above-mentioned proviso in the Pepsu Act. It is, however, significant that the conversion formula is not mentioned in the said proviso at all and still the Financial Commissioners had imported the same into proviso (b) to bring the said proviso in accord with the spirit of the purview of Sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Pepsu Act. This extended interpretation did not find favour with Khanna, J. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ners were displaced persons and had been allotted land measuring 50.55 standard acres equal to 133.61 ordinary acres. Out of that holding an area measuring 2.81 ordinary acres equal to 1.83 standard acres was acquired by the Government thus leaving with the landowners only 48.72 standard acres which was equivalent in that case to 130.80 ordinary acres. If the conversion formula was to be applied the landowners could not be described to be small ones as their holding exceeded 100 ordinary acres. If, however, for determining the permissible area of the displaced landowners the standard acreage alone was taken into account they were obviously small landowners as their holding amounted to only 48.72 standard acres. The application of Rawat, the tenant, under Section 18 of the Ceiling Act for purchasing the tenanted land was dismissed by the authorities under the Act. He then came to this Court by way of a writ petition. Mahajan, J., dismissed the writ petition by interpreting Clause (a) of the second proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Ceiling Act to the effect that the measure of ownership is fixed in the said clause in standard acres and that a reference has to be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ) to Sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Pepsu Act and that, therefore, the conversion formula which has been deliberately omitted by the Legislature, should not be imported into the relevant proviso by the Court. Some kind of support is sought to be derived for this interpretation by the presence of the word or and the addition of the expression as the case may be in the relevant clause. The resultant injustice which might result to some of the displaced persons by adopting the other interpretation is also called in aid by the petitioners. The words as the case may be are sought to be attached by the learned counsel for the petitioners to the nature of allotment. The interpretation opposed to that canvassed by the petitioners is also stated to come in conflict with the object of the proviso i.e., to give maximum possible relief to displaced persons. An additional argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners in support of this contention is that it is obvious from Clause (b) of the second proviso that unto a maximum of 50 standard acres the holding of a displaced person has not to be diminished at all. It is argued that the interpretation sought to be plac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 59SC519 : ...... The Act seeks to limit the area which may be held by a land-owner for the purpose of self-cultivation, thereby releasing surplus area which may be utilised for the purpose of resettling ejected tenants, and affording an opportunity to the tenant to become the land-owner himself on payment of the purchase-price which, if anything, would be less than the market value. It, thus, aims at creating what it calls a class of small land-owners , meaning thereby, holders of land not exceeding the permissible area (Section 2 (2)). The utmost emphasis has been laid on self-cultivation which means cultivation by a land-owner either personally or through his wife or children, or through such of his relations as may be prescribed, or under his supervision --(Section 2 (9)). The Punjab Legislature, realising that the interest of a tenant was much too precarious for him to invest his available labour and capital to the fullest extent so as to raise the maximum quality and quantity of money crops or other crops, naturally, in the interest of the community as a whole, and in implementation of the Directive Principles of State Policy, thought of granting lo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nsel draws our attention to the grounds of claim made before the Collector as well as to the grounds of revision before the Financial Commissioner. It is no doubt true that this point was raised but from the orders of the Collector and the Financial Commissioner, it appears that the matter was not pressed to its logical conclusions. 32. Some arguments have been addressed in these cases by both sides as to the scope of a proviso in a statute. The learned counsel for the petitioners has referred in this connection to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Commr. of Income Tax v. Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd. [1959]36ITR1(SC) , and in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha [1962]2SCR159 . Reference has also been made by the learned counsel for the petitioners to the judgment of the Madras High Court in Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam. v. Commr. of Income Tax, Madras AIR 1964 Mad 483. On the other hand the learned Advocate General has referred to a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Jammarlal Surajkaran v. Commr. of Income Tax. Andhra Pradesh [1963]47ITR809(AP) . 33. In [1959]36ITR1(SC) the Supreme Court held that the proper ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tment and that the function of a proviso is very often to deal with an except-ed class of cases, which may be within the principal enactment, but for it. The learned Judges of the Madras High Court held that it would not be correct to say that a proviso should always be assumed to be and read as an exception. A substantive provision may also appear in the form of a proviso and if the clear meaning of the proviso establishes that it is not a qualifying clause of the main provision, the Court is bound to give effect to the proviso without straining to attribute to it the character of a segment in the main enactment. The Madras High Court further held that the meaning of a proviso should be derived from its own terms without any predilection that the subject-matter of the proviso is already covered by the main provision and that its object is to exclude something out of that main provision. The learned counsel for the petitioners has strongly relied on this judgment of the Madras High Court and has argued that the relevant proviso in this case should be construed without reference to the purview of Sub-section (1) of Section 2 as it is fallacious to think that the proviso is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es out of the purview cases of displaced allottees. With this preface regarding the scope of the proviso, I may now deal with the three alternative sets of interpretations canvassed before us. 36. I will first take the argument suggested on behalf of the counsel for the petitioners to the effect that Clause (a) of the second proviso leaves an absolute choice in the hands of the displaced allottee to get his permissible area fixed either at 50 standard acres or at 100 ordinary acres as he may like. I have no hesitation in repelling this suggestion. To construe Clause (a) in the manner suggested by the petitioners in this respect would be to read the words as the displaced person may like in place of the expression as the case may be in the relevant sub-clause. Dulat and Mahajan, JJ. in Sham Lal Saluja's case, C.. W. No. 1313 of 1962 (Punj) did not accept the argument about the choice of the displaced person. The precise argument was no doubt advanced before the Bench but all that the Court said was that the contention in question seemed to have some force. The argument was not at all examined any further and no finding of the Court thereon was even attempted to be g ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... are envisaged by the earlier part of the section and two separate provisions or alternatives are provided in a later part of the same sub-section to one of which the one alternative and to the other of which the other is intended to be applicable. The expression as the case may be cannot permit the application of the same alternative to both the contingencies or vice versa. It is implicit in the use of this phrase that one out of the various alternatives would apply to one out of the various situations and not otherwise. One here would of course include more than one contingencies for one set of circumstances in a given case. It is significant that the relevant qualification of a displaced person referred to in Clause (a) of the second proviso is who has been allotted land in excess of 50 standard acres . Then two alternative measures of permissible area are provided viz., 50 standard acres or 100 ordinary acres. It is after the provision of these alternatives that follows the expression as the case may be . In this context it is obvious that the use of the aforesaid phrase (as the case may be) would not permit the application of both ways of calculation, i.e., calc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cres or 100 ordinary acres, as the case may be. 42. As I will hereinafter show, the reading of the disputed proviso in the above manner reconciles it with the scheme of the Ceiling Act as also with the remaining clauses of the proviso itself. This construction also gives clear and definite meaning to the expression as the case may be deliberately used in the relevant clause. No other way of construction is capable of giving any sense to that phrase. At the same time it gives full effect to the word or used between the reference to standard acres and ordinary acres. In fact even the respondents want to introduce something into Clause (a) of the second proviso in order to support their interpretation. They want to read into Clause (a) of the second proviso the words whichever is less' after the words 100 ordinary acres . But the moment this is done the last words of the clause as the case may be not only become redundant but come into direct conflict with the rest of the clause and become irreconcilable with it. The construction canvassed for by the respondents would also lead to some amount of uncertainty and confusion in the application of Clause (a) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y to the special provisions contained in the second proviso. The argument of the learned Advocate General to the effect that the blood and life of the purview must be allowed to run through the proviso does not appeal to me in a case of this type where the proviso contains a complete exception to the purview. A proviso is not a sub-section so as to be treated as a part of the integral whole of the section. The second proviso in the context of this section is meant to provide a definitely different definition of permissible area for displaced allottees as compared to other persons who do not fall in that particular class. 44. The next thing which has weighed with me in this connection is that the proviso contains a piece of legislation specially beneficial to and enacted for the welfare and more liberal treatment of displaced persons who are allottees of agricultural land from the compensation pool. One of the objects of the Act is to place a ceiling on the holding of agricultural lands within the State of Punjab. The Legislature appears to have thought that if the ceiling was fixed in terms of geographical area it may result in inequity as certain lands are worth ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ord and in place of the word or and vv will also have to substitute the expression whichever is less in place of the phrase as the case may be . There is no warrant for adopting such a course so as to completely change the construction of the entire proviso. 45. In the 1950 Act there was no conversion formula for holders of less than 100 standard acres of land. Even now for persons who are not displaced allottees the holding of less than 30 standard acres does not appear to attract the conversion formula. The provision as interpreted by me would not, therefore, be inconsistent with the general scheme of the Act. 46. It may also be noticed that in the Pepsu Act, 13 of 1955 the conversion formula has been applied even to the permissible area of displaced allottees. The ceiling Act was amended in 1955 and still the phraseology of the second proviso was not interfered with. It also appears to me that at least one of the Financial Commissioners has been constantly interpreting the proviso in the manner favourable to the petitioners in these cases and my learned brother, Shamsher Bahadur, J. interpreted the proviso in the same manner quite some time ago but the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... clearer. It appears to me that the second proviso contains a complete definition of permissible area so far as displaced allottees are concerned. No doubt further relief is given even to displaced persons by the first proviso and that is why the same has been put between the two otherwise independent and self-contained statutory provisions. The first proviso permeates on both sides. But no part of the purview has to be brought into the second proviso which is a complete code in itself and which forms an exception to the rule contained in the purview in all its material aspects. 48. Only one argument of Mr. J. N. Kanshal, the learned Advocate General remains to be examined He submitted that the intention of the statute is clear at least to this extent that the Ceiling Act envisages that no one shall be allowed to retain more than 100 ordinary acres. It appears to me that this argument is misconceived. A displaced allottee of land upto 50 standard acres is not being touched at all even if his holding in ordinary acreage is definitely more than 100 Similarly, a non-displaced person holding less than 30 standard acres does not appear to be affected by the purview of Sub-sectio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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