TMI Blog2020 (1) TMI 197X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... chment and sale in execution of a decree, of the residential property owned by a judgment debtor - irrespective of the nature and extent of the residential property that the judgment debtor may own, and irrespective of the standing/ avocation/ background of the debtor, or the creditor. The interpretation of Clause (ccc) of proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code in a plain and grammatical way, de hors the context in which the said Clause came to be introduced by the extension of the PRI Act as amended to Delhi, in the Code as applicable to Delhi, would continue to throw up completely absurd results, where debtors occupying extremely large and valuable properties the value whereof far exceeds the debt owed to the decree holder/ certificate holder, would get away without discharging their adjudicated liability. Such an interpretation would strike at the very foundation of the Rule of Law - The interpretation sought to be canvassed by the petitioner in respect of Clause (ccc) of proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code would encourage fraudulent contrive by debtors to evade their liability which, certainly, would not be conducive to the preservation of the Rule of Law. The Legislature, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Debtor/ Certificate Debtor by Section 60(1)(ccc) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the Code) as applicable to Delhi. Thus, the scope and interpretation of the said provision arises for consideration before us. Before we proceed, we may take note of a few admitted facts, and facts emerging from the record. We may observe that the petitioner has selectively filed documents before us. The petitioner has not disputed the factual position as recorded in, and emerging from the orders passed by the Recovery Officer (R.O.), the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) and the DRAT. We have, therefore, proceeded to consider the matter in the light of facts found in the orders passed by the said Authorities/ Tribunals. 4. Late Sh. B.R. Dougall (BRD in short) [described as respondent No.4 in the present writ petition], undisputedly, was the owner of the said property having acquired the same on his own. M/s Atul Food Products Limited obtained a loan from the respondent Union Bank of India (UBI for short). Amongst others, BRD offered his personal guarantee to secure the said loan. Since the loan was not serviced and repaid in time, the UBI initiated recovery proceedings vide O.A. No.653/2000 befor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mount specified in the certificate within fifteen days from the date of service of the notice and intimating that in default steps would be taken to realise the amount under this Schedule . 7. From the record, it appears that the certificate which means the certificate drawn up by the Recovery Officer in respect of the defendant under the Act, was duly drawn up and served, inter alia, on BRD (CD-3) in March, 2002. 8. Rule 4 of the Second Schedule provides for mode of recovery. The same, inter alia, provides that if the amount mentioned in the notice is not paid within the time specified in the notice referable to Rule 2, the Recovery Officer shall proceed to realize the amount, inter alia, by attachment and sale of the defaulter s immovable property. Rule 5 of the Second Schedule provides for recovery of interest, costs and charges as well. These Rules read as follows: 4. If the amount mentioned in the notice is not paid within the time specified therein or within such further time as the Tax Recovery Officer may grant in his discretion, the Tax Recovery Officer shall proceed to realise the amount by one or more of the following modes :- (a) by attachment and sal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... yment of money. (2). Where an attachment has been made under this Schedule, any private transfer or delivery of the property attached or of any interest therein and any payment to the defaulter of any debt, dividend or other moneys contrary to such attachment, shall be void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment. (emphasis supplied) 11. Rule 48 provides for attachment of immovable property of the defaulter. The same reads as follows: 48. Attachment of the immovable property of the defaulter shall be made by an order prohibiting the defaulter from transferring or charging the property in any way and prohibiting all persons from taking any benefit under such transfer or charge. 12. Rule 51 provides that where any immovable property is attached under the Second Schedule, the attachment shall relate back to and take effect from the date on which the notice to pay the arrears (amount due under the Recovery Certificate) issued under the Second Schedule was served upon the defaulter. The said Rule reads as follows: 51. Where any immovable property is attached under this Schedule, the attachment shall relate back to, and take effect from, the date o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y kindly be stayed. 18. The petitioner claimed that she was a bona fide purchaser without notice for valuable consideration of the said property from the erstwhile owner, namely BRD (CD-3) vide sale deed dated 29.11.2006. She claimed that BRD (CD-3) had mortgaged the said property with the Indian Overseas Bank (IOB) in respect of the loan obtained by his son Vivek Dougall in the name of his sole proprietary firm M/s Vinayak International Inc. sometime in 1993. She claimed that IOB had instituted O.A. No.15/2002 against Vivek Dougall and BRD in his capacity as surety/ guarantor before the DRT. IOB had made an offer for One-Time Settlement of the outstanding dues for ₹ 2,09,18,000/- on 16.09.2006. She claimed that her father and brother had offered to buy the said property in her name for ₹ 2,11,90,000/. 19. The IOB had agreed to the said sale. Consequently, the said property was purchased in the name of the petitioner vide sale deed dated 29.11.2006. She claimed that she had also got mutated the said property in her name in the records of the MCD in 2007, and she had been paying the property tax thereafter. BRD (CD-3) passed away on 28.02.2009. 20. She argued ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Transfer of Property Act. 23. The Recovery Officer rejected the objections preferred by the petitioner vide order dated 13.05.2016. He took note of the fact that as per the record, the demand notice dated 15.03.2002 was issued to the certificate debtor s including BRD (CD-3), and all the CDs were served at their recorded addresses in March 2002. BRD (CD-3) appeared, for the first time, before the Recovery Officer on 11.10.2002 through counsel and he appeared in person on 16.12.2002. He filed his affidavit of assets on 24.08.2004, which disclosed the said property as his self-occupied property. On the same day, i.e. 24.08.2004, the CDs, including BRD (CD-3) were restrained from creating third party interest whatsoever to the detriment of the CH Bank UBI in the immovable assets which was a part of the record. BRD (CD-3) filed an additional affidavit vide Diary No.3060 dated 29.09.2004, wherein he again disclosed that he was the owner of the said property, which was self-occupied by him. The Recovery Officer notes that on the date of service of demand notice/ certificate dated 15.03.2002, as also on the date of the restraint order dated 24.08.2004, BRD (CD-3) was the owner in p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... defended the order passed by the learned Recovery Officer. The DRT dismissed the appeal of the petitioner on 21.09.2016. It rejected the petitioner s reliance on Hamda Ammal (supra), since the demand notice in the present case had been issued on 15.03.2002; BRD (CD-3) was served with the same in March, 2002; BRD (CD-3) had appeared before the Recovery Officer of the DRT through counsel on 11.10.2002 and in person on 16.12.2002, and also filed his affidavits disclosing his assets including the said property as his self-acquired property of which he was in possession on 24.08.2004; he had filed an additional affidavit on 29.09.2004 also to the same effect; the attachment by virtue of Rule 51 of the Second Schedule of the I.T Act related back to the date of service of notice under Rule 2, and; therefore, the attachment made in 2011 related back to the year 2002. Transfer of the said property by BRD (CD-3) in the year 2006 was in the teeth of Rule 16 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 26. The petitioner preferred a further appeal before the DRAT, which has been dismissed by the impugned order. 27. The learned DRAT after referring to the decisions in Gangadhar Vis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e of attachment. Therefore, even if it is accepted that the appellant objector was in possession of the property in question in April, 2011 when the learned Recovery Officer had attached the property which she was claiming to be her matrimonial home also that possession and even the sale deed allegedly executed in her favour by her father - in - law before that attachment order of the Recovery Officer will not confer any interest upon her for the purpose of getting an order of withdrawal of attachment under Rule 11 . 29. The learned DRAT rejected the submission of the petitioner that the sale executed by BRD (CD-3) in her favour of the said property was to redeem the mortgage with the IOB and, therefore, the prohibition against the sale of any property belonging to the CD by him after he has been served with a demand notice under Rule 2 of the Second Schedule is not attracted, by observing However, I do not find any substance in the above argument of Mr. D.K. Malhotra. In the present case Rule 2 notice stood served upon the deceased Mr. Dougall in March, 2002 and thereafter on 18th November, 2006 the Indian Overseas Bank had released the property in dispute from its char ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... icer, since the same was disclosed by BRD (CD-3) as his personal assets in his occupation in his affidavit dated 24.08.2004. He had filed an additional affidavit on 29.09.2004 to the same effect. We may observe that, though the Authorities/ Tribunals below have proceeded on the basis that orders for attachment were passed on 18.04.2011 and 26.05.2011, to us, it appears that the attachment orders were issued in respect of the said property, firstly, on 24.08.2004 when the C.D.s, including CD-3 (BRD) was restrained from creating any third party interest whatsoever, to the detriment of the CH-UBI. We state so, since the manner of attachment of immovable property of the defaulter under Rule 48 of the Second Schedule is made by an order, inter alia, prohibiting the defaulter (which CD-3/ BRD was) from transferring or charging the property in any way . However, even if the attachment of the said property is taken to have been ordered on 18.04.2011 and 26.05.2011, it makes no difference, since the same relates back to, and takes effect from the date on which the notice to pay the arrears, issued under the Schedule, was served upon the defaulter (See Rule 51). In this case, the noti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on to interfere with the impugned order on any aspect raised before the DRAT and decided by it. 33. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the petitioner actually did not even urge before the learned DRAT the issue raised by learned counsel for the petitioner before us, namely, that the said property could not be sold in execution i.e. for recovery of the amount due under the recovery certificate, since the same was the only residential property of BRD (CD-3) till the time that he transferred the same to the petitioner, and, thereafter the same is the only residential property of the petitioner. 34. However, when the writ petition was taken up for initial hearing on 11.03.2019, learned counsel for the petitioner sought to advance the submission taken note of in paragraph 3 hereinabove. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought an adjournment to address the Court on the aspect whether Section 60(1)(ccc) of the Code, as applicable to Delhi, is attracted in the facts of the present case. The matter was, thereafter, heard at length and judgment reserved. 35. To begin with, we may extract the opening words of Section 60 of the Code, de hors the State Amendments applicable t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... inafter. Nevertheless, even the unamended clause (c) in the proviso exempts houses and other buildings with the material and the sites thereof and the land immediately appurtenant thereto and necessary for their enjoyment belonging to an agriculturist or a labourer or a domestic servant and occupied by him, from attachment and sale in execution of a decree. Evidently, the Parliament granted exemption in Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 60(1) in respect of the poorer classes of persons comprising of agriculturists, labourers, and domestic servants. 37. Amendments to, inter alia, section 60 (c), and the introduction clauses (cc) and (ccc) [with which we are specifically concerned] were introduced by the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1934 [Punjab Act No. VII of 1934] (PRI Act for short), which was extended in its application to Delhi. 38. Before coming back to the relevant clause of Section 60 CPC, we may now turn our attention to the PRI Act. The PRI Act was enacted even prior to the coming into force of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Parts thereof were extended to the whole of Punjab (as then defined). The PRI Act was described as An act to provide for the r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... velihood mainly by agriculture, and is either a landowner, or tenant of agricultural land, or a servant of a land owner, or of a tenant of agricultural land, or (ii) who earns his livelihood as a village menial paid in cash or kind for work connected with agriculture. Provided that a member of a tribe, notified as agricultural under the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900, shall be presumed to be a debtor as defined in this section until it is proved that his income from other sources is greater than his income from agriculture. Explanation . (i) A debtor shall not lose his status as such through involuntary unemployment or an account of incapacity, temporary or permanent, by bodily infirmity, or, if he is or has been in service of His Majesty s Military or Naval Forces, only on account of his pay and allowances or pension exceeding his income from agricultural sources. (ii) A debtor shall not lose his status as such by reason of the fact that he makes income by using his plough cattle for purposes of transport. (iii) A debtor shall not lose his status as such only because he does not cultivate with his own hands. If any question arises in proceedin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... No. 189/38. In exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912 (XIII of 1912), and in supersession of all previous notifications under that section extending Punjab Acts to the Province of Delhi or any part thereof, except the notification of the Government of India in the Department of Education, Health and Lands, No. F. 117/32-L. O., dated the 26th January, 1933, the Central Government is pleased to extend to the Province of Delhi or such part thereof as is specified in the second column of the Schedule annexed hereto, the enactments specified in the corresponding entry in the first column thereof, subject to the restrictions and modifications, if any, specified in the corresponding entry in the third column, and to the following provisions, namely : (i) references in the first column of the said Schedule to an Act shall be deemed to be references to that Act as in force in the Punjab on the date of this notification, and (ii) references in the said enactments to the Provincial Government shall be construed as references to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, and references to the Punjab shall be construed as references to the Province of D ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to persons other than his father, mother, wife, son, daughter, daughter-in-law, brother, sister or other dependents or left vacant for a period of a year or more; (ii) after clause (c), the following clauses shall be deemed to be inserted, namely:- (cc) Milch animals, whether in milk or in calf, kids, animals used for the purposes of transport or draught carts, and open spaces or enclosures belonging to an agriculturist and required for use in case of need for tying cattle, parking carts, or stacking fodder or manure; (ccc) one main residential house and other buildings attached to it (with the material and the sites thereof and the land immediately appurtenant thereto and necessary for their enjoyment) belonging to a judgment-debtor other than an agriculturist and occupied by him: Provided that the protection afforded by this sub-section shall not extend to property which has been mortgaged; (b) after subsection (2), the following subsections shall be deemed to be inserted namely:- (3) Notwithstanding any other law for the time being in force an agreement by which a debtor agrees to waive any benefit of any exemption under this section shall be void. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Act XII of 1940) to the State Government shall be construed as references to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi. THE SCHEDULE Name of Act Modifications 1 2 The Punjab Relief of Indebtedness (Amendment) Act, 1940 (Punjab Act XII of 1940). 1. In section 2 for the words and figures the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1934 , the words and figures, as extended to the State of Delhi shall be substituted. 2. In Section 3 (i) for the words Imperial Bank , the words State Bank shall be substituted; and (ii) for the words and figures the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 the words and figures the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, as extended to the State of Delhi shall be substituted. 3. In section 14, in clause (b) for the words, figures and brackets commencement of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness (Amendment) Act, 1940 , the words, figures and brackets date of the extension of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness (Amendment) Act, 1940, to the State of Delhi shall be substituted. 4. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d to be an agriculturist until the contrary is proved. (6) No order for attachment shall be made unless the court is satisfied that the property sought to be attached is not exempt from attachment or sale. (emphasis supplied) 50. For the sake of completeness, we may also notice the Punjab Moneylending and Debtors Protection Laws (Extension and Amendment) Act, 1960, whereby, inter alia, the PRI Act, 1934 and all Rules, Notifications and Orders made, and all directions or instructions issued thereunder, which were in force immediately before the commencement in the territories, and which immediately before 01.11.1956 were comprised in the State of Punjab, were extended to and came in force in the transferred territories i.e. the territories comprised in the State of Patiala and East Punjab States Union before 01.11.1956. 51. Section 3 of the Punjab Money-lending and Debtors Protection Laws (Extension and Amendment) Act, 1960 reads as follows: 3. Extension of certain moneylending, and debtors protection laws to transferred territories (1) The following Acts, namely, (i) the Punjab Regulation of Accounts Act, 1930 (I of 1930), (ii) the Punjab ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court, shall be exempted from attachment and sale under the Schedule. Thus, the said property cannot be attached and sold to recover the debt due to the respondent UBI, since Section 60(1)(ccc) is specifically made applicable in respect of debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions. Learned counsel has placed reliance on C.N. Paramsivam and Ors. v. Sunrise Plaza Tr. Partner and Ors., (2013) 9 SCC 460, wherein the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of legislation by incorporation. The Supreme Court in paragraph 17 of its decision referred to Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, and quoted the following text from the said book, which reads: Incorporation of an earlier Act into a later Act is a legislative device adopted for the sake of convenience in order to avoid verbatim reproduction of the provisions of the earlier Act into the later. When an earlier Act or certain of its provisions are incorporated by reference into a later Act, the provisions so incorporated become part and parcel of the later Act as if they had been bodily transposed into it . The effect of incorporation is admirably stated by Lord Esher, M.R.: If a subsequent A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l have to file a suit under Rule 11(6) to have the transfer declared void under Section 281. 57. Learned counsel submits that this Court has examined the scope of the exemption granted under Section 60(1)(ccc), and has even applied the same in several cases relating to the recovery of debt under the Act. In this regard, he places reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in S.C. Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1983 Delhi 367 (DB). In this decision, the question determined by the Division Bench was whether Clause (ccc) inserted in the proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code by means of Section 35 of the PRI Act, as amended and extended to Delhi, stands repealed after the passing of the Amendment Act 104 of 1976, amending the Code, specially in the light of Section 97(1) of the amendment Act of 1976. Section 97(1) of the Amendment Act of 1976, whereby the Code was amended, reads as follows: 97(1) Any amendment made, or any provision inserted in the Principal Act by a State Legislature or a High Court before the commencement of this Act shall, except in so far as such amendment or provision is consistent with the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that clause (ccc) of proviso to Section 60(1) was not inconsistent with the main provision of Section 60 of the Code, and that it was only an additional and beneficial provision giving extra benefits that are covered by the main provision of Section 60(1)(c) of the Code and, thus, no question of repugnancy arises. The Division Bench rejected the view taken by the two learned Single Judges of this Court, that Clause (ccc) was no longer available in Delhi. In paragraph 10 of its decision, the Division Bench observed: 10. Now Section 97(1) of 1976 Act only purports to repeal amendments in stated circumstances but only if inserted by Act of legislature or a High Court. The contention of Mr. Tikku is that the insertion of clause (ccc) in proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code, though effected by Punjab Amendment Act XII of 1940 and Punjab Act VI of 1942 a State amendment, cannot be treated to be so, when extended to Delhi by a notification of 1956 issued by the Central Government as mentioned above. The extension in Delhi, it is claimed is by an Act of Parliament and thus is outside the ambit of Section 97(1) of 1976 Act. So far as Punjab is concerned, there is no dispute that the in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ccc) are satisfied or not, has to be decided by the Tax Recovery Officer. 65. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed heavy reliance on the observations made by the Division Bench on paragraph 20 of its decision, which reads as follows: 20. The next contention of Mr. Wazir Singh was that as clause (ccc) was brought in by the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, it would be available only in proceedings under 1934 Act, as amended. The argument is not understandable. Part IV of 1934 Act sets up Debt Conciliation Boards for settlement of particular kinds of debts. Section 35 of 1934 Act, as amended, inserted clause (ccc) in proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code. Under Section 222 read with Rule 10 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, all such property as is by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, exempted from attachment and sale in execution of a decree of a civil court shall be exempt from attachment and sale under this Schedule. Hence in proceedings before the Tax Recovery Officer, in Delhi the provisions of clause (ccc) in proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code are applicable. (emphasis supplied) 66. Premised on the aforesaid observation, the submission of l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... they must be understood and expound limited to their natural and ordinary sense. The words used best declare the intention of the rule maker. (emphasis supplied) 68. On the same aspect, he places reliance on Commercial Tax Officer and Ors. v. M/s. Biswanath Jhunjhunwala and Anr, AIR 1997 SC 357. 69. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1980 to submit that the statement of object and reasons of the PRI Act taken note of hereinabove, cannot be relied upon to examine the scope of the amendment to Section 35 of the PRI Act, whereby Section 60 of the CPC, as applicable to the State of Punjab was amended, which was later on extended and made applicable to Delhi. In this decision, the Supreme Court quoted its observations in Ashwini Kumar Ghose and Anr. v. Arabinda Bose and Anr., AIR 1952 SC 369, wherein Patanjali Sastri, CJ had observed in paragraph 32: 32. As regards the propriety of the reference to the statement of objects and reasons, it must be remembered that it seeks only to explain what reasons induced the mover to introduce the Bill in the House ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Court invoked Clause (ccc) of proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code, as applicable to Delhi, to set aside the order of restraint against the petitioner from selling, transferring, disposing of, creating any third party interest in respect of a residential property of the petitioner it being the only residential property of the petitioner/ debtor under the Act. 73. We have considered the submissions advanced by Mr. Ravi Gupta learned senior counsel for the petitioner, and those advanced by Mr. Malhotra as well. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in S.C. Jain (supra) only examined the issue whether Clause (ccc) of proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code stood repealed, so far as Delhi is concerned, by virtue of Section 97(1) of the Amendment Act, 1976, whereby the Code was amended. The scope of, and the meaning to be ascribed to Clause (ccc) of proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code was not considered by the Division Bench in that case. Even while dealing with the submission of the Revenue (advanced by Mr. Wazir Singh, Advocate) that Clause (ccc) of proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code having been introduced by the PRI Act, 1934, it was available in proceedings und ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ither a landowner, or tenant of agricultural land, or a servant of a land owner, or a tenant of agricultural land, or who earns his livelihood as a village menial paid in cash or kind for work connected with agriculture. 77. The statement of objects and reasons for enactment of the PRI Act, contained in the Bill moved in the Legislature, also throws light on the background in which the PRI Act was passed. The relevant extract thereof reads as follows: Statement of objects and reasons In 1929 the total volume of agricultural debt in the Punjab was estimated by the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee at 135 crores of rupees. Since that date the sharp fall in the prices of agricultural produce has made the pressure of debt on the cultivator even heavier than these figures indicate, and the problem of finding some relief has now become a very acute one. At the end of March, 1932, the Punjab Government appointed a committee of members of the Legislative Council to consider this problem and to submit proposals for its solution. The Report of the Committee has been debated in the Legislative Council, and has been for some time under the careful and detailed consideration of Gov ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , Clause (ccc) of proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code, with which we are concerned. Inter alia, Clause (ccc) of proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code was initially introduced in the PRI Act as applicable in the Punjab. As noticed hereinabove, eventually, PRI Act, as amended, was extended to Delhi and with it, inter alia, Clause (ccc) to the proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code came to be inserted in the CPC as applicable to Delhi vide Central Government notification dated 08.06.1956 bearing SRO No.1354 in exercise of powers conferred by Section 2 of the Part-C States (Laws) Act, 1950. It is pertinent to note that by the said notification dated 08.06.1956, the Central Government extended to the State of Delhi the PRI Act, as amended, and it is not that the Parliament, de hors the provisions of the PRI Act, introduced amendments in the CPC so as to include, inter alia, Clause (ccc) in the proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code, as applicable to Delhi. 82. Aforesaid being the position, in our considered view, the expression judgment debtor used in Clause (ccc) of proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code has to be read and understood in the context of the meaning ascribed to the express ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iv), is a piece of legislation by incorporation. Dealing with the subject, Justice G.P. Singh states in Principles of Statutory Interpretation (7th Edn., 1999)- Incorporation of an earlier Act into a later Act is a legislative device adopted for the sake of convenience in order to avoid verbatim reproduction of the provisions of the earlier Act into the later. When an earlier Act or certain of its provisions are incorporated by reference into a later Act, the provisions so incorporated become part and parcel of the later Act as if they had been bodily transposed into it . The effect of incorporation is admirably stated by Lord Esher, M.R.: If a subsequent Act brings into itself by reference some of the clauses of a former Act, the legal effect of that, as has often been held, is to write those sections into the new Act as if they had been actually written in it with the pen, or printed in it. (p. 233) Even though only particular sections of an earlier Act are incorporated into later, in construing the incorporated sections it may be at times necessary and permissible to refer to other parts of the earlier statute which are not incorporated. As was stated by Lord Blac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ause (ccc) of proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code continued to be available even after enactment of Section 97 (1) in the Amendment Act, 1976, whereby the Code was amended, D.R. Khanna, J. lamented the exploitation of Clause (ccc) of proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code by persons with large undisclosed incomes. The learned Judge observed in paragraphs 28 and 29 of this decision as follows: 28. The controversy which has given rise to the present writ petitions is about the attachability of property bearing No. 7, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi in realisation of the tax arrears. It is situated over a plot of land measuring 5000 sq. yds., and if the price of land around Connaught Place can moderately be taken as ranging between rupees 4000 and rupees 5000 per sq. yd., the land underneath the property should itself be worth above rupees two crores. The contention of the petitioners is that this property constitutes as their main residential house, and is therefore, exempt in terms of the provision contained in clause (ccc) of the proviso to Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 29. It will be relevant here to here to trace the history of how this provision was introdu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it frustrates the patent purposes of the Statute . Cabell Vs. Markham, 148 F 2d 737 (2d cir 1945), (Judge Learned Hand). (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh 12th Edition 2010 page 119). 93. In M/s Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd Vs. Union of India Others, (1988) 2 SCC 299, the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 42 as follows: 42. It has to be reiterated, however that the Objects and Reasons of the Act should be taken into consideration in interpreting the provisions of the statute in case of doubt. This is the effect of the decision of this Court in K.P. Varghese v. ITO [(1981) 4 SCC 173 : 1981 SCC (Tax) 293 : AIR 1981 SC 1922 : (1982) 1 SCR 629] where this Court reiterated that the speech made by the Mover of the Bill explaining the reason for the introduction of the Bill could certainly be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation and the object and purpose for which the legislation was enacted. It has been reiterated that interpretation of a statute being an exercise in the ascertainment of meaning, everything which is logically relevant should be admissible. See in this connection the o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... arned counsel for the petitioner on Section 34(1) of the Act is also misplaced, and does not advance the submission of learned counsel that while construing the meaning of Clause (ccc) of proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code, the expression debt should be understood as the debt defined in Section 2(g) of the Act. The definition of the expression debt contained in Section 2(g) is for the purpose of the Act. Section 2 opens with the words In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, . Therefore, the word debt is defined in Section 2(g) in the Act, for the purpose of the Act. Even that definition may not be adopted, if the context otherwise requires. Clause (ccc) of proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code has to be viewed in the context of the PRI Act since, it is by virtue of the PRI Act and, to fulfill the purpose object of the said PRI Act, namely, to grant relief against indebtedness to agriculturists etc., that the said Clause (ccc) was introduced in the proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code. 96. Reliance placed by the petitioner on Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade (dead) through Mrs. Shobha Ravindra Nemiwant (supra) is of no avail. This decision has no conce ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... right is not absolute, and in accordance with the procedure established by law it may be curtailed. The Legislature, in its wisdom, sought to carve out exceptions to Section 60(1) only in exceptional cases of agriculturists, labourers and domestic servants (under Clause (c) of proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code). Other Clauses contained in the Proviso, similarly, provide protection against attachment and sale in execution of a decree. Clause (ccc) has also to be viewed in the light of the other Clauses contained in the Proviso to Section 60(1). If the submission of the petitioner premised on the basic needs of a man for shelter were to be accepted, there would be no justification to allow the attachment and sale in execution of a decree of any residential property, of any person whatsoever. However, that is not the intendment of the law. 101. We, therefore, reject the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the said property is exempted from attachment and sale in execution of a decree of a Civil Court under the Code. Reliance placed by the petitioner on Rule 10 of the Rules is, therefore, of no avail and the same is rejected. 102. The writ petition is, accord ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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