TMI Blog2006 (8) TMI 683X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed even now. Steps to procure the presence of the 1st respondent were taken by the learned Magistrate and an item of property over which he has rights was attached by the Court as per order passed under Section 83 of the Cr.P.C. on 3.12.02. 4. The attachment was in force and continued from 3.12.2002. The petitioner herein, a private limited company came before Court on 18.11.04 with a claim petition under Section 84(1) Cr.P.C. It was contended that the petitioner came to know of the order of attachment effected on 3.12.02, only on 10.11.04 and thereafter within 8 days, the claim petition under Section 84(1) Cr.P.C. was filed. The petitioner contended that long prior to the date on which the attachment was effected, a registered.sale deed on which the attachment was effected, a registered sale deed dated 12.4.02 was executed by the 1st respondent and his brothers assigning their interest in the property to the petitioner herein. It was in these circumstances contended that on the date of the attachment (3.12.02) or after 12.4.02 (the date of the sale deed) the 1st respondent or his brothers had no right over the property attached. 5. The application was opposed by the complain ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ner contends that in the light of the amended Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, Sections 4 to 24 of that Act must be held to be applicable to an application under Section 84(1) Cr.P.C. and consequently the jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be held to be available to enable the Criminal Court to entertain a belated application under Section 84(1) Cr.P.C. 11. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act reads as follows: Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period or limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. (Emphasis supplied) 12. There can be no doubt that the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to the criminal courts. To attach the application of Section 29(2), it will ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e said dispute has been settled finally and completely by the pronouncement of a 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. L.N. Mushra . The position has been reiterated in the subsequent decisions in Ittikhar Ahmed v. Syed. Meharban Ali as also in Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar . 18. The Supreme Court in those cases clearly held that the expression expressly excluded cannot justify the search for and insistence on a specific stipulation in the special law to exclude the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act or a declaration that the stipulation under the special law will override the stipulation in the Limitation Act. The crucial question is whether the provisions of the special or local law provide a complete code, which by necessary intentment, scheme, object and purpose excludes the provisions of the Limitation Act while applying the special stipulations in the local or special law. There can be no dispute on this proposition and hence it is unnecessary to advert to the details of the controversy in law. 19. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also accepts the proposition, but he contends that so far as the stipulations in a specia ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by the offender and other claimants. 23. The said decision does not at all consider the play of Section 29(2) which statutory provision was not in force at the relevant time. The precise question as to whether provisions in the Code prior to amendment would indicate express exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 did not come up for consideration before the Calcutta High Court in the said decision even impliedly or incidentally. I am in these circumstances satisfied that the language employed, scheme, purpose and object of the stipulations in Sections 83 to 86 do not at all justify a conclusion that the application of Sections 4 to 24 as mandated under Section 29(2) is not permissible or possible while considering the claims against attachment by the indictee as also those claiming rights over the property. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. L.N. Mishra, Ahmed v. Syed. Meharban Ali and Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar, where dealing with provisions in special enactments like the Representation of Peoples Act, Land Reforms Act etc., where the scheme, purpose and object clearly indicated that Sections 4 to 24 were not intended to apply. That is not the case with th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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