TMI Blog2023 (10) TMI 41X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rom an order of assessment is decided, a mistake in that part of the order of assessment which was not the subject matter of review by the Appellate Authority and was left untouched can be rectified, however, that part of the order which is sought to be rectified is the untouched part of the original order. Applying it to the facts of the case, what is evident is that the assessment order was dated 02.02.2012. In an appeal to the CIT(A) there was no dispute regarding Section 10A. The relief was granted in appeal on 27.08.2014. There too there was no dispute regarding Section 10A provision. The order giving effect was date 31.03.2015. Here also since benefit of 10A was as per assessment order , as held in the case of Poonjabhai Vanmalidas [ 1978 (2) TMI 73 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT ] in relation to issues not appealable, the order of the appellate authority does not subsume the original order and the time for correcting the mistake in the original order has to relate back to passing of the original order and not the appellate order. In the case of Mettur Chemical Industrial Corpn. Ltd. [ 1976 (4) TMI 25 - MADRAS HIGH COURT ] has held that where proceedings are initiated under Se ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d 3977 of 2019 is that there were no orders giving effect. 7. FACTS OF SCA NO.3971 OF 2019 7.1 The petitioner is a public limited company and a Global Information Technology Service Provider offering a wide range of software development and related services. A return of income was filed for A.Y. 2008-2009 on 30.09.2008 declaring a total income of Rs.1,76,66,295/- after claiming a deduction under Section 10A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ( the Act for short). The case was selected for scrutiny and notices under Section 142(1) and 143(2) were issued. During the assessment proceedings, the respondent specifically inquired into the computation of deduction under Section 10A of the Act and called for evidence and justification in respect of the same which was duly submitted by the petitioner. 7.2 The respondent passed an order dated 02.02.2012 assessing total income at Rs.26,28,28,351/- making certain additions. Deductions under Section 10A was not disputed as the same was allowed in the assessment order. No appeal on the ground of Section 10A was filed. On other grounds raised in an appeal before the CIT(A), the CIT(A) by an order dated 27.08.2014 granted relief to the petitio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rectify the mistake u/s 154 of the Act by not allowing set off of loss (negative profit) of the eligible unit amounting to Rs.4,46,67,531/- against any other income. 8.2 The issuance of notice under Section 154 is illegal and without jurisdiction. 8.3 That the issue of deduction under Section 10A was not a subject matter of appeal before the CIT(A) for the said year and therefore there was no question of making any mistake while passing the OGE. 8.4 Mr.Soparkar would submit that the jurisdiction and power of the Assessing Officer while giving effect to the Appellate Authority s order are confined only to the issue and aspect involved in the appellate order. The Assessing Officer cannot go beyond the issue and aspect which he was directed to reconsider. The Assessing Officer cannot travel beyond the jurisdiction and limits of the directions of the Appellate Authority. 8.5 Mr.Soparkar would submit that the time for passing of the rectification order has expired. The assessment order for the said year was passed on 02.02.2012. The limitation prescribed is four years from the end of the financial year in which the order sought to be amended was passed. The time has expired ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r would rely on the following decisions: I. Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd v. Income Tax Officer; [1961] 41 ITR 191 (SC) II. Jeans Knit (P.) Ltd v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Banglore; [2017] 390 ITR 10 (SC)) III. JMC Projects (India) Ltd v. Principal Commissioner of Income-tax (Central); [2016] 67 taxmann.com 258 (Gujarat) IV. Engineering Professional Co. (P.) Ltd; [2020] 115 taxmann.com 288 (Gujarat) V. Coates of India Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax; [1995] 214 ITR 498 (Calcutta) VI. Karsandas Bhagwandas Patel v. Income- tax Officer; [1975] 98 ITR 255 (Gujarat) VII. Ahmedabad Sarangpur Mills Co. Ltd v. A.S.Manohar, Income-tax Officer; [1976] 102 ITR 712 VIII. Poonjabhai Vanmalidas v. Wealth- tax Officer; [1978] 114 ITR 38 (GUJ.) IX. Mettur Chemical Industrial Corpn. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax; [1977] 110 ITR 822 (Madras) X. Standard Chemical Co. (P). Ltd v. Income-tax Officer; [1977] 110 ITR 832 (Allahabad) XI. Shree Naw Durga Bansal Cold Storage Ice Factory v. Commissioner of Income- tax, FAIZABAD; [2017] 397 ITR 626 (Allahabad) XII. T.S.Balaram, Income-tax Officer v. Volkart Brothers; [1971] 82 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... directed to give the benefit of the section 10A of the Act on individual unit basis and not after clubbing the income in the preceding years as well as succeeding years. The A.O. made an apparent mistake while passing the order of appeal effect by allowing the setoff of losses from 10A eligible against the non eligible income. Therefore, the notices u/s 154 of the Act was issued to rectify the apparent mistake. 10.3 The CIT(A) in earlier year as well as subsequent year has directed that the benefit of Section 10A of the Act should be given on the individual eligible unit basis. The A.O. while giving the effect of CIT(A)'s order made an apparent mistake by allowing the losses (negative profit) of eligible 10A unit namely SDF VI and VII amounting to Rs. 4,46,67,531/- to be set off against the income from house property and other income. Hence, it is clear that the A.O. rightly issued the notice u/s 154 of the Act to rectify the apparent mistake from record. 10.4 The notice u/s 154 of the Act is issued within the time limit as provided by the section 154(7) of the Act. 10.5 In this case, order u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 144C was passed on 02.02.2012. After that the assessee prefe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... referred to in sub-section (1), the authority passing such order may, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, amend the order under that sub-section in relation to any matter other than the matter which has been so considered and decided.] (2) Subject to the other provisions of this section, the authority concerned (a) may make an amendment under sub- section (1) of its own motion, and (b) shall make such amendment for rectifying any such mistake which has been brought to its notice by the assessee [or by the deductor or by the Collector], and where the authority concerned is the [the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) or [Commissioner (Appeals)], by the [Assessing] Officer also. [* * *] (3) An amendment, which has the effect of enhancing an assessment or reducing a refund or otherwise increasing the liability of the assessee [or the deductor or the Collector], shall not be made under this section unless the authority concerned has given notice to the assessee [or the deductor or the Collector] of its intention so to do and has allowed the assessee [or the deductor or the Collector] a reasonable opportunity of being heard. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 20.03.2018 and hence was within a period of four years as provided under Section 154(7). 11.3 In the case of Poonjabhai Vanmalidas (supra), the assessment order passed under the Wealth Tax was dated 23.02.1971. The assessee went in appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who by his order dated 23.06.1971 reduced the net wealth of the petitioner. Consequential orders in light of the appellate orders was passed on 30.03.1974. The revenue issued rectification notices on 15.01.1976. The principal contention of the assessee was that they were time barred after expiry of four years from the date of the orders i.e. 22.02.1971. Considering the issue and disposing of the matter before it, only on the ground of limitation, the Division Bench of this Court held that even after an appeal from an order of assessment is decided, a mistake in that part of the order of assessment which was not the subject matter of review by the Appellate Authority and was left untouched can be rectified, however, that part of the order which is sought to be rectified is the untouched part of the original order. Applying it to the facts of the case, what is evident is that the assessment order was d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mistake, if any, which vitiated the order of assessment would then be a mistake in the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who alone would be entitled to rectify it. The question is whether this hypothesis is correct. Does the doctrine of merger apply in all its fulness so that an order of assessment made by the Income-tax Officer could be said to merge in the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner wholly, not only in respect of items considered and decided by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner but also in respect of items not considered and decided by him? The Division Bench in Karsandas Bhagwandas Patel's case [1975] 98 ITR 255 (Guj) held that, having regard to principles as well as authority, it was not possible to say that the doctrine of merger does not apply at all to income-tax proceedings. At page 261 it was pointed out: So also where an appeal is preferred by an assessee against an order of assessment in respect of all the items considered and decided by the Income- tax Officer so that the whole of the order of assessment made by the Income-tax Officer is for consideration by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the effect of the decisio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ficer in order to see what is the decision in regard to that matter in the process of assessment. The ultimate assessment in such a case consists partly of decisions of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and partly of decisions of the Income-tax Officer. The collective effect of these decisions results in the computation of total income and determination of tax. The order of assessment made by the Income-tax Officer thus does not merge wholly in the order made by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It is only that part of the order of assessment which consists of decisions reviewed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and when we use the word 'reviewed', we mean, considered and examined irrespective of whether ultimately affirmed, modified or reversed that is superseded by the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The legal position was thus summarized by the Division Bench at page 265: The legal position may, therefore, be summarized by stating that even after an appeal from an order of assessment is decided by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, a mistake in that part of the order of assessment which was not the subject-matter of review by th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that the question as to whether the additional amount mentioned in clause (c) of Paragraph A of Part I of the Schedule to the Wealth-tax Act should or should not be included was never dealt with nor touched upon by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It is, therefore, clear that the omission in the original order passed on February 22, 1971, was sought to be rectified by the Wealth-tax Officer when he initiated proceedings under section 35(1) of the Act and he wanted to rectify it by removing that error from the order of assessment for each of the three years under consideration. It is obvious that what he was seeking to do was not in consequence of the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner nor was it in consequence of what the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had done in respect of each of the three years under consideration but was a matter which should have been dealt with initially by the Wealth-tax Officer himself and was not dealt with by him at that stage when he passed the orders on February 22, 1971. Therefore, for the purpose of limitation under section 35, sub-section (7)(b), of the Wealth-tax Act, the period of four years has to be calculated from the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... court referred to above, viz., Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1963] 50 ITR 809 (Mad) held that wealth-tax paid by a company under the provisions of the Wealth-tax Act, on the net wealth of the company is not an allowable expenditure in computing the taxable income of the company, either under section 10(2)(xv)or under section 10(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. This decision of this court is an authoritative pronouncement as to the scope of section 10(2) (xv) and section 10(1) as far as the Income-tax Officer was concerned. Consequently, this decision made it clear that the Income-tax Officer has committed an error in deducting the wealth-tax paid by the assessee from the income from the business and that error was apparent from the record. Consequently, the Income-tax Officer acted well within his jurisdiction in proceeding under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in order to rectify a mistake apparent from the record by adding back the wealth- tax which he had originally deducted. We are not referring to the subsequent decisions on this question and the retrospective amendment of the law in this behalf because at the time w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ward the argument that once the Income-tax Officer took proceedings under section 147 and passed a fresh order of reassessment the original order has ceased to have an independent existence and it had merged in the subsequent order or it has become non-existent. We are of the opinion that the contention of the learned counsel for the revenue is not correct. Before giving our reasons in this behalf we may refer to the only decision which is directly in point rendered by the Allahabad High Court. That decision is in Standard Chemical Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Income- tax Officer (See Appendix page 832 infra). In that case the assessee was a limited company. For the assessment year 1966-67 in computing 'the total income the assessee was granted development rebate in respect of some machinery which had been installed by it in the calendar year 1964. The assessee had also claimed depreciation on certain assets including land. However, the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income- tax v. Alps Theatre [1967] 65 ITR 377 (SC) had held that the depreciation was allowable only on the value of buildings and not on the value of land. Consequently, the Income-tax Officer relying on the decision o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eopening and reconsidering the whole assessment. See Kashi Nath Bagla v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1950] 4 ITC 472 (All) and Kevaldas Ranchhodas v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1968] 68 ITR 842 (Bom). Likewise, in proceedings under section 34 the assessee cannot reagitate questions which have been decided in the original assessment. So the original assessment cannot be challenged in appeal against an assessment order under section 34. See Commissioner of Income-tax v. A.D. Shroff [1957] 31 ITR 284 (Bom). It is thus clear that the question of development rebate had become final when the original assessment order was passed. It was not the subject- matter of dispute in subsequent proceedings under section 148 ; so the original assessment order cannot be said to have merged in the order under section 148, which was restricted only to depreciation. This decision of the Allahabad High Court is on all fours with the facts of the present case and, therefore, on the basis of this decision it must be held that the proceedings initiated by the Income-tax Officer in the present case under section 154 was barred by limitation. 11.5 Before the Madras High Court, the order of assessm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iginal assessment order under which the development rebate was allowed to the assessee was passed on 9th February, 1967. This order could be rectified under section 154 within four years. The rectification order passed on September 10, 1971, was, therefore, clearly barred by time. The standing counsel for the income-tax department says that the limitation should be counted from the order passed under section 148 and not from the original assessment order. His plea is that the original assessment order had merged in the order passed under section 148 by the Income-tax Officer and, therefore, the limitation should be counted from the latter order. We find absolutely no merit in this contention. An order under section 148 is a separate order dealing with an item of income which had escaped assessment. The original assessment order does not merge into an order passed under section 148. Where reassessment is made under section 148 (corresponding to section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922), the Income- tax Officer's jurisdiction is confined to the income which had escaped assessment and does not extend to revising, reopening and reconsidering the whole assessment. See Kashi Nat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , High Court reversed the view taken by Tribunal and held that period of four years could be calculated from initial order of assessment made on 21.09.1979 and not rectified assessment order dated 12.07.1982. Supreme Court while construing Section 154 observed that word 'order' has not been qualified in any way and does not necessarily means original order . It can be any order including the amended or rectified order . Assessee therein had sought rectification of order dated 12.07.1982 and Court held that word 'order' under Section 154 (7) would include even rectified order . 24. In Tony Electronics Ltd. (supra), Court has held that judgment in Hind Wire Industries Ltd. (supra) lays down that once an order is rectified, initial order ceases to operate and it is no more in existence. Relevant observation reads as under: What follows from the aforesaid is that after the rectification order, the initial order of assessment ceases to operate. It is no more in existence and is substituted by the fresh assessment order passed. The court, thus, categorically held that the word any' in the expression order sought to be amended would mean even the rect ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t in the case of Volkart Brothers (supra) explaining such meaning, held as under: The first question that we have to decide is whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Officer was within his powers in making the impugned rectifications. He purported to make those rectifications under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. That section, to the extent material for our present purpose, reads : 154. (1) With a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record (a) the Income-tax Officer may amend any order of assessment or of refund or any other order passed by him :.... The corresponding section in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, is section 35. From what has been said above, it is clear that the question whether section 17(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was applicable to the case of the first respondent is not free from doubt. Therefore, the Income- tax Officer was not justified in thinking that on that question there can be no two opinions. It was not open to the Income-tax Officer to go into the true scope of the relevant provisions of the Act in a proceeding under section 154 of the Income-tax Ac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n under section 154 of the Act can only be made when glaring mistake of fact or law has been committed by the officer passing the order becomes apparent from the record. Rectification is not possible if the question is debatable. Moreover, the point which was not examined on fact or in law cannot be dealt as mistake apparent on the record. The dispute raised a mixed question of fact and law. 11.11 Even otherwise as submitted by Shri S.N.Soparkar learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner in any case the interpretation of Yokogawa India Ltd. (supra) by the Assessing Officer is erroneous as the said decision in fact supports the case of the petitioner. 11.12 Before the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Yokogawa India Ltd. (supra), the principal issue was the true and correct meaning of and effect of the provisions of Section 10A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The broad questions before the Supreme Court were as under: 3. The broad question indicated above may be conveniently dissected into the following specific questions arising in the cases under consideration. (i) Whether Section 10A of the Act is beyond the purview of the computation mechanism of total income a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f 36 do not separately apply to an eligible unit during the period of tax holiday. During the said period the deduction under the aforesaid sections of the Act are deemed to have been made. Similarly, under Section 10A(6)(ii) losses referred to in Section 72(1) or 74(1) and 74(3) are also eligible to be carried forward to the assessment year following the end of the holiday period commencing from the assessment year 2001-02. All these, according to the learned counsels for the assessees, suggest that, though heterogeneous elements exist in Section 10A, the provision is really an exemption provision. Alternatively, according to the learned counsels, even if Section 10A is understood to be providing for deductions, the stage of such deductions would be immediately after computation of profits and gains of business and before the aggregate of incomes under different heads of other loss making eligible units or non- eligible units of the assessee are taken into account. In other words, it is immediately after the computation of profits and gains of business of the undertaking that the deduction under Section 10A is required to be made. There is no question of such deductions being comp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion etc. commencing from the year 2001-02 on completion of the period of tax holiday also virtually works as a deduction which has to be worked out at a future point of time, namely, after the expiry of period of tax holiday. The absence of any reference to deduction under Section 10A in Chapter VI of the Act can be understand by acknowledging that any such reference or mention would have been a repetition of what has already been provided in Section 10A. The provisions of Sections 80HHC and 80HHE of the Act providing for somewhat similar deductions would be wholly irrelevant and redundant if deductions under Section 10A were to be made at the stage of operation of Chapter VI of the Act. The retention of the said provisions of the Act i.e. Section 80HHC and 80HHE, despite the amendment of Section 10A, in our view, indicates that some additional benefits to eligible Section 10A units, not contemplated by Sections 80HHC and 80HHE, was intended by the legislature. Such a benefit can only be understood by a legislative mandate to understand that the stages for working out the deductions under Section 10A and 80HHC and 80HHE are substantially different. This is the next aspect of the ca ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uch treatment would amount to treating Section 10A provision as an exemption provision and not a deduction provision. 11.15 In the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Karle International (supra) in Tax Appeal, the Court was considering whether the Tribunal was right in law in allowing the claim of the assessee towards set off of losses. The Division Bench therein held as under: 9. Admittedly, in the instant case, two units of the assessee namely unit No.II and unit No.III were export oriented units and were eligible for exemption. The assessee had sustained loss in respect of unit No.I and therefore, the assessee had claimed set off, as permissible under Section 70 of the Act and had offered the balance as income taxable under the head income from business of Rs.12,89,762/- which has been declared in the return. The provisions of Section 70 of the Act have to be given effect to. It is pertinent to mention here that Income Tax Appellate Tribunal had taken a similar view in MINDTREE CONSULTING (P) LTD., supra, which was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX Vs. YOKOGAWA INDIA LTD., supra. Similar view has been taken by Bombay H ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and made additions on this score spread over all the assessment years, namely, assessment years 2008-09 to 2012-13. 5. The petitioner has challenged this notice on various grounds. Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the Commissioner had no authority to take the orders of assessment under revision in exercise of powers under section 263 of the Act. He pointed out that the assessing officer had made additions on account of non-verifiability of the payments made to 176 vendors which additions totally came to Rs.123 crore (rounded off). Thus, as against the proposed addition of Rs.105.36 crore suggested by the Commissioner in his impugned notice, the assessing officer had already made much greater additions concerning the same expenditure. The order of the assessing officer, therefore, cannot be stated to be prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. On such premises, counsel for the petitioner raised the following contentions: (i) That the orders of assessments were not prejudicial to the interest of revenue. The Commissioner, therefore, had no jurisdiction to issue the notice under section 263 of the Act; (ii) Original assessments were made in consul ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... notice, the assessing officer under the same heads for the assessment years in question had made addition of Rs.123 crore to the income of the assessee. The crucial question, therefore, arises whether revisional powers under section 263 of the Act can be exercised. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. (supra), powers under section 263 of the Act would be available when an order of assessment is shown to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. In other words, both the conditions, namely, that the order of assessment is erroneous and that is also prejudicial to the interests of the revenue must exist to give jurisdiction to the Commissioner to take an order of assessment in revision. 11. In the case of ITO v. D.G. Housing Projects Ltd. [2012] 343 ITR 329/20 taxmann.com 587/[2013] 212 Taxman 132 (Mag.) (Delhi), Division Bench of Delhi High Court held that, a finding that the order is erroneous is a condition or requirement which must be satisfied for exercise of jurisdiction under section 263 of the Act. The matter cannot be remanded for a fresh decision to the the assessing officer to conduct further inquiries without a fi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425; Union of India v. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882; State of U.P. v Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P.) Ltd. v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1089 have held that though article 226 confers a very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of writ absolutely discretionary in character. If the High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of principles of natural justice or procedure required for decision has not been adopted. 17. In Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Assn. of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337, this Court has held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction for relief and observed as follows: 12. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419 this Court adverted to the rule of self-imposed restraint that the writ petition will not be entertai ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , J. (speaking for the majority of the larger Bench) observed: (SCC p. 607, para 77) 77. ... So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this Court under article 32 is concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It is, however, equally obvious that while exercising the power under article 226/article 32, the Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment. (See: G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192; CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., (1985) 1 SCC 260; Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura, (1999) 1 SCC 472; Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 3 SCC 5; C.A. Abraham v. ITO, (1961) 2 SCR 765; Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433; H.B. Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and Sons, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 312; Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1; Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1998) 8 SCC 272; Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh, (1999) 1 SCC 209 and Punjab National ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ana, (1985) 3 SCC 267 this Court has noticed that if an appeal is from Caesar to Caesar's wife the existence of alternative remedy would be a mirage and an exercise in futility. In the instant case, neither has the assessee-writ petitioner described the available alternate remedy under the Act as ineffectual and non-efficacious while invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court nor has the High Court ascribed cogent and satisfactory reasons to have exercised its jurisdiction in the facts of instant case.' 14. Thus, the dictum of law, as laid in the aforesaid decision, is that although the Act provides complete machinery for the assessment/reassessment of tax, imposition of penalty and for obtaining relief in respect of any improper orders passed by the Revenue Authorities, yet the remedy under the statute, however, must be effective and not a mere formality with no substantial relief. It is true that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievance, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. But, such principles, in a given case, maybe given a go-bye, if the Court is convinced that on the face of it, the impu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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