TMI Blog2022 (2) TMI 1436X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not decide a lis - The scheme of Section 28A of the Act is unmistakably clear from its very opening words. What Section 28A contemplates is a redetermination of compensation under an award passed under Part III. Part III takes in Section 23. Section 23 deals with the matters to be taken into consideration. Various aspects including the market value on the date of the notification Under Section 4(1) are indicated. A plea founded on estoppel arising out of a consent decree or from an Award passed by a Lok Adalat which can perhaps be even likened to a consent decision cannot be the basis for redetermination of the compensation. What Section 28A indeed insists is on decision by a Civil Court as defined in Section 2(l). In other words what is made the only basis for invoking Section 28A of the Act is an adjudication by the Court as defined in the Act. The plea of estoppel which, ordinarily, arises from a consent decree or Award passed by the Lok Adalat which, as already noticed, does not involve any adjudication by a Court, would hardly suffice. The estoppel which is referred to by this Court applies as between the parties to the consent decree. In K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon v. C.D. Shaj ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... terms being reduced to writing with the approval of the parties it assumes the garb of an Award which in turn is again deemed to be a decree without anything more. We would think that it may not be legislative intention to treat such an award passed Under Section 19 of the 1987 Act to be equivalent to an award of the Court which is defined in the Act as already noted by us and made under Part III of the Act. An award of the Court in Section 28A is also treated as a decree. Such an Award becomes executable. It is also appealable. An application Under Section 28A of the Act cannot be maintained on the basis of an award passed by the Lok Adalat Under Section 20 of 1987 Act. The impugned judgments stand set aside - Appeal allowed. - K.M. Joseph And Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, JJ. JUDGMENT K.M. Joseph, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. In these batch of cases, the question which arises is whether the Award passed by a Lok Adalat Under Section 20 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the '1987 Act') can form the basis for redetermination of compensation as contemplated Under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ' ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 11.1984 and the Hon'ble High Court, while clubbing/consolidating all the appeals together, has disposed them off thereby directing the concerned Authorities to determine the compensation at the rate of Rs. 297.50 per sq.yard. On the basis of the said order, both parties have voluntarily executed, signed and verified the Settlement/Compromise Agreement Paper No. 60Ka1 and submitted the same before the court. In such a situation, it is just and proper to decide the case by passing the following order on the basis of the settlement/compromise agreement Paper No. 60Ka1 which shall form part of the decree: ORDER Instant Reference No. 6/2002 is hereby decided on the basis of Settlement/Compromise Agreement Paper No. 60Ka1 filed by the parties. The Settlement/Compromise Agreement shall form part of the Decree and in the circumstances of the case, each party to bear their own costs. One copy each of this judgment shall be kept in the file of LAR No. 7/2002, LAR No. 8/2002 and LAR No. 9/2002. 4. As is evident, compensation was fixed at Rs. 297 per square yard as against Rs. 20 per square yard which was fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer by his Award dated 28.11.1984. This led to the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... He commended for our acceptance the view taken by the High Court of Bombay in the decision reported in Umadevi Rajkumar Jeure and Ors. v. District Collector and Ors. He would submit that view taken by the High Courts which have held contrary do not represent the correct position in law. 8. He has further a case on merits. He points out that the High Court in the First Appeal No. 1100/04 titled as Mangu and Ors. v. State of U.P., awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 297 per square yard. However, it is his contention that while the case of Mangu arose out of the notification of the year 1991, cases arising out of the earlier notification issued Under Section 4 came to be tagged and heard as a common batch. He points out that the review petition is already filed by the Appellant. He further contends that in the year 1982, the compensation was fixed at Rs. 20 per square yard. This computation of compensation was upheld by the High Court and what is more, this view of the High Court was further approved by this Court by dismissal of the special leave petition filed against the same. However, on the basis of the facts which were not properly appreciated the Award came to be passed by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... quisition Officer. He would finally contend, at any rate, that should this Court be inclined to hold against the Respondents, while this Court may declare the law, it may still not exercise the discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the Appellant Under Article 136 of the constitution. In this regard, he drew support from the decision of this Court reported in Tahera Khatoon (D) by LRs. v. Salambin Mohammad (1999) 2 SCC 635. 10. Shri V.K. Shukla, learned Senior Counsel essentially advanced similar submissions. He would, in particular, highlight the facts which led to the passing of the Award by the Lok Adalat, namely that, it was accepted by the Appellant that compensation can be fixed at Rs. 297 per square yard on the basis of the judgment of the High Court which prevailed. This fact, he points out, may not be overlooked by this Court. He would also submit that the Award passed by the Lok Adalat would satisfy the requirement of an application Under Section 28A of the Act. He further drew upon the powers of the Lok Adalat. ANALYSIS 11. We may advert to the scheme of the 1987 Act, Section 2(a) defines 'case': (a) 'Case' includes a suit or any proceeding before a cour ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... shall be referred to the Lok Adalat Under Sub-clause (b) of Clause (i) or Clause (ii) by such court except after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the parties. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Authority or Committee organising the Lok Adalat Under Sub-section (1) of Section 19 may, on receipt of an application from any, one of the parties to any matter referred to in Clause (ii) of Sub-section (5) of Section 19 that such matter needs to be determined by a Lok Adalat, refer such matter to the Lok Adalat, for determination; Provided that no matter shall be referred to the Lok Adalat except after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the other party. (3) Where any case is referred to a Lok Adalat Under Sub-section (1) or where a reference has been made to it Under Sub-section (2), the Lok Adalat shall proceed to dispose of the case or matter and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties. (4) Every Lok Adalat shall, while determining any reference before it under this Act, act with utmost expedition to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties and shall be guided by the pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... its own procedure for the determination of any dispute coming before it. (3) All proceedings before a Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and every Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purpose of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(2 of 1974). 16. It will be interesting to note that Chapter VI(A) came to be inserted by the Act 37 of 2002 with effect from 11.06.2002. Thereunder, permanent Lok Adalats have been contemplated in respect of certain public utility services. Suffice is only to note that unlike a Lok Adalat, Section 22C Sub-section (8) contemplates that when the parties fail to reach an agreement, the permanent Lok Adalat is duty bound, if the dispute does not relate to any offence, to decide the dispute. SCHEME OF THE ACT 17. The Act provides for acquisition of land and for compensation to be provided thereunder. The proceedings are commenced by a notification Under Section 4. Compensation is determined with reference to the date of the said notification. After the procedures are undergone, an Award is passed. While Sec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d to do) a special judicial officer within any specified local limits to perform functions of the Court under this Act; DIVERGENCE IN THE VIEWS OF THE HIGH COURTS 18. In Vasudave v. The Commissioner and Secretary Government, Revenue Department and Ors. ILR 2007 KAR 4533, learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court took the view that was guided by Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the fact that the award of the Lok Adalat is to be deemed to be a decree of the Civil Court. Learned Single Judge also considered the intention of introducing Section 28A and took the view that the provision is in consonance with the equality clause. The Court took the view that the Award passed by the Lok Adalat by consent fell Under Section 28A. 19. However, another Learned Single Judge of the very same Court in the decision reported in Chanabasappa and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer ILR 2011 KAR 4276 took the view that to apply Section 28A(3) of the Act, there must be an Award Under Section 28A(2). He further took the view that the existence of an Award passed by a Court under Part III of the Act was a condition precedent to apply Under Section 28A. The award passed by the Lok ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ised, is not concerned even at the stage of the reference. The award made by the Lok Adalat does not have to go back to that court to enable it to make it a part of its decree. The award itself is final and binding (and not appealable) as between the parties. It is deemed to be a decree of a civil court and executable as such. There is nothing in this scheme of things for treating an award passed by a Lok Adalat as a deemed decree of that court which made the reference to the Lok Adalat or for which the Lok Adalat was organised. In the context of the LA Act, and particularly for the purposes of Section 28A, the fiction of decree of a civil court will not only have to be to be extended to a decree of the court referring the matter to Lok Adalat or for which such Lok Adalat is organised, but such court having passed it under Part III of the LA Act, so as to have consequences for third parties. There is nothing to suggest that if the award is in a compensation dispute in a land acquisition matter, any third party should thereby be entitled to apply for re-determination of its compensation Under Section 28A of the LA Act. As a matter of principle, it is not possible to say that that ev ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... im the benefit of Section 28A by resorting to the method of arriving at a settlement or compromise before the Lok Adalat on the strength of which the decree was passed. It was further found that the mere fact that the Court had made such an Award only on the strength of a compromise would not alter the situation in any way. 24. In Thomas Job v. Thomas 2003 (3) KLT 936, a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court took the view that by no stretch of imagination, it could be held that an Award passed by the Lok Adalat despite the legal fiction created in Section 21 could be treated as a compromise decree passed by a Civil Court. It is further found that a Lok Adalat is not a Court; the Lok Adalat only certifies an agreement. It is further found that the Civil Court cannot vary the terms of the Award or extend the time agreed to between the parties to an Award. 25. Having set out the provisions and referred to the judgments, we may consider the respective arguments that are raised before the Court. FINDINGS 26. The object of the 1987 Act inter alia as can be noticed from the preamble to the Act, also is the organisation of Lok Adalats. It is clear beyond the shadow of any doubt tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cation of demands. As per Termes de la Ley, compromise is a mutual promise of two or more parties that are at controversy . As per Bouvier it is an agreement between two or more persons, who, to avoid a law suit, amicably settle their differences, on such terms as they can agree upon . The word compromise implies some element of accommodation on each side. It is not apt to describe total surrender. [See Re NFU Development Trust Ltd. [1973] 1 All ER 135(Ch.D.)]. A compromise is always bilateral and means mutual adjustment. Settlement is termination of legal proceedings by mutual consent. The case at hand did not involve compromise or settlement and could not have been disposed of by Lok Adalat. If no compromise or settlement is or could be arrived at, no order can be passed by the Lok Adalat. Therefore, question of merger of Lok Adalats order does not arise. 28. An argument was raised by Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents, that the Lok Adalat insofar as it manifests the stand of the Appellant and it being consensual based on the consent of the NOIDA, NOIDA is estopped. In this regard, he drew our attention to the judgment of this Court in P.T. Thomas v. Tho ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... edly is a benefit to those who have not availed of their right Under Section 18 of the Act, a beneficial view can be taken, the Court cannot shut its eyes to the command of the law giver. 30. It is the province and duty of the Court in the ultimate analysis to give effect to the will of the legislature. The golden Rule of interpretation of statutes along with other principles came to be discussed, as it may be indeed set out by the Constitution Bench of this Court reported in Union of India and Anr. v. Hansoli Devi and Ors. (2002) 7 SCC 273 and which also arose Under Section 28A of the Act. One of the questions which pointedly arose was whether the dismissal of an application filed beyond time Under Section 18 of the Act would entitle a person to invoke Section 28A: 9. Before we embark upon an inquiry as to what would be the correct interpretation of Section 28-A, we think it appropriate to bear in mind certain basic principles of interpretation of a statute. The Rule stated by Tindal, C.J. in Sussex Peerage case [(1844) 11 Cl Fin 85 : 8 ER 1034] still holds the field. The aforesaid Rule is to the effect: (ER p. 1057) If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... proved by the legislature had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill had passed into a law. At times, the intention of the legislature is found to be clear but the unskillfulness of the draftsman in introducing certain words in the statute results in apparent ineffectiveness of the language and in such a situation, it may be permissible for the court to reject the surplus words, so as to make the statute effective. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle, let us now examine the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act, to answer the questions referred to us by the Bench of two learned Judges. It is no doubt true that the object of Section 28-A of the Act was to confer a right of making a reference, (sic on one) who might have not made a reference earlier Under Section 18 and, therefore, ordinarily when a person makes a reference Under Section 18 but that was dismissed on the ground of delay, he would not get the right of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act when some other person makes a reference and the reference is answered. But Parliament having enacted Section 28-A, as a beneficial provision, it would cause great injustice if a literal interpretation is gi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... consent decree. 32. This brings us to the next question, i.e., the implication of Section 21 of the 1987 Act under which the Award of the Lok Adalat is to be treated as a decree. The High Court in the impugned judgment has drawn upon Section 21 to uphold the contention of the Respondents. The reasoning runs as follows: An Award passed by the Lok Adalat is to be taken as a decree of a Civil Court Under Section 21 of the 1987 Act. What Section 28A requires is redetermination of compensation by the Civil Court. Therefore, the Award of the Lok Adalat, in this manner of reasoning, is to be conflated to the adjudication contemplated Under Section 28A of the Act. 33. In K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon v. C.D. Shaji (2012) 2 SCC 51, this Court was concerned with the question as to whether Under Section 21 of the 1987 Act, when a case is referred to the Lok Adalat in a criminal case Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the matter is settled and an award is passed, whether it could be treated as a Decree of a Civil Court and, thus, executable. The Court held: 23. A statutory support as evidenced in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act would not only reduce the burden ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he purpose of enforcing the award as a decree. 36. When a legal fiction is employed by the legislature, it becomes a duty of the Court to interpret it and to give it meaning. In gleaning its meaning, the Court is duty bound to ascertain the purpose of this legislative device. The Court cannot allow its mind to be boggled undoubtedly as contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent, in the matter of carrying the legal fiction to its logical end. But this is not the same as holding that the Court will not look to the object of the Act and, in particular, the fiction in question. In this regard, we notice the judgment of this Court in State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (2017) 3 SCC 362: 75. In this context, we may usefully refer to the Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14th Edn. by G.P. Singh. The learned author has expressed thus: In interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction, the court is to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created [State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory AIR 1953 SC 333; State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak AIR 1953 SC 244 : 1953 Cri. LJ 1094], and after ascertaining this, the Court is to as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the courts have to give full effect to such a statutory fiction and it has to be carried to its logical conclusion. 38. From the aforesaid pronouncements, the principle that can be culled out is that it is the bounden duty of the court to ascertain for what purpose the legal fiction has been created. It is also the duty of the court to imagine the fiction with all real consequences and instances unless prohibited from doing so. That apart, the use of the term deemed has to be read in its context and further, the fullest logical purpose and import are to be understood. It is because in modern legislation, the term deemed has been used for manifold purposes. The object of the legislature has to be kept in mind. 37. In the light of the principles which have been laid down, we are inclined to take the following view. An Award passed by the Lok Adalat under 1987 Act is the culmination of a non-adjudicatory process. The parties are persuaded even by members of the Lok Adalat to arrive at mutually agreeable compromise. The Award sets out the terms. The provisions contained in Section 21 by which the Award is treated as if it were a decree is intended only to clothe the Award with enforcea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Lok Adalat passes an Award then such an Award would be treated as an order of the Court. However, in this regard, we have noticed the judgment of this Court reported in K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon (supra). Even when the Criminal Court refers the matter Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in order to make it executable, this Court has taken the view that it will be treated as if it were a decree. 39. If a Revenue Court or a Tribunal which, undoubtedly, fall Under Section 2(aaa) of the 1987 Act were to refer a case to the Lok Adalat Under Section 20(1) and an award is passed it may become the order of the court/tribunal. In other words, if the matter were finally concluded on a regular basis, that is, without reference to the Lok Adalat, it would be an order which would be passed. 40. The argument, however, according to Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel, appears to be that by virtue of this legislative device, the award of the Lok Adalat passed in these cases by the Reference Court Under Section 18 executing the Lok Adalat must be treated as an order passed by the Court Under Section 28A of the Act. We will answer this question after considering the requirement ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd Section 2, Clause (9), respectively of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (5 of 1908). 44. The award which is passed by the Lok Adalat cannot be said to be an award passed under Part III. It is the compromise arrived at between the parties before the Lok Adalat which culminates in the award by the Lok Adalat. In fact, an award under Part III of the Act contemplates grounds or reasons and therefore, adjudication is contemplated and Section 26(2) of the Act is self-explanatory. 45. The next aspect is even more fatal to the case of the Respondents. Not only must it be an award passed as a result of the adjudication but it must be passed by 'the Court' allowing compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the collector. The word 'Court' has been defined in the Act as the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction unless the appropriate Government has appointed a Special Judicial Officer to perform judicial functions of the court under this Act. We have noticed the composition of a Lok Adalat in Section 19(2) of the '1987 Act'. The Court is not the same as a Lok Adalat. 46. The Award passed by the Lok Adalat in itself without anything more is to be treate ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... matter of this nature forming the basis for redetermination as a matter of right given Under Section 28A. 49. We would, therefore, approve the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Umadevi Rajkumar Jeure (supra) and the learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in Vasudave (supra) and hold that an Award passed Under Section (20) of the 1987 Act by the Lok Adalat cannot be the basis for invoking Section 28A. 50. As far as the argument of the Respondents that the award dated 12.3.2016 can be treated as the order of the Court within the meaning of Section 18 of the Act read with Section 28A of the Act, we are of the view such an argument cannot be accepted. Unlike in the facts of the case decided by the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in (supra) which has been distinguished by the Bombay High Court in Umadevi (supra) on the score that in the case from Andhra Pradesh, the Reference Court has passed an award based on a compromise arrived at between the parties before the Lok Adalat, in this case, the award dated 12.3.2016 is the award passed by the Lok Adalat. This is clear from the judgment of the High Court, the case of the parties before it and the terms of the award dated ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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