TMI Blog1993 (2) TMI 98X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gh not reviewed by it in exercise of the recognised power. This reason which supports the first ground urged in support of the appeal, to wit, that the learned single judge ought not have entertained a second writ petition in respect of the order of compulsory retirement of the respondent, when a Division Bench of the same court had refused to entertain a writ petition of the same respondent filed respecting the same subject-matter for non-availing of the alternate remedy before the forum of the U. P. Public Services Tribunal, is also a valid reason. Appeal allowed. - C.A. 498 OF 1993 - - - Dated:- 9-2-1993 - Judge(s) : N. VENKATACHALA., L. M. SHARMA JUDGMENT The judgment of the court was delivered by VENKATACHALA J. - Leave granted. The respondent who was in the service of the U. P. Government as an Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation, Banda, served a notice dated 19th December, 1989, on the Secretary, Area Development-2, U. P. Government, Lucknow, seeking from the Government, settlement of his outstanding claims by 31st March, 1990, and grant of permission to him to retire from service voluntarily from that date. It was stated in that notice that the res ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng a second writ petition before the same High Court challenging over again the very order of the U. P. Government by which he had been compulsorily retired and sought reliefs thereto. That second writ petition registered as Writ Petition No. 7498 of 1990, it appears, did not come up for hearing before a Division Bench of the High Court as had happened with the earlier dismissed writ petition. Instead, it has come up for hearing before single judge Bench constituting that single Bench of the High Court. By his order dated 19th February, 1992, the learned single judge Bench allowed the writ petition, quashed the impugned order by which the respondent (the writ petitioner) had been compulsorily retired under F. R. 56 and directed the U. P. Government to treat the respondent as having retired voluntarily from 31st March, 1990, and to pay his salary for the period elapsed between the date of his compulsory retirement and the date from which he wished to voluntarily retire. It is the sustainability of this Order of the learned single judge made in the second writ petition of the respondent which is challenged by the State of U. P. and its Chief Engineer in the present appeal by special ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t the discretion already exercised by the High Court in refusing to entertain the earlier writ petition was either arbitrary, or otherwise unwarranted. (ii) The learned single judge of the High Court, by entertaining a second writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution on the subject matter which was covered by an earlier writ petition dismissed by the Division Bench of the same court had given a go-by to the well-established salutary rule of judicial practice and procedure that an order of a single judge Bench much less of judges of larger Bench of a High Court refusing to entertain the earlier writ petition in limine even on the ground of laches or on the ground of non-availing of alternate remedy ought not to be interfered with by another single judge or judges of larger Benches, except in review or appeal, if permitted. As the first ground urged in support of the appeal is founded on the said two reasons, our endeavour here would be to find whether they are valid enough to sustain the same. Reason (i) : -Entertaining by the High Court of a second writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution, filed by a person whose earlier writ petition on the same subje ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ch grievances, cannot be disputed. What remains, therefore, to be seen is whether the discretion exercised by the Division Bench in refusing to entertain the earlier writ petition for non-availing of alternate remedy and dismissing it, could be said to be an unwarranted exercise of discretion in the light of the said well-settled legal position governing such matters. As the alternate remedy which according to the Division Bench was not availed of by the respondent here before the filing of his earlier writ petition, being that available before the forum of the U. P. Public Services Tribunal, it becomes necessary for us to see whether that forum did provide to the respondent here a remedy which was both adequate and efficacious. We shall now look into the relevant provisions of the U. P. Public Services (Tribunal ) Act, 1976 ( for short " the Act " ), creating the U. P. Public Services Tribunal and the Rules made thereunder as they would throw the much needed light on the exact nature of the Tribunal, and the adequacy and efficaciousness of the remedy available with it. The preamble to the Act declares that it is enacted to provide for the constitution of tribunals to adjudicate ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f natural justice in the matter of consideration of the references, making it clear that it is not bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or the rules of evidence contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 6 of the Act expressly bars the filing of suits respecting matters to be referred for adjudication under section 4 of the Act. Section 7 of the Act empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying out all the purposes of the Act. The U. P. Public Services (Tribunals) Rules, 1975 (to be referred to as " the Rules which are made by the State Government contain elaborate procedural rules, needed for effective adjudication of matters by the Tribunal. As is seen from the said Preamble, the provisions in the Act and the Rules, the U. P. Public Services Tribunal is intended to be an exclusive and exhaustive machinery or forum for adjudication of claims of all public servants including the persons in the service or pay of the State Government, in matters of their employment, inasmuch as suits in such matters are specifically barred by the provisions in section 6 of the Act. Since that Tribunal is composed of a judicial Member who ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rticle 226 of the Constitution on its view that the respondent could not have invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution for the redressal of his grievances, bypassing the special forum created specifically by a statute for redressal of such grievances, efficaciously and adequately, it is not possible for us to think that such exercise of discretion was unwarranted, particularly when we have due regard to the settled legal position governing such matters, to which we have already adverted. When the second writ petition, Writ Petition No. 7498 of 1990 filed by the respondent before the said High Court challenging over again the very order of the State Government by which he was compulsorily retired came up for hearing before a learned single judge, notwithstanding the dismissal by a Division Bench of the same High Court of his similar writ petition filed earlier on the ground of non-exhaustion of alternate statutory remedy, the appellants who were respondents in the second writ petition, as was rightly expected of them, raised a preliminary objection as to its maintain ability relying on the dismissal order of the said earlier writ petition by a D ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t followed the well-established salutary rule of judicial practice and procedure that an order of a single judge Bench or of a larger Bench of the same High Court dismissing the writ petition either on the ground of laches or non-exhaustion of alternate remedy as well, shall not be by-passed by a single judge Bench or judges of a larger Bench except in exercise of review or appellate powers possessed by it. In the case on hand, a Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad dismissed the respondent's writ petition challenging the sustainability of the order of his compulsory retirement from the U. P. Government service, while exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution in that it took the view that the respondent had the alternate remedy in the matter before the forum of the U. P. Public Services Tribunal constituted under the Act. There cannot be any doubt that that order of dismissal of the writ petition could have been reviewed by the same Division Bench, in exercise of the recognised power of review possessed by it. But, as a learned single judge constituting a single judge Bench of the same court has, in the purported exercise of his jurisd ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it petition. This would only lead to introduction of disorder, confusion and chaos relating to exercise of writ jurisdiction by judges of the High Court for there would be no finality for an order of the court refusing to entertain a writ petition. That is why, the rule of judicial practice and procedure that a second writ petition shall not be entertained by the High Court on the subject-matter respecting which the first writ petition of the same person was dismissed by the same court even if the order of such dismissal was in limine, be it on the ground of laches or on the ground of non-exhaustion of alternate remedy, has come to be accepted and followed as a salutary rule in the exercise of writ jurisdiction of courts. Hence, we are of the view that this reason which supports the first ground urged in support of the appeal, to wit, that the learned single judge ought not have entertained a second writ petition in respect of the order of compulsory retirement of the respondent, when a Division Bench of the same court had refused to entertain a writ petition of the same respondent filed respecting the same subject-matter for non-availing of the alternate remedy before the forum ..... 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