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2008 (5) TMI 708 - SC - Indian LawsDecree of eviction - `Change of user' in the suit premises - Clause 9 of the unregistered Tenancy Agreement between the parties - violation of provisions of Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act - whether the expression `change of user' would cover a situation wherein the property is let out for a particular named officer and for none else and despite this condition, the same is given to some one else, or would it cover and be limited to the cases where property is leased out for a residential or non- residential purpose or for a particular business and despite such express conditions, the property is used for the purpose other than the specified - Section 49 of the Registration Act, an unregistered document can also be admitted into evidence for a collateral fact/collateral purpose or not?. HELD THAT:- We have noted that under the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, an unregistered document can also be admitted into evidence for a collateral fact/collateral purpose. In the case of Bajaj Auto Limited vs. Behari Lal Kohli [1989 (8) TMI 344 - SUPREME COURT], this Court observed that if a document is inadmissible for non-registration, all its terms are inadmissible including the one dealing with landlord's permission to his tenant to sub-let. It was also held in that decision that if a decree purporting to create a lease is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none of the terms of the lease can be admitted in evidence and that to use a document for the purpose of proving an important clause in the lease is not using it as a collateral purpose. In our view, the clause 9 in the lease agreement in question cannot be called a collateral purpose. As noted earlier, it is the case of the appellant that the suit premises was let out only for the particular named officer of the respondent and accordingly, after the same was vacated by the said officer, the respondent was not entitled to allot it to any other employee and was therefore, liable to be evicted which, in our view, was an important term forming part of the lease agreement. Therefore, Clause 9 of the Lease Agreement in this case, cannot be looked into even for collateral purposes to come to a conclusion that the respondent was liable to be evicted because of violation of Clause 9 of the Lease Agreement. That being the position, we are unable to hold that Clause 9 of the Lease Agreement, which is admittedly unregistered, can be looked into for the purpose of evicting the respondent from the suit premises only because the respondent was not entitled to induct any other person other than the named officer in the same. Violation of provisions of Section 108(o) - In our view, the High Court was justified in coming to a conclusion that since this was not a case of `Change of User' within the meaning of Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act, it could not be held that the appellant had violated the provisions of Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 108(o) requires the lessee to use the property as a man of ordinary prudence would use his property and not to use it for a purpose different to that for which it was leased. We are of the view that although the premises was leased out exclusively for the named officer of the respondent, the fact that it was subsequently used for the residence of some other officer of the respondent would not constitute `change of user' so as to be hit by Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act. We are unable to agree with this contention of Mr. Mukherjee for the simple reason that for a decree to be passed under the Act, the landlord has to plead and prove one of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the Act. Even if we accept that the appellant had made out a case under Section 13(1b) of the Act to the extent that the respondent was liable to be evicted u/s 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act, in view of our findings made on that aspect, the appellant is not entitled to a decree of eviction under the Act. We are, therefore, of the view that Clause 9 of the Agreement, which requires the respondent to use the suit premises only for its particular named officer, cannot be looked into even for collateral purposes and that the decision of this court in Smt. Juthika Mullick's case[1995 (10) TMI 249 - SUPREME COURT] would not be of any help to the appellant because in that case, the lease deed was registered. Secondly, we are of the view that although the suit premises was leased out exclusively for the named officer of the respondent, the fact that the respondent sought to use it for some other officer would not constitute "Change of User" within the meaning of Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act and, therefore, the respondent cannot be evicted for violation of the provisions of Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act. W do not find any merit in this appeal and the appeal is therefore dismissed - Since the appeals have been dismissed, all the interlocutory applications, if any, now pending before this Court have become infructuous and accordingly, they are disposed of as infructuous.
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